
1 Austro-Hungarian strategic interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina are explained in Kraljačić, Tomislav: Kala jev režim u Bosni i Hercegovini 1882-1903 [Kállay's Regime in Bosnia and Hercegovina 1882-1903], Sarajevo: Veselin Maćeša 1987, pp. 13-38.


5 Kraljačić 1987, pp. 61-87.


With the arrival of Habsburg occupiers in 1878, Bosnia-Herzegovina became Austria-Hungary's first and only colony. It rapidly became the sole outlet for the energies, ideas, and resources of aspiring colonizers in the parent-land. Geographically adjacent to its colonizer on two sides of its distinctive triangular-shaped territory, Bosnia-Herzegovina went from being an Ottoman enclave nearly enveloped by the Dual Monarchy to being the pivotal protrusion of Austria-Hungary's geostrategic ambitions into the Balkans.¹

What kind of colony was this? In this essay, I argue that Bosnia-Herzegovina during its Habsburg era may best be understood as a proximate colony, in which the proximity of colony and colonizer compounded what Georges Balandier called, in his landmark 1951 essay, its «colonial situation».² The two parties in the colonial relationship, Austria-Hungary and Bosnia-Herzegovina, each had socially and ethnically diverse populations that shared language, religious affiliation, nascent national consciousness, or some combination of these three traits, with inhabitants of the other polity. Three decades ago, Michael Hechter provocatively suggested that the concept of internal colonialism, developed principally by students of Latin American core-periphery relations, could be applied to Great Britain.³ In advanced industrial societies, Hechter argued, development heightened social inequities and ethnic divisions rather than attenuated them. Our inquiry shows the same to be true of Bosnia-Herzegovina's forty year colonial experience. Industrialization and urbanization rapidly advanced, but ethno-religious differentiation and inequality increased, as Hechter's argument would have anticipated. Contention and contradictions rose, not only between colonizers and colony, but also among major actors within the colony, contributing to the ultimate demise of the Dual Monarchy itself.

Austro-Hungarian administrators and journalists at the time recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as a colony, and most historians who have since studied that era have also used that characterization. However, the meaning of «colonialism» in the Bosnian context has rarely been systematically explored. In a summary of the various approaches to the scholarly study of colonialism, the American historian of Africa, Frederick Cooper, offers a comprehensive and nuanced description of the colonial phenomenon.⁴ Elaborating and updating Balandier’s analysis, Cooper demonstrates that colonialism, more than just a repressive hegemony of one society over another, often produced consequences unintended by the colonizers, including unforeseen changes in the society of both the colony and the colonizing power. Using the categories of scholarly colonial studies proposed by Cooper in his recent work, I will argue in this essay that Bosnia's colonial experience was more acute, and that antagonism between colonizer and colony intensified, because of the proximity and interconnectedness of the two polities. Bosnia-Herzegovina thus became a quintessential colony, subordinated to and profoundly dependent upon the parent, while imposing far-reaching and often unintended consequences on its colonial masters.

Modernizing Bosnia

Austro-Hungarian administrators frequently voiced the hope that Bosnia-Herzegovina would become a contemporary European society.⁵ Their policies, however, aimed only to append the outward manifestations of modernity to a traditional society. They saw themselves as missionaries of a cultural revival that would end the backwardness and particularism that they believed bedeviled Bosnia’s peoples. Benjamin von Kállay (1839-1903), the kaisertreue Joint Minister of Finance who headed the monarchy’s administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1882 until his death, wrote to the emperor in 1895 that he expected a «new, modern spirit» to develop thanks to the «blessings of culture which the government seeks to spread through the land».⁶ But because he and other policy-makers were loath to unleash forces of social change that might disrupt their colonial mission, the monarch’s administrators went to great lengths to preserve intact the social structure which they had found on their arrival in 1878.

The imperial bureaucrat were, in any case, far from being free agents operating in a vacuum. With potentially volatile areas of the monarchy to the north, south, and west of Bosnia-Herzegovina, officials had to consider the risks of unleashing a social upheaval that might
spread to the parent-land. Furthermore, they encountered stiff resistance from Hungarian agrarians, who opposed the colonial venture from the beginning, and feared, erosion of their social and political prominence. Political considerations within the monarchy reinforced the bureaucrats’ own conservative instincts. In fulfilling their expressed goals «to make the people content» and «retain the ancient traditions of the land vivified and purified by modern ideas», imperial administrators reinforced the traditional dominant elites and froze in place a social structure that proved deeply resistant to economic and political transformation. Imperial administrators stood little chance of converting Bosnians into docile, grateful subjects unless they addressed the largest source of discontent in the province, the quasi-feudal system of peasant obligations to landlords. But the prospect of such reform aroused opposition from Hungarian landowners, and neither the emperor nor his minions could muster the political will to tackle the issue head-on. Instead, they codified and thoroughly regulated agrarian relations, eliminating many landlord abuses but also making the state an accomplice in the gathering of agrarian dues. Only in the latter days of their rule did they offer a «voluntary» solution to peasants, who could purchase the land they worked by committing to future payments. Peasants rebelled against these antiquated and inequitable agrarian relations in several uprisings in the early 20th century, and their plight became the cause célèbre of youthful Serb and Croat nationalists who turned so bitterly against the empire in the decade before the First World War.

On the other hand, imperial civil servants experienced some success in urbanizing their colony. They drew upon a small army of architects educated in Vienna, most of whom were South Slavs or Czechs, to remake Bosnian city centers into European-style downtowns. Architects benefited from metropolitan Vienna’s proximity to the colony, traveling freely from one to the other and fostering a reciprocity of influences and designs. Bosnian urban centers came to look much like other provincial towns in the monarchy. Immigrants flocked to towns from the nearby countryside and from the monarchy proper, particularly from its Croat lands. Much new construction in these towns was lavishly devoted to conservative causes. Large, stately churches were built in even the smallest of towns. Adopting the pattern of city-builders in other regions of the monarchy, architects routinely adopted historicist models in designing new structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Architects deliberately designed monumental religious structures in the capital city of Sarajevo to enhance the stature of government-appointed religious functionaries, furthering the regime’s strategy of deflecting popular interest away from secular nationalist movements and toward personal piety and obedience. Constrained by the hills that lined Sarajevo’s narrow 15th-century, and their plight became the cause célèbre of youthful Serb and Croat nationalists who turned so bitterly against the empire in the decade before the First World War. Of the cultural mission had largely succeeded by the beginning of the 20th century. But it was a Pyrrhic victory. The spread of «modern» culture redounded to the detriment of the monarchy’s colonial hopes and aims. Better communications and accessible transportation eradicated the isolation in which many Bosnians had been trapped prior to the advent of roads, railways, and the telegraph, but the increased mobility and availability of information created possibilities for Bosnians to organize politically. From 1895 until the ruthless crackdown following the 1914 assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Austro-Hungarian administrators faced various forms of Bosnian discontent, which increasingly targeted imperial rule.

Four variants of protest developed during the Dual Monarchy’s rule. First, Serbian Orthodox and Muslim members of conservative social elites mobilized to seek greater autonomy for their respective educational and religious establishments. Catholic clergy, while not launching a protest movement, mobilized to encourage Orthodox and Muslim conversions to Catholicism, an initiative that shared some characteristics with the Serb and Muslim autonomist movements. Second, middle-class and elite Serbs and Croats joined national movements, became increasingly hostile to the regime, and developed progressively closer ties to similar movements in neighboring lands. Third, the regime alternately ignored and repressed a workers’ movement that began in the middle of the first decade of the new century. Finally, and
most dangerously to the monarchy, youthful nationalist activists formed secret societies and plotted the empire's destruction. Some of them proved willing to carry out assassinations and to sacrifice their own lives while wreaking havoc on the monarchy's ruling circles.

Leaders of all four types of movements quickly learned they could find sympathizers and safe haven in proximate territories, both within the monarchy and in neighboring Serbia. Paradoxically, although not unique in colonial situations, dissidents in the colony were able to operate with impunity in the parent land and so avoid the colonizers' strict regulations and close surveillance in the colony itself. Proximity provided Bosnian organizers with convenient access to the monarchy's policy-makers and to instruments of public expression. Movement leaders benefited from allies within the monarchy, including lawyers who drafted their petitions, journalists who publicized their causes, and parliamentary delegates who lodged complaints on their behalf.

While cultivating and empowering traditional elites, the Habsburg authorities also encouraged a small faction of pro-reform Muslim intellectuals and landowners. Through their journal _Bošnjak [The Bosnian]_ that began publication in 1891, these Muslims supported Kállay's project to create a single multireligious identity based on Bosnians' common loyalty to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.Officials were delighted to see the leaders of this group endorse the reform of Islamic education to include scientific and secular subjects. The authorities held high hopes that _Bošnjak_ would overcome the nascent Serbian Orthodox loyalty to the Serb national identity and the loyalty of Catholics to Croat national ideals. But the idea of a single Bosnian national identity never gained support beyond the small circle of youthful pro-regime Muslim intellectuals. To the dismay of imperial administrators, adherents of Serbian Orthodoxy in Bosnia-Herzegovina increasingly came to identify themselves as Serbs by nationality, and Catholics gradually adopted Croatian national identity. »Bosnians«, it turned out, would not settle for cosmetic cultural innovations; many instead adopted identities being promoted from neighboring lands.

**Psychologizing Bosnia**

At the heart of the Habsburg administrators' approach to their colonial subjects was a pervasive paternalism. They stood _in loco parentis_ and believed that inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina could best be understood, motivated, and disciplined as children. Their attitude corresponded well with the spirit of absolutism that dominated in the first twenty years of occupation under Kállay, who devised the monarchy's occupation strategy from 1882 until 1903. But notwithstanding Kállay's profound imprint on the monarchy's policies, paternalism preceded his arrival and continued after his death. Throughout Austro-Hungarian rule, the authorities that believed they bore the burden of imposing an inherently superior civilization on inherently inferior peoples, and neither geographic proximity nor shared ethnicity mitigated their purposeful condescension. As aptly noted by the anthropologist Joel Halpern, »Geographical proximity was accompanied by a sense of remoteness«. While one would expect the victorious commander to be harsh with those who were killing and wounding his troops, Philippovich provided the first instance of an imperial official bestowing the supreme compliment – the authorities' approval – upon Bosnia's Catholics for their exemplary behavior.

16 Kraljačić 1987, pp. 214-278.
The authorities reckoned that the reward of imperial favor would guide others in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the path to loyalty, obedience, and gratitude. In 1880, Kállay’s predecessor Baron von Szlávy wrote that the Habsburg administrators would appoint at the local level ‘personalities who will exercise influence on their co-religionists because of their integrity, education, irreproachable conduct, and social status’. As a statement of colonialists’ intent, this is unremarkable. Similar words have no doubt been penned or spoken by European administrators of other colonies. More remarkable are the glaring omissions from these criteria: no particular skills, educational preparation, or even basic competence were required of appointees to the positions in question. With the exception of leaders of the religious hierarchies, local office-holders needed no administrative ability and did little real work. They were ciphers, elevated to prestigious positions in hopes that the respect they engendered would translate into the loyalty and quiescence of the communities which they led. Their days were filled with ceremonial appearances, courtesy visits to higher authorities, participation in delegations of appreciation, and other symbolic gestures of loyalty. They were compensated with salaries, but the more significant payoff for their public displays of loyalty came in the status associated with the positions to which they were appointed. Every town had its mayor, deputy mayors, town councilmen, and appropriate religious authorities carefully selected to reinforce loyalty and obedience to the regime.

Disloyalty, of course, evoked the opposite effect. Punishments, like rewards, were administered in the spirit of paternalism, undergirded by the assumption that a display of imperial disfavor would deter others from following the example of the miscreant. As a first step, the authorities often issued a public rebuke to an offender, sometimes accompanied by a nominal fine or suspension from duties for a few days. Such gestures did little to deter the offender, but in many instances they aroused resentment of the offender’s co-religionists. The malcontents cited these episodes in their quest to further incite popular resentment and added acts of petty repression to their growing litany of complaints against the regime. Occasionally the regime extended loans and concessions to its favored appointees in order to be able to retract them in the event the recipient misbehaved.

The real work of administering Bosnia-Herzegovina was done by bureaucrats imported from the monarchy. The colony’s proximity, and the overlap of groups between the colony and colonizing power, bestowed on the Dual Monarchy the great benefit of a large pool of educated bureaucrats who shared a common language with the colony’s subjects. The regime was able to maintain two parallel structures, the ceremonial hierarchy consisting of ‘prominent’ local appointees and the functional bureaucracy staffed by imports from the monarchy. Not until after the annexation of 1908 did Habsburg officials begin to move Bosnians into positions of administrative responsibility, and the process was still in its infancy when the First World War began.

Functional officials from the monarchy were stationed in every town in the new colony, charged with heading the local bureaucracy and collecting detailed information about every leading citizen. Almost all of them spoke the local language. They cultivated informants, participated in meetings of voluntary associations, and scoured the area for signs of possible disruptive activities and potential political activism. Their reports were gathered, analyzed by officials in Sarajevo, and forwarded to the Joint Ministry of Finance in Vienna. Kállay excelled at this form of political surveillance: The archives are filled with reports that drew his attention and commentary, and some were even forwarded to the emperor for his review. From the mid-1880s until Kállay’s death in 1903, Bosnians were among the most closely watched peoples on the face of the earth, their proclivities and activities known to officials from local civil servants to the emperor in Vienna. Imported civil servants carefully monitored the behavior of those appointed to ceremonial posts and acted as an internal affairs division to assure that local appointees were faithfully leading their constituents to loyalty and gratitude toward the monarchy.

The paternalistic system of surveillance, petty incentives, and symbolic punishments gradually fell into disuse after Kállay’s death in 1903, but the regime’s paternalism continued to guide its responses to the student movements and secret organizations that arose in the early 20th century. The regime held a familiarly paternal approach: Education was a privilege, bestowed at the discretion of the regime upon promising youth in the expectation that they would return the favor with loyalty and gratitude. But proximity undermined the paternalistic premise that education was a reward for loyalty. Bosnians found higher education available at
Habsburg authorities set out to create a history of Bosnia-Herzegovina that distinguished that land and its people as much as possible from neighboring South Slavs and their lands. Kállay, himself an amateur historian and author of a history of Serbia, personally led this effort. In 1884, he commissioned his colleague and friend, Lajos Thallóczy, to write a two-volume history of Bosnia-Herzegovina from ancient times to 1856. Thallóczy eagerly accepted the challenge and concurred that the "history of Bosnia must be understood as one historical organism which has developed completely independently." He plunged into several Hungarian archives in his quest but soon became overwhelmed with the material and task at hand. In 1894, unable to complete his own proposed two-volume account, he proposed to publish first a five-volume compilation of relevant documents to be entitled Monumenta Bosniae, to be followed by a three-volume study of his own. But Kállay, faced with emerging Serb and Croat studies that included Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of their histories, was more interested in tangible results than in exhaustive documentary discoveries. He cut off funding for the project. Although Thallóczy published several articles reporting the results of his scholarly inquiries, he completed neither his magnum opus, nor a published compilation of documents.

With Thallóczy's failure, Kállay took a publicist's approach to the problem. He supported the publication in German of a richly-illustrated popular account by another friend, János Asbóth, a member of the Hungarian Parliament sympathetic to the monarchy's occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1889 Kállay personally signed an agreement with London's Swan Sonnenschein for publication of this work in English under the title An Official Tour through Bosnia and Herzegovina. Asbóth's book supported Kállay's effort to create a separate, multi-confessional Bosnian identity by providing Bosnians with an empirical history separate from that of the Serbs and Croats.

In developing a distinct history of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kállay and other imperial administrators sought to justify Austria-Hungary’s occupation as well as to isolate the new colony from dangerous trends emanating from its neighbors. Kállay most admired the Roman period in European history, and he saw his own efforts to introduce rational administration into Bosnia-Herzegovina as recreating the principles of Roman rule in the hinterlands of the Dalmatian Coast. Officially-sanctioned historical accounts invariably stressed prehistory, the Roman era, and the Middle Ages, while the four centuries of Ottoman rule were ignored or treated as inconsequential. Many visitors from Western Europe, unable to comprehend that the moribund Ottoman Empire of their time had ever been capable of great architectural achievements, imaginatively assigned Ottoman works to other times and builders. Many travelers insisted that the elegant stone bridge across the Neretva in Mostar, a triumph of 16th century Ottoman architecture and engineering, had been erected in Roman times. Despite overwhelming and readily available historical evidence of the bridge’s Ottoman provenance, many Westerners persistently ascribed the structure to the Romans, thus perpetuating the error of mistaking the bridge’s construction by more than a millennium. Their error was widely disseminated in the written word and visual images. A stunning black-and-white photo of the famous bridge, taken in Austro-Hungarian times, evocatively captured the contemporary spirit of Romanticism in showing humans as miniscule beings overwhelmed by nature's splendor and monumental achievements of an earlier time. Reflecting the bridge’s mythical origins, the photo bore a false label: Römerbrücke ("Roman Bridge").
In his most ambitious undertaking to historicize Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kállay sponsored the founding of the Regional Museum (Landesmuseum; Zemaljski muzej) in Sarajevo in 1884 and oversaw its development for the rest of his life. Although it bore only the name «museum», it combined the functions of archive, library, museum, scientific institute, and sponsor of archaeological expeditions. Consciously modeled on the Court Museum in Vienna and the Hungarian National Museum in Budapest, the Regional Museum expanded to employ many dozens of researchers, curators, librarians, and archivists. 27 It published a journal in two editions, one in the local language in Sarajevo and a second in German in Vienna. In 1894, to showcase the findings of the museum and demonstrate the regime’s commitment to enlightened cultural policies, Kállay sponsored and personally hosted an archaeological congress in Sarajevo attended by leading scholars from many European countries. 28 The museum staff’s undaunted enthusiasm for a distinct Bosnian past resulted in occasional exaggerations, cover-ups, misrepresentations, and downright inventions, 29 but the formation of the Regional Museum must nevertheless be judged as a significant contribution to the long-term development of science and learning in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The monarchy’s proximity made possible a great deal of exchange between museum professions at the Sarajevo institution and the older, larger museums in Vienna and Budapest.

Economizing Bosnia

In becoming the monarchy’s sole colony, Bosnia-Herzegovina became the economic periphery to two rival «cores», one dominated by the agrarian Hungarian elite and the other by the German liberals of Cisleithanian Austria. Those two dominant elites were constantly at odds. They had rival economic interests and national loyalties, and many groups in the monarchy became allies of one only to find themselves adversaries of the other. The rival elites each hoped to burden the emperor and the imperial regime with the task of advancing its preferred foreign policy as well as its domestic agenda. The imperial regime, of course, had an agenda of its own, and most day-to-day administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina fell to loyal bureaucrats who found that the internecine competition crippled their own efforts to govern. In the monarchy’s complex decision-making architecture, the Hungarian agrarians had the advantage of being able to obstruct most decisions. Many of them unsuccessfully opposed the occupation from the outset, but they succeeded in crafting legal constraints on the monarchy’s activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 30

Fatefully, the Hungarian obstructionists secured a guarantee that no funds from the monarchy’s coffers would be employed for projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian historian Dževad Juzbašić has shown that this limitation drove imperial administrators to focus on developing extractive industries to generate revenues in the province. While the authorities may have turned principally to extractive industry in any case, Juzbašić rightly points out that fiscal constraints effectively eliminated the alternatives and led the new rulers to insist on state ownership of most major firms in the tobacco, lumbering, and iron ore industries. 31 The empire’s bureaucrats were hobbled in achieving most of their ambitious projects that might have reduced economic dependency. Economic rivalry between Hungary and Cisleithanian Austria for example profoundly influenced the building of railways in the colony. Administr-
The new administrators’ high hopes to provide universal elementary education, embodied in their proposal to build a network of schools throughout the province, went unrealized. This signal failure of Austria-Hungary’s colonial project meant that literacy rates rose little during the monarchy’s forty year rule. Since few Bosnians could read and write, many skilled laborers were imported from elsewhere in the monarchy to fill the relatively few industrial jobs created by economic development. Making up for the deficiency in government-sponsored schools, Muslim, Catholic, and Serbian Orthodox leaders expanded their respective parochial school systems, often with financing and teachers from neighboring lands. The parochial schools fostered nationalism and produced youthful malcontents, some of whom actively protested Habsburg policies or opposed Habsburg rule.

Bosnia-Herzegovina’s economic dependency deepened in the course of Austria-Hungary’s rule. With the exception of tobacco, most of its products were unfinished raw materials, while its population consumed imported manufactured goods. Most goods were produced in the Austrian half of the monarchy in the late 19th century, but entrepreneurs in the Hungarian lands began to industrialize and produce manufactured goods in the early 20th century. Hungarian competitors included Austrian goods for the limited market in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The prospect of rival Austrian and Hungarian salesmen promoting their wares was realized in 1909 when competing trade museums were established in Sarajevo to display manufactured goods for purchase by those Bosnians who could afford them. The proximity of the colonizing land deepened Bosnia-Herzegovina’s dependency by prolonging and intensifying competition between the two economic elites.

Conclusion

Bosnia-Herzegovina was familiar territory to Habsburg imperial rulers when, in 1878, they commenced rule under their mandate to «occupy and administer» the land. With the benefits of proximity and the overlap of major population groups, Austria-Hungary’s colonial administrators had a better understanding of the colony’s history, traditions, and culture than officials of European lands who governed more distant colonies. But familiarity did not translate into benefits for the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Proximity deepened the rift between colony and colonizers, as those in the colony became pawns in power struggles that engulfed the monarchy in the latter half of the 19th century and early 20th centuries. Every major decision faced by imperial administrators had ramifications for political life in the monarchy. Even administrators with bold vision and considerable autonomy, such as Kállay, exercised greater circumspection in making decisions than might have been the case in an overseas colony. Their regard for the monarchy’s dominant political groups reinforced their own conservative instincts.

Despite promoting many of the outward manifestations of modernization and liberalization, the monarchy increasingly exploited Bosnia-Herzegovina and intensified its colonial situation in the early 20th century. The proximate colony became a hyper-colony, increasingly dependent upon the colonial parent, while many of its inhabitants voiced their resentment by protesting the colonizers’ authority over them.

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