TAMING BALKAN NATIONALISM
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Taming Balkan Nationalism

ROBIN OKEY
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Preface

Few historical episodes are as exclusively linked with a single act as the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The assassination of the heir to the Habsburg throne by the Serb student Gavrilo Princip in 1914 has irrevocably associated Bosnia and the occupation with the theme of nationalism, and given them a small niche in the consciousness of educated people. A generation ago one could say no more than this. Events since the fall of communism have lent a wider interest to themes which were never dull. With the decline of Marxism a shift of academic focus from issues of class to culture and ethnic identity makes multinational Bosnia a potentially rich field for booming nationalism studies. Related preoccupations with a ‘clash of civilizations’ find resonance in Austria-Hungary’s attempt to overhaul a backward Ottoman province, justified as it was by appeals to ‘modern’, western values and the aspiration to influence existing Bosnian mentalities in accordance with them. These themes of cultural politics intersected in Austrian-occupied Bosnia with the power politics of Balkan regional strategy which the occupation was intended to solve. This dual aspect also has a modern connotation. As long as Great Powers feel the need to intervene in troublesome areas of different cultural background to protect their perceived interests, the Bosnian record may merit attention. It is the politics of Austria-Hungary’s self-proclaimed ‘cultural mission’ in Bosnia and the native Bosnian responses evoked by it which are to be the main themes of this book.

Cultural mission, the preferred Austrian term, or the French *mission civilisatrice*, were concepts of the period in which the Bosnian occupation occurred which powerfully expressed the sense of a western superiority towards other cultures after a century or more of unprecedented advance. The progress of industry and communications, the explosion of knowledge and scholarly disciplines, and the revolution in the concept and practice of government and society all understandably conspired to produce in the agents of this age of imperialism a sense of historic power and calling. While during the occupation European rule extended rapidly over almost the whole world, in 1878 it was mainly exercised over Oriental and Islamic-influenced countries, like British India, French Algeria and Russian Turkestan. Thus Bosnia, an Ottoman territory for four centuries, geographically in Europe but universally accounted an ‘Oriental’ province—in the lifestyle also of its Christian subjects—fitted all the more naturally into the contemporary frame as European mission land. ‘Europe’ in a civilizational sense was after all western Europe. Hence many of the attitudes on the part of governors and governed under the Austrian occupation can be best understood in the context of imperialism, and the debate engendered by Edward Said’s thesis on the ‘Orientalist’ stereotypes that he saw westerners imposing on the
eastern, particularly the Islamic world. Ideas of the discords resulting when a Europe governed by abstract, regimented norms came in contact with an ‘Other’ perceived as irrational have been prominent in recent studies of colonialism. To what extent did ‘Orientalism’ operate in Bosnia and how fraught was the encounter between different civilizational modes?

Yet Bosnia was not just another colony of western power. Its physical contiguity with the metropole meant that occupation was always intended to become permanent. Bosnia had to be absorbed into the Monarchy to prevent the emergence of a large south Slav state on its border, which could destabilize the Monarchy’s fraught nationality relations. This rationale for the occupation bore the weighty implication that Austria-Hungary’s rulers had rivals in their claim to bring European progress to Bosnia. Serbs and Croats, as Christian Europeans, also asserted a European mission in Bosnia, which they interpreted, however, in national terms: the mobilizing power for betterment of the national spirit. The story of the occupation became that of a battle for the moral high ground. The vision of a family of peoples united in progress under the august sceptre of a benevolent emperor opposed that of nations awoken from the despond of poverty and alien rule to the fulfilment of their high destinies. The rival Serb and Croat claims to Bosnia, and the tensions between the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Monarchy, added further fields for contestation.

Whether in the Habsburg or Slav nationalist perspective, the task of European uplift was both economic and cultural. The development of modern communications and economy are readily understood themes, whose outlines will be briefly sketched as background to the main story told here. But the work of cultural modernization requires initial explanation. At the root of the progress on which Europeans prided themselves were shifts in mentality. As a result of the Enlightenment the orbit of received authority, particularly previously pervasive religious authority, had contracted relative to notions of a civic society, whose progress was based on the free circulation of ideas and free association of individuals, endowed with equal rights before the law. Such a society necessarily placed great weight on general education, at least as an ideal, so that individuals could play their role as its members. The Habsburg cultural mission in Bosnia meant introducing the modern spirit to a province seen to be in hock to superstition and ignorant priests. Modern-minded religious hierarchies would be organized, and seminaries for an educated clergy, who could become mediators of Austrian reform ideas to the masses, while schools open to members of all Bosnia’s religious confessions could teach a common loyalty to the new state power. A cultural mission so conceived had the advantage for Austro-Hungarian administrators of identifying the legitimizing modernizing principle with the Habsburg state, while associating the people of Bosnia with the traditional, religious sector in the modernist paradigm. In many ways, the Monarchy continued the Ottoman millet system of treating Bosnians as religious rather than national groups, to be governed through reshaped religious hierarchies. This dovetailed conveniently
with the occupation’s political goal of restricting the growth of Serb and Croatian nationalism. Under the masterful Benjamin von Kállay, Bosnia’s longest-serving administrator, the confessionalizing strategy was extended to subsume Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics into a wider Bosnian entity, which was to operate as a further barrier to pan-Serbian or pan-Croat influences.

It was here that the clash with Serb and Croat-minded Bosnians came. Sharing the modernist association of religion with the traditional sphere, they saw Orthodox and Catholics as members of Serb and Croat nations with distinguished pedigrees in medieval statehood, whose national consciousness was now in process of revival. The sense of a historic, secular identity was strong enough for many nationalists to look beyond the actual overlap of Serbdom with Orthodoxy and Croatdom with Catholicism to make hegemonic claims for their own nation, as a home for the three religions—including the Muslims. At stake were themes much debated by modern historians: the respective roles of ethnic and civic factors in the ‘construction’ of modern nations; the degree to which, if at all, such nations can claim roots in a remoter past; and the rival claims of national and supranational units to be able to deliver the inclusive and developed society foreshadowed in Enlightenment ideas. The rise of ethnic contestation in the post-communist world has to an extent coloured views of the national question in the Habsburg monarchy. Whereas from the 1960s it appeared widely accepted that the Monarchy was not capable of meeting the cumulative challenges of social and ethnic change, some recent emphasis has been rather on the negative features of the nationalism which displaced it. What light does the Bosnian occupation throw on the balance of forces in play?3

Cultural politics thus operated at a number of levels. In practical terms, given the usual reluctance of metropoles to fund their colonies, could modern schools and religious organizations be established on a scale and standard to justify the claims of civilizing mission? Would the experiment of multiconfessional schools work and how would its products relate to Austria’s vision? Could Bosnia’s new institutions be effectively isolated from outside influences running contrary to the Monarchy’s goals? At the ideological level, two discourses talked past each other: that of still tiny nationalist intelligentsias, for whom the policies of a Kállay simply defied the nationalizing spirit of the age, and that of the occupiers, who deployed the argument that a minority of ‘radicals’ or ‘malcontents’ were unrepresentative of the great bulk of the (peasant) population at large. A special set of questions concerned the Muslims. Could they play the role of anti-nationalist counterweight, even integrating force, required of them in Kállay’s strategy, when their own allegiances were divided between claims to a primordial Bosnian inheritance, consciousness of themselves as fellow south Slavs, and their Islamic tradition? The emergence of a group of western-orientated Muslim reformers, now seen as intellectual progenitors of the modern Bosniak nation, though they largely called themselves Croats or Serbs, shows the complexity of nationality under the occupation. This period saw the crystallizing of the pattern
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of similarities and differences which have enabled official doctrine over the last 120 years to proclaim one nationality in Bosnia (called Bosnian under Kállay and Yugoslav between the wars), then two (Serbs and Croats, 1945–c.70) and thereafter three, with the recognition of Muslim or (renamed 1993) Bosniak nationhood.

In the event, Kállay’s policies aroused movements for lay-dominated cultural autonomy among Serbs and Muslims. The man who conceded this autonomy, István Burián, has received much less attention than his predecessor, Kállay, and his tenure and reputation deserve fuller assessment. It has conventionally been argued that under Burián cultural politics yielded to the real politics of political movements and ultimately a quasi-parliamentary Diet. This book will argue that motifs of cultural politics—expanding literacy and cohorts of professionally trained native Bosnians, organizing networks of cultural association, debating the relationship between modernity, democracy, nationality and Islam—retained their potency in these years. Concepts of ‘the national’ on the Bosnian side of the battle for the intellectual and moral high ground became more complex as earlier romantic nationalism yielded somewhat in the wider south Slav environment to concepts of social realism, democratization, positivism, social Darwinist struggle, even secularism and socialism, which significantly influenced pre-war secondary school youth in Bosnia. The story of the Sarajevo assassination and its key players has been often told, but not that of the near-shambolic secondary school scene from which it emerged. The tensions in the Bosnian education system—between ambitious goals and desperately limited resources; the liberal-humanist but austere Germanic academic tradition and the background and mentality of Bosnian peasant youths; the Serb–Croat divide and a very late, somewhat inchoate Yugoslavism; not to speak of the conflict between state and Serb confessional schools, and the neglected plight of the Muslim madrassas—all await full exposition, which this book can only claim to broach. To judge the success or failure of westernizing ‘cultural mission’ in Austro-Hungarian Bosnia solely from these difficulties and the action of a schoolboy assassin is, however, another matter. Bosnia’s troubled history since 1918 leads many observers to view the Austrian period in a comparatively positive light. The final chapter seeks an overall assessment of the great changes in mentality which had taken place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, noting how all parties to the occupation, whatever their ideological standpoint, found themselves challenged by the rapidity of change.

The present book has a complicated genesis. Much of the archival work on the period up to 1903 was originally done for an Oxford doctorate awarded in 1972 and recommended for publication. However, I conceived taking the story further, to 1914, and other things supervened, both academic and military. Meantime, several monographs appeared on aspects of the thesis’s ground. Nusret Şehić and Božo Madžar wrote about Muslim and Serb autonomy movements respectively,
Preface

Petar Vrankić on the Orthodox and Catholic churches, and Zoran Grijak on Archbishop Stadler. Tomislav Kraljačić’s study of Kállay’s administration was published in 1987, and Srećko Džaja’s quantitative work on teacher and student cohorts in 1992. However, no book has attempted to survey the themes outlined above as a whole, and on many aspects of the monographs just mentioned my own research yields variations of detail and interpretation. More remains to be said on the two main individuals on the Habsburg side, Kállay and Burián, on which my use of their private papers, including those in Hungarian, can shed light. There is, I hope too, value in the voice of an outsider in what can be vexed issues in the history of a communally torn land. The story is taken only to 1914 because the assassination and the Austro-Hungarian reaction to it ended the narrative of cultural mission. In the aftermath of Sarajevo, it was concluded that the ideal of civic tolerance had foundered on Serb intransigence; the Cyrillic script was banned outside Church use and all Serb confessional schools were closed. The course which had been pursued since 1878 was thus abandoned before Habsburg Bosnia expired at the end of the First World War.

Late development (the University of Sarajevo opened only in 1949), the pressure of nationalist and Marxist orthodoxies, and civil strife, have hampered the efforts of dedicated individuals to build up Bosnia’s historiography. Treatment of ‘cutting-edge’ themes and depth of case-study research seen in larger and wealthier countries are not therefore to be expected. Against this background, the present work does not claim to open up a wholly new way of conceiving Bosnian or Balkan history, but aims to provide an intellectual framework for considering its topic which draws out all its potential interest. The concept of ‘modernization’ is not used in the sense of a theory of historical development privileging a particular set of (western) values, but as shorthand for the context of rapid economic, political and cultural changes against which the occupation was played out, and which most educated contemporaries themselves saw in evolutionary terms, as a movement from backwardness towards a desired society of ‘progress’ and ‘enlightenment’. In the absence of substantial existing work on shifts in peasant mentalities in this period, the book’s coverage, already wide, is orientated mainly to the educated stratum of Bosnian ‘cultural workers’, whose aspirations are recorded in their publications and in Austrian archives.

Finally, my thanks are due to a large number of archivists and librarians, among whom I should like to mention those in the State Archives and National Libraries of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Austria and Croatia, as also the staff of the Istorijeski institut, Gazi Husref-beg Library, Catholic seminary and central municipal library in Sarajevo, of the Serbian, Croatian and Hungarian Academies of Arts and Sciences and the Synodal Archives of the Reformed Church in Budapest. Other institutions where I have been made welcome include the National Museum in Sarajevo, the Franciscan Gymnasium in
Visoko, the State Archives of Serbia, the Library of the Hungarian Parliament, the British Public Record Office and not least the History Departments in the universities of Sarajevo, Zagreb, Budapest, Novi Sad, Banjaluka and Oxford, where I am particularly indebted to Professor Robert Evans and Professor Richard Crampton. To all those concerned I take this opportunity of expressing my warm appreciation.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABiH</td>
<td>Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine (Bosnian State Archives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANUBiH</td>
<td>Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine (Bosnian Academy of Arts and Sciences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Administrative Registratur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH/BH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fl.</td>
<td>Florin. Worth two K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasnik ADA</td>
<td>Glasnik arhiva i Društva arhivista Bosne i Hercegovine (later Glasnik arhiva i arhivskih radnika Bosne i Hercegovine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMP</td>
<td>Gemeinsame Ministerratsprotokolle (minutes of the Austro-Hungarian common ministerial council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godišnjak ID</td>
<td>Godišnjak istoriskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine (later Godišnjak Društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GZM</td>
<td>Glasnik zemaljskog muzeja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAZU</td>
<td>Hrvatska Akademija znanosti i umjetnosti (Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHStA</td>
<td>Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Austrian State Archives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKU</td>
<td>Hrvatska katolička udruga (Croatian Catholic Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNZ</td>
<td>Hrvatska narodna zajednica (Croatian National Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAS</td>
<td>Istorijski arhiv, Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JiČ</td>
<td>Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMF</td>
<td>Joint Finance Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Krone (crown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KB</td>
<td>Kabinettbriefe (confidential correspondence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knj.</td>
<td>knjiga (book)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Miniszterelnökség (Hungarian prime ministerial papers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNO</td>
<td>Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija (Muslim National Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MÖStA</td>
<td>Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.d., n.pl.</td>
<td>no date, no place (of publication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>Nova serija (New Series)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODN</td>
<td>Odjeljenje/Odelenje/Odjel društvenih nauka (Social Science Section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>Országos Levéltár (Hungarian State Archives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ÖOH</td>
<td>Österreichische Osthefte</td>
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Abbreviations

O.S. Old Style (for dates in the Julian calendar)
OSzKK Országos Széchényi Könyvtár, Kézirattár (Hungarian National Library, Manuscripts)
PA Politisches Archiv
PG Provincial Government, Sarajevo
Pos. izd. Posebno izdanje (out of series publication)
Pr Präsidial (Presidial: for more important documents)
Prilozi za IFK BiH Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini
Prilozi IIS Prilozi, Institut za istoriju Sarajevu
Priv. Reg. Privatregistratur (confidential correspondence)
PRO, FO Public Record Office, Foreign Office
RZsL Református Zsinodalni Könyvtár (Archives of the Hungarian Calvinist Church)
Radovi fil. fak. Radovi filozofskog fakulteta
SAN Srpska akademija nauka (Serbian Academy of Sciences)
SANU Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences)
SEER The Slavonic and East European Review
SKA Srpska kraljevska akademija (Serbian Royal Academy)
ZMF Zajedničko ministarstvo finansija (Joint Finance Ministry)

NOTE TO THE TEXT

Wherever possible, italics have been used for foreign words at the first occurrence but not normally thereafter.
Map 1 Bosnia in International Context, c.1900
Map 2  Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1878
1

Background to a Mission: Pre-Austrian Bosnia and the Powers

In a memorandum to the European powers of 21 April 1878, making the case for a Habsburg occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Gyula Andrássy, struck an altruistic note. An autonomous Bosnia-Herzegovina, he argued, lacked the means to overcome internal divisions and maintain its existence against its neighbours. Only a strong state could set in train the internal development of these lands, establish equality before the law, eliminate murder and rapine, and advance trade and agriculture in an environment of stability and progress.¹ In short, Andrássy proposed a cultural mission, to use the snappy phrase variously echoed by a host of authors in connection with his request.²

The reasons for this request were, of course, matters of high policy, in which the cultural state of Bosnia played only an incidental role. In the wake of Turkey’s defeat in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78, Andrássy made no bones of the fact that the Monarchy wished to prevent the formation of a large south Slav state in the Balkans. The impact of developments on these lines could be extremely destabilizing for the still unconsolidated Dualist system, established in 1867 at the expense of the half of the Monarchy’s subjects who were Slavs. It was highly convenient that mere allusion to contemporary notions of civilizing mission could legitimize Austria-Hungary’s takeover of two provinces from a friendly power.

What made for the potency of the slogan? The later nineteenth century saw European confidence and prestige at its zenith. A century of unparalleled economic, scientific and educational progress was associated with the espousal of rationalist, increasingly secular norms and notions of constitutional government rooted in respect for civic society. In the dawning age of imperialism the sense of European superiority was fostered by the decline of the Ottoman empire, long a feared rival. Whereas European commentaries on the Ottomans in earlier times had mixed positive and negative features, from the mid-eighteenth century the latter perceptions hardened into stereotype.³ The energy, drive, curiosity and goal-directed desire for improvement rooted in the Enlightenment were opposed to the lethargy, conservatism and disorder, however picturesque, of the non-European Other, rooted in religious fatalism. These western attitudes were
no less prevalent in the German cultural sphere of which the Monarchy was still deemed part. The greatest European authority on the Ottoman empire, Joseph von Hammer (1774–1856), a graduate of Vienna’s famous Oriental Academy, concluded his history with reference to its ‘incurable malady’, at least in its European half. If Goethe showed interest in eastern culture it was as of a patriarchal world of ‘primal simplicity’, reflecting the West’s arrogation to itself of the status of the modern and objectively real, as by Edward Said’s famous thesis, though arguably Goethe was aware of the element of western fantasy involved. Eastern society, when understood by German science, and in fusion with western culture, could help prepare the way for a brighter future, claimed the president of the German Oriental Society in 1856; but ‘everything in the East of the present day is in a state of deep-seated lethargy and decay in state, church, school, family, learning and art’.

That Bosnia, Ottoman for four centuries, like the Balkans as a whole was part of this Oriental picture was quite patent to contemporary observers. Even those sympathetic to the Balkan Christians set them firmly in the context of Oriental backwardness. The English traveller Adeline Irby wrote of Bosnia’s ‘savage and Oriental aspect’; the highest compliment Andrew Paton could pay ‘primitive’ Serbs, children in civilization, was that they were healthy children. But the small educated minority among Balkan Christians staked their aspirations for national regeneration precisely on the claim to be Europeans, seeking admittance to the circle of European civilization whose dress some of them increasingly affected and through whose leading languages they gained access to European ideas. Not denying the backwardness of the great bulk of their compatriots, they sought to be active instruments of their ‘enlightenment’, rather than objects of a process designed to legitimize Great Power occupation. In this clash between Habsburg and native Balkan claims to embody the spirit of European progress lay a fateful source of future confrontation.

Yet the potential for improvement some glimpsed in lowly Balkan Christians was not credited to the ‘fatalistic Mohammedan Osmanli, resigned to his unchangeable lot’, in the phrase of Felix Kanitz, most Serbophile of nineteenth-century German-language writers. In Bosnia, in the scenario created by 1878, occupiers and native Christians alike contested the inheritance of the Muslims, whom each saw only as material to be shaped to their own vision, whether as bulwarks against Slav nationalism in the Habsburg case, or as Serbs or Croats restored to the national fold. What is striking in hindsight is the power of Eurocentric assumptions to play down the tenacity of a Muslim civilization which for long periods had outmatched Europe and which still provided a cultural matrix for a vast area from west Africa to China. These three protagonists, the occupiers, the native Christians and the Bosnian face of Islam, were to be the main actors in the drama which followed. The society which the new rulers encountered was a dauntingly complex one. There were 1,412 Orthodox villages, 793 Muslim and 437 Catholic, together with a slightly higher number of mixed
settlements, forming a collective conundrum, the gist of which had been well put by an Austrian official in 1864:

Whereas the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina linguistically and historically is for the greater part nationally uniform, the situation as regards its actual political nationality appears quite different. Just as in the Orient in general the concepts of nation and religious community have been confused, so in particular the Southern Slav nation in Turkey is divided according to confession into three sharply differentiated ‘nationalities’ which have no desire for mutual contact, viz. the Serbs, that is the Greek Orthodox Christians, the Latins or Roman Catholic Christians and the Turks, that is, the Muslims.

Sax accurately pinpointed the essence of the nationality problem in Bosnia which continues to frustrate its rulers: the conjunction of common cultural traits and divergent aspirations. To set out how this curious situation had evolved and why Austria-Hungary felt it necessary to stir a potential hornets’ nest is the task of this opening chapter.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE BOSNIAN MUSLIM EXPERIENCE

A striking feature of the Bosnian experience, which opened the field for contestation in the age of nationalism, is how little certain is known about it. Bosnia first appears to history in the tenth century as a small territory centred on the valley of the River Bosna. Except in some Bosniak views, the word is not taken, unlike Croatia and Serbia, to refer to a particular branch of the south Slavs who settled in the Balkans in the seventh century, but like the names of most major rivers in the region is assumed to be of pre-Roman origin. Their valleys, cutting roughly northwards to the river Sava or bending south-west to the Adriatic, help to define a wedge of territory in the west Balkan mountain massif which has a certain geographic unity. By the fourteenth century the Bosnian state had expanded to include almost all of modern Bosnia-Herzegovina and, more briefly, land beyond, becoming a kingdom when Ban Tvrtko I took the royal title in 1377. Yet sparse evidence means it is not even known exactly when or how the first significant autonomous ruler, Ban Kulin (1180–1204), died. While he enjoyed de facto independence Tvrtko acknowledged the Hungarian suzerain, which had replaced Byzantium as the dominant power in the region, as an autonomous kingdom within the wider Hungarian realm; Croatia’s historical claim to Bosnia was linked to that of Hungary. The symbolism of Tvrtko’s own crown kept the powerful nobility, effective rulers in their own right, from open secession. Herzegovina’s emergence under the strongest of these dates from the mid-fifteenth century.

Uncertainty over medieval Bosnian history has been most fateful in controversy over its religion. From the late twelfth century, the medieval state and nobility
were closely aligned with the so-called ‘Bosnian Church’, which, given contradictory evidence, has been claimed variously as a dualist heresy on ‘Bogomil’ lines, essentially Orthodox, or a separate but not heretical regional development in schism with both Orthodoxy and Catholicism. At first a source of cohesion in the Bosnian state, the ‘Bosnian Church’ became a weakness as the Turkish threat mounted. It expanded little into Orthodox areas acquired from Serbian rule in eastern Herzegovina and north-east Bosnia, while hopes of organizing a crusade against the Turks led the Bosnian elite to abandon it for Catholicism by the 1450s, launching a persecution which may have weakened popular resistance to the Turkish conquest of 1463–65. It is not clear how far it was already losing popular support.

These obscurities were to be important for the evolution of identity in Bosnia under Ottoman rule. Traditionally, Muslims have found the ‘Bogomil theory’ congenial, assuming their descent from heretics who preferred Islam to the persecution of the mainstream churches. It situates them as the autochthonous population of Bosnia, as against fringe populations of medieval Catholic and Orthodox. Turkish records, however, do not confirm traditions of an initial mass conversion. Continuity of the new Bosnian Muslim elite with the medieval one has been described as ‘only moderate’, particularly as far as the higher aristocracy is concerned. The issue of continuity touches on the longevity of a specifically Bosnian patriotic tradition. But it is clear that whatever its origins the new elite quickly acquired a Bosnian identity, and Islamicization proceeded so steadily that a document of 1604 made Bosnia at least three-quarters Sunni Muslim. Recent scholarship has seen a rediscovery of Ottoman Bosnian culture, long shadowed by non-Muslim perceptions of centuries of Turkish misrule. The sixteenth century was its golden age, in which Sarajevo, Mostar, Banjaluka and many other towns were founded and equipped with the commercial and cultural institutions of a quintessentially urban civilization: mosques, hans, caravanserai, madrassas, mektebs, tekkes, libraries, baths and fountains, including the jewels of the Begova and Careva mosques in Sarajevo and the bridge in Mostar. From 1513 only Bosnians could hold timars (Ottoman fiefs) on Bosnian soil, which from 1593 could be inherited, a provision unique in the empire. Bosnians quickly became proficient in the three classical Islamic languages of Arabic, Persian and Turkish, producing some 700 known titles by some 375 authors in the Turkish period, while also writing their own language in Arabic script, the so-called alhamijado literature. The Ottoman empire, as universalistic at its height as that of the Romans, induced a reorientation of Bosnian elites towards Constantinople and imperial service which lasted well into the Austrian period. The flourishing of culture went with an undoubted improvement of the condition of the common people, accompanied by their acculturation to Oriental lifestyle. In these circumstances Islamicization was a peaceful process, though monopolization of public office by Muslims, and legal discrimination, made Ottoman tolerance as different from modern ideas
of civic equality as it was from the intolerance of contemporary Christian states.

By 1878 the glory days of this culture were long gone. Lacking a stream of revenue from fresh conquests, the cultural infrastructure was only shakily maintained through increased taxation of the Christian peasantry. Yet it seems likely that it was in the years of decline that a Bosnian Muslim or Bosniak identity defined itself most strongly vis-à-vis the empire. The loss of Hungary and Slavonia to Austria by the Treaty of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) in 1699 made Bosnia a border outpost in which many displaced Muslims settled, reinforcing an embattled warrior mentality in its ruling class. The victory of local forces over Austria in the battle of Banjaluka in 1737 is increasingly seen as ensuring the survival of Bosnian Muslims as a unique people. The songs which developed around the battle, as over the escapades of the Mori´ći brothers, popular leaders in social strife in mid-eighteenth-century Sarajevo, testify to a community with its own structures and traditions, whose hegemony non-Muslim Bosnians acknowledged—the Orthodox metropolitan of Sarajevo was at hand in support at Banjaluka, and Franciscans also contributed to the defence. Modelled in part on the Austrian Military Frontier institution, the heritable kapetani
je lordships led to distinctive elements of autonomy under native landowners, amid a rising insecurity, however, which brought the first Bosnian criticisms of the power of Istanbul to protect them. A mass base for Bosniak identity was strengthened due to the fact that by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the great bulk of Muslim peasants held free as opposed to dependent (raya) status). However, the opening up of this gap with a much more dependent Christian population made Christian disaffection part of a threefold threat to Muslim Bosnia by the nineteenth century, together with Austria on the frontier and an Ottoman central power determined to reassert its control. By this time the Muslim population had possibly lost its absolute majority, affected by losses in constant wars in the Ottoman cause and by epidemics strongest in the Muslim-dominated towns.

Istanbul struck first. Bosnian resistance to centralizing measures, as in the 1831 revolt under Husein Gradaščević, in Muslim recollection the ‘Dragon of Bosnia’, was long depicted as a feudal elite’s obscurantist resistance to reform. It is now presented by Bosniak historians as a crystallization point of a Bosnian national consciousness and programme, concerned not so much with the cry of ‘Islam in peril’ as to affirm Bosnian autonomy within the empire. Insistence here on a continuity of Bosnian state tradition (the term used connotes German notions of Staatsrecht) fits east European nationalist ideology too closely to carry full conviction. Claims, for example, that Gradaščević’s movement aimed at a bourgeois civil society for a multiconfessional Bosnian nation are the exaggerations of a young historiography. The Ottoman government succeeded in dividing the rebel forces, particularly in Herzegovina, demonstrating an importance of locality which remained true of the Austrian period too. Nonetheless, the existence of a strong Bosnian Muslim identity with its own historical perspective remains an
important conclusion to draw from the Gradaščević movement, with relevance for what was to come.

The final eclipse of the Bosnian aristocracy’s resistance to the centre by Omer Pasha in 1850–51 marked, for the father of modern Bosniak historiography, Safvet-beg Bašagić (1870–1934), the end of Bosnian freedom and of the energetic, progressive role of ‘the old Bosnian-Herzegovinian elite’ for the common good. His picture of psychological disorientation in the wake of these blows appears persuasive. The predominant response to defeat was recourse to a religious conservatism which had lost its creative spark, though in institutional terms it remained outwardly impressive. In the 1870s the occupied provinces had about 1,000 mosques, 900 mektebs, or Koranic primary schools, and perhaps 50 madrassas, or religious secondary schools. Kadis in the forty-odd district towns administered the sharia or Muslim law, while muftis in the half dozen sandžak towns offered judgements (fatwas) on points of Islamic principle. According to a record of 1870, over 41,000 Muslim children attended a mekteb, as against less than 4,000 Christian schoolchildren. The problem was that these institutions no longer functioned adequately, as Vali ordinances of 1822, 1833 and 1856 reiterated. Political instability and often irresponsible administrators lessened the value of the inalienable endowments (Arabic waqf; in Turkish and Bosnian, vakuf), which maintained pious projects and public utilities like schools and hospitals, as well as fountains in the Islamic world. Mektebs taught children to read the Koran in Arabic by rote; madrassas, where students commonly spent twelve to fifteen years, had over the centuries dropped from their syllabuses all but Arabic grammar and religious subjects. Bosnia had become economically one of the most backward areas of the Ottoman empire. Most remarkable was that conservatism kept literary production at a manuscript level. Not till 1866 did Bosnia acquire a printing press, through the initiative of the energetic Turkish governor, Osman Pasha.

Osman Pasha (1861–69) was earnest that the Tanzimat, or Turkish reform period, had finally arrived in Bosnia. Though imperial Ottoman edicts of 1839 and 1856 had formally introduced the principle of civic equality of Muslim and non-Muslim, the conqueror of the Bosnian nobility, Omer Pasha, laughed when the Austrian consul taxed him with the discrepancy between the regime’s theory and practice, and said he should not believe everything he read in the newspapers. By contrast, Osman Pasha built Bosnia’s roads fit for wheeled traffic, constructed many European-style public buildings, notably in Sarajevo, and launched Bosnian journalism through his press’s official journals, though he was too masterful to relish the advisory provincial council which Istanbul required him to appoint. Moreover, he opened several of the Tanzimat’s trademark (ružijas), state interconfessional schools teaching secular subjects, and he subsidized Christian schools, even sending his daughter to one. What light does his work cast on Austria-Hungary’s claim to be inaugurating a process of
modernization in Bosnia, and on the Serbs’ charge against Austrian rule that it showed them less tolerance than the Turks?

Osman Pasha’s administration certainly anticipated Austria’s in its main lines, but the incompetence of the seven governors who followed him between 1869 and 1874 showed how far his were personal achievements. The British consul, a consistent Turkophile in the 1860s, could hardly find words in the 1870s to condemn the ‘infamously corrupt, fanatical and ignorant’ Turkish courts, the ‘bribery, corruption and religious fanaticism’ which were the ‘motive power of the whole system of government’, and the ‘thousand petty vexations by which the Turk endeavours to assert his superiority’ at the Christian’s expense.\(^{30}\) Besides the failure of land reform was the fact that, as the Ottoman empire modernized, it abandoned the laissez-faire attitude which constituted its traditional tolerance of non-Muslim affairs and sought to regulate these on the pattern of western states. The Ottoman School Law of 1869 ordered that confessional schoolteachers should be Turkish citizens using approved textbooks and teaching Turkish. In 1874 an imperial rescript endeavoured to enforce this in Bosnia by demanding the transfer of schools from the care of disloyal ‘committees called opschtines’ (the Serb communal organizations) to that of intercommunal local political authorities.\(^{31}\) The 1860s and 1870s were a time of mounting government pressure on Serb national feeling. Educational and religious leaders were expelled or imprisoned, textbooks confiscated, foreign south Slav newspapers banned and the expressions ‘Bosnian language’ and ‘Bosnian nation’ enforced at the expense of the suspect term ‘Serb’.\(^{32}\) Osman Pasha was a bitter opponent of ‘Panslavism’.\(^{33}\) Any idea that late Ottoman Bosnia was on top of mounting ethno-confessional tensions would be wishful thinking. It is interesting that when the Christian revolt broke out in 1875, the native Muslims blamed it on the Tanzimat.\(^{34}\)

Yet it would be wrong to see the Ottoman legacy solely in terms of Bosnian Muslims sunk in resentful conservatism, and a failed project of alien centralization. It is not just that the Muslim population inherited centuries of proud tradition as a bulwark of Islam, embattled defenders of a culture both universalistic and richly diverse. There were also the ties to the Slavic environment, embodied in memories alive in various lineages of a medieval ancestry, in traditions of heroic poetry and the *sevdalinke* love songs of Muslim women, in *alhamijado* literature and in the knowledge individual families retained of Christian scripts, particularly Cyrillic or its Bosnian variant, *bosanˇcica*.\(^{35}\) Thus Muslims were available to edit the pathbreaking journals *Sarajevki cvjetnik* in Sarajevo (1868: Mohamed Šakir Kurtčehajić) and *Neretva* in Mostar (1876: Mehmed Hulusi Džumrukčić), and to operate publicistically in early Austrian Bosnia, like Mehmed-beg Kapetanović, a former Ottoman ruždija pupil. A man like Kurtčehajić (1844–72) breathed the same yearning for an education as a ‘European young man’ as his Christian contemporaries: ‘Sad and sorrowful are my sighs when I survey the world where
other nations from day to day advance with giant strides.'36 The complex Bosnian Muslim experience promised the bearers of ‘cultural mission’ in post-1878 Bosnia an intriguing task. How complex that experience could be may be gauged from the multiple allegiances of Mehmed Ali-paša Rizvanbegović (1849–1901), member of a great Herzegovinian family which emigrated to Turkey after Omer Pasha’s conquest, where he grew up loyal to Bosnia, a Turkish patriot and also, as witness his use of Cyrillic (but as bosančica, acquired from a Franciscan), a convinced Serb.37

ORTHODOX BOSNIANS AND THE SERB NATIONAL MOVEMENT

As the vitality of Islamic civilization declined, the Christian population began to raise itself from centuries of ignorance and lethargy. This advance was also a demographic one, perhaps nearly threefold in eighteenth-century Bosnia-Herzegovina.38 It also entailed a fateful shift in the balance between Catholic and Orthodox, as migration of Catholics in the wake of Austro-Turkish wars reduced this community relatively, while the people with whom Bosnian landowners resettled abandoned areas were mainly Orthodox. Known as Vlachs, the name still in use today for the Balkans’ remaining Romance speakers, these incomers have often been depicted as not Slavs at all, but merely assimilées to Serbdom by virtue of their shared Orthodoxy. Since ‘Vlach’ had acquired the secondary meaning of ‘herder’ as opposed to ‘agriculturalist’ already in the Middle Ages, however, it did not necessarily indicate non-Slav origin. To be sure, Serbs had inhabited only parts of medieval Bosnia acquired from Serbian rule, notably in the north-east and Herzegovina, while all three Orthodox sees as of 1878 had moved between various monastic localities before settling in their current seats: Sarajevo, Donja Tuzla and Mostar. The Austrian census of 1879 revealed the Orthodox as the largest Bosnian community, at 43 per cent as opposed to the Muslims’ 38 per cent and the Catholics at 18 per cent. Locally significant Sephardic Jewish communities existed in a couple of the largest towns, above all Sarajevo.

Overall numbers are not everything, however. While Muslims dominated the towns, Christians were, overwhelmingly, illiterate peasants who impressed observers by their ‘extreme abjectness of mind as the result of long and harsh serfdom’, their ignorance, poverty and fanaticism, their ‘total engrossment in the problem of daily subsistence’.39 The land question was the peasants’ overriding focus of interest. The core of the matter lay in the Ottoman state’s inability to remedy the dangerous imbalance which had developed between Muslims, comprising (in 1879) almost all landowners and 95 per cent of the 77,000 free peasants, and the 85,000 families of dependent kmets who were almost
wholly Christian. The Tanzimat had attempted to standardize the kmets’ rights and obligations, namely to retain and pass on their plots, provided they kept them in cultivation and supplied a third of their crop (the trećina) to the landlord and a tithe (the desetina) to the state. But the Ottoman state lacked the resources to carry out such a complex reform; the Bosnian landlord class (at some 5–6000 strong) sought to utilize any change to strengthen their position as landowners at the kmets’ expense—by legal tradition, most land belonged to the Sultan—and the upshot was that the position of the peasants if anything declined. The Catholic Bishop of Bosnia, Marijan Šunjić, reported that kmets now retained only 35 per cent of their crops. Upheavals where landlord pressure was particularly strong helped bring about a general land law for the empire (1858), ambiguous and plentifully revised, and a specific regulation for Bosnia, the law of Shefer (1859), which reaffirmed the terms outlined above. It is easy to see how Austria could exploit the land problem as evidence of Turkey’s terminal incompetence. In practice, the difficulties of land reform are notorious, and more so where ethno-confessional issues are involved. Like the Irish land question in the nineteenth century, the Bosnian case became an immense imbroglio, in which complaint, commission, legislation and tumult chased tail down the decades. In the event, the law of Shefer was to remain the basis of Bosnian agrarian relations until 1918.

Serb national aspirations among the Orthodox population were therefore a matter of a small, cautious and moreover divided elite. For by the Ottoman millet system, which made religion the basis of ethnicity and allowed non-Muslim religious hierarchies to manage their own affairs, Serbs since the abolition of their own Patriarchate of Peć in the eighteenth century had been assigned to the Greek millet under the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople. Their bishops in Bosnia were regularly Greeks or at best Hellenized Slavs, known as Phanariots from the Greek quarter of Constantinople, the Phanar. Usually ignorant of the language, these ‘baptized Turks’ and ‘clerical hyenas’ in a hostile view, acquired a bad reputation for recouping the cost of their appointment at the expense of their Slav flock. Below them, the handful of monasteries, ten in 1878, were poor and sparsely inhabited, an exception perhaps being Žitomislić near Mostar. An Austrian estimate of 1882 was that two-thirds of the 350 or so parochial clergy had had no more education than a training to read sections of the Scriptures from their fathers—for the priesthood was commonly hereditary. Should they attend primary school and go beyond, it was to seminaries in Belgrade, Karlowitz in Hungary, Prizren in Kosovo or exceptionally Russia, though the briefly successful seminary of Vaso Pelagić in Banjaluka (1868–75) did provide many of the Bosnian clergy under Austria. For all the ignorance that shocked foreign observers, the Orthodox clergy, often themselves kmets, were traditionally close to the people, on whose offerings they relied. ‘He [the Orthodox peasant] holds the priest for God and believes everything from him’,
the mid-century prophet of Bosnian enlightenment, fra Ivan Franjo Jukić, had written.47

Yet the nineteenth century had seen the rise of a significant Serb urban class in Bosnia which now claimed from the traditional religious leaders the dominant role in the Orthodox community. In Banjaluka, for example, 60 Serb householders in 1850 had become a Serb population of 1,893 in 1879.48 There, and elsewhere, Orthodox merchants entered into their own as trade came to be orientated north and west towards Austria, and Bosnian Serb merchant colonies sprang up in Trieste, Dubrovnik, along the Sava, and in Vienna itself. ‘The control of trade and the greater part of its profits are exclusively in the hands of the Greek Oriental commercial class which in general possesses the fluid capital of the province’, wrote the Austrian official Thoemmel in 1867.49 Moreover, Serbs monopolized the farming of the state tithe, and a number even profited from the freedom granted Christians under the Tanzimat to become kmet owners themselves.50

This wealthy merchant body dominated the Orthodox church communes, the likes of which existed all over the Orthodox world, to attend to administrative aspects of the church and, where there was one, the school. According to the most prestigious contemporary Serb theologian, this sphere of action represented a Byzantine erosion of the original lay role, when the laity had also had a role in the appointment of bishops and priests.51 While ecclesiastical dominance of Church affairs prevailed in modern Orthodox states like Russia and Serbia, in Turkey and particularly Bosnia, with its alien hierarchy, circumstances lent much greater influence to the lay-dominated communes. Thus the commune in Sarajevo gained the metropolitan’s written approval of its right to participate in the appointment of priests as early as 1734.52 An Austrian document of 1879 says quite simply that priests were elected by the local commune.53 But communal organizations existed only in a few dozen urban centres—there were twenty-six in Sarajevo diocese in 1873.54 The right of these to hold annual assemblies, to elect a management committee, usually for three years, to build schools, appoint teachers and priests and control funds constituted for the Serb communes their much-vaunted autonomy. The merchants’ leading role appeared in Sarajevo commune, where the six representatives of their guild on the committee outnumbered all artisan members put together.55 In the contrast between the organized communes and the rural hinterland, and between the Phanariots and the native clergy, Bosnian Orthodoxy thus markedly displayed the gulf between town and country and upper and lower clergy which has been seen as characteristic of Orthodoxy in general.56 Both features were to be crucial in disputes over Serb Orthodox cultural autonomy under the Austrian occupation.

The national programme under which the communes came to fight Austria was foreshadowed in the final stages of Turkish rule. Despite the restrictions on higher clergy’s due-levying power, decided by a representative body of Orthodox
in Constantinople in 1857–60, and their eventual adoption in Bosnia, the metropolitans continued their old ways.\textsuperscript{57} In 1873 matters came to a head in Sarajevo diocese. An eparchial (diocesan) assembly, convoked despite the metropolitan’s reluctance, drafted a statute creating a largely lay consistorial court, which would be effectively an executive committee for regular future assemblies, with central supervision over Serb schools. While the metropolitan hesitated, the Turkish governor appeared before the assembly and declared that only the government could exercise such a supervisory role.\textsuperscript{58} The assembly’s vice-president was the wealthy merchant Dimitrije Jeftanović, while the kmet owner Petro Petrović also stood up against the metropolitan for the assembly’s right to be heard. Traditionally, the richest merchants had been seen as self-interested supporters of the system by such diverse observers as the radical paper \textit{Zastava}, the Serbian statesman Ilija Garašanin, and the Slavophile Russian consul in Sarajevo, Hilferding.\textsuperscript{59} By the 1870s the Serb urban class had acquired greater psychological self-assurance. Even the anti-merchant \textit{Zastava} bore witness, as to a new departure, to the participation of young Gradiška merchants in the 1875 rising, stirred by ‘reading and study of radical writings’ and zest for battle ‘in the name of humanity and freedom’.\textsuperscript{60}

The phraseology indicates the origin of the ideas the young merchants were imbibing. It was ‘Europe’, identification with which became the touchstone of Serb nationalists’ growing sense of power vis-à-vis the declining ‘Asiatic’ Turks. From the litany of European liberal nationalism Serbs acquired, or at least reshaped, the national idea itself. Returning from their studies in France and Germany, the nascent intelligentsia of autonomous Serbia found it galling to accept that millions of their countrymen, in the language of the time, groaned under Oriental despotism. The dream of restoring the medieval empire of Dušan the Mighty (though it did not include Bosnia) could access historical traditions celebrated in Serb folk poetry by people not much troubled by European ideas. Through the more mobile elements in the population, like merchants and teachers, this composite of heroic past and European destiny could spread from the most active centres of Serbdom via the trading towns of northern Bosnia, to Sarajevo, Mostar and by degrees beyond. The term ‘Serb’ had currency in Bosnia—though Jukić claimed not to have heard it on his Bosnian travels\textsuperscript{61}—but in line with the Balkan coupling of ethnicity with religion it arguably had Orthodox as much as national connotations.\textsuperscript{62} Now it was to be the instrument of a new consciousness, symbolized by the setting up of a society in Sarajevo some time after 1863 to eliminate use of the disparaging term ‘Vlach’ and, in the historian Skarić’s words, ‘bring in the name “Serb”’.\textsuperscript{63} This was nation-building in action.

In the larger centres, a number of energetic immigrants had introduced elements of modern Serb school organization into Bosnia from the mid-nineteenth century onwards: a four-year course with graded, textbook based material, secular subjects, phonetic reading and where possible a school fund to guarantee teachers’
regular salaries. A start was made also with commercial education, which led, in Sarajevo in 1864, to the foundation of a four-year realka, modelled on the German Realschule, and with the education of girls, through the Sarajevo schools of the charismatic Staka Skenderova and the philanthropic Englishwoman Adeline Irby. More than half the 113 Serb schools whose foundation before 1878 can be ascertained, however, were village schools reflecting few, if any, of these innovations. Their flickering fortunes, dependent on the relations of individual teachers with the communities to which they offered their services, meant that in 1879 Austrian officials recorded only 56 Serb schools in existence, attended by some 3,500 in a Serb population of 600,000. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the educational movement, which in larger towns was already bound up with national politics, as it was to remain under Austria.

Symptomatic of Serbs’ late development is that their lay leaders continued to be mainly immigrants to Bosnia, while the native leaders were clerics. Among the former were the Dalmatians Stevo and Bogoljub Petranović, the first the leader of lay opposition to the metropolitan in the eparchial assembly of 1873, the second a Serb government agent, member of the Omladina, pioneering publisher of Bosnian folk poetry and director of Sarajevo commune’s schools from 1865 to 1869, when he was expelled by the Turks. But more remarkable was the native Bosnian archimandrite Vaso Pelagić (1838–99), founder of the nationally minded seminary in Banjaluka in 1866, which three years later brought him before a Turkish court. ‘Right, freedom and national dignity’, he told it, ‘cannot be won by yielding and requests, only by struggle and work.’ Later, in his autobiography, he explained his stand:

I wanted through my sufferings and the questions I raised to spur the people to protest and intellectual endeavour, for it is only in this way that wits will be sharpened … against force and injustice … and the consciousness awakened without which we will not be able to realize our aspirations.

After escaping from Turkish exile, Pelagić wandered the south Slav world, extending his denunciation of arbitrary rule from Turkey to Serbia and Montenegro and eventually becoming a socialist and atheist, who never returned to Bosnia. A less unorthodox figure was another archimandrite, Sava Kosanović (1839–1903), like Pelagić of poor peasant stock. Driven by his ‘thirst for knowledge’ in the nineteenth-century phrase, to walk from Žitomilšić monastery to study in Belgrade seminary, he served as priest and teacher in Mostar and then in the Sarajevo realka, contributing articles on Bosnian folklore and history and touring Russia for funds for Sarajevo’s new Orthodox church. An energetic and ambitious man, the best qualified of native clergy, the visit contributed to his reputation for Panslavism. Other notable clerics were the abbot of Žitomilšić, Serafim Perović, and Nićifor Dučić, co-founders of a short-lived seminary in Herzegovina (1858–60). Dučić became head of a Serbian Foreign Ministry department
dealing with Serb schools in Turkey. Perović, like Kosanović a future bishop under Austria, spent the years 1870 to 1876 in prison for his work as a Serbian agent.

A thin layer of educated Bosnian Serbs was thus emerging, which had quite a clear view of its allegiances. Its world was being shaped within a pan-Serb Orthodox framework, with the help of reform-minded individuals with their own kind of cultural mission, from Vojvodina and Dalmatia, and with an overarching reference point in autonomous Belgrade. Insurrectionary traditions were territorially limited, to the semi-tribesmen of the Herzegovinian-Montenegrin border, where Luka Vukalović led a series of revolts (1852–62); the overwhelming majority of hard-pressed peasants shared nothing of the wider political perspective. But the British consul’s assessment, in 1875, that the position of Christian townspeople had ‘immeasurably improved during the last quarter of a century, but I do not think that the agrarian population is much better off than it was thirty years ago’, boded ill for authority.70 It meant a boosting of confidence of the educated and a reservoir of discontent in the masses, which the former could seek to turn to national ends. This combination would face Austria too.

THE BOSNIAN CATHOLICS

Of the three main confessions Catholics were the least widely spread, being most strongly represented in western Herzegovina and central and south-west Bosnia. They were also the poorest, for though quite numerous in Travnik, Mostar and Livno, they lacked the urban elite of the Serbs. This position actually represented a recovery from the low point of the early eighteenth century, due in part to immigration from Dalmatia. It was a recovery accompanied by a weakening of certain customs Catholics had shared with many other Bosnians, but it was not linked to a rise of national consciousness to the same extent as with the Serbs. The great bulk of Bosnian Catholics continued to identify themselves as ‘Latins’ and their language as ‘Slav’, ‘Bosnian’ or simply ‘ours’. Relations with Orthodox Christians were poisoned by mutual attempts to invoke the Sultan’s authority against the other.71

The most notable feature of Bosnian Catholic life was its domination by the Franciscan Order. Introduced into Bosnia in the thirteenth century, the Franciscans had made themselves the indispensable protagonists of Catholicism against both the ‘Bosnian Church’ and later Islam, acquiring the exclusive right to provide priests for Bosnian parishes (the ‘cure of souls’) and providing from their midst the apostolic vicars who held the post of titular bishop in Bosnia from the mid-eighteenth century. The original bishops of Bosnia had taken up residence in Đakovo in Slavonia in the medieval period and lost touch with their flock. The result was a potentially divisive dualism in Bosnian Catholic organization. On
the one side stood the Franciscan Bishop, or Apostolic Vicar, and on the other the Provincial of the Franciscan Province of Bosnia Argentina, elected every three years by the heads of the individual monasteries. The bishop had no control over the economic management of the monasteries, and for the clergy he had only the right to confirm appointments. The majority of Franciscans, moved from parish to parish each six years by the monastery to which the parish was subject, were therefore rarely under monastic discipline. Under the Tanzimat the number of monasteries, long reduced to three, had risen to eight in Bosnia and two in Herzegovina. Observers credited them with a higher cultural standard than existed elsewhere in Bosnia; Franciscans often completed their studies in Hungary or Italy. Hilferding called Bishop Šunjić in the 1850s ‘a jewel in any clergy because of his high learning and moral character’. Since the seventeenth century Franciscans had produced a corpus of significant literary and historical work, while not matching the kind of parochial education equally remote, early modern Estonia, say, received.

By 1878, however, their position was not uncontroversial. The Italian consul had commented that their parochial role made them ‘quite far from strict observation of the rule of the order’; the British vice-consul in Mostar that they were rapacious and ‘did not in the least exert themselves to ameliorate the moral condition of their flock, which, in general, is most degraded’. Though themselves Franciscans, bishops were suspected by the Bosnian Provincialate of threatening its privileges. In 1846 Bishop Barišić had to be shifted from his post to a newly created Apostolic Vicariate in Herzegovina, accompanied by a split in the Province too which led eventually (1892) to a separate Herzegovinian Province. Service which had been appreciated ‘in partibus infidelium’ (the lands of the unbelievers) was looked at differently in high places when the Tanzimat loosened the reins and quarrels between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Slav nationalists appeared to offer the Catholic Church openings in the Balkans. The Province of Bosnia Argentina was subject to seven visitations and its Constitution twice suspended in a period of forty years, at a time when internal wranglings in the Franciscan Order had also lowered its prestige in the Vatican.

Political aspirations of younger Franciscans added another strand to the story. From the 1840s began the association of certain Bosnian Franciscans with the various forms of nineteenth-century south Slav nationalism. Ivan Franjo Jukić (1818–57), an ardent Illyrian but also a Bosnian patriot, was the first Bosnian Catholic to formulate a programme of national enlightenment (prosvjeta), the word which was to become synonymous with later generations’ modernizing dreams; politically, he worked for Bosnian autonomy under the Tanzimat. Illyrian sympathies could broaden into active Serbophilia, as in the lauding of Serbian and Montenegrin heroism in the first part of fra Grgo Martić’s epic poem Osjetnica. Gradually they merged into the new but similar Yugoslavism of Bishop Strossmayer of Đakovo, who built a seminary for Bosnian Franciscans
in his diocese in 1853, where a generation of Bosnians acquired a strong Slav national feeling.

The Order’s official leaders avoided provoking the Turkish authorities but succeeded in coaxing concessions with Catholic consuls’ support. Here they realized the importance of Austria’s backing, and their ambitions took on an increasingly Austrophile guise. Grgo Martić dropped his bardic name ‘Ilir’ (Illyrian) for the neutral ‘Hercegovac’ (Herzegovinian) and worked closely with the Austrian consul, rarely referring to himself as a Croat before the occupation. Fra Anton Knežević represented a further tendency, identifying with the medieval Bosnian kingdom and the cultural traits binding Bosnians of all faiths together, like bosančica in former times. With Jukić, he has become an icon of modern Bosnian/Bosniak ideology. The difficulty is that none of the pigeonholing of these various figures quite fits. Besides the fact that Knežević’s fellow Franciscans were themselves responsible for the decline of customs he praised, like the bosančica script, his Bosnianism was marked by animus against Muslims who had in his view rejected their history; he looked for liberation from Christian states. As for Provincial Šunjić, the best example of a cautiously Austrophile gradualist, he was also an expert in Oriental languages and admirer of Islamic educational and charitable provision, who feared that behind Austria stood centralistic Germany, with its Protestantism and atheism. As he once exclaimed, ‘Won’t Austria destroy our customs and our traditions? … We unhappy Bosnians will be first swallowed up into this soulless and monolithic civilization.’ The piling up of ambiguities and reservations follows logically from the extremely difficult position of what Lovrenović has called the ‘European-Oriental micro-culture’ of Bosnia’s Catholic Croat community.

One issue on which Jukić had fired general agreement was the need for education: ‘No nation can advance, either spiritually or physically, if it does not have learned teachers and priests: “if the blind lead the blind, both will fall into bondage”—so the Holy Spirit tells us.’ Real growth began with the Order’s appeal for funding from Austria in 1852. By 1878 there were fifty-four Catholic schools in the two provinces, of which nine were run by the Order of Merciful Sisters, operating from Zagreb with Austrian subsidies. The Sisters’ schools were modern, using Croatian textbooks and qualified staff, teaching girls mainly, but not exclusively. The failure to develop a body of qualified lay teachers distinguished the Catholic community from the Orthodox, since instruction in Franciscan-run schools depended on the priest’s availability from other duties. Where Catholic merchants attempted to found a lay-controlled commercial school in Livno, Franciscan hostility reduced it to a primary school role with irregular teaching by priests for the most part. However, there was a Catholic realka in Sarajevo from the mid-1860s, with Turkish, Italian, French and Austrian funding. The twenty-six young Franciscans studying philosophy and theology in Bosnian monasteries in 1877, together with the nineteen studying
in Hungary, testify to the well-organized higher education programme by which the Order maintained its hegemony among talented Bosnian Catholic youth.

It was this hegemony which Austria increasingly called in question. Tension over episcopal appointments between her and the Franciscans had arisen in the 1860s, and Bishop Vučić’s resistance to the introduction of other male Orders, combined with what Austrian observers thought his lethargy, led to the withdrawal of his Vienna subvention in 1877. Only the Trappists succeeded in establishing themselves, with a monastery near Banjaluka in 1870. Nonetheless, Catholics had made great strides. ‘The Catholic population of the Herzegovina … sweeps forward with daily-increasing strength,’ wrote a French observer; ‘the plentiful support from abroad, the help drawn from the Propaganda, have done much for the revival of this interesting group.’

But this advance was relative. With thirty-five churches in more than a hundred parishes, compared to the 236 churches of the Orthodox, no real national consciousness and a clerical elite embroiled in the defence of its historic position, Catholics were not expected by non-Austrian observers to play a decisive part in shaping events in Bosnia. These preferred, at least in the 1860s, to stress the isolation of the Catholics, the mutual hatred of the Christian confessions and the likelihood, in the event of a rising, that Catholics would side with their Muslim masters to avoid falling from one domination to another (Serbian) that would be even more humiliating.

The more the Habsburg monarchy interested itself in Bosnia, however, the more significant their role could potentially become.

BOSNIA AND THE POWERS

For centuries neglected by the European world, Bosnia came to attention with the opening of consulates by the six leading powers in the 1850s and 1860s. From then until 1878, diplomats, geologists and military officers, together with private citizens and tourists, greatly augmented the few, mainly French accounts of this intriguing backwater. The picture they presented was largely unflattering. While the ignorance and ingrained conservatism constantly referred to might be glossed with the primitive egalitarianism of an oppressed people, equally common was the stereotype of the sly, cowardly Oriental Christian, ‘the universal falseness, cruelty and treacherousness’ which were the moral consequence of backwardness and subjection. Muslims might strike some as ‘manly’ and ‘honourable’, but by common consent they were ‘fanatical, intolerant, arbitrary … and devoid of comprehension of modern civilization’. Influenced by their ethnological interests and the superciliousness of a dawning imperialist age, these European writers depicted a static society, with little reference to the new currents of thought mentioned above. ‘They are all naturally indolent and averse to progress, Christians and Muslims alike’, wrote the British consul of the Bosnians, ‘and I know not one, nor have I
ever heard of anyone among them of any particular intelligence or political
capacity.’91

Bosnia’s economic potential was more favourably treated. According to an
Austrian civil engineer in 1878, it was a land ‘prodigally endowed with treasures
of every kind, with fertile soil, cattle, wood, minerals, water power as well as
unparalleled scenic attractions’.92 Prompted by the excellent fruit the British
consul grew in his Sarajevo garden, the future archaeologist Arthur Evans
reflected on the ‘heaven’ it could be in ‘civilized hands’, while for an Austrian
commentator its ‘comprehensive’ mineral riches were ‘for the asking’.93 However,
the most interesting economic literature on Bosnia came in 1878–79; it was
a consequence, not cause, of the occupation. Austria’s trade with Bosnia was a
petty, regional concern, just as a mere 3.2 per cent of Russia’s went to Turkey as a
whole.94 Even Bosnia’s role in Baron Hirsch’s trans-Balkan railway project failed
to elicit much interest in Austrian business circles, although a section of it was
opened there in 1873.95 In other words, Bosnia attracted growing international
interest neither for its people nor its resources. The issue was political. It was ‘the
Eastern question’.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the question mark over the Turkish empire
in the Balkans was linked with other international uncertainties. Polish emis-
saries worked in Constantinople and Belgrade. The exiled Hungarian leader of
1848–49, Louis Kossuth, drafted plans of a Danubian confederation including
Serbia and Romania, while Garibaldi’s schemes envisaged an east Adriatic landing
to mobilize south Slavs and Magyars against the Habsburg enemy. The Eastern
question thus entered a new phase. It had seemed for much of the eighteenth
century that Austria would carve out the most from any Ottoman collapse,
but the French revolutionary experience had turned it into a conservative force,
centered to shore up the Sultan’s power. The initiative in its rivalry with Tsarist
Russia passed to the latter. Yet there was a dualism in Russian policy. The ties of
language and Orthodox religion which Russia shared with the majority of Balkan
people could not be a matter of indifference to Russian diplomacy, but mindful
of Tsarist autocratic traditions and distrustful of Slav nationalists’ loyalty, the
long-serving foreign minister Gorchakov (1856–78) was more concerned to
maintain Russian influence in places like Belgrade than to set an activist agenda.
Once Russia had succeeded in throwing off restrictions in the Black Sea, imposed
on her after the Crimean War, he was content to enter the conservative Three
Emperors’ League with Germany and Austria in 1873. But Panslav sentiment
exerted a far greater influence on emerging Russian ‘public opinion’, exercised
through forums like the Slavic charitable societies, which channelled aid for
church and school building in the Balkans, often through local Russian consuls.
For the duality was present in official circles themselves, like the Balkan consular
service under the energetic Count Nikolai Ignatiev, Panslav ambassador in Istan-
bul from 1864 to 1877. Austrian suspicions of a restless Russian propaganda in
the south Slav world came to shadow Austro-Russian relations.
In contrast, Austrian imperial circles had evolved a more specific policy towards Bosnia. It entailed positing support for Turkish integrity on the Porte’s willingness to reform as well as repress; should reform ultimately fail, a paternalist relationship with Serbia offered a safeguard against the emergence of a large south Slav state under Serbian aegis. Thus Austria lent Serbia diplomatic support over the withdrawal of the Turkish population and later the Turkish garrison from Belgrade in 1862/1867. As early as 1856 military circles had suggested that Austrian Dalmatia was indefensible if the Bosnian hinterland fell into hostile hands. By 1875 the Austrian position had come to be the occupation of Bosnia. From the 1850s and establishment of a consulate in Sarajevo the Monarchy cultivated its only natural support base there through subventions to Franciscan schools and clergy. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century treaties entitled her to intercede for the rights of Ottoman Catholics, but she also made grants to some Orthodox priests in Montenegro, and Bosnians could attend the Orthodox seminary in Zadar, Dalmatia.96

Nowhere in the monarchy did the Panslav bogey loom so large as in Hungary, with its own large Slav population. The distinctive Hungarian role in Habsburg south Slav policy is apparent in the mission of Benjamin von Kállay as Austro-Hungarian Consul General in Belgrade (1868–75). Deeply convinced of the importance of the south Slav question both for the Monarchy and his own nation, Kállay argued in his *History of the Serbs* that the Serbs traditionally had looked to Austria, only for Austrian diffidence to allow the Russians to make Serbia a mere tool in its drive to Constantinople.97 Besides thwarting Russia, Kállay’s diplomatic activity had a further, specifically Magyar, angle. This was to win the Serbs for a pro-Hungarian alignment through offering support for Serbian acquisition of Bosnia; Hungaro-Serbian friendship could help offset the threat Austro-German centralists still posed to the autonomy Hungary had won in the Compromise of 1867. In the event, Prussia’s victory over France in 1870–71 removed this threat and assured Kállay’s full loyalty to the Habsburg Dualist state.98

One aspect of Kállay’s policy was to detach Serbia from Croatia at a time when the Croats were resisting subordination to Hungary in the new Dualist structures. Croats formed the majority of the south Slavs in the Monarchy, who naturally had an interest in the fate of Bosnia. Five of the eight Habsburg consuls in Sarajevo up to 1878 were south Slavs, and they were also prominent among officers of the Military Frontier which had developed from the sixteenth century along the Habsburg–Ottoman border. Andrássy did not disguise his suspicion of this south Slav role, and in 1871 Franz Joseph finally decreed the disbandment of the Military Frontier, though its fusion with ‘civil’ Croatia was not completed till 1881, very much on Hungarian terms. The Frontier spirit remained a factor, however, though not all influential Frontiersmen were Catholic Croats. General Rodić, Governor and military commander of Dalmatia in the 1870s, for example, was Orthodox.
Indeed, the position of some two million Croats in the Monarchy was weak compared to their historic claims. Since 1102 the medieval Croatian kingdom had come under the Hungarian Crown and the ‘Triune Kingdom’ of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia had later been partitioned, with Dalmatia falling under Venetia and (definitively from 1814) Austria. Croatia-Slavonia was about 85 per cent peasant and 80 per cent illiterate, while the educated class in Zagreb was as fluent in German as Croatian. The ‘Illyrian’ movement for intra-Croatian and Croato-Serb linguistic unity launched by Ljudevit Gaj in the 1830s had provided a modern basis for aspirations towards the reunification of the Croatian lands, which were also inhabited by Serbs. Under the name of Yugoslavism it took a more explicitly political form in the 1860s under Bishop Strossmayer, who championed the cause of a federal Monarchy against Austro-Magyar Dualism. True to his Serbophile views, Strossmayer at times was prepared to envisage a federal Yugoslav state formed from Habsburg and Ottoman territories, and even, in 1875–78, to allow a Serbian occupation of Bosnia, historically considered by Croats a Croatian land. The Croatian claims went back to medieval precedents and overlapped with Hungarian claims, as well as arguments over medieval Bosnia’s Catholicity. But majority opinion in Strossmayer’s Croatian National Party had no intention of yielding their right to Bosnia. Both Serb and Croat contemporary historians are keener than their ideologically ‘Yugoslav’ predecessors to stress the essentially Croatian priorities of Strossmayer too.

The Nagodba (compromise) with Hungary of 1868 allowed Croatia only limited internal self-government. The failure of Strossmayer’s attempt to broaden the base of Croatian politics by alliance with the Serbs led to the rise of the Party of (historic) Right under Ante Starčević, which condemned Serbs, as well as Austrians and Hungarians, as enemies of Croatia. In circumstances of Croatian weakness this triple rejection was a quixotic position, lent piquancy by Starčević’s description of the Bosnian Muslims as the ‘flower of the Croatian nation’. Since he said Bosnia should remain Turkish until a self-governing Croatia could take it over, he made himself irrelevant to the approaching crisis of Turkish rule. All in all, diverse Croatian attitudes to Bosnia expressed the complexities of Croatian society, in which Habsburg dynasticism and Magyar nationalism constrained options for the native Slav population. The question was whether Croatia could achieve her national ambitions in Bosnia without becoming the tool either of the Serbs or the Habsburgs. Yet Strossmayer remained an imposing figure on a wider stage. Internationally known for his speeches against papal infallibility at the Vatican Council of 1870–71, he withdrew from a direct role in Croatian party politics in 1873, only to launch vaster, if vaguer projects of Slav renaissance through Catholic–Orthodox reconciliation and a rapprochement of Russia with the Vatican. For a confessionally organized society like Bosnia these could have profound implications.

Equally ambitious for Bosnian, or Herzegovinian, territory were Serbia and Montenegro respectively. Tiny, impoverished Montenegro, its capital, Cetinje,
a village of 1,500 souls and a dozen consulates, punched far above its weight in European politics, aided by its influence over Herzegovinian Orthodox and the marriage ties its canny ruler, Nikola, had contrived with the Russian and Italian royal families. Serbia’s situation was different, at least potentially, because of its greater capacity for modernization. Institutionally, since the 1840s it had been developing the lineaments of a bureaucracy and intelligentsia trained in foreign universities, while the 1869 Constitution provided the basis for evolution from princely autocracy to parliamentary monarchy. After the withdrawal of the Phanariots an autonomous Church hierarchy had introduced most of the institutions of the more advanced Karlowitz Serb Orthodox Patriarchate in the Monarchy. Seeing how Slavs occupied the lowest rung of the ladder in the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, autonomous Serbia’s leaders early developed a sense of mission whereby their little state would become the nucleus for the creation of a truly independent and united Serbdom. The Belgrade government had networks of agents in Bosnia which went back to, indeed preceded, the secret Načertanije (Plan) of 1844: minister Garašanin’s programme for the liberation of other Serb-inhabited provinces of the Turkish empire, in the first instance Bosnia, followed by that of Serbs in the Habsburg monarchy.

There is something outlandish in a subject statelet of little more than a million people, just 4.2 per cent of whom were literate in 1866, planning for the destruction of two great empires. It is easier, at first view, to understand the dismissiveness towards Serbia of Habsburg Balkanists like Kállay than their frequent paranoia about the threat it posed. Serbian nineteenth-century history was strewn with coups, assassinations and dynastic conflict. The reorganization of the Church did not penetrate the grass roots, nor did Serbian propaganda in Bosnia, hampered by Belgrade’s concern to win Muslim support by guaranteeing beg property rights. Indeed, Bosnian and Herzegovinian students in the ‘second section’ of the Belgrade seminary set up to indocrinate ‘unliberated’ Serbs claimed that its harsh authoritarianism was preparing them for a life of lying and servility, as in Turkey. The Serb socialist pioneer, Svetozar Marković (1848–75), denouncing the futility of Balkan revolution from above, observed tartly that Serbian statesmen simply identified ‘civilization’ with the repressive norms of western Europe: ‘and indeed, the more the Serbian state has developed the greater the internal independence of the Serbian people has declined’. Yet the very fact that a man like Marković could concern himself with the Serb cause at this level of sophistication showed that the rising Serbian intelligentsia was not to be sneezed at. The only way forward for the tiny, backward state’s educated class was to align itself with modern European liberal ideas, which could be used to justify Serbian national goals. Gale Stokes has argued persuasively that instability at the top, as in the assassination of Prince Mihailo Obrenović in 1868, facilitated the development of a quasi-parliamentary party politics, which developed largely independent of the illiterate peasant masses. A tacit bargain
was struck whereby the educated class would not interfere with the peasants’ patriarchal ways and the peasants would not block the elite’s endeavours to create a bureaucratic state apparatus, which satisfied their aspiration to modernize ‘the nation’—and provided them with jobs.\textsuperscript{109} This conjunction of educated elite and peasantry, linked theoretically by the concept of the nation, however far apart in ordinary life, provided a model by which Balkan society could be understood. It was to be influential in Bosnia, both in its positive and negative implications.

But Serbia was not the only role model for Bosnian Serbs. The Serbs of Vojvodina in southern Hungary, descendants of migrants from Turkish rule, were the wealthiest and best-educated section of Serbdom. In the Orthodox Patriarchate of Karlowitz, serving the great majority of Habsburg Serbs, they had a rich and powerful autonomous institution, whose influence was marked in the early development of the Church in autonomous Serbia.\textsuperscript{110} The Vojvodina Serbs’ relative development allowed for the rise of a commercial and professional class, organized in Svetozar Miletić’s National Liberal Party of the 1860s, which like Strossmayer fought for federalism in the Habsburg Monarchy, and also challenged the dominance of the Karlowitz Orthodox hierarchy. Though they failed in the first objective, they gained a substantial role for the laity in the constitution of the Karlowitz Patriarchate approved by the Hungarian government in 1868. The Vojvodina liberals were to be an important influence on the development of Bosnia, both through the migration of teachers and other ‘cultural workers’ and the example of a liberal nationalist laity locked in conflict with a conservative Church hierarchy.

Miletić was associated with the organ \textit{Zastava}, the best informed critic of Turkish rule in Bosnia, and the \textit{Ujedinjena omladina srpska} or United Serb Youth, which advocated a fervent if vague pan-Serb cultural unity and criticized the Belgrade government for not linking the Serb cause more strongly with free modern political institutions. Consul General Kállay described its themes as ‘the unattainable wishes of a few hot-heads’, reflecting the discontent of those in a backward milieu who were unable to land a job in the bureaucracy—a foretaste of arguments he would deploy at the helm of Austrian policy in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{111} The nationalist atmosphere of this time of claim and contestation made everyone cynical about others’ pretensions. \textit{Zastava}’s view of Croat aspirations was that Strossmayer’s Yugoslavism was a cloak for German penetration, Franciscans should be rebuked for teaching their flock to reject the Serb name in favour of the ‘topographical’ term Croat and, while Serbs extended a friendly hand to the Croats, they could just as well do without them!\textsuperscript{112} For small nations the stakes in the acquisition of such a prize as Bosnia were high. But without assistance from the Great Powers, they could not achieve their goals. The Bosnian rising of 1875 opened the final act, in which all these interrelationships were brought to resolution.
BALKAN CRISIS, 1875–78

In the event, the outcome confirmed the themes prefigured here. Serbia was too weak, pursued a dubious strategy in Bosnia and did not receive full-hearted support from Russia. Russian prioritization of Bulgaria helped Austria to safeguard her interests in the west Balkans, in which she received the support of most Croats. Bosnians themselves were not united enough to influence events. Thus Andrassy was able to implement the policy he had outlined in early 1875, that if full Turkish integrity was unsustainable, Bosnia should be Austria’s. This was a policy of the Monarchy’s governing circles, strongly opposed by parliamentary liberals concerned for the likely resulting charges on the public purse.

The rising was not the work of Serbian agents, but essentially a peasant revolt, prompted by tithe grievances. Soon, though, merchants linked to insurrectionary plans assumed a role. But the rising failed militarily because of disunity, both between Serbia and Montenegro and between peasant aspirations and nationalists’ attempts to win Muslim support. The Bosnian Serb historian Milorad Ekmečić comments sarcastically that it was a unique historical moment when nobles were canvassed to join a peasant revolt.113 Serbia’s intervention by declaring war on Turkey led to her swift defeat. Russia followed in 1877 but her campaign targeted Istanbul and the east Balkans rather than Serbia and Bosnia. This made it easier for her to offer Vienna the prospect of an Austrian occupation of Bosnia in the Budapest Convention (January 1877), thereby winning Habsburg neutrality and clearing her way to war. At Austria-Hungary’s wish, the Convention ruled out the creation of a large south state, but Russia may have thought this was directed against a Greater Serbia, not the Greater Bulgaria eventually created by the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878. In fact, not only Austria but also Britain objected to San Stefano and succeeded in rolling it back. Austria was also able to wean away Croat support from the Bosnian insurgents: fra Grgo Martić organized a petition against their declaration in favour of annexation to Serbia. While Strossmayer and his leading collaborator Canon Franjo Rački opposed an Austrian occupation, the majority of Croat politicians welcomed it, somewhat naively thinking it would result in a Bosnia devolved to themselves.

Since Serbia recognized her impotence, this left the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims as those most directly opposed to the threatening Habsburg occupation. As their military options ran out, Serb insurgent leaders formed a provisional government in September 1877 and called for ‘complete freedom and self-government’ for the ‘Bosnian people’, while reserving their wish for union with other Serbian lands.114 But this was a solution with little inner strength because the ‘people’ it posited did not exist as a cohesive force. Muslim peasants had responded to the rising by streaming to the towns and often joining counter-insurrectionary forces which had led some 200,000 Christians to flee to Austria. When the Congress of Berlin
conferred a mandate for occupation on Austria in July 1878, Muslims in turn became insurrectionaries. Defying the Sultan’s orders (though in one view not his wishes), they mustered a substantial resistance, which held up 170,000 Habsburg troops for three months, with significant Serb support in the towns but not in the countryside. Religious figures, most notably the mufti of Plevlje and the hodža Hadži Lojo, were prominent in the resistance, which had enthusiastic support from the Muslim masses, with more equivocation among elite figures. While important Serb leaders remained loyal to their ideology of Serb-Muslim cooperation, a contemporary also observed some fear of its Muslim neighbours in the Serb urban minority. There seems justification for the view that Muslim resistance to Austria in summer 1878 reflected a ‘Bosniak ethno-national self-consciousness’ which has been unduly neglected, but hardly for the claim that behind it stood ‘the whole nation of Bosnia’ asserting the continuity of Bosnian state tradition. It was the lack of overall unity among south Slavs and in Bosnia which had smoothed Austria’s course.

The incoming Austrian commander, according to one account, rounded on the Bosnians as mere rebels whom he would show the might of Austria. But the matter was not so simple. The crisis of 1875–78, in the view of Serb patriots and many later Serb historians, was to have provided the consummation whereby the social wrongs of a misruled people were to be fused into a national movement uniting Serbdom and its lands. It was the turning point which failed to turn and the disenchantment bore bitter fruit. Yet already in 1834 the Austrian information service had reported it as axiomatic for Bosnian begs that the raya should not become free peasants, nor Bosnia be made into a Serbia. The crisis was traumatic for Muslims too. Finally, the crisis had directly engaged Croatian opinion, and occupation by a Catholic power gave spokesmen of the Bosnian Catholic minority a new significance in their own and others’ eyes. Austria-Hungary had taken on more than the cowering Balkanites General Phillipovich saw before him.

Thus this introductory survey has confirmed the aptness of Karl Sax’s 1864 observation, that the people of Bosniawere, in national terms, ethnically uniform and politically divided. Both aspects of this paradox must be given full weight. The sense of cultural affinity, reflecting language, folk tradition and widely overlapping lifestyle, was a powerful reality in Bosnia, but in its linguistic aspect it could transcend the distinctive Bosnian milieu. When fra Anton Knežević visited the Hungarian Serb leader Svetozar Miletić, Miletić, taking him for a Muslim, addressed him as ‘Brother Bosniak’. Miletić’s greeting was to a fellow south Slav. The importance of the Herderian view of nationhood prevalent in the nineteenth century, which identified it with language, can hardly be exaggerated. It inclined intellectuals, who naturally saw mother-tongue literacy as the key to their ‘enlightening’ goals, towards acceptance of a common south Slav identity, any notion of religiously defined ethnicities being felt to savour of the past. Yet since the term ‘Illyrian’ to denote this encompassing nationality did not catch on, a tendency developed for different south Slav peoples to express the
common cultural identity through their own name. This applied particularly to Bosnia. Miletić called his assumed Muslim visitor ‘brother’ because of his ideological position that Bosnian Muslims were Serbs. Similarly, the leading Croatian expert on Bosnia, while acknowledging the different communities, saw them all as one nation ethnically, namely Croat. Though remaining outside European debates about nationhood, Bosnian Muslims undoubtedly held Bosnia to be their patrimony. The paradox was that separate communities could and did project cultural affinities into their own perspectives. But these perspectives had different points of reference, the Muslim in notions of the Bosniaks as defenders of Islam, the Serb and Croat in terms of medieval state traditions.

It may be said that these ideological positions were held consciously by very few, particularly in the Christian communities. However, the foundations had been set and the tendency through the nineteenth century was for them to define themselves against each other more clearly. Thus the Cyrillic script, at least in its Bosnian form, had a traditional presence in all three groups, reflected in the choice of Cyrillic for Osman Pasha’s official journal, Bosanski vjetnik. But despite their bosančica past the Franciscans boycotted Bosanski vjetnik because of its script. Of the subscribers to Srpsko-dalmatinski magazin (The Serb-Dalmatian Magazine), 99.2 per cent were Orthodox Serbs. Intellectual initiatives developed on independent confessional lines, as if without question. The only exceptions appear to have been Ivan Franjo Jukić’s proposal for a common fund for Christian schools, which the Orthodox Metropolitan ignored, and the Đakovo Franciscan students’ calendar for 1871.

In the lead-up to occupation the lack of a Bosnian consensus no doubt aided the Habsburg monarchy. In governing Bosnia, however, the fissures history had dug in this beautiful land faced her with difficult conundrums. Cultural mission was a plausible theme in view of the shortcomings this chapter has described, but it bore misleading implications of a tabula rasa. Bosnia had arguably had too much history, rather than too little. Moreover, owing to international and domestic reservations, the Monarchy had only occupied Bosnia, not annexed it. This book will deal with the internal aspects of the Monarchy’s cultural task, the overhauling of the creaking religious and educational structures, and the attendant mentalities, which contemporaries saw as central to successful adaptation to modern European civilization. Yet enough has been said to indicate how such problems could have an international aspect, embedded in the complex hierarchies of multinational religious organizations. And how diverse the mentalities could be with which Austria had to grapple in the south Slav world, even among reformers, needs final emphasis. The chronicle of events in Bosnia from 1825 to 1856 written by the remarkable champion of Sarajevo Serb girls’ education, Staka Skenderova, frequently broke into the ten-syllable lines of Serbian heroic poetry. It was, she said, easier to remember. Yet nearly contemporary was Vaso Pelagić, who became a socialist. When to this is added the Paris-trained Muslim portrait-painter, Mustafa Juzbašić, the world of Muslim
ulema who eschewed print and held that the earth was flat, and the various shades of Catholic opinion, it becomes clearer still that shaping this inheritance would be no light matter. The greatest problem was that a limited number of Bosnians had imbibed the Enlightenment view of progress, linked in their minds with notions of the people or nation. There were therefore expectations which might be difficult for a ‘conservative, non-Slav state’ to satisfy.\textsuperscript{127}
Despite the complex background to the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its significance for contemporaries was quite simply put. Baron Helfert greeted the ‘cause of humanity and civilization’ which Austria had undertaken in Bosnia, comparing the Austrian army to the Romans of old, who followed their feats of conquest with ‘productive peace’.¹ The influential Belgian publicist Laveleye agreed, likening it to the Roman Veterans and proclaiming it ‘an agent of civilization’.² According to the Dalmatian MP Miho Klaić, only the idea of a ‘civilizing mission’ could justify the occupation at all,³ while for the clerical Neupauer history had assigned Austria a ‘civilizing task’ in the Balkans.⁴ The Duke of Württemberg, Governor of Bosnia in 1879, saw the ‘true mission of Austria’ as ‘demonstrated’ in the occupation.⁵

The potency of these ideas was an undoubted convenience for Habsburg politicians. They summoned up a set of readily understood concepts that went with the grain of contemporary thinking, they provided a blueprint for action and they were reassuring. Alfred (later Lord) Milner’s comment on British government in Egypt in 1892 gives the tone: ‘it needs only a little experience of the East to realize how vast an improvement may be effected in the condition of a country by the introduction of nothing more than the ordinary methods and principles of civilized government’.⁶ In the ‘civilizing’ model, the economic obligation could be acquitted by basic public works, like communications, irrigation or drainage, and the cultural one by the application of such notions as confessional even-handedness, equality before the law and a few European-style schools. The skill was to provide cadres competent to assist in the functioning of a more modern society—including pliant religious leaders—without producing an under-employed, potentially discontented native intelligentsia. Cultural mission in such circumstances was a relatively leisurely affair, which put a great premium on strong and prestigious administration, creating what would now be called a ‘demonstration effect’ in favour of westernization. Provided government persisted in giving ‘a thoroughly modern education to its pupils, while carefully avoiding any heedless offence to religious prejudices’, Milner had no doubt that the new ideas would prevail in the long run.⁷ It is possible to see a line of division in western views of cultural mission at this time. Alice Conklin’s work on French West Africa shows how the French Third Republic at first essayed a somewhat more radical version, in which French principles were directed against native
elites. The policy of monarchical Britain, certainly after the Indian Mutiny of 1857, was aimed at securing such elites’ cooperation. Conservative Austria-Hungary inclined naturally to the British position. Its spirit breathed through Franz Joseph’s proclamation to the people of Bosnia as his troops marched in:

Your laws and institutions will not be arbitrarily overthrown, your customs and usages will be respected … The Emperor-King orders that all sons of the land will enjoy equal rights according to the laws, that you will all be protected in life, faith and property … Under his mighty sceptre many peoples live together … he rules over the followers of many religions … and all freely profess their faith.

The history of the colonial epoch speaks for the limitations of such perspectives. But long-term hindsight is hardly necessary in the Bosnian case. The first years of occupation brought swift disillusionment. This was predictable on the part of the Serbs, deprived of their Bosnian prize. ‘Sorrowful Bosnia, who has bathed for five centuries in the tears of her sons, has become the victim of a Tartar tribe—the Magyars … Europe, who vaunts her liberal principles, in place of freedom has imposed a still harsher yoke’: so wrote Jovan Džinić, one of the agents in Bosnia of the Russophile Serbian Prime Minister, Jovan Ristić. No Serb government or activist inwardly abandoned the belief that Bosnia was a Serb land and theirs by right. Yet Kosanović could chaff fra Grgo Martić that his austrophilism had brought little reward, while disgruntled Muslims continued to emigrate. In the words of Consul Freeman, a longstanding advocate of Austrian occupation, in September 1880: ‘As regards the disposition of the population towards the existing Government, I do not hesitate to say that Mussulmans and Jews, Catholics and Christians of the Orthodox faith, all alike from the highest to the lowest, regret the Turkish Government.’ At a wider level, the felt need to ensure against Russian bitterness at the Berlin settlement led Bismarck to conclude the 1879 Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary, setting the pattern for security pacts between Great Powers from which the two rival blocks of pre-1914 Europe were to emerge. Bosnia’s part in the road to world war thus began well before the crises of 1908 and 1914. Meanwhile, in 1882, Muslims joined with Serbs in an insurrection in Herzegovina which brought the first phase of the occupation spluttering to a close.

How to explain this far from ideal start? The chief weakness of the cultural mission model was to overestimate the sheer efficacy of western rule in face of a complex native response. The occupation inevitably cut through the tissues of myriad relationships formed over four centuries of Islamic rule. The cultural gulf between the occupiers and their new subjects, particularly the Muslims, was vast. Leaving aside well-known intellectual divergences, amplified by the Enlightenment in Christian Europe, there were a host of matters of daily living which could readily be elevated into civilizational divides by Bosniaks who had defined their very identity against the adjacent Christian world. Bosnian Christians were not only Catholics and Orthodox, but also potential Croats and Serbs and...
as such at odds with their occupiers over the key issue of the day. Habsburg statesmen were not unaware of the problem. In defining Austria’s mission in 1879, the Duke of Württemberg went on to say that it was the reconciliation of nationalities, at a time when nationality ruled all. This was a tougher brief than faced the average colonial governor. As the Austrian military newspaper commented bleakly on the assimilation of Bosnian Slavs into the Monarchy, a state which could not absorb a territory abutting its own borders would have lost the right to live. Throughout the occupation there were to be two ways of regarding Austria’s task in Bosnia. One was the colonial-derived vision of spreading the benefits of western progress; the other was the need to show the superiority of the Habsburg multinational idea over ethnic nationalism as the means to that progress. In this light, the Bosnian occupation became a touchstone for the viability of the Habsburg state. Benjamin von Kállay, the most important of Austro-Hungarian administrators of Bosnia, was to link both themes when he defined his goals as to raise the people gradually on to the level of European civilization, and to prove to the world the Monarchy’s ability to rule foreign lands.

For all this awareness of the high stakes in Bosnia, Habsburg statesmen were surprisingly blasé in preparing for them. Doubtless Bosnia’s extreme backwardness gave the colonial-derived discourse of modernization a powerful logic and seemingly scaled down the dangers. There is irony here, for the very backwardness of isolation, by preventing Bosnians from developing their own institutions, had deepened their dependence on extra-Bosnian factors, enmeshing them in a web of relationships outside direct control of the newly occupying power. Bosnians, even more than most Balkanites, were objects in the manoeuvres of the powers, not subjects of their own history, while their backwardness inhibited perspective on the broader game of which they were part. Hence the role of rumour, conspiracy theory and mistrust in Bosnian as in Balkan politics, as an undeveloped milieu proved apt ground for cultural clashes, while in time Bosnian politicians learnt how to exploit the region’s strategic significance to play the international game with some skill. If Austrian administrators were less perturbed by this treacherous terrain than modern counterparts would be, a key factor was the inherently elitist nature of nineteenth-century notions of civil society; officials were accustomed to disregard much of the rumblings of subalterns and to give police and censorship a freer rein. And, above all, occupied Bosnia was a subaltern society in a hierarchical age.

Official self-assurance was fortified by Habsburg history. In former takeovers of Turkish territory (1699, 1718, 1784), the Monarchy had established patterns which foreshadowed themes of the cultural mission in Bosnia. Some precedents were no longer on its agenda, like the disappearance through (re)conversion or flight of scores of thousands of Muslims in late seventeenth-century Slavonia and Lika. But the strategy of dealing with non-dominant peoples through their religious hierarchies had proved its worth in Habsburg eyes in the case of the
Serbs of Hungary and Croatia. The Orthodox Church province of Karlowitz set up by the Leopoldine Privileges of 1690–91, granting Serbs religious toleration, was the basis of the Habsburg monarchy’s claim on the loyalty of its Serb subjects, while at the same time the Karlowitz hierarchy offered Vienna a mechanism for their control. Moreover, the identification of Serbs with Orthodoxy and Croats with Catholicism served the dominant powers in the Monarchy as a weapon against a united Yugoslav movement on a linguistic base. By 1878 the Hungarian government had regretted the concessions to the laity it had allowed in the 1868 Karlowitz Church constitution and resolved to support the conservative hierarchy against the Serb liberals. A framework was set for the policy Vienna would pursue in Bosnia, fitting both the cultural mission model and Habsburg precedent.

Assumptions from past and present therefore help explain why only two memoranda touching on the putative occupation’s cultural policy appear in the Austrian archives. Drawn up by the Austrian consul in Cetinje, Gustav Thoemmel, in spring 1878, they follow the lines implied above. Positing the natural abilities but ‘cultural abandonment’ of the Bosnians (a common contemporary contrast), Thoemmel advocated winning Serbs discontented with the state of their Church, through replacing the Phanariots with native clergy and abolishing abuses like the sale of livings. He thought the Muslims should be separated from their religious superiors in Constantinople, but otherwise believed it would be disruptive to change Muslim or Catholic religious circumstances for the time being. As to education, ‘if education is left out of account at the start, this will hardly do any harm’.17 This was cultural mission at its most conservative and reflected the mood of the central Habsburg authorities whom Thoemmel was advising.

Meanwhile, Croatian presses hummed with works on Bosnia,18 and Croatian officials summoned to occupied Sarajevo by the Croatian Grenzer general in charge, Joseph Phillippovich, appeared to echo their reformist zeal. Memoranda streamed into Vienna on matters of religious reorganization, particularly from Catholic circles. This disjuncture indicated that the Monarchy was hardly the multicultural family Franz Joseph’s manifesto depicted. The division between dominant Germans and Magyars and non-dominant Slavs, expressed on the issue of dualism or federalism in the 1860s, was reproduced over Bosnia too. The first phase of the occupation was a case of too many cooks spoiling the broth as the Monarchy’s tensions spilled over into policy towards the new acquisitions, contributing to the humiliating setback of the Herzegovinian revolt.

TWO VIEWS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S MISSION IN BOSNIA

A minimalist view of the Monarchy’s commitments was given by the Emperor himself in a council of common ministers of 12 September 1878. Franz Joseph
argued against a special Department for Bosnia as expensive and superfluous and suggested that the important issues, which were financial and commercial, could only be settled by agreement of all political power centres of the Monarchy; the ‘few matters of political administration’ would be dealt with by the appropriate common minister.\textsuperscript{19} Though the setting up of a Bureau of Bosnian Affairs in the hitherto under-employed Joint Finance Ministry the following February recognized the need for direct departmental responsibility for Bosnia, the minister concerned, Leopold von Hofmann, had no special qualifications for his new role, which he exchanged after barely a year—for the directorship of the Vienna Burgtheater.\textsuperscript{20} He remained virtually a messenger boy between the Monarchy’s big hitters. The Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza fought tenaciously to require both parliaments to legitimize the Bosnian arrangements.\textsuperscript{21} Austria’s initial resistance was based on the view that such legitimacy was superfluous, as the necessary decisions had been taken by the common organs, which Austria still aspired to see as something like the central imperial government Hungary opposed. The parallel laws eventually passed in Vienna and Budapest in February 1880 provided that the Bosnian budget would be discussed (but not voted on) in the biannual Delegations of the two parliaments; Bosnia was to meet its own expenditure, and all measures needing outside loans or funding, even where their expenditure was only tangentially involved, needed the approval of the two governments, which also had the right to be consulted on matters of importance.\textsuperscript{22} These provisions reflected the habitual concern of metropolitan electorates that imperial responsibilities meant higher taxes, a concern previously expressed in substantial parliamentary opposition to the occupation itself. The implications for reform in Bosnia were spelt out in Tisza’s reiterated view that the Berlin treaty merely obliged Austria to alleviate Turkish abuses, not to introduce an administration there ‘on European lines’.\textsuperscript{23}

At the Monarchy’s power centres the priority was to stamp its authority on the occupied provinces and to shore up its position diplomatically. In April 1879 the Austro-Turkish Convention settled the terms of Austria-Hungary’s mandate in Bosnia, recognizing the Sultan’s ‘rights of sovereignty’ in symbolic ways, like the mention of his name in Friday mosque services, but not his wish for occupation to be explicitly temporary. The clause on safeguards for Bosnian Muslims passed without discussion except for the addition of the first word in the sentence which was to have greatest impact on later events: ‘Notably, Muslims are assured full liberty in relations with their spiritual leaders.’\textsuperscript{24} The rift with Russia was first countered with the Austro-German treaty of 1879 and then ostensibly healed with a renewed Dreikaiserbund (June 1881), which recognized Austria’s right to annex Bosnia when she chose. It followed a secret treaty with Serbia earlier that year, whereby Serbia promised to consult Austria on foreign policy and renounced her interest in Bosnia in return for support in Macedonia. All in all, the diplomatic fallout from 1878 seemed to have been contained pretty successfully by 1881.
The entry of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Monarchy’s customs union (December 1879) showed the political and economic priorities Franz Joseph had emphasized. These prevailed, too, in non-official publications. In the view of the weightiest commentator, Baron Helfert, the administration should not be precipitate in the cultural field, but should await initiatives from Christians, and later Muslims, who would turn to it when they realized its beneficent intentions. These pragmatic emphases were in line with contemporary ‘conventional wisdom’: an activist European role in developmental matters—a new railway connected Sarajevo to the Austrian frontier already in 1879—and in other spheres reliance on notions of confessional equality and the rule of law. Yet this socio-economic orientation heightened awareness of the agrarian question, where civic rights potentially clashed: the guarantee to Muslim property rights and Christian peasants’ belief that equality would release them from kmet status. Controversy waxed as to whether this status was a private landlord-tenant relationship or a form of feudalism, which the new government could simply abolish. In December 1879 a conference in Sarajevo voted 15–3 for the latter position, but as they also recommended that peasants pay compensation, Vienna sided with the minority’s view that this solution would satisfy nobody. Bearing in mind advice that the gathering of relevant information would probably take ‘several years’, there was a growing tendency in higher quarters to think in terms of minor adjustments rather than a general reform. Andrásy’s successor, Baron Haymerle, suggested to his colleagues that foot-dragging over land reform might alienate Bosnia’s Orthodox population more than was really necessary, but his concerns were not taken up. The central government in 1878–79 envisaged its ‘civilizing mission’ in Bosnia in the unhurried, dispassionate terms of any European colonial administration of the time.

The land question was not the only one where a different atmosphere prevailed among the Slav-tinged embryonic administration in Bosnia. A Provincial Government with political, financial and judicial sections was set up in Sarajevo in September 1878 and the powers of the Provincial Governor, holding military and civil authority, were defined on 29 November. While the old Turkish units were retained under new names, giving six Kreise and 48 Bezirke or Districts, Bosnians and Ottomans were considered inadequate to staff them and administration was largely in military hands until civilianized on 1 June 1879. Meanwhile, officials for Bosnia could be seconded from their posts in the Monarchy for two years at a time. District Commissioners, as in colonial tradition, were jacks of all trade, combining political, judicial and tax functions. The field was open for all sorts, whose quality was often impugned later, though many substantial careers began in this ad hoc manner.

Briefly, General Phillipovich presided over a unique episode in Habsburg rule. Early in September 1878 fourteen judicial and financial experts arrived in Sarajevo, eleven of them Croats whom he had requested. As enthusiasm for the Bosnian occupation reached a height in Croatia, where the Diet called...
for the union of Bosnia with the Croatian lands, the organ of the occupying authorities urged Muslims to eschew the ‘darkness’ in which they had hitherto lived, and exchange the useless study of a foreign Asiatic language with that of the mother tongue and some ‘cultured European language’. Fifty-eight leading Muslims were prevailed upon to petition for annexation and a Bosnian Muslim religious authority in ways which made the British consul doubt their representativeness. As for Serbs, they were told that their realka did not deserve the name and were pressurized to switch allegiance from the Ecumenical Patriarchate to that of Karlowitz in the Habsburg monarchy. Much of this can be related to Phillipovich’s instructions of 19 July 1878, in which he was urged to bring together loyalist Catholics and elite Muslims, while frustrating Muslim overtures to the suspect Orthodox and cutting off these last two groups from their religious leaders in Constantinople. As usual in politics, practice was more complex than official ‘spin’ of confessional even-handedness. But it was the uninhibitedly Croatian character of his regime which undermined Phillipovich’s position with higher authority. The Latin alphabet was exclusively employed and government pronouncements came in a brand of German-influenced Croatian officialese which drew ridicule on the regime. Nor did it help that Phillipovich figured in the official newspaper as a ‘Croatian son’ and that Bosnians were urged to put their trust in their Croatian kin, to whom the occupation had drawn them closer. In late November his transfer to Prague was announced.

Yet although Phillipovich’s replacement, the Duke of Württemberg, was a German Protestant, the Slav influence in the Provincial Government, and its alertness to cultural issues, did not disappear. Government reports regularly breathed indignation, whether at the ‘most evil example’ of the ‘wholly idle and incompetent Greek Orthodox Episcopate’, drunken Catholic clergy, the lowly place of women, or the appalling state of education to which this contributed: ‘thoroughly defective’ in the Orthodox schools, ‘most primitive’ in the Catholic. In short: ‘The intellectual, cultural and material development and elevation of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the finest goals for which the Government can strive.’ Interestingly, the Provincial Government inverted the politically driven priorities of Vienna. Education was put first: ‘one of the first and most important tasks we have to undertake here’. But although it disclaimed intervention in Church affairs as a government concern, it argued that ‘it is the moral duty of any government to work for the gradual removal of observed inequalities and injustices and step by step to introduce order into total anarchy’.

A stream of proposals reflected these convictions. In April 1879 Württemberg’s deputy, General Jovanović, a Serb Grenzer, suggested the replacement of all three Phanariot bishops by natives and the founding of a new Orthodox see in Banjaluka. Next the Provincial Government ordered local authorities to address the delimitation of Orthodox parish boundaries to ensure each priest an adequate income. In December, it issued an ordinance setting a fixed due
from each family towards their bishop’s salary and forbidding all other dues.\textsuperscript{43} Meanwhile, the Provincial Government’s Croat expert on cultural matters, Dr Milutin Kukuljević, entered into negotiations with Orthodox leaders in Sarajevo over the founding of a seminary, towards which all Orthodox families should contribute.\textsuperscript{44} The will to action was plainly there for other confessions, too, for after recommending the dismissal of the Catholic bishop in Herzegovina, Jovanović rather plaintively requested advice on how best to reform the Catholic clergy.\textsuperscript{45} As to the Muslims, the Provincial Government believed it had a lever to reform in a Muslim School Committee it had organized in Sarajevo, headed by a former Ottoman official whom it nominated inspector of Muslim schools. The Committee’s information, it hoped, would also enable it to clarify its views on the vakuf institution.\textsuperscript{46} To set these proposals in perspective, the Banjaluka see did not come into being till 1900, the equalizing of Orthodox clergy’s income remained a problem well after 1905 and there never was such a person as an official inspector of Muslim schools again.

Another flurry of activity occurred over state education, which the Provincial Government believed to be essential to enable Muslims to compete, the Tanzimat reformed schools having been undermined by the turmoil of 1875–78. Initiatives in the summer of 1879 summoned forth in Sarajevo a girls’ primary school, two literacy courses for Muslims, a Lower Gymnasium with an able Slovak head, and a military secondary school or \textit{Knabenpensionat}, providing a German education which could be continued at military academies in the Monarchy.\textsuperscript{47} By the time the Vienna authorities had permitted the appointment of a schools inspector in October 1879, the impatient Provincial Government had already formulated two schemes for primary education, one offering a premium to intelligent army corporals to give instruction where they were stationed,\textsuperscript{48} the other an ambitious school law, drafted by Kukuljević, pledging the eventual establishment of a school in every commune. There were to be sixty boys’ and thirty girls’ schools in the first year, in practice financed mainly by the state, six years’ compulsory attendance for all those in a school catchment area, and six Kreis inspectors, well paid at 2,100 florins a year. Most innovative of all was that in view of the bugbear of ‘religious conservatism’, schools were to be interconfessional. Confessional schools were declared ‘tolerated’ but must follow the interconfessional school syllabus and textbooks and submit any changes of staff to governmental approval.\textsuperscript{49}

Kukuljević’s proposals were the high point in the ambitions of reformers on the ground. Their immediate inspiration was no doubt the liberal and secularizing Croatian School Law of 1874 under the native Croatian Ban Ivan Mažuranić, whose reforming administration saw Croatian patriotism revive after the imposition of Dualism. But their utopian, étatiste tendency recalls more widely the reformist spirit of the late eighteenth century, when the seeds were sown that came to belated fruition in the Monarchy’s periphery among thin
but enthusiastic elites of scholars, clerics, politicians and other professional men, trumpeting diffuse liberal ideas of progress and enlightenment which they identified with the ‘national idea’ of their particular ethnicity. Thus the Slav-tinged Provincial Government put substance into notions of cultural mission in 1879. Yet with the critical attitude of the mainly Croat Sarajevo officials to the Serb-Muslim majority in Bosnia, they were doubly exposed, to the denunciations of Serb organs like Zastava and the suspicions of the Monarchy’s real rulers, the Austro-Germans and the Magyars. There was certainly a lack of touch in the Provincial Government’s initial pronouncement on the learning of the ‘Croatian language with Latin letters’ which it modified only after pressure from the ministry and the schools inspector, who was a Serb. Württemberg’s private view was that ‘unpractical’ Cyrillic was being pushed against the ‘world-wide’ Latin script only by ‘a few fanatics’. This was a dangerous assumption for an administrator of Bosnia. No less than Phillipovich’s, the regime of the well-meaning Württemberg was to be an interlude.

ESTABLISHING THE HIERARCHIES: THE ORTHODOX

Joint Finance Minister Hofmann was frankly irritated by Sarajevo’s activism. ‘Present circumstances do not permit the immediate and thorough removal of all abuses,’ he confided to the Emperor. Yet he was a minor player. The dominant role of the Ballhausplatz sufficed to make for different priorities at the centre, where the ‘official mind’ was more concerned with the relation of Bosnian confessions to their external leaders than with internal reform. On one theme, the desirability of replacing Orthodox Phanariots by native bishops, Habsburg conventional wisdom and south Slav reformism overlapped. It was the theme of hierarchy which had served the Monarchy well in integrating immigrant Serbs in the early modern period through the Church province of Karlowitz. The question of the Orthodox Church was thus the first to move towards clarification.

As Phillipovich’s instructions and actions indicated, Austria’s preferred solution to this question was to switch Bosnia’s Orthodox population from the jurisdiction of the Constantinople Patriarchate to that of Karlowitz, which claimed to be the historic successor to the Serbian Patriarchate of Peć. Crucially, its hierarchy was being backed in its struggle with the Serb liberal nationalist laity by the Hungarian government. Older Serb accounts stressed how patriots saw through such schemes; but wider factors lay behind the dropping of the Karlowitz strategy than Bosnian Serb resistance. Indeed, on 13 September 1878 the Sarajevo Serb commune initially responded to Phillipovich’s pressure by requesting the transfer. Wealthy leaders who had been excoriated in the Serb press for their cooperation with the Turks as ‘the offal of Christianity’ or ‘degenerate and traitor’ plainly thought the same course prudent with Austria. But Archimandrite Kosanović, who belonged to the more radical tendency in the commune, also sought to
accommodate the masterful general, who wished to make him a conduit for government policy. A later communal meeting, in October, however, claimed lack of authority in the matter but affirmed the people’s right to choose their metropolitan. Meanwhile, Serbs hoped to extract benefit from the situation on grievances in matters of language and script. Kosanović took the lead in this, in April 1879 petitioning Franz Joseph for an Orthodox seminary, a consistory and the transformation of the Serbian realka into a Gymnasium.58 By contrast, the manoeuvres of the Phanariot Metropolitan of Sarajevo, Antimos, whether his request to go under Karlowitz or offer of resignation, aimed only at his personal advantage, at the least a good pension.

The issue concerned far more than the wishes of Sarajevo Serbs, however. The 1870s had thrown the entire structure of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Balkans into disarray. In addition to its ongoing battle with the breakaway Bulgarian Exarchate (1870), the Phanar faced demands from newly independent Serbia for full autocephality of its previously merely autonomous Church. The loss in terms of prestige and income for a cash-strapped organization made it all the more determined to retain its influence in Bosnia. In hindsight it seems on the cards that the new, German-speaking Patriarch Joachim III might seek an understanding against Slav pressures with the anti-Slav Habsburg monarchy, but this possibility was long shrouded by mutual suspicions. Hence the successive probings of the wily Patriarch: an investigative envoy sent to Bosnia, expelled by Austria; his appointment of Kosanović as suffragan bishop of Sarajevo, apparently to meet criticisms of the Phanar’s neglect of native priests;59 his overtures to the Slav-speaking, allegedly Austrophile Greek bishop of Plovdiv, then to a reputedly Russophile Greek Archimandrite. Austrian diplomacy surmised Russian influence behind such shifts.60 The fact was that the Patriarchate could not be immune to pressures from an Orthodox Great Power, and might even hope for Serbian support against Bulgaria. For their part, Habsburg statesmen were clear that a transfer of Bosnian allegiance to Karlowitz could not canonically take place as long as Bosnia remained formally under Turkish sovereignty, but expectation of a relatively quick annexation made them at first reluctant to deal with the Patriarchal chameleon.

It seems it was the Serbian Church question which helped incline Austria towards a deal with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Newly independent Belgrade’s request for autocephal Church status did not specify the territorial extent of the claim and there was initial fear it might aspire to a Serbian Patriarchate, including Bosnia. Kosanović, among other Bosnian Serbs, was now pushing for this. ‘We observe the further development of the affair with great interest and follow it closely,’ Foreign ministry Sektionschef Kállay wrote to the Habsburg minister in Belgrade, stressing that the defence of Bosnia from Serbian ecclesiastical influence should not be complicated for the time being by a conflict with Joachim.61 An agreement reached with him should be dubbed provisional, as the Karlowitz solution, the only worthwhile one in Kállay’s view, was to be
merely postponed till Bosnia’s international status changed. Assumptions of a relatively short transition to annexation were thus central to the negotiations with the Patriarchate that ensued, with prior Austrian and Hungarian government approval.

The negotiations with the Patriarchate were marked by the Holy Synod’s long resistance to giving Franz Joseph unfettered right of appointment of Bosnian bishops, and by Austria’s dismissal of all Joachim’s counter proposals. Yet, given Austria’s de facto position in Bosnia and the hint of the Karlowitz alternative held in prospect, the cards lay with the Great Power. In the settlement of March 1880, termed provisional, the Monarchy got its way, with the very minor concession that the Patriarch should have prior information of the Emperor’s choice, so as to perform the canonical Cheirotonia ceremony. A private note confirmed that reference to the ‘qualities required in general by the holy canons’ for prospective bishops was a form of words which would not be used by the Patriarch to obstruct appointments. Austria also offered Joachim diplomatic support in Macedonia and doubled the offer of his annual compensation to 58,000 piasters or 6,000 florins (about £500). All told, the episode was a pointer to the future: Austria’s somewhat demeaning attitude to the Patriarchate, but also the shifting sands of international Orthodox politics where nothing could be taken fully for granted and victory tended to be, as here, ‘provisional’.

Shortly after the agreement Hofmann was replaced as joint finance minister by József Szlávy von Okány, the first of three successive Hungarians to hold the post. Hungarian minister of commerce in 1869 and briefly prime minister in 1872, Szlávy likewise had no particular qualifications for his new role, but he went further than Hofmann in asserting a distinctive ministerial input into the centre’s policy, which now concentrated on establishing autonomous hierarchies for all three main Bosnian confessions. Szlávy termed stabilization of the position of the Bosnian Orthodox Church hierarchy ‘a fundamental condition of the administration’ and appeared not ill-disposed to the Serbs. Belated acceptance of the resignation which Antimos had sent in the year before (and plainly hoped had been forgotten), and the installation of a Slav metropolitan in the capital was a more attractive course for a conservative power than the dismissal of all three Phanariots, as the Provincial Government had originally proposed. There was, moreover, only one native Bosnian who seemed to Szlávy to fit the bill, the Sarajevo archimandrite, Sava Kosanović. What might be called the gamble on Kosanović, as someone who knew the ‘ways of thinking and needs’ of the people, was to dominate government relations with the Bosnian Serbs in the first phase of the occupation. It was not perhaps as arbitrary as it has been depicted.

Kosanović has been reported as greeting the downfall of Ottoman power with pistol and banner in hand on 28 July 1878. But after this momentary exuberance he played his cards cautiously, cultivating a loyal attitude to the new administration in private as well as in public: on 27 September he wrote to
an enquiring Orthodox priest that now that Austria had freed Bosnians from tyranny their only task was to unite in pursuit of culture and progress. In June 1879 he had to make public rebuttal of rumours of his Panslav activities spread by Antimos. In October he revealed to the authorities that the Patriarch had called him to Istanbul to accept episcopal rank, and took their advice not to respond. These actions seem congruent with the account of him by a ministerial envoy, Baron Andrian, who had toured Bosnia in autumn 1879. Andrian saw Kosanović as a vain, ambitious and influential man who could be won for Austria, though he was momentarily alienated through lack of the status he thought his due. The authorities were caught in two minds. In April 1879, Jovanović, deputy governor in Sarajevo, was prepared to recommend the ‘influential’ and ‘able’ archimandrite for his proposed fourth see in Banjaluka but not for Sarajevo. Hofmann believed, however, that he should be watched further before a step could be taken. When the search for a new metropolitan in Sarajevo had already begun, in June 1880, the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry reported that Kosanović was a hypocritical intriguer and Panslav, who had been in the forefront of the campaign to subordinate Bosnia to the Serbian Church. Shortly afterwards, Württemberg concluded that his withdrawal to a monastery would be the best solution for the regime; his frequent visits to the Russian consulate were reported on by a consulate servant and his planned visit to Belgrade seemed disloyal. Szlávy, however, had effectively made his decision. Before complex enquiries about episcopal candidates in the Monarchy were even complete, he answered Württemberg’s report by disclosing his intention to call the archimandrite to Vienna to test his suitability directly, asking the Duke to telegraph his opinion. Early in October Kosanović gave the written loyalty declaration required in Vienna and the Patriarch was informed of Franz Joseph’s choice.

Szlávy was not acting just off his own bat. He cited Foreign Minister Haymerle’s agreement, behind which must have been that of Haymerle’s first secretary, the Balkan expert Kállay. As for the Istanbul Ambassador Calice’s surprise that Vienna should nominate someone the Patriarch had described as a ‘dangerous man’, the answer was that Joachim had himself proposed Kosanović for bishop in summer 1879. However, Calice’s raised eyebrow was in its way à propos, for the March 1880 Convention was now exposed to its first test. Joachim complained not only about the choice of Kosanović, but that the Convention had been breached by Antimos’s dismissal without his knowledge and that Bosnian priests were being moved from parish to parish without their metropolitans’ consent. He also expressed the wish that the consecration should take place in Istanbul and that no Karlowitz bishops should be involved in it. The joint finance and foreign ministries batted these points away blandly enough, while avoiding a consecrating bishop from Karlowitz—without admitting a precedent. Most intransigent of all was Franz Joseph himself, who wrote on one document that he
did not see what interest Austria had in a particularly good relationship between the Bosnian bishops and the Patriarch.80

The proceedings in the Phanar are worthy of mention because they revealed the techniques by which the Patriarchate could cause Austria problems.81 It could profit from the complex process of appointment, notification, consecration and proclamation to draw out rights which by the Convention were exiguous. More effectively, it could take the opportunity to make embarrassing enquiries about the inner life of the Bosnian Church. When its links with the Bosnian laity were strong and the Patriarch was uncertain of his majority in the Holy Synod, as later at the turn of the century, the results could be potentially disconcerting for Austria. Joachim’s probings in 1880 lacked this significance because his information on Bosnian affairs came almost certainly from the unpopular Phanariot Bishop of Mostar, Ignatios, who was quarrelling with the government over his salary. Yet for once Ignatios did not appear isolated. He had disclosed the terms of the March Convention ahead of publication to the Mostar Serbs, who had protested to the Patriarch against it, and he had put his name at the top of a list of 180 signatures to a petition of grievances of the Mostar Serb commune to Franz Joseph.82

While the Serbs of Sarajevo held aloof from overt opposition, it was thus the Mostar commune, in more fiery Herzegovina, which expressed the general discontent of urban Serbs at high taxes, the throttling of municipal councils and violations of Serb national feeling in matters of script and school. With the aid of the patriotic archimandrite Leontije Radulović and its teaching staff, notably the early socialist Jovo Ljepava and Đorđe Bekić, a Prague University graduate and Zastava correspondent, the Mostar commune drafted a statute which empowered it to represent general national interests before the Provincial Government. This was the same affirmation of the urban Serb communes as self-governing bodies which had been proposed, but thwarted, in the last years of Turkish rule. Yet the alignment between people and metropolitan, with the Ecumenical Patriarch waiting in the wings, proved a mirage. Joachim III was basically Austrophile, while Ignatios proved only too willing to denounce commune radicals once his material interests were safeguarded. Neither dissidents nor Austria could work through instruments like the Mostar bishop, whom Württemberg found a man ‘without any influence on his co-religionists, and altogether a quite insignificant person’.83

The purpose of the Kosanović appointment was to break this pattern whereby a metropolitan’s loyalty to government was in inverse relationship to his prestige with his flock. In Sarajevo, the largest of the formally equal three dioceses, a popular metropolitan would be installed who would gradually become primus inter pares and, working with government, assume some of the responsibilities of an archbishop in the Catholic Church. Hence the precaution shown through Kosanović’s carefully phrased oath of loyalty to Franz Joseph in February 1881 and the choreography of his April installation, when the legal dedication
deliberately preceded the religious ceremony and the consecrating bishops made Austrophile speeches. In the words of the Provincial Government’s report: ‘The pomp of the … installation of the Archbishop was thus not only a celebration of the Bosnian Orthodox people and the newly-elected Metropolitan, but also in a notable way a celebration for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.’

Some weeks after the ceremony, the ministry outlined its first proposals for the reorganization of the Bosnian Church. Peasant ‘popes’ leading their people against authority were to become modern priests explaining the government’s intentions. In theory the clergy were to lose their political role; in practice they were merely to change it. In many ways this operation resembled the task Josephinian reformers had faced in remote parts of the Monarchy like the newly annexed Bukovina in the 1780s, whose case-history Szlávy forwarded. But he wished to avoid both the bureaucratic tenor of that time, which had introduced government-paid parochial salaries (the so-called congrua), and also the heavy lay influence in the Karlowitz Patriarchate. Bosnian circumstances required, Szlávy believed, modest measures in cooperation with Kosanović, who ‘most earnestly’ desired reform, and eventually with other metropolitans. Equitable delimitation of parishes, followed by regulation of parochial dues and metropolitan disciplinary powers should come first, as befitted an attempt to distance Austria from Phanariot abuses.

Complementary to these proposals was a plan for an Orthodox seminary which grew out of Kukuljević’s discussions with Orthodox leaders back in 1879. The original scheme was heavily criticized for not taking sufficient account of Bosnia’s backwardness, for it posited funding largely by the Orthodox community itself, while giving the Sarajevo commune influence over the appointment of the seminary director. The solution adopted for a four-year ‘clerical school’, combining secular and religious study but without Latin and Greek, owed much to Professor Joseph Zhishman of Vienna, destined to be a regular government consultant on Orthodox matters. That all costs should fall to the government was, however, the ministry’s decision. The final arrangement, drafted under Szlávy’s successor, exemplified the regime’s cautious approach. There were to be only twelve places a year, matched against the 350 parishes and existing qualified priests to ensure that in twenty years all parishes would be in trained hands, with no danger of a ‘clerical proletariat’. Kosanović was to act as adviser on staff appointments, though the seminary was to serve all Bosnia, and it was to be placed on land bequeathed by Kosanović at Reljevo, several miles from Sarajevo’s unruly influence. Relatedly, students should spend the whole year there, rather than returning to their ‘filthy peasant hovels’ in vacations.

On Kosanović’s initiative, the government also set up a consistory in Sarajevo, whose four members received a salary of 2,000 florins a year like the canons of the Catholic chapter. Indeed, consistories in the Karlowitz patriarchate were resented as a Catholic importation by radicals. From it poured circulars imposing on Bosnian parish priests the tasks of their counterparts in the Monarchy — preparing
lists of baptisms, marriages and deaths, providing educational statistics, even
satisfying Kosanović’s folkloric interests by compiling lists of local Christian
names. In 1882 the first schematism of the Sarajevo diocese was published
under its auspices, which revealed the sharp differences in the size and income
of parishes.90 Until this basic economic question had been sorted out, other
steps towards a more modern, professional clergy might actually make priests
more rather than less discontented. Further constructive action depended on the
relationship between the government and the new Metropolitan of Sarajevo.

Yet an important misunderstanding clouded this relationship. Szlávy believed
that the elaborate procedure followed in Kosanović’s appointment and conse-
cration would both oblige him to a pro-government course and lend him the
authority to do so. Kosanović had a shrewder awareness of the populist element in
the Serb Church, strongest under foreign rule. He seems to have been in genuine
doubt as to whether a compromise between the Austrian favour bestowed on
him and the popular backing he sought was possible. While the Sarajevo see
was vacant he wrote to Metropolitan Mihailo of Belgrade, who advised him to
accept an offer rather than leave his ‘wretched flock’, and to the brilliant young
Dalmatian archimandrite, Nikola Milaš, who praised him as ‘contemporary’
and ‘patriotic’ for wishing to make his choice dependent on the popular will.91

For Kosanović had meanwhile informed the Sarajevo Serb commune of his
attempt to get the Patriarch to lend a popular element to his appointment by
communicating it to them for their approval, a manoeuvre which did eventually
lead Joachim to telegraph them about Kosanović’s promotion. This episode has
been cited variously as evidence of Kosanović’s enlightened patriotism and of his
skill as a duplicitous nationalist, undermining the Convention by which Austria
had sought to bind him.92 Indeed, it was a shrewd move, but it may have been
the least gesture Kosanović thought he could make to retain credibility with his
community, given the implicit dualism of Bosnian Serb authority and the risk of
appearing an Austrian tool. The unpopularity of successive Franciscan bishops
with their own Order shows how easily estrangement could develop. Nationally
conscious Serbs did not want to emerge from four centuries under a Muslim
empire to forfeit the chance of a truly national Church in a Catholic one. Besides,
Kosanović’s dealings with the commune were more ambiguous than appears
in Serb accounts. They took place two months after his October 1880 visit to
Vienna and formal deposition there that Bosnian Orthodoxy’s interest lay with
Austria. It seems likely that only later events wove them into Serb nationalist
legend. In 1883 Zastava could inveigh: ‘Kosanović became bishop without any
participation of our people; he knew how to recommend himself to the powers
that be.’93

Kosanović admitted the difficulties of his position in January 1882, when the
Sarajevo commune decided to curtail the ceremony of Blessing the Waters and
and the Provincial Government, suspecting political discontent, pressured him to
talk the commune round.94 But incidents of this sort were symptoms rather than
causes of the uneasy relations between metropolitan and government. The real issue was the status of the Serb Orthodox community in Bosnia. Were Serbs to be, as the leaders of the urban communes aspired, the premier community in a land they took by national ideology to be Serb, or were they to lose the initiative to Muslim elites maintained by the occupying power, even the hitherto unregarded Catholics, co-religionists of the new dynasty? No doubt the alternatives were not yet as stark as this, because commune leaders varied greatly in degrees of deference and Austrian policy was still exploratory. But the antithesis points to what was potentially at stake, and suggests how dangerous for Austrian interests was the attempt of a leading Sarajevo official, Count Mieroszowski, just after Kosanović’s installation to persuade him to join the Uniate Church, leading even the British consul to write of ‘an energetic Catholic propaganda … under the auspices of the Austrian government’. The large role which attempts to ‘Uniatise’ Hungarian Serbs in the eighteenth century had played in Habsburg Serbs’ historical consciousness gave the issue an added charge. Since Mieroszowski was moved to a post outside Bosnia, Freeman’s charge was hardly fair, but it shows how Austrian policy to Bosnia’s Orthodox and the touchy Kosanović was bound up from the start with the evolution of Bosnian Catholicism. From the viewpoint of nationally conscious Serbs this was not just a religious matter, but the beginning of an attempt to deny them their natural inheritance in Bosnia on the eclipse of Ottoman power.

ESTABLISHING THE HIERARCHIES: THE CATHOLICS

Under growing anti-clerical pressure, the international Catholic Church remained a formidable institution. It is tempting to apply to Serb–Croat relations the terms Connor Cruise O’Brien has used for the divide in Ulster, namely that Protestants (read Serbs) did not fear Catholics (read Croats) but Catholicism, whereas Catholics did not fear Protestantism (Orthodoxy) but Protestants. Indeed, Bosnia was occupied at a time when under Pope Leo XIII the Vatican was paying unprecedented attention to eastern Christendom, in part as compensation for difficulties further west. For a Pope intimately concerned for the fate of Armenian Catholics and Chaldean Christians and in serious negotiations with Russia, as for German-speaking monastics seeking escape from Bismarck’s Kulturkampf or a liberal Austria which had repudiated its Concordat with Rome (1870), a Bosnia restored to Christendom could only hold promise. Had not Strossmayer written to the Tsar in 1876 that the growing importance of nationality and the Slavs made the task of Christian unity, whose absence most grievously wounded Slav peoples, all the more timely?

Strossmayer’s career showed how the interlinking of religious and national goals, which Serbs took for granted, had spread to the Roman Church. Thus the political tension between Austrians and Hungarians and between Hungarians and
Croats found expression in rival views of Bosnia’s future Church organization, particularly where the affiliation of any new Bosnian hierarchy was concerned. That Archbishop Mihalović of Zagreb was a Magyarized Croat was a matter of particular irritation to Strossmayer, making him all the more concerned, as the historic titular bishop of Bosnia, to ensure that the process of reorganization there should not fall into the wrong hands. In a memorandum to the Curia of October 1878, Strossmayer proposed the setting up of a regular hierarchy, with bishop, chapter and seminary in Sarajevo and episcopal vicariates in Banjaluka and Tuzla.99 As early as 8 August 1878, however, Count Paar, Habsburg envoy at the Vatican, had been requested to investigate the ‘restless’ bishop’s activities, on the basis of a note by the Emperor himself, which said care should be taken to do nothing to disturb Catholic relations in Bosnia.100 The Curia responded gratifyingly to Austria’s appeals that it did not consider the moment opportune for Strossmayer’s proposals and that it would undertake no action in Bosnia without consulting Austria.101

Despite these assurances, Strossmayer’s personal testimony on the perspectives opened up by the Bosnian occupation, particularly for Church reunion among Orthodox south Slavs, undoubtedly won the Pope’s interest. With Secretary of State Nina’s encouragement he presented Franz Joseph with a memorandum on his ideas in a meeting of May 1879, proposing Franciscans should fill the new hierarchy but lose their exclusive right of ‘cure of souls’ in the parishes.102 Franz Joseph’s apparent sympathy now led the Pope to request the Propaganda to make out a case for a revived hierarchy, which sharply emphasized the inadequacy of the Franciscans for the fresh tasks of the Church in Bosnia. However, in a joint session of the Propaganda and the Commission for Extraordinary Affairs in June the prepared document was rejected by seventeen votes to two, a result which was long taken to show that the Vatican did not share the negative view of its faithful Franciscans pushed by the joint intrigues of Austria and Bishop Strossmayer. This parochial judgement, associated with fra Berislav Gavranović, is no longer held, but like traditional Serb historiography of Karlowitz it shows the distrust an imperial power could arouse in Bosnians when their affairs became subject to international calculations.103 In fact, wider considerations were in play. The main reason for the decision of 23 June was doubtless that mentioned at the end of the document in debate itself, fear of hostile Russian and Turkish reaction to the forward move implied by a new Catholic hierarchy in the Balkans.104 As to Austria and Strossmayer’s alleged collaboration, the fact that the great Slav patriot tried to co-opt Franz Joseph for his Bosnian plan is interesting primarily in showing the weakness of the Croatian position, condemned either to impotence or to seek external support. Austria was indeed sceptical of the Franciscans, as her ambassador at the Vatican told the Pope in autumn 1878, yet the Pope had agreed with him, while Joint Finance Minister Hofmann spoke warmly about the Franciscans the next June.105 It seems likely that Strossmayer shared an assumption with a section of Bosnian Franciscans working with him that many
in the Order would willingly undergo ‘secularization’ (renouncing monasticism to become ordinary parish priests), so that this aspect of the reorganization would not be as controversial as it became.\textsuperscript{106} In fact, Bosnian Catholic life is still scarred by the Franciscan sense of betrayal.

It was never likely that the matter would end with the negative vote of June 1879. Both Austria-Hungary and the Vatican had too much interest in change. For the monarchy it was a matter of Franciscan clergy reacting in some ways like Orthodox and Muslims against its more active style of government, fearful for their tithe exemptions and parochial role,\textsuperscript{107} suspicious of state supervision of their schools,\textsuperscript{108} and resentful of official interference in cases of Muslims wishing to convert.\textsuperscript{109} Meanwhile, disputes over alleged Hungarian ill-treatment of Bosnian Franciscan novices training in Esztergom reached a spectacular climax in October 1880 when sixteen of the young Bosnians escaped from the monastery in lay clothing.\textsuperscript{110} Given this background, it is hardly surprising that in summer 1880 a Ballhausplatz memorandum should begin:

The transformation of the existing organization of the Catholic hierarchy in Bosnia-Herzegovina has since the occupation of these provinces in 1878 revealed itself to be necessary … The transformation can only take place through the partial displacement of the Franciscan Order and the introduction of a secular hierarchy, for which the Curia is also ready.\textsuperscript{111}

In the Vatican, the Pope continued to mull over the hierarchy issue and lend an ear to Strossmayer’s ideas on Church unity and the Slavs. In August 1880 the aristocratic English Cardinal Howard was commissioned to sound out Franz Joseph’s views on Bosnia,\textsuperscript{112} while an encyclical of 30 September declared the feast day of the Slav evangelizers Cyrill and Methodius one of general observance in the Catholic Church. By autumn an exchange of notes began formal negotiations between Vienna and the Curia, which concluded in June 1881.

In this lengthy process Franciscan privileges were only one of the issues. Doubtless the Vatican was more alive to the need to conciliate the Franciscans than the Ballhausplatz, which at one point even suggested closing two Franciscan monasteries because of signs of disloyalty.\textsuperscript{113} However, the main papal negotiator assured Ambassador Paar that though the Curia would not formally refer to the gradual transformation of the Franciscans’ role, the Pope was convinced it was necessary.\textsuperscript{114} The final version referred only to the training of a secular clergy ‘which would take active part in … cure of souls in conjunction with the regular clergy, to which consideration should be shown in view of its long service to the Church’.\textsuperscript{115} Delay was also a product of debate in Habsburg circles where Archbishop Mihalović, the Cardinal Archbishops of Esztergom and Kalocsa, the Croatian clerical expert on Bosnia, Alois Boroša, as well as the Austrian and Hungarian governments, threw their proposals and influence into the fray in ways typical of the complex multinational realm. Should plans envisage temporary or
post-annexation arrangements? Should Bosnia have its own archbishop or not? Should its hierarchy be subordinated ecclesiastically directly to the Vatican, to Austrian Zadar, to Zagreb (with the Hungarian hierarchy behind it), or even divided between the two Habsburg states? But all this in turn was bound up with resources. Ambassador Paar shrewdly surmised that the Vatican thought temporizing towards the end of the negotiations would be more effective in extracting a larger state-funded Catholic establishment. Size mattered. In a pre-affluent age, the Habsburg monarchy and the Vatican haggled over the number of cathedral canons.

The upshot was that in place of the archdiocese, four suffragan sees and two cathedral chapters with which the Curia opened the negotiations, it gained an archbishop with a chapter in Sarajevo, a bishop in Mostar and an apostolic administrator in Banjaluka. While conceding the right of appointment of bishops to Franz Joseph, it refused to instruct these to induct as priests only men acceptable to Austria, no doubt judging that Vienna’s own favours were limited. For his part, Szlávy anticipated a key future theme when he asked if it was in the interests of the Church ‘so soon to build up an apparatus and a pomp glaringly disproportionate to the previous situation and offering occasion for the envy and suspicion of the other confessions’. He also showed sensitivity to local conditions in being less anti-Franciscan than Haymerle, suggesting that the main emphasis should go on the new hierarchy rather than parochial reorganization.

The fact was that many sections of the Church, including new Orders, were trying to get in on the act, and Franciscans who had been alone in the centuries of subjection could understandably feel alienated. An active role was being played by the Hungarian head of the Trappist monastery in Banjaluka, Beda Vestenek, who wished to build up the Catholic community in the hope of winning the Muslims and isolating the Serbs, as did Boroša, the Yugoslav-minded Strossmayer’s antipode. Vestenek was aware that some Catholic groups in the Monarchy were coming to regard Bosnia as a kind of virgin soil, forgetting that not even there could Austria ‘cut free from the drag of modern law’ — a reference to the neo-liberalism of the age such groups deplored. An interesting illustration of the mutual irritations which could arise is the case of the Sisters of the Precious Blood, driven from their native Baden by the Kulturkampf and invited by officials to settle near Banjaluka, where they sought permission to open an orphanage and a German-language school. Disappointed to find the land they had bought occupied by kmets they could not evict, the nuns began to shower the Emperor and the ministry with requests for free transport, tax reductions, the right to hold charitable collections and the like. Their projects, backed by an Austrian nobleman, Baron Dahmen, were approved only on condition they did not evangelize. Dahmen represented a current of aristocratic opinion in Vienna, embodied in the Austro-Hungarian Aid Society for Bosnia-Herzegovina, founded in 1881 under the patronage of Archduke Albrecht, the Emperor’s uncle, which pressed for Catholic activity in the Balkans.
As in the Orthodox case, the relationship between Bosnian Catholicism and these complex influences depended greatly on the personality of the new Archbishop of Sarajevo. The field was limited by the Habsburg authorities’ opposition to native Franciscans and fear of Strossmayer and his circle. Again, Szlávy played a significant role, for the two men on whom he requested the Croatian Ban’s opinion in a somewhat shadowy process, both Slavonians, included the final choice, the thirty-eight-year-old Josip Stadler, a Zagreb university theology professor. There is some irony in the rather anonymous appointment of a man who was to prove anything but a nonentity. At the start of his thirty-seven-year reign the prodigiously energetic and tenacious Stadler had already formulated the programme which was to animate it: the building of hundreds of churches, together with educational and charitable institutions; a strong central religious power, based on a secular clergy, the winning of outside aid and introduction of new religious orders in a province too poor to meet these goals alone. Zoran Grijak has shown how these energies were to be exercised in the ardently conservative spirit of the Rome of the Syllabus of Errors (1864), where Stadler had received his formative training at Jesuit hands, his primary work to date being the combatting of positivistic psychology in Croatian education and schoolbooks. Stadler told Szlávy forthrightly:

By the love which binds your Excellency and myself to our Holy Church and the precious fatherland I can testify that I have always strictly maintained the Catholic principle which rejects the separation of Church and state as unchristian and maintains mutual cooperation of both for the temporal and eternal welfare of the peoples a divine command.

Where circumstances required the state’s relationship with the Catholic Church to be looser than in the Monarchy, Stadler assumed it would be tighter. In his notion of a ‘special relationship’ of Catholic Church and Bosnian administration lay the root of much subsequent difficulty.

With the arrival of Stadler the outlook for Bosnian Catholicism changed completely, as it was charged directly with the spirit of a central European Catholicism steeled in Kulturkampf. The downside was that Stadler appeared close to the type of the schwarzgelb Croat whose Ultramontanism, Austrian patriotism and German-tinged culture Serb propagandists liked to caricature. Even before his arrival Stadler had obtained a Curial decree in Rome, empowering him to dispose of all parishes in his see except those directly tied to monasteries—and ensuring the hostility of the Franciscans. Furthermore, on his arrival he immediately brought in Jesuits to organize a Catholic Gymnasium in Travnik (to feed the projected Sarajevo seminary) and invited members of the Vienna Daughters of Divine Love to Bosnia, each time without consulting the government. A warning went his way to consult the authorities on any steps which might have political consequences, since ‘the Government had other interests besides Catholic ones.
to protect’. Right up to the pious Franz Joseph Habsburg government was still sufficiently Josephinist to put the state interest first.

But the Bosnian case also confirms that the Habsburg state simply could not treat the Catholic Church or its episcopal representatives in Bosnia as it treated the Ecumenical Patriarch and his metropolitans. This came out, for example, from the Pope’s refusal to allow Franz Joseph to appoint the Banjaluka Apostolic Administrator, along with Stadler being allowed more direct control over seminary staff than Kosanović in Reljevo. An uncertain situation prevailed whereby the authorities asserted the doctrine of religious equality and impartiality, but up to a point had to give special consideration to the Catholic Church.

ESTABLISHING THE HIERARCHIES: THE MUSLIMS

Unsurprisingly, the new regime broached Muslim religious reorganization last. The Austrian occupation had patently cast Bosnian Muslim society into a state of almost existential crisis, but by and large officials were too ignorant of that society’s Islamic roots to have remedies to propose. The wider context was the fate of Muslims left stranded by the withdrawal of the Ottoman tide. Justin McCarthy has estimated five-and-a-half million Muslim deaths and more than five million forced to leave their homes on this score in the period from 1821 to 1923. Exposed to ruinous competition from incoming goods and businessmen from the Monarchy, ordinary Muslim artisans, like Muslim peasants, had lost the one thing to which, in Karpat’s view, the Balkan Muslim masses had clung as the economic tables turned against them in the nineteenth century—their identification with the ruling religion. Haymerle put the uncomfortable parallels most sharply when he said that while the Muslim element might perhaps learn to adapt, ‘[it] will never be a sure support for us, because it will no more forget in Bosnia than it has, for instance, in India, Algeria and the Caucasus, that it once ruled’.

The early trauma of occupation was significantly the theme of the first works of modern Muslim literature written a generation later. In the best-known novels of Edhem Mulabdić and Abdul Aziz, though the authors were modernizers, pragmatic spokesmen of Muslim accommodation are contrasted not altogether attractively to the heroic young Ahmed, who dies in the resistance, and the tragic Alaga, who loses the will to live in the alien new world. In each book fears that Muslims will not get justice, and that the Vlachs (the implicitly disparaging term for the Christian kmets) will become overbearing, build pressures for emigration, while young men forbidden by rigidly conservative families to enter the new schools or learn the new script from Austrian soldiers (as Mulabdić himself did) fritter their way into drunken demoralization. These works are powerful because they distil a psychological reality. A group of Livno Muslims complained to exiles in Istanbul that the Christians treated them as if the Sultan had handed them over to Austria like beasts in the field. Particularly sensitive
was the conversion of property that Muslims claimed as vakuf into post offices, gendarme stations, officers’ casinos or public parks, the latter including former graveyards. Two instances, involving Catholic churches planned on land which had been used for Muslim services (Sarajevo) and in a mainly Muslim street near a mosque (Derventa), acquired greater notoriety. Württemberg resented Vienna’s censure on these issues, seeing Muslims as invoking Franz Joseph’s promise of religious equality merely as a pretext to continue treating Christians like raya as before. Conversion was a particularly sensitive issue for a community which traditionally had punished apostasy by death. On the one hand, Catholics in Bosnia and throughout the Monarchy were outraged at a district commissioner’s gloss on a secret instruction (October 1879) not to intervene in conversion cases: he claimed the instruction ruled out the conversion of Muslims and was dismissed. On the other, the alleged abduction of a Muslim girl and her baptism before marriage produced a petition of protest from Mostar Muslim leaders. It seems the girl was actually a young woman and had eloped herself, but Muslims were not convinced. Overall, the British consul sympathized with Muslim plaints. On the introduction of Austrian military service, he commented that having lost their former status, seen their commerce ruined, their taxes increased and living costs doubled, they were now expected to give their blood for a government they disliked: ‘They ask with much justice what they have gained by an Austrian occupation.’

Austria approached this dissatisfied community with understandable caution. Yet one thing seemed to offer her a point d’appui. This was the prestigious role in Muslim society of the learned class who, in conjunction with leading landowners, had largely held aloof from the popular resistance in 1878. Everything was done to flatter the esteem of these groups. Muslims were habitually the mayors in the towns, leaders of all official deputations, their sons encouraged, like young Hungarian aristocrats of Maria Theresa’s reign, to enjoy a Vienna education (after the Sarajevo military school)—even if a hodža with a substantial salary had to be appointed to minister to the religious needs of just two of these. The same sensitivity to the views of the Muslim elite was shown in the all-important question of an autonomous Muslim hierarchy, which Sarajevo Muslims had been prompted to raise in their petition of November 1878. The later official view was not to force the issue but to avoid a split in Muslim ranks, and while appearing neutral to aid those who favoured such a hierarchy. More urgency was injected into the matter when in July 1880 the Sultan appointed a mufti to Bosnia. In response, the Sarajevo was now commissioned to broach talks with a universally respected Muslim figure, for which role the Mayor of Sarajevo, Mustaj-beg Fadilpašić, was chosen.

The problem was complicated by Islam’s organizational flexibility relative to the Christian Churches. The hierarchical element was present at the top, where Sultans from 1517 had assumed the title of Caliph, involving a claim to religious authority for Sunni Muslims, which they exercised through the Sheikh-ul-Islam.
Beneath the Sheikh-ul-Islam, who commonly appointed to the higher religious posts, Islam possessed no consecrated priesthood but a wide variety of religious functionaries chosen in different ways, so that it was hard to conceive of a central organization. France in Algeria and Russia in her Muslim lands simply appointed someone to act in the Sheikh’s stead. However, Fadilpaˇsi´cd i dn o t believe the Sultan had forfeited his role as Caliph in Bosnia, and his Austrian interlocutor Sax held that by the Convention of April 1879 he could still make religious appointments there.140 Hence for long Austria did not think in terms of a total separation of her Muslims from the Sheikh’s authority. It was the ministry official Kranz who in July 1881 cut through the Gordian knot and proposed that an authentically Islamic body, a commission for examining the qualifications of kadis, should be set up which could gradually develop into an autonomous supervisory organ. Events soon favoured these calculations. Prompted by the authorities to follow their Christian fellow citizens’ lead, Sarajevo Muslims petitioned for a Reis-ul-Ulema, or Master of the Learned, assisted by a council or Medžlis-el-Ulema, which Szlávy was minded to approve before the Herzegovinian rising preoccupied him. The fact that the Sultan was anxious for an Austro-German-Turkish alliance, and in March 1882 had empowered the Mufti of Sarajevo to choose all Bosnian religious officials, smoothed the way for the inauguration of the new hierarchy, with Mufti Omerovi´ca sR e i sa n da Medžlis of four ulema, corresponding to the Catholic chapter and the Orthodox consistory.141

There was ample work for the new institution to do. The ruždijas, the teacher training school, the trade school and all other achievements of the Tanzimat had been swept away. Sporadic Austrian attempts to retrieve the situation foundered on basic problems like the non-translation of much of the relevant Turkish legislation; thus early regulations on the previous regime’s educational funds were later judged wide of the mark, in good part because the relevant Turkish law was not unearthed in the Turkish archives till 1883.142 Talk of a superior madrassa in Sarajevo, which would obviate the need to go to Istanbul, went no further. The revival of the ruždijas, for which budgetary provision was made, was shackled by hodžas’ refusal to accept that one teacher in each ruždija, necessarily a Christian at this stage, should teach Serbo-Croat. A statute for a provincial vakuf council drafted by the industrious Kukuljevi ´cw a sr e j e c t e di n Vienna for reasons which are unclear.143 Muslim justice also remained without formal regulation, though Muslims were attached to the courts on an ad hoc basis to offer opinions when matters of Muslim law arose.144 Insistence that the language of instruction should be Turkish was the Muslim school committee’s only comment on Austrian plans for a kadis’ training school, which got off to an inauspicious start.145 Salaries offered for instructors were too low to attract Bosnian ulema who were members of an elite used to the leisurely ways of the madrassa;146 and the Muslim masses, we are told, assembled when it first opened to jeer at the students and call them ‘popes’.147
However, though there was ample work to do, there is little sign that Austria expected the new autonomous institution to do it. The climate of opinion in Europe and in Austria inclined the new regime to see Islamic society as both retrograde and moribund. Hence Austria’s wish to fortify the occupation with Muslim support presupposed a drastic overhaul of Muslim institutions and psychology. However, for political reasons, she had begun by working through Muslim dignitaries whose loyalty was more a matter of conservatism than attachment to the western civilization Austria offered. With a certain resignation Austria felt the contradiction of her policies. In appointing the Reis and his Medžlis, she contented herself with rewarding merit as seen through traditionalist Muslim eyes, and expressed no hope that her choices would show the energy she expected from Stadler and Kosanović. Nor did they, though this was not necessarily due to the habitual ‘indolence’ which contemporary Europe ascribed to Orientals. The fact was that the Austrian agenda still represented to most Bosnian Muslims the alien world against which their identity had been forged.

### A SCHOOLING POLICY EMERGES

By 1878 a cultural mission had to show some aspiration towards popular primary education. Not only did the second half of the nineteenth century see decisive steps towards the compulsory education Enlightenment laws had called for (Austria 1774, Hungary 1777); it also shaped the rationale which was to lend this principle its practical and idealistic dynamic almost to our own day. ‘Only a free school can rear a free nation,’ declared the driving force of the ‘popular school’ movement in Croatia, Ivan Filipović, in 1874.148 This was an age when primary education came into its own; when teacher training colleges with three-year courses produced cohorts of professionals, school laws liberated these from the tutelage of the clergy; syllabuses (endlessly agonized over) went beyond the three Rs and religious catechisms to include all the rudiments of a modern curriculum; a variety of textbooks, journals, methodologies and professional associations became indispensable features of what might be called the education industry, and the august mission of the primary school teacher to provide the weapons of the present—knowledge, not arms, in the ubiquitous trope—was as lavishly extolled as it was meanly rewarded. Education acquired talismanic power. ‘With this Bill we join the circle of all civilized nations,’ said Kukuljević of the Croatian school law of 1874.149 Yet any institution which makes such symbolic claims risks arousing rival symbolisms and receiving symbolic treatment. In Bosnia issues of resources and principle were to dog the development of mass education.

The claims of established Churches vis-à-vis the new pedagogical professionalism remained the most divisive issue in contemporary schooling, as
witness the Anglican–Nonconformist disputes in England (1870–1902) and the lay–Catholic tensions in France. Kukuljević’s proposals for compulsory, interconfessional schooling in Bosnia were given short shrift by the powers that be called on to judge them. Hungary’s Culture Minister Ágoston Trefort, a long-standing proponent of Hungary’s largely confessional primary school system, condemned them as liable to be communally disruptive. His Austrian counterpart Stremayr judged them ‘inexpedient’ and costly in backward Bosnia. 150 Called on by the Joint Finance Ministry to revise its draft, Sarajevo dropped the compulsion but retained the interconfessionality, arguing that only thereby could Muslims get the western education not provided for in their Koranic mektebs. 151 But the ministry denied that the matter was so urgent. In hard political—and financial—terms, all that was needed was an interim solution for a few interconfessional schools in the largest towns, with subsidies offered to the existing confessional schools if they agreed to accept children of other faiths; confessional barriers would fall if parents saw that interconfessional schools offered their children better education. 152 The Austrian culture minister agreed, noting that no final regulation of primary education could take place without the element of compulsion. 153 In fact, Szlávy took no action on the Provincial Government’s draft and relative compulsion was not introduced until 1911.

The provision of suitable personnel and teaching materials posed similar resource problems. The first appointee as provincial school Referent, a Dalmatian Serb named Zore, quickly resigned when he was refused four months’ leave to draft a coherent educational programme. 154 Although the government’s official motive was that it could not do without its adviser for so long, a fifteen-month interregnum followed, before the trawl produced a Slavophone German teacher in Dubrovnik. 155 Cobenzl, however, was required to resign a year later since the ministry now considered the post unnecessary. 156 Not surprisingly, Kukuljević’s six Kreis inspectors did not materialize. As to teaching staff, the higher echelons, who would need to be of proven loyalty and conversant with German and Serbo-Croat, could hardly be enticed from the monarchy except by very high salaries; and the Catholics who were most likely to pass the loyalty test would be alien to most of their pupils. 157 Meanwhile, the Provincial Government believed a teachers’ training college was out of the question till there were enough educated Bosnians to justify it, and the War Ministry declined to continue paying the non-commissioned officers who had assumed teaching duties. 158

Hence the thirty-eight primary schools under the Provincial Government’s wing in September 1880 had increased to only forty-one, with 3,344 pupils, two years later. 159 The interconfessional principle survived in these, but in practice schools tended to take on a confessional stamp even in towns where all confessions lived. Thus twenty-nine of the thirty-eight schools extant in 1881–2 drew at least three-quarters of their pupils from a single confession. 160 Despite complaints of anti-Islamic textbooks, 161 Muslim pupils rose from 237 to 443 between 1881–2 and 1882–3, perhaps as a result of the ‘intrigues, persuasion and pressure’ which
Joint Finance Minister Kállay later said were used at the start of the occupation to lure them to school. But this still amounted to only 13 per cent of government school pupils and 5.5 per cent of those having a western-style education all told. The state girls’ school in Sarajevo, intended eventually mainly for Muslims, because confessional Christian girls’ schools already existed, had as yet one solitary Muslim pupil. Linked to the confessional problem was the failure of Vienna’s hopes of assimilating cooperative confessional schools through judicious subsidy. That this strategy had a rationale is shown by the success of Bijeljina District Commissioner Karl Plentaj, credited with eight foundations; in fact they were mainly Orthodox schools in homogeneous Orthodox neighbourhoods, which he had helped recover from the dislocation of 1875–78 with the offer of teachers or money. In the first years of the occupation Sarajevo was anxious to achieve this kind of relationship in the small centres of eastern Herzegovina, in order to extend Austrian influence among the turbulent, semi-tribalized Orthodox along the Montenegrin border. It was the chance of appointing government teachers to three newly organized Serb schools in this area which had prompted the Provincial Government’s enthusiasm for a school law early in 1880. But it was not to be.

The modern principle of education for citizenship posed an acute problem in a confessionally structured society. Where was this new-fangled civic allegiance to go? Already under Turkish rule Serb church and school communes in the larger towns had conceived education as the linchpin of a specifically Serbian national consciousness, opposed to the Ottomanizing aims of the 1869 Turkish school law. Serb criticism of the equivalent Croatian law of 1874, as a bid to dissolve their nationality in a Croatian civil society, kept activists alert to the issue. As early as October 1879 the Dalmatian Serb newspaper Srpski list was inveighing against ‘fanatical’ Latinizing Croat teachers, calling on Serbs to defend their confessional schools. By autumn 1880 the Mostar commune had despatched an envoy to the Emperor to complain of the violation of an autonomy they claimed, characteristically, to have enjoyed under the Turks: the border town of Gacko was one case where local Serbs were apparently dissuaded from accepting a communal school by Mostar’s warnings. A ministry official toured the area and recommended a more conciliatory policy, but the damage was done. The Mostar Serbs’ identification of Serbian patriotism with the autonomous Serb school made close government relations with such schools, except perhaps in the remotest rural districts, impossible. A principle emerged whereby the government was not to subsidize a Serb school by paying its teacher unless it had itself appointed that teacher. Intermediate categories of communal, state-supported school began to appear in government tables as state schools, and these and confessional schools faced each other across a barrier of suspicion and ill-will.

In later Serb propaganda, this opening period of the occupation appears as a veritable inquisition against the Serb school. Yet despite the charges
of Croaticization, twenty-three of the forty-seven teachers in state-controlled schools in 1880 were Orthodox, while in only three of them were predominantly Orthodox children taught by Catholics, two of these, however, being in Herzegovina. Only in one case at this stage did direct competition from a new state school lead to a Serb school’s closure. It was natural that Austria should bridle at schoolbooks with prayers for Prince Milan Obrenović and exhortations to love the Serbian fatherland, though the ministry was less scandalized by Serb history books than Sarajevo and preferred to leave the question of supervision of Serb education to a settlement of relations to Serb communes in general. On the other hand, tearing out the offending pages, as began in Sarajevo Kreis, highlighted the tension. In a centre like Sarajevo, government suspicion made the functioning of Serb schooling difficult. By 1882 two teachers had been expelled, two appointments annulled and the educational director forbidden to return from his summer holidays. In an embittered teacher’s view, the chief of police quizzed all the governors of the Serb realka several times, because of the army of spies watching every word of those ‘who, as Serbs, think and feel in a Serb way’. Dr Ivan Zoch, dedicated Slovak director of the new state Realgymnasium, also fell prey to official insecurity, not saved by his free public lectures, geological and botanical expeditions and excellently produced school reports from forced resignation for his Serbophilia and criticism of sluggish school policy. However, Serb school difficulties owed much to their own inadequate arrangements. In 1881–82 only twenty-seven of their seventy-one confessional teachers were qualified, against forty of fifty-nine government teachers, and those in rural schools were wretchedly paid. The result was that more Serb schools closed than opened in 1882 and numbers in confessional schools fell by 13 per cent over the previous year, while those in state-controlled schools rose by 28 per cent. If this gave the authorities some encouragement, it must have been tempered by the outstanding problems. Whether different tactics could have avoided a confrontation with the Serbs seems doubtful, given the importance control in this sphere had to both sides. Henceforth, however, the Serb national cause was bound up with defence of the confessional school and school affairs became a touchstone of Austro–Serb relations.

THE HERZEGOVINIAN REVOLT AND THE END OF SZLÁVY’S MINISTERSHIP

In January 1882 an insurrection began in Herzegovina along the Montenegrin border. It spread rapidly to other parts of the province, so that 70,000 men and 31,700,000 florins of extraordinary credits were needed to put it down. Many Muslims joined an originally Serb movement, though the organization of the revolt was too weak to develop the formal programme of Muslim-Serb brotherhood advocated by Bosnian Serb emigrants in Serbia. Unfortunately for
the rebels, Austria-Hungary’s international position after the treaties of 1881 was secure and they failed to win support even from Montenegro. Though the revolt never really threatened the Austrian occupation, and the rebels were moved most directly by agrarian and tax grievances and the introduction of military conscription in November 1881, their area was one, as General Jovanović pointed out, where the Orthodox population had been independent in Church and school matters under the Turks. This connection, highlighted in the Mostar commune’s campaign against government schools, was brought out in the Austrian Delegation’s lively discussion of the revolt. Whereas the German liberal leader Ernst von Plener saw only Austria’s fateful preference for the begs over the peasants, the Dalmatian Croat, Dr Miho Klaić, called for a Slav national administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In setting the Herzegovinian revolt in the context of the Bosnian regime’s cultural policies, Klaić expressed the disillusionment of both Croat and Serb nationalists. Naturally, they deplored the shackling of the ‘national spirit’ by non-Slav authorities in Vienna and Budapest. Equally naturally, the political structures of the Dual monarchy meant that it could not be otherwise. Austria-Hungary was, as Andrássy had written, ‘a conservative non-Slav state’, whose activities in Bosnia were further determined by the reluctance of European Great Powers to be out of pocket on imperial ventures. Within this framework, the Monarchy’s policies in Bosnia between 1878 and 1882 were quite predictable and in their cultural aspect followed closely the course advocated by Thoemmel in his memoranda of occupation year.

The faithfulness with which this programme had been followed helps to show up its limitations. Full separation of Bosnian subjects from external religious influence had been shown to be impossible while Austria was denied sovereign status in Bosnia by the Treaty of Berlin. It was already plain that the new hierarchies could make for new problems, like the relationship of Stadler to the Franciscans, or give old ones a new twist, as in Kosanović’s relation to the Serb lay communes. The slogans of religious equality and toleration which the regime professed veiled deep-seated ambiguity as to its ultimate intentions, whether to shore up or dismantle the social structures of the 1878 status quo. Did the 20,000 florins apiece of cultural subvention granted to Catholics and more numerous Orthodox, compared to the 2,000 florins for Muslims, violate even-handedness or reflect pragmatic recognition of Muslim vakuf resources and Catholic poverty? What was clear was that all sides were dissatisfied. It is symptomatic that when Serbs were already developing their thesis of Croat-Catholic prejudices on the part of Bosnian officialdom, a Croatian paper could write in 1880 that the attitude of some of these officials was such ‘that we will soon be convinced that our sacrifices of blood and money were in vain’.

It is easy to pick holes in political positions. Bland declarations of religious equality, together with very gradualist attitudes to cultural reform, were the stock-in-trade of all European regimes administering backward regions. Britain in
Cyprus used the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan as spokesman for his community much as Austria hoped to use Kosanović. Habsburg rule kept a tighter leash, yet no tighter than that of the government in Serbia or Greece. Yet here the state power was Orthodox, like the people, and government tutelage of the Church aroused less hostility. The difficulty of Austria’s position in Bosnia, in comparative context, was the level of development of nationalism already by the start of the occupation, the interpenetration of ideas from other parts of the Serb and Croat worlds and the cumbersome supervision of the Bosnian administration by power centres in the Dual monarchy. These power centres had disguised the complexity of the situation behind pious phrases and entrusted the day-to-day implementation of policy to people as implausibly qualified as Hofmann and Württemberg. It was time to relaunch the project by putting in place the Monarchy’s leading Balkan specialist, the multitalented diplomat, historian, and one-time MP and editor, Benjamin von Kállay.
Benjamin von Kállay is the most important figure of the Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As second in command in the Foreign Office, he had negotiated the secret treaty with Serbia and been directly involved in the setting up of the Bosnian religious hierarchies. His intellectual abilities and driving personality gave him charismatic qualities which cast an aura about him throughout his career. Reading a copy of a lecture delivered to his memory, the former Croatian Ban and twice Hungarian prime minister Baron Khuen-Héderváry was to report his emotion as Kállay’s ‘noble form’ appeared before him once more.¹ In a way, the occupation had led up to his appointment and its evolution after his death in office in 1903 was still more fully a reaction to what he had done.

Naturally, Kállay has attracted attention from commentators and historians. Seen in his own lifetime as an eminent statesman by the wider world, he was subject in post-1918 Yugoslavia to the verdict of the south Slav nationalism he had opposed, which became even sharper when in communist Yugoslavia this was reinforced by the imperialist and class critique of Marxism.² Long central to criticism was the view that Kállay had started his career a Serbophile before turning against the Serbs, proclaiming as minister that Bosnia was a nation to itself and even banning his own youthful History of the Serbs in Bosnia. Gradually in the communist period comment became more measured, acknowledging more consistency in Kállay’s position and seeing his attitude to Bosnian nationhood as a pragmatic stance not without a certain rationale.³ This chapter shares this perspective, yet will suggest that there are indeed paradoxical elements in the career of an undoubtedly gifted man, owing, however, probably more to temperament than shifts in underlying beliefs. Here the ideas will be set out which gave his regime its incisive stamp, leaving the details of the Bosnian response to subsequent chapters.

PROCONSULAR VISIONS

Kállay was born in 1839 into a family of the Hungarian middle nobility. Brought up by his widowed mother (of Magyarized Serb descent) and his tutor in a spirit of piety to the patriotic cause, already by 1865 he had published a translation of John...
Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty*, developed an interest in south Slav themes, learnt Serbo-Croat and stood for parliament in a Hungarian Serb town. In 1868 Andrássy, then the first constitutional Hungarian Prime Minister, secured his appointment as Consul General with diplomatic status in Belgrade where he played a bold role, along with Andrássy, in advancing a Serbian policy which accorded with Hungarian interests, rather than the official line of the Ballhausplatz. At a time when centralist elements in Vienna had not fully accepted the autonomy won by Hungary in 1867, Kállay sought to cement Serbian-Hungarian friendship as a bulwark against them by suggesting the Monarchy would back a Serbian occupation of Bosnia. The scheme lost relevance after the Franco-Prussian war ended Austro-German dreams of undoing 1866–67, but a growing consensus is that Kállay really did initially want Hungaro-Serb friendship and was not, as Serbian historians once believed, engaged in a Ballhausplatz plot to deceive the Serbs. That said, there seems little doubt that the relationship Kállay sought was to be skewed in Hungary’s favour and that ‘the ‘Bosnian scheme’ was a convenient way of preventing Belgrade from lining up with Strossmayer’s Yugoslav-tinged Croat movement or the restless Hungarian Serbs. Indeed, Kállay once confided privately that one day Bosnia would fall to the Monarchy. The extended episode shows that Kállay in younger days had nurtured dreams of Serb-Hungarian cooperation for a ‘great Danubian confederation on democratic foundations uniting different but roughly equal nations’, but also reveals a power drive, both personal and national, together with an unscrupulous streak over methods which suggests a fascination with the ‘Great Game’ of high politics.

The intellectual confidence and ambition displayed during Kállay’s Belgrade mission (1868–75) led him to publish a noted *History of the Serbs* (1876), found a journal, *Kelet Népe* (*People of the East*) and enter parliament before returning to official employ in 1878. He may have had an offer to coordinate the Bosnian administration at the start of the occupation, but in fact became Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary in the Eastern Rumelia Delimitation Commission (1878–79) before entering the Foreign Ministry as *Sektionschef*. The mature Kállay was certainly a Hungarian patriot but identified with its dynastic rather than nationalist wing, making his trusted relation with the Emperor the cornerstone of his career. He reflected the characteristic mix of liberal and conservative motifs of his Hungarian generation: liberal in the espousal of freedom and social modernization in the spirit of the Hungarian pre-1848 reform movement, but conservative as members of a noble elite were bound to be. Parliamentarism was the form of government of oligarchy, whether aristocratic or bourgeois, he once jotted, but not of democracy. Kállay reflected the class and national pride of the Hungarian gentry, who, having disavowed their feudal roots, believed the civil liberty they had established made further revolutionary commotions unnecessary.

Kállay did not see his views as the product of Hungarian experience alone. In a widely discussed lecture on ‘Hungary’s Place between East and West’ given to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1883, he contrasted the anarchic
individualism of the Orient with the Rechtsstaat tradition bequeathed to the West by ancient Rome. Whereas the ‘Muslim–Turkish’ culture permitted only the despotism of individual rulers and the ruling race, leaving conquered cultures to their own devices, Roman law allowed for equal citizenship, providing a framework in which different elements could be moulded into a common polity. This was a classic example of what has been called ‘Orientalism’, an intellectual mindset which arrogated the energetic, progressist impulses of modern civic society to the West. Characteristic of Kállay’s conservative modernism was that in his typology democratic ancient Greece belonged to the eastern sphere. In it he allotted Hungary a mediatory role. Its conquering race had neither been absorbed by the conquered, as in the West, nor, like the Turks, had it left them as unassimilated rayas, but through the institution of the ‘political nation’ of citizens enjoying equal rights it had amalgamated non-Magyars with itself. Many contemporaries were baffled by such high-flown discourse, surmising that Kállay envisaged an Austro-Hungarian advance on Constantinople. In fact, the address can be readily decoded as a theoretical underpinning for what Kállay intended to do in Bosnia. In this Oriental land, wedded to religious mores, the Bosnian communities would not be treated as proto-nations, with the political claims that would imply, but as religious groups whose interests could be met by the pledge of religious tolerance and equality. Politics and in general the higher sphere of civic modernity were to be reserved to the Habsburg state, whose cultural mission in Bosnia would be complete when these backward lands were successfully assimilated into the multi-ethnic empire. This was an intellectualization and extension of the Monarchy’s traditional policy of dealing with its Serb subjects through the Karlowitz Orthodox hierarchy, which had the advantage of emphasizing Serb–Croat religious differences rather than their linguistic kinship. But in context it struck also a proconsular note characteristic of an age which saw European powers extending their dominance almost everywhere over ‘Oriental’ civilizations. Endowed with awesome responsibilities over millions of subjects in lands diverging hugely from where they came, many colonial administrators found themselves all but constrained to be both philosophers and men of action. The able, ambitious Kállay, who had combined technical studies with languages in his youth, fitted the bill naturally. In the words of an admirer: ‘His idea was to make Bosnia-Herzegovina the model land of the Balkans, of whose cultural development and organization the Monarchy should be proud.’

Given such an approach, cultural factors could not but play a prominent place in Kállay’s strategy. The religious hierarchies and the school question figured fourth and fifth in eighteen points he listed privately for action at this time. But the Herzegovinian revolt and his own theories’ identification of the West with state authority combined to make the political security of the Bosnian government his overriding initial goal. Far from reflecting expansionist designs, Kállay’s motivation was the double defensiveness of the agent of a conservative
Monarchy and of a Magyar outnumbered in his own country. The background to his policies in Bosnia was fear of Russia and the Slav Orthodox world, which become in his writings emblematic of the Eastern threat. Russian expansionism for him appeared an elemental, anarchic force, an ‘instinctive pressure’ of the Russian people sustained independent of the will of Russian rulers ‘with never slackening strength … The Russian writers are right to see an essential difference between Russia and western European civilization in our day also.’

By contrast, Austria’s task in Bosnia was ‘to awaken the spirit of the West, namely the strong feeling for the state … working against petty, destructive and disruptive particularism’.

Hence the emphases of Kállay’s memorandum discussed in the common ministerial council of 3 June 1882: a rapid annexation, revision of the 1880 joint Austro-Hungarian law on Bosnia to lessen the two governments’ tutelage, and civilianization and simplification of the Sarajevo administration—quicker procedure and more personal contact. The last was achieved, and until 1912 a Civil Adlatus replaced the military governor as the real head of the Provincial Government. Though Tisza would not give up any of his government’s rights to supervise the Bosnian administration, in practice Kállay’s professionalism and avoidance of recourse to external funding led to a steady loosening of the apron strings. When in 1893, following a Bosnian episcopal appointment, the Hungarian minister of culture pointed out that such appointments at the start of the occupation had been made subject to the agreement of the two governments, the prime minister annotated the report ‘neither necessary nor desirable’. No progress was made on annexation, because of concerns for Serbia’s and perhaps also Turkey’s response. There was also the awkward question of fitting Bosnia into the Monarchy’s Dualist structures, which in 1882 and when the common ministers next discussed it in 1896 led to agreement that after annexation a provisional period of separate administration under joint Austrian and Hungarian auspices would be necessary. Since Kállay’s memorandum had called annexation the ‘chief condition for the securing of ordered circumstances’ in Bosnia, it is useful to be reminded of the constraints upon his administration. Another was finance. It was a potent reason why the agrarian question, which the memorandum said exercised ‘a not insignificant influence on all relations in Bosnia’ and should be settled as soon as possible, was to remain unresolved: the cost of Muslim landlords’ compensation.

However, the lineaments of the ‘purified’ administration Kállay desired came into being. With the Oriental expert Hugo Kutschera his right-hand man as Civil Adlatus, military commander Baron Appel content to confine himself to a largely nominal role as head of the Provincial Government, and fewer Croats and more Austro-Germans and Magyars among Kreis and District Commissioners, he had the reshaped personnel he wanted. It was an authoritarian system. The provincial advisory council ceased to meet, local self-government remained at the level of nominated village headmen, and of the towns only
Sarajevo and Mostar were given, in 1884, a semblance of municipal autonomy, which the British consul described as illusory. Like many other authoritarian regimes, Kállay’s rested on the assumption that political reforms should wait on economic progress. In the first instance, his mission was an economic one.

Kállay turned an enterprising hand to the development of Bosnia’s economic resources. A ten-year road-building programme, completed in 1893, and a resourcefully financed railway network established an infrastructure on which coal and iron mining was opened up, with a modern forestry industry created and numerous other branches launched, including paper and spirits manufacture, distilling, food-processing, carpet-making and cigarettes. Except in forestry, these were nearly all state enterprises, managed, like the forestry work, almost wholly by immigrant personnel.

Until Kállay’s last years, the focus was on Bosnian development rather than extraneous priorities, whether Hungarian national or military—as in unproductive strategic railways. Limits were set by the double bind in which the regime found itself, however: the stagnation on the land as long as agrarian relations remained substantially unchanged, and resultant inability to fund the railways which might produce revenue to finance a land reform. Officially, it was a matter of awaiting the results of a cadastral survey, begun in 1884, but as this was still far from complete at Kállay’s death, he put his real hopes in attempts to boost agricultural productivity through model agricultural stations and voluntary redemption of kmet status. This disjuncture between promotion of capitalist relations in industry and maintenance of traditional structures on the land was an important shaping factor in Kállay’s relations with the confessions. It reflected the conservative pull at the heart of his creed, for land reform was not just restricted by finance. Kállay saw a role for the Muslim begs as a support of the regime and feared they could not survive to play it if their landed privileges were removed. Hence his regime’s two goals, economic progress and political stability, had to be kept in balance. The secret would be to hold the various political and confessional pressures in check until the economic transformation of Bosnia introduced new social and cultural conditions with, hopefully, a more tractable political superstructure.

This was the framework within which Kállay’s policies towards the rival confessions were determined. Nothing in the history of the occupation is more controversial than these, for they led to charges of discrimination by all three, by Serbs and Muslims of pro-Catholic, by Croats of pro-Muslim bias, which fed intercommunal suspicions outlasting Austrian rule. In fact, it would be truer to say that at the outset of his tenure he aimed to subject them all to the overriding authority of the state. He had reservations about all three.

From the start Habsburg officials had hoped to win over Muslim support. Kállay, however, went somewhat further when he wrote to Tisza that the Muslim element, as a conservative force, “if won for us, can form the surest support for our administration in the future”. The Muslim landowners should be safeguarded, he told the Austrian Delegation in 1892, because they were ‘the most stable
element for the country and people, with whom they feel at one in nationality and language.28 Yet a man who thought of modern progress in terms of the distinction of the religious from the civil sphere—hardly a characteristic of Islam—could not view a Muslim community without certain qualms. Could a Muslim community survive in a modern environment? Or, as the author of a book on Bosnia’s Muslims, credited to Kállay, but probably written by his intellectual alter ego, Lajos Thallóczy, put it in 1900: ‘Before our eyes an interesting and by no means insignificant part of the problem of mankind is being enacted. Can the Muslim way of life adapt itself, and in what ways, to the framework of modern progress?’29 Hence Kállay’s opposition to compulsory redemption of landlord rights, since he feared thereby the ruin of the Muslim aristocracy. In non-agrarian matters, though, he did nothing to prevent the advance of capital and admitted that a more numerous but equally distinctive element in the Muslim population, the middling artisans and merchants in the towns, had inevitably suffered from ‘the great cultural upheaval and economic displacement’ brought about by competition from the Monarchy.30

This solicitude for landowners and comparative indifference to the urban poor illustrates the central ambiguity in Kállay’s political philosophy, and that of his Hungarian gentry class. Their nineteenth-century reform movement had been intended to modernize the gentry, not abolish it. Not Islam so much as the independent spirit of a Bogumil aristocratic elite was what Kállay wished to support; believing as he did that the Bosnian begs were direct descendants of medieval leaders who accepted Islam to retain their predominance in the land.31 Now that power had slipped from their hands Kállay even held out hopes, in confidential papers, for their eventual return to Christianity. On becoming minister in 1882 he wrote to Franz Joseph that the status of Catholicism in Bosnia should be enhanced so that if the Muslims left their religion, which he surmised would take place in the distant future, they would join the Catholic rather than the Orthodox confession.32 Nor was this a thought of the moment, for Kállay had outlined the same idea in a memorandum of 187733 and he was to return briefly to the idea of a Muslim apostasy in 1893.34 It was shaped by the contemporary European identification of modern civilization with their own but it had, in Kállay, the specifically Bosnian dimension just mentioned. Thallóczy, in a document written after Kállay’s death, pregnantly reveals the reasoning behind much of his former chief’s policy. Beginning by stating Kállay’s conviction that attempts to Europeanize Turkey could only reap confusion because of Turkish institutions’ Asiatic roots, it continues:

He was, however, convinced that the old Bosnian Slavic element had only been overlaid by Oriental deposits and must gradually reemerge. He believed firmly in the historical separate identity of Bosnia, which until the fifteenth century had formed quite a distinctive organism in the western Balkans and had never been attached to the power centres of Hungary. If, then he used to conclude, the awakening of the historical spirit and the old
Bosnian self-consciousness were possible on the basis of historical awareness, and if in the not too distant future a conservative Bosnian national character could develop and differentiate itself from that of Croat and Serb, then the basis of all the fanciful dreams, whether pan-Croat or pan-Serb, would be removed.35

This passage sufficiently shows the key place of the Muslim community in Kállay’s vision, whatever present problems. These included the land question and the adaptation of sharia law to western norms, linked because agrarian reform might be financeable through use of state and vakuf land—but touching the vakuf depended on a general regulation of Muslim legal affairs.36 Thus Muslims posed Kállay with a complex knot of problems contrasting with the bold simplicity of his underlying plan for them. This was not untypical. Throughout the new minister’s career a positive relish for marshalling of detail and the grand design is revealed, if in the end he was often to be enmeshed in his own subtleties.

The preceding discussion illuminates the ambiguous role assigned by Kállay to the Catholic population of Bosnia. On the face of it the most Austrophile section of society, they should be made, he had written to Franz Joseph, ‘the most educated and powerful community’ in it.37 But the Catholics, few in numbers and as yet poor, could not in themselves be a sufficiently broad base for Austrian policy. They were to be helped chiefly to provide an attraction to others, notably the Muslim landowning class. Yet there was an awkward balance to be struck here between fulfilling Austria-Hungary’s obligations to the Vatican and convincing non-Catholics of Austria’s confessional even-handedness. Besides, the court circles, whose support Kállay needed to maintain independence from the two governments and the Ballhausplatz, were sympathetic to the cause of Catholic outreach in the Balkans. He also had to ensure that a more self-confident Bosnian Catholic community would not, like the Bosnian Serbs, adopt the national ideology of its co-religionists beyond Bosnia’s borders. Though Kállay had always been prepared to play divide and rule—at Belgrade he had threatened Serbs with a switch of Hungarian support from a Serbian to a Croatian Bosnia38—in essence Croat aspirations were no more acceptable to him than Serb ones. His policies to the Bosnian Catholics therefore depended on a whole range of conflicting pressures. The immediate task was to save them from crippling disunion in the feud pending between Archbishop Stadler and the native Franciscans.

The Serb community caused Kállay the most concern and his policies to it caused the greatest controversy. The charge levelled against him by Serb nationalists, and for long by Serb historians, is twofold. First, that he discriminated against them, and, second, that in doing so he contradicted his own scholarly work, inventing the artificial notion of a ‘Bosnian nation’ in order to deny the Serb nature of Bosnia which his History of the Serbs had recognized.39

At first sight, indeed, the Bosnian Serb urban communes’ emphasis of the civic-national element of their identity, rather than the religious, might seem to
have aligned them with his definition of westernism. But, with social science in its infancy, nineteenth-century social philosophers like Kállay had enough leeway to shuffle complex realities into line with their vast overarching themes. The 1883 Academy lecture declared that though the new Balkan states had created western institutions, the Oriental element remained uppermost in their public and private relations. In his posthumously published history of the first Serbian revolt against the Turks, Kállay was to return to the ‘particularism’ and personal divisions which he claimed militated against more sophisticated political relationships at all stages of Serbian history.\(^{40}\) While he had written appreciatively in his earlier history of aspects of the Serbian experience like the role of folk music in maintaining a national identity under Turkish rule, closer inspection reveals other themes. Serbs had traditionally looked to Austria, and the Russian orientation that came later was not necessarily in their interests; not so much Serb strength as ‘the lack of assimilative power of the Muslim element’ saved the Serb people.\(^{41}\) In other words, Kállay had never been an unconditional friend of the Serbs, and certainly not of radical leanings on their part. As Consul General in Belgrade he had formed the view that they were ‘eminently conservative’ and more respectful of authority than almost any other European nation:

The Serbs are indeed an energetic people, endowed by nature with much healthy understanding, but they stand at a very low level of civilization, so that, left to themselves and exposed to the restless operation of foreign influences they would soon fall into anarchy … Serbia needs a strong government which will lead the people along the path of moderation and gradually raise them into the ranks of the nations of culture. The people themselves feel the need for tutelage and authority.\(^{42}\)

In Kállay’s plans, therefore, the first imperative was to provide that strong government in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs were to be officially a religious group, the ‘Oriental Orthodox’, who were to be debarred from contact with Orthodox Slav countries and directed to the traditions of their own province and to Austria-Hungary as the metropolitan power. While Bosnian Catholics were strengthened and Muslims cajoled, the ultimate aim was to be the complete emancipation of Bosnians from allegiance to Belgrade, Zagreb or Constantinople and their acknowledgement of a common Bosnian identity based on traditions which it was supposed the Muslim nobility had particularly preserved.

This key aspect of Kállay’s thought has been summed up in the historical literature as the idea of the Bosnian nation (bosanska nacija). First pinpointed by Kállay’s Serb and Croat critics as an artificial notion invented for political reasons, the term has retained its potency as Bosnian identity took on political form in the period of the People’s Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1945–92) and subsequently independent statehood. Increasingly, since 1945, the emphasis has been less on the Bosnianizing course as some unnatural plot and more on the pragmatic function that it had for Kállay, both as a barrier against Serb and Croat claims to Bosnia and a practical response to such difficulties as the
name of the language. Bosniaks have rightly attacked the notion of ‘invention’, with reference to Bosnia’s centuries-old historical distinctiveness and the long-standing use of the Bosnian/Bosniak name. A Bosnian Serb historian, Tomislav Kraljačić, in the most searching discussion to date, has argued for a consistency in Kállay’s view of the Serbs. While it has long been demonstrated that he did not, as nationalists alleged, ban his own *History of the Serbs* in Bosnia, Kraljačić suggests persuasively that political pragmatism and the pride of the scholar battled in him. He could concede in 1892 that there were Serbs in Bosnia and in 1899 deny without sense of contradiction what he had formerly written, that Bosnia was a Serb land, because this merely ethnic issue lost significance in the face of the Serb ‘particularism’ he had always stressed, the historical failure ever to unite Serbs into one state. Kraljačić is also aware of Kállay’s Hungarian background, with its concept of the political nation, and sees a parallel between this concept and Kállay’s view of the Bosnian Muslim nobility, whom he once called ‘the only bearers today of a state idea in the Balkans’. Writing after the fall of communism and with a view to Kállay’s legacy for contemporary Bosnia, Vera Krzišnik-Bukić has transposed the concepts of ethnic and historical/political nation into modern debates about pluralism and civic nationhood, arguing for an explicitly multi-ethnic Bosnian civic nationality. On the earlier parallel she raises, though, a pertinent issue concerning the very term used in the literature, ‘bosanska nacija’.

‘Nacija’ is a relative neologism in Serbo-Croat. The terms almost exclusively used in the Austrian period were ‘narod’—equivalent to the English word ‘people’ and even more to the German ‘Volk’—and ‘narodnost’, or nationality. Whereas ‘nacija’ bears associations of the modern sovereign nation, ‘narod’ is a term with much more varied, and vaguer, ethnic overtones. It was regularly used of the Muslims in the Austrian period (‘muslimanski’, sometimes ‘islamski narod’), though few at the time conceived them to be a nation. Thus ‘bosanska nacija’ conveys a heavier ideological message than the terms used at the time to which it is applied, nor was its application to Kállay’s policy standard among earlier historians. Kállay himself spoke of one people (Volk) in Bosnia calling itself Bosnian, and used ‘national’ as an adjective, but the term which Kraljačić interprets as ‘bosanska nacija’ was actually ‘bosnische Nationalität’. The semantic point raises the question of quite what the Bosnian theme meant in Kállay’s conceptual framework. Did he wish through the Bosnianizing policy, in Mustafa Imamović’s words, ‘to awaken and develop among Bosnians feelings of statehood’ (državnost), in the sense Imamović implies of Bosnian statehood? Was there a direct parallel between the Hungarian political nation under the Magyars and the Bosnian political nation under the Muslim nobility, as Kraljačić seems both to assert and qualify? The terminological points raised above suggest that Kállay was not thinking of Bosnia as the primary state entity—he argued that she had always depended on outside support—but hoped to utilize the historical Muslim consciousness in the interests of the Monarchy. The idea of
a distinctive Bosnian identity was very important to him, but it was that, an identity, a means of warding off Serb and Croat claims. To this extent, its most important function was perhaps to ensure that Bosnian Muslims were not undermined by these claims, and, while not intended for them only, it would serve its purpose if this goal alone were achieved. What should be clear is that the whole tenor of Kállay’s political philosophy reserved the state role to the empire, through whose modernizing mission the people of Bosnia would eventually be acculturated to loyal membership of this multinational realm. It may be significant that he addressed the Bosnian idea most clearly when he was pressed to do so, in the Delegations, rather than in internal documents. Austro-Hungarian state power was his primary, and Bosnian nationhood only his secondary, organizing principle.

It might be said that Kállay’s attitude to the three confessions was anticipated in the instructions to Phillipovich in 1878, while the Bosnian theme had been broached by the province’s first newspapers in the 1860s, albeit through an Ottoman rather than Habsburg prism. It was, however, the boldness of Kállay’s ultimate vision, allied to the greater command of detail, which made his regime distinctive. The fusion of theory and practice, careful attention to detail within the framework of an overall design, remained his pleasure throughout his life. He himself was aware of the tension between these two poles. In a letter of congratulation to Max Falk, on the quarter-centenary of Falk’s editorship of the Pester Lloyd, he praised him for ‘a certain idealistic thread’ discernible in his work. Falk’s idealism was not the dreaming of dreams, but practical, an active espousal of the ‘great ideas which quickly fly beyond the bounds of individual countries and times and embrace the interests of general progress and civilization’. Largely unrealizable as these might be, it sufficed that they should be but partly implemented, since the main thing was not to cool to ‘the great ideas moving the world’; the need for idealism was hidden deep in the human soul. In these words it is hard not to see Kállay’s own inmost politico-philosophical convictions.

Kállay was thus better fitted than his predecessors to appreciate the combination of long- and short-term goals in Austria’s task. On the one hand his administration laboured in the 1880s to lay the foundations of European culture in Bosnia, wearing away Bosnians’ ‘exclusivism’ and impressing them with the might, benevolence and progressiveness of Austria. On the other it had to minister to the needs of the separate confessions, appear to hold the ring impartially between them and accommodate them painlessly to the modernization process. The one theme which could unite these two processes was the theme of Austrian state power. If political power were associated exclusively with the Austrian regime and communal life confined to religious issues, the whole secular side of life with its attendant educational and economic benefits could be linked with Austria alone. Conversely, government could claim that it had solved the communal problem by guaranteeing religious toleration. Political activity of a modern kind would be permitted only when it could take place in the framework of the civilized,
Austrophile Bosnia of the future, free of the taint of communal nationalisms. At
the heart, therefore, of Kállay’s regime was the attempt to see the confessions as
purely religious organizations. The rest of this chapter will examine the attempt
to establish a framework for the government’s Austrianizing and Bosnianizing
goals.

THE CREATION OF AN EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL
INFRASTRUCTURE

The importance Kállay placed on the inculcation of new values might have
implied a rapid expansion of the Bosnian educational system. That this did not
occur was due both to fiscal constraints and also his belief that Austria should
impress its new subjects by excellence. As he once told the Delegations, no school
at all was better than a school with a poor teacher. In this context, secondary
schools appeared as important as primary, for in them an elite would be trained in
the regime’s goals and to play a role in the administrative apparatus. But Kállay’s
cultural vision cannot be judged on his schools alone. Specialist institutions like
a museum, and corresponding journals, also had a place in his thought, so that
the nature of the Monarchy’s mission would not only be absorbed at home but
by a curious Europe. Within ten years Kállay had done much to build himself
an international reputation.

As to the interconfessional National Elementary Schools, officially so termed
from 1885 (they will be called state schools here), the procedure for founding
them was now regularized—through an annual Sarajevo list of proposals based
on local reports and adjudicated on in Vienna. The Provincial Government’s
report in 1883 that its school-building program ‘would certainly have lively
support from the native population, since the need for education and schools is
already felt by them, especially among the Orthodox’, is supported insofar as
annual lists of proposals show how the schools set up had generally been requested
by the local population for years before the authorities felt able to act. But their
number rose only slowly from 42 at the beginning of the school year 1882–83
to 135 in September 1889, with an increase of pupils from 2,836 to 9,613, in a
population approaching a million and a half. Most political communes’ poverty
forced some reconsideration of an edict of 1880, charging them with the erection
and maintenance of interconfessional primary schools. From 1886 the Provincial
Government budgeted 20,000 florins a year for new school building, compared
to the mere 48,000 florins it had spent on this in the whole first seven years of
the occupation. In all, of an estimated provincial expenditure of £756,356 in
the 1888 budget, £125,974 fell on the gendarmerie and £5,667 (0.7 per cent)
on primary education. Teacher provision was similarly small-scale. A ‘Training
Course for Assistant Teachers’ set up in Sarajevo in 1882 was transformed into a
teachers’ training college in 1886, with a hostel and twelve annual scholarships,
but its intake actually decreased in the late 1880s. From its supply of just over a
dozens qualified teachers a year could be added a trickle from the private colleges
of the Daughters of Divine Love and the English benefactress of the Serbs,
Miss Adeline Irby, to shape the first native cohorts in a teaching body hitherto
almost entirely immigrant.59 Till their status was regulated in 1892, teachers were
ineligible for periodic salary increments or pensions and their pay, particularly
where funded by a commune, was well below rates obtaining in Austria.60

Thus primary schools were seen as a field of future rather than present
expansion. The overwhelming bulk of the Provincial Government’s education
expenditure—74.5 per cent in the budget for 188961—was devoted to the
handful of secondary institutions, which were to meet Kállay’s criterion of
quality. In the years 1882 to 1890 the government spent more on the Sarajevo
Gymnasium (developed from the original Lower Realgymnasium in 1883) and
its new building than on all primary schools in the same period.62 At 112,000
florins, the semi-Oriental building of the Muslim Sharia School for the training
of kadis, completed in 1889, was another costly investment, while more was
spent on the three confessional seminaries between them in 1889 than on the
135 primary schools together.63

Kállay’s post-primary institutions fitted clear functional purposes. He made
plain in 1885 that the Sarajevo Gymnasium for the time being satisfied needs
for general humanistic education. In recognition that Bosnia lacked a sufficient
Mittelstand for the Austrian Bürgerschule, the administration concentrated on
founding commercial schools: three- (later four-) year courses which offered a
wide variety of subjects emphasizing the technical and commercial side. Within
a few years nine of these had been founded, thanks partly to pressure from
the authorities who based their plans directly on the number of merchants in
particular localities, in the hope of engaging the interest of the Serb urban
class.64 The same motives, for an older age-group, underlay the foundation of
a Technical Middle School in Sarajevo in 1889, which aimed its graduates for
the lower levels of the Bosnian administration as ‘contractors, clerks, contractor
supervisors, gamekeepers, head gamekeepers and in certain circumstances, when
particularly able, forest officials for the middle rank of the forestry service’—a
categorization that set due limits on Bosnian ambitions.65

Just as these schools were intended mainly for Serbs, so Muslim artisans’
interests were predominantly in view in the craft schools set up in the late 1880s
and early 1890s, including artistic craft schools—the largest, in Sarajevo, also
provided Muslim pupils with primary education—a carpet factory, and a school
for wheelwrights, locksmiths and blacksmiths. These schools reflected Kállay’s
intellectual alertness and also his propagandist’s eye, for he was in touch with
the burgeoning industrial craft school movement in Vienna and saw to it that
Bosnian handicrafts were exhibited in Vienna as early as 1889.66 However,
their influence on the growing plight of Bosnian artisans was slight. Middle
schools for girls completed the educational picture. Presented to the public as a
way of producing efficient housekeepers and more companionable wives, they were meant to permeate the atmosphere of the better-off Bosnian households of Sarajevo and Mostar, and in the latter place to offset the influence of a Russian girls’ school in Cetinje and the Mostar Serbs’ plan to found one themselves. 67

Combining features of two Austrian school types in a five-year course, they offered general education alongside specialist instruction in housework, music and modern languages.

All these schools had a dual purpose: to provide general information lacking in a still backward society, and train pupils for a specific social role. This, and the concern for standards, made syllabuses heavy. The Technical Middle School taught for forty hours a week, the commercial schools, whose graduates were barely fifteen, for thirty-five. 68 The special needs of the schools, and linguistic problems, made recruiting adequate staff difficult; as late as 1904 only two of fifty-two teachers in the commercial schools had formal qualifications for this type of work. 69 On the other hand, everything was done to make the post-primary schools attractive propositions, with comfortably equipped boarding sections and a generally low pupil–teacher ratio. Thallóczy calculated that it cost 3,000 florins to produce a graduate of a commercial school and 5,000 florins for a Higher Girls’ School. 70 Scholarships were also generous, although not till Sarajevo Gymnasium had its first cohort of eighth-year maturanti in 1887 were they allotted for university level institutions in the monarchy on a regular basis. The sums dispensed for secondary and tertiary education scholarships rose quite sharply from some 28,000 K in 1890 to 88,700 K in 1900, with university level grants making slightly less than half of this. 71 These figures do not include the scholarships Sarajevo provided for the Christian seminaries and the Sharia School. Set against the small sums spent on primary education, they illustrate Kállay’s preference for quality over quantity. In the 1890s the number of Bosnian students with grants in the monarchy moved between forty and sixty. Awards could be influenced by the desire to attract Muslim boys and Orthodox girls; in 1895, the Provincial Government recommended that of something over thirty grants for Sarajevo Gymnasium, twenty should go to the twenty-four Muslim boys who had applied, out of 145 applicants in all. 72

Similar attention to detail characterizes the Kállay ministry’s treatment of textbooks. As early as February 1883 it had enquired what history and geography books were teaching about Bosnia. 73 Rather than continue the uncertain schemes for the adaptation of Zagreb textbooks, it was decided to prepare a new range of books especially for Bosnian circumstances, avoiding offence to Muslims, for example. 74 These books, according to a later review, were to be of high quality, pedagogically up-to-date and carefully orientated towards the Bosnian fatherland, so as to strengthen the ‘inadequately developed national self-consciousness of the population’ and weaken the impression in some quarters of a ‘particular community of interest with neighbouring Slav races’. They were also to stress Bosnia’s relations with the Monarchy and with Hungary in particular. 75 Much
thought and some breadth of vision went into this process. Book drafts were submitted to a committee of officials and native Bosnians who judged their suitability in terms of Bosnian idiom, and whose choice of Vuk Karadžić’s grammatical norms and phonetic spelling brought them more into line with Serbian than Croatian practice. Readers and reckoners for all four primary classes, a geography and a grammar were completed by 1887, and a grammar for secondary schools the next year, geography getting pride of place because it ‘aroused love of the homeland’. Even the radical Serb teacher Kašiković, who for ‘well-weighed reasons’ had been added to the panel, lauded the books as suitable for Serb schools, provided only the term Serb Orthodox was used, instead of Oriental Orthodox. Inevitably, not all Serbs agreed with him.

As so often in the Bosnian imbroglio, however, with pluses came minuses. It was not just the difficulty of squaring the Serbs, exercised because from 1884 the term ‘Bosnian language’ was used in the textbooks and because Muslims were to be given only their Latin script version. Kállay could argue, with expert support, that the use of ‘Bosnian’ was the only course left since ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’ alone would not do, and ‘Serbo-Croat’ or ‘Croato-Serb’ were cumbrous terms known only to scholars. The further problem was meeting the authorities’ own demanding criteria. Thus the draft of a first secondary school reader by the Hungarian Serb editor of the pro-government daily Sarajevski list was judged deficient in not obtaining a correct balance between Serb and Croat reading passages, and German and Hungarian ones, in omitting extracts from the Arabic classics for the Muslims, and in having too little on Bosnia and Bosnian literature, and in including biblical extracts from a standard Serbian translation. History proved even more intractable, which was ironic given that the ministry contained two of the leading historians of the Balkans, Thallóczy and Sax, besides Kállay himself. A draft history text was submitted to the ministry in 1884 and reviewed in 1887 by Thallóczy, who took the opportunity to outline plans for books for the top two classes of primary school, the first on Bosnia, the second on the Monarchy. After much further drafting and discussion, a history of Bosnia for primary standard four appeared in 1893, telling the children how their ancestors had settled between their neighbours, the Serbs and Croats ‘and to this day our nation (narod) is divided into three religions … and we Bosniaks are all, of whatever religion, brothers born, children of the same mother, our dear homeland’. However, Kállay firmly opposed teachers filling out the Austro-Hungarian side of the story with passages from primary readers. They could not be trusted sufficiently for this. History should be taught only as commentary on approved textbooks; the rest should be silence.

A further episode is worth citing to illustrate the ideological minefield that was the occupation. In 1891 the history master in Sarajevo Gymnasium, Emilijan Lilek, was commissioned to write a plan for production of Bosnian history textbooks. Provocatively, he quarrelled with the word ‘Tendenz’ in his
instructions, equating it with tendentious, and he advocated detailed studies of Calvinism and the French Revolution rather than a Monarchy-orientated approach. Thallóczy grumbled sourly that it would not matter that Lilek was a somewhat Croatized Slovene if he had possessed the technical competence; for him Lilek’s ostentatious liberalism was *ipso facto* proof of incompetence. The matter rumbled on till 1899, when Lilek was asked to rework a Croatian textbook on the Middle Ages. This did in fact appear, but only after the ministry’s distraught advisors realized that a reference to medieval Croatia having retained her independence had been overlooked in the proofs—a major affront to Thallóczy’s view of the Hungaro-Croatian relationship. The copies would have been recalled and the offending passage excised if officials had not reflected that to do so would draw even more attention to the solecism—and sought to comfort themselves with the thought that the word used for independence could perhaps be translated as autonomy. In 1919 Lilek was to take the chair of history in the first ever Slovene university in Ljubljana. As for Thallóczy’s grand schemes for his own history of Bosnia, he was wedded to the positivist spirit of contemporary Hungarian historiography in which the search for more facts, more documents, militated against works of synthesis.

The coping stone of educational publication was the Provincial Government’s monthly pedagogical journal, *ˇSkolski vjesnik*, characteristically spurred into being, in 1894, by reports that Bosnian Serbs might launch one. At a thousand pages of close print a year, covering educational theory, practice and history, and with abundant reviews and surveys, often by outsiders, *ˇSkolski vjesnik*, under official Ljuboje Dlustuˇs’s editorship, was further testimony to Kállay’s belief that if something were to be done at all, it should be done well. Alongside heavy material on Leibnitz’s determinism and theories of condensation, articles on Pasteur’s life and the like catered to popular science. The contributors were filled with a sense of the importance of their work: ‘Oh, what great benefactors teachers can be to mankind, if they know how to elevate themselves to an apostolic conception of their sublime vocation’, enthused the ethnographer and folk-craft specialist Jelena Belović-Bernadžikowska, a rare woman author in this patriarchal environment. A Muslim teacher presented the occupation as a great turning-point in Bosnian history, for its schools had begun to dispel ‘the murky clouds about our vision’ and draw Bosnia closer to the ‘spiritual work’ of more advanced neighbours.

There is indeed some romance in the story of these years, as in the dawn of all major change in human affairs. Educational journals all over the Balkans tell the same tale of aspiration and hardship. Each new school, particularly in the countryside, represented in embryo a new world, self-contained: the schoolroom, 10 metres square—for there was only one in the standard plans—the teacher’s quarters, the separate rooms, where needed, for Muslim religious instruction and/or boarding, the vegetable garden in which rural children learnt agricultural
Taming Balkan Nationalism

It is tempting to envisage the village teacher sitting by a winter fire (fuel was one item which local people could usually contract to provide), reading Školski vjesnik’s high-minded exhortations or penning a letter about the problems of educating children, paying subscriptions, getting medical care, maintaining status and morale on a small salary in a primitive environment. However, imagination is checked by the reflection that Bosnia had relatively few rural schools. Taken against education in British-controlled Egypt, which was budgeted only £70,000 Egyptian out of £5,237,000 Egyptian in 1891, Kállay’s regime was generous, but Balkan comparisons are less favourable to it. The key to his approach was the belief that everything Austrian should be perceived by the population as superior, ultimately a belief in the power of authority to overawe unsophisticated folk. This psychology, and the heavily controlled nature of instruction, was unsubtle for a subtle man and risked increasing opposition where this had already taken ideological form.

Less reservation is in order for the new minister’s courting of cultural prestige at an international level. It was strikingly successful. The major initiative was the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Provincial Museum which under this title in 1888 took into government control the collections of a museum society founded by Sarajevo citizens three years previously. The society’s head was already the government commissioner for Sarajevo, Kosta Hörmann, who became its administrative chief, while the expert leadership fell to the Croatian archeologist Ciro Truhelka. As early as 1889, Truhelka’s excavations at the prehistoric site of Glasinac, followed by work on Roman roads, won the museum wide recognition. With activities also covering natural history, geology and ethnography, it began publishing a Serbo-Croat monthly journal in 1889 and a German quarterly in 1893 which soon established links with some sixty institutions in Austria and elsewhere. A five-day conference of twenty-six leading European archaeologists in Sarajevo in 1894 duly won glowing praise, and not only scientific. Based on principles ‘selected from the best elements of modern civilization’, the administration, said the Scot Munro, had ‘cemented together a singularly mixed people into a happy, prosperous and almost homogenous community’.

Investigation into Bosnia’s past also gave a fillip to the idea of a separate identity. Truhelka elaborated the theory that the adaptation of the Greek alphabet to Slavic purposes had developed idiosyncratically in the west Balkans, so that the traditional script of Bosnia, a ‘strongly national phenomenon’, should properly be called bosančica, not Cyrillic. This work fell in with a government decision at this time on the Bosnian standard and arms, which had engaged the administration before Kállay. It came out for the red-gold colours of the arms of medieval Rama, which had been included in the Hungarian crown. The motivation for this, and the rejection of the Slavic tricolour favoured as Bosnia’s colours by the Croatian historian Rački, Strossmayer’s right-hand man, is patent. Public, even private architecture, began to take a modified
Oriental form which was dubbed Bosnian. Hörmann, by far the most active government worker in this cultural sphere, edited two volumes of poems of the Bosnian Muslims, while the Austrophile Mehmedbeg Kapetanović produced his own collection of Bosnian folk poetry. Hörmann’s work was credited with encouraging the learning of *latinica* by Muslims, this being the only script in which it appeared. The theme of Bosnian national identity rooted particularly in Muslims could be extended into the *Sandžak* of Novi Pazar, which Austro-Hungarian troops occupied from 1878 to 1908. Thallóczy recommended for publication the book to this effect by the Monarchy’s former civil commissioner in the region, which underpinned ideas of the Monarchy’s sphere of influence in the west Balkans. There were even notions of Bosnia as belonging to a west Balkan geological stratification of European type, different from the east Balkans’ Asiatic formation. A full-fledged academic geography of Bosnia was not achieved, however.

It can already be seen that the aim of reasserting Bosnia’s special place in the Balkans meant giving it, and thereby the Monarchy, a Balkan role. The most important manifestation of this was the founding of a high-quality illustrated literary magazine in Sarajevo, for which Hörmann was despatched to Belgrade, Zagreb and Sofia to solicit prestigious contributors. The first number of *Nada* (*Hope*) on 1 January 1895 proclaimed its goal of being ‘a mirror of the entire culture of the Yugoslav nations before the world’, around which would gather ‘Serbian and Croatian poets and writers as well as our own’. Like *Školski vjesnik* and *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja*, *Nada*, appearing fortnightly in Latinic and Cyrillic editions, was an impressive publication for a backward location like Bosnia. In its first year some forty-eight poets contributed ninety-seven original poems, with twenty translations, while there were thirty-four passages of prose. The Reich German Ewald Arndt, engaged for the artwork, became member of a group of foreign painters attracted to Bosnia, whose work was exhibited in the Bosnian pavilion of the Budapest Millennial Exhibition of 1896 and in Sarajevo. Their attraction to southern climes, which their work lent a certain exoticism, paralleled that felt by French artists in north Africa in the colonial period. Bosnia’s Muslim heritage was a standard aspect of the drawings with which travel writers regularly adorned their productions. *Nada’s* reputation now stands higher than it did when suspicious Serb and Croat writers detected Kállay’s political hand behind it. Yet the consistently sentimental-picturesque depiction of Bosnia, in which Oriental street scenes, peasant swains and lushly lyrical poems feature in surfeiting succession, still puts off the non-specialist.

Kállay’s projection of Bosnia and Bosnianism tended to convince the more readily, the further removed from the Balkans the observer. The ballet *A Marriage in Bosnia*, performed in the Vienna Hoftheater in 1893, delighted Emperor and audience with the picturesque staging of minarets, church towers and a throng of assorted Bosnians in colourful costumes, dancing native dances before Austrian
tourists, till the latter taught them a waltz, with which the whole piece ended. But behind the fun a whole set of assumptions was being orchestrated, not to speak of Kállay’s claims to be regenerating Bosnian crafts. \(^{102}\) Orchestration is the key word for the officially authorized travelogue of the Hungarian J. A. Asboth. Asboth’s pages redounded with romantic accounts of loyal Muslim landowners who could be won by a firm hand, an open, hearty manner and goodwill, like ‘our old acquaintance Dervišbeg Čengić, now bearing the Star of the Order of Franz Joseph on his proud breast’. \(^{103}\) Although religion changed from Catholic to Bogomil to Muslim:

> The national consciousness still lives on, inextinguishable amidst all the changes, and whilst the Great Serbian agitation may find a place amongst the Orthodox and the Croatian under the Catholics, the Mohammedan Bosnian remains the immovable guardian of Bosnian national tradition. \(^{104}\)

Such welcome views were no accident. Kállay was reputed to have the best press relations of all ministers in Vienna. \(^{105}\) Inside the Monarchy he had a long-standing friendship with Maz Falk, editor of Hungary’s leading German-language newspaper, *Pester Lloyd*, whom he plied with articles unflattering to Serbia, sometimes with a Belgrade byline. \(^{106}\) In the case of foreigners, an English journalist outlined the technique in 1890:

> Visitors to Bosnia must be few and far between, for Herr von Kállay … on hearing of my intention to visit Bosnia, expressed a desire to see me before starting … Nothing could exceed His Excellency’s kindness, and he volunteered every kind of assistance on behalf of his subordinates and the provincial authorities. \(^{107}\)

The Bosnian administration sponsored the English translation of Asboth’s work. The methods worked. The well-known Belgian publicist de Laveleye, after his interview with Kállay, ‘an enlightened friend of liberty and progress’, \(^{108}\) devoted much of his Bosnian narrative to a colourful account of the dilemmas of Muslims in modern society, and made virtually no reference to the ‘sullen and subdued’ Bosnian Orthodox, except that they called their schools ‘popular Servian schools’—and ‘by Servian they mean here the Orthodox Church, but, as Dr Strauss points out, the right word would be “Pravoslavno”, “Orthodox”, or the true faith’. Behind this detail of nomenclature lay problems which, had he but known it, would have given Laveleye’s picture greater depth. \(^{109}\) Kállay’s most ambitious approach to the French-speaking world was through the Paris *Revue Générale des Sciences Pures et Appliquées*, which agreed to an expenses-paid expedition of eleven scholars to Bosnia, yielding two numbers, later published in book form as *La Bosnie et L’Herzégovine* (1900). \(^{110}\) As in all these carefully sponsored western treatments, the self-confident, often distinguished men involved did not see themselves as the regime’s propaganda agents, as witness a certain independence of view on the unresolved agrarian question. \(^{111}\) On cultural-confessional issues, however, they toed the Kállay party line unquestioningly. Visits to Bosnia from neighbouring south Slav states were very rare and were vigourously
controlled, as with a party of Belgrade Gymnasium students in 1890, who, through an ‘outwardly quite friendly considerateness’, were to be kept from any unobserved contact with Bosnians. District officials received money from the secret Dispositionsfond to make arrangements, ‘in which, moreover, the gusle, allegedly banned in Bosnia, should nowhere be lacking’.112

This chapter has described the launching of an intellectual project designed to cement Bosnia to the Habsburg state as the source of modern development, while separating it from its Balkan neighbours on the strength of a historically conceived separate identity, rooted in the Bosnian begs. It was a project based on wide-ranging knowledge of the Balkans, behind which stood a strong and masterful will. The very sweep of ideas appearing to dovetail Bosnia’s past and present with Austro-Hungarian interests and the assumptions of European imperialism impressed even awed contemporaries, and quickly became the accepted wisdom on the matter in international circles. Kállay’s swelling reputation tended to distract attention from small disjunctures in what seemed a seamless web. The alleged shift in his attitude to the Serbs, from benevolence to hostility, was more apparent than real, but did point to traits in his psychology, the overriding play of an overweening ambition, self-confidence and a certain cynicism over means. His attitudes to Catholics and Muslims were at least as paradoxical, and raise the question, in view of his doubts about Islam, as to whether his strategy was really directed at making the Muslims the leading element or at keeping them on board and preventing their slippage either to Constantinople or the Serbs. The difficulty disappears if one assumes it was the Bosnian begs as a ruling class that he supported, but reappears if he assumed that the begs could be so clearly separated from their four centuries of Islamic tradition. Indeed, Kállay’s thinking here bristles with potential paradoxes, as on his ‘Bosnian scheme’ of 1868–71. Was the essence of Kállay that he thought he could juggle all the balls each entailed, including the associated element of disingenuousness? Perhaps the greatest disjuncture is linked to his preference for the personal exercise of power despite his avowal of the importance of due process in the western tradition. No doubt the tactic reflected his view of Bosnia as an Oriental society, but could there not be danger in using such methods to induce a westernizing process? These questions all point one way: that though Kállay had formulated perspectives that satisfied distant outsiders, his administration inside Bosnia depended for success in the immediate term on its dealings with the individual confessions. These will be explored in the next three chapters.
Kállay and the Serbs

Throughout the occupation the Serb threat and its potential patron in independent Serbia loomed largest in Austro-Hungarian eyes. This was never more so than under Kállay, whose career had begun in Belgrade. That the proud representative of a great empire should have been so concerned about a state of two million largely rural and illiterate people may seem odd. Serbia appeared no more capable of offering effective leadership to a wider Serbdom than successive twentieth-century Arab regimes to a divided Arab world. Its politics in the 1880s were blighted by tensions between King Milan Obrenović and the Radical Party and his unseemly feud with his wife. The other parties, the Liberals and Progressives, were both Belgrade-based groups of the tiny, foreign-educated intelligentsia, whose westernizing programme amounted to setting up a bureaucracy they could fill without much regard to the peasant masses. Though they claimed to defend the peasants against this bureaucracy, the Radical leaders mainly came from the same narrow educated class.\(^1\)

Yet Serbian backwardness should be set in its proper context. When Kállay first concerned himself with Serbian politics in the 1860s, Hungary was also a backward country, as Austria had been vis-à-vis Prussia a century earlier. Late nineteenth-century Serbia was following a course its more advanced neighbours had taken, and from a purely ideological perspective had positioned itself soundly. Elite support for the notion of Serbia as a European state, qualified for this role by the heroic past of the Serbian nation, offered a perspective for the mobilization of a wider Serbdom in the longer term. A favourable self-image of Serbs as freedom-loving martyrs for faith and fatherland was being inculcated through the Kosovo myth of empire nobly fallen, transmitted in folk song of European renown and a rapidly developing literature of prose, poetry and drama.\(^2\) Even in the mid-1880s, when Milan kept the anti-Austrian Radicals down, Belgrade’s Vidovdan (Liberal) and Videło (Progressive), Novi Sad’s Zastava, Sombor’s Školski list, and Zagreb’s Srbobran maintained a chorus off which penetrated the ban on entry into Bosnia, to offer Bosnian Serbs a radically different view of Serbdom from Kállay’s.

Central to this view was that the definition of Serbs included not only Orthodox Serbs, but also non-Orthodox Bosnians, Macedonians and Montenegrins, while the awareness of linguistic kinship made Croats seem a kind of subaltern Serb too in unsophisticated eyes. The ambiguity on this last point can be seen even
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in the most sophisticated Serb ranks, among the handful of intellectuals who cultivated links with Yugoslav-minded Croats. Thus the scholar-politician Stojan Novaković could call Serbs and Croats ‘the two chief constituent parts of one and the same nation’, yet write of ‘Serbs of all religions’ in Dalmatia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Old Serbia and Hungary, leaving unclear who the Croats could be, particularly since Catholics were referred to as having been ‘separated by prejudices of religion’. Serb nationalism rode two horses: the nineteenth-century linguistic nationalism bequeathed by Herder and the older traditions of the Orthodox community subjugated by the Turks.

This is why Serbian eyes might appear bigger than their belly. Yet the frustrating present curdled the dream. Writing in 1890, Novaković saw Serbs as having played their cards wrongly. They had concentrated too much on their small state at the expense of the wider Serbdom, allowing the Greeks through the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Bulgarians through their Exarchate to claim spiritual dominion over Ottoman Orthodox citizens. This is what made the loss of Bosnia in 1878 so galling. Novaković was a member of the Progressives, most Austrophile of Serbian parties, under whom the Austro-Serbian treaty of 1881 had been signed, but this did not stop sections of Progressive opinion attacking Austrian policy in Bosnia fiercely. When the Radicals began to come to the fore in Serbia from the late 1880s, the fraught atmosphere helped all the more to sabotage Kállay’s hope for a transition towards the politics of accommodation. But his own uncompromising response to perceived danger played its part, as urban Bosnian Serbs mobilized to break out of the restrictions in which he had encased them. The symbolic disavowal was the memorandum sent in 1896 to the Emperor himself, alleging discrimination and calling for cultural autonomy: self-management in matters of Church and school.

COMMUNES, KÁLLAY AND KOSANOVIC

For a government paranoid about pan-Serbian nationalism, a battle was afoot between the urban communes and itself for influence over the Bosnian Serb masses. Kállay brought to the task a distinctive approach reflecting his self-confidence and his belief in personal, rather than bureaucratic dealing with Balkan ‘particularism’. Thus he declared unnecessary for the time being a draft edict prepared by the Provincial Government on the authorities’ right of supervision over Serb Orthodox communes and their schools. ‘I am wholly familiar with the temperament and mentality of the Bosnian people,’ he once remarked. Under the new Civil Adlatus, the Hungarian Serb aristocrat Baron Feodor von Nikolics, social contacts were opened up with leading Sarajevo Serb families. Kállay’s criticism of the military’s ban on open coffin Serb funeral processions, on the grounds that hygienic considerations should not override an immemorial custom, showed a similar desire for flexibility. So did his response
to disloyal misbehaviour by the first cohort of Bosnian university students: they should be reprimanded through their fathers, suitably primed by the relevant District Commissioners.  

This was the Kállay who was looked at askance by his Magyar fellow countrymen as a Serbophile. But their perception missed the mark. Such measures showed the kind of tradition-bound, religious community he wished Bosnian Orthodox to be and whom he could accommodate. But he did not accept Mostar Serbs’ request to form a ‘Serb Singing Society’, despite the Kreis Commissioner’s view that a ‘liberal attitude’ on such matters would show the difference between Habsburg rule and the ‘eternal suspicion’ of a decrepit Turkey or Russia. The government’s view of nationality and religion in Bosnia meant that it would accept either an exclusively ‘Orthodox’ society, singing only religious music, or a ‘National Singing Society’ open to all, for ‘the entire population of these provinces is of the same origin and nationality’. The Mostar Serbs would not renounce the Serb name in this case or in the statute being negotiated for the reconstitution of their commune, dissolved in 1882. On the central issue of Serb identity agreement could not be reached.

The pattern of conflict was set in the Provincial Government’s educational proposals for 1884, based on local reports. Tension with the communes ruled out the kind of indirect rule common in contemporary British imperialism. In Cyprus, for example, teachers were chosen by locally elected village boards, while the syllabus and textbooks were decided by Greek and Turkish Boards of Education, and conformed to the norms of the mother countries. Many of the Austrian proposals, the Provincial Government commented, would make unnecessary ‘Oriental Orthodox schools … which eke out a pitiful existence and also are not always reliable from the political viewpoint.’ In sum they recommended government schools in four places where Orthodox communes already had their own buildings, in seven others (six of which had confessional schools before the occupation) where people were willing to accept government help, and in two border locations where a Serb school functioned or had just ceased to function. This pattern was duplicated in Sarajevo’s proposals for 1885. Thus while the number of government schools rose only slowly, the authorities had the satisfaction of seeing Serb schools do worse. The slight rise in their overall number—from fifty-seven to sixty-one between 1881 and 1890—disguised violent fluctuations: in these years thirty-three new Serb schools appeared and twenty-nine closed. While the Provincial Government rightly stressed poverty and bad teacher–commune relations in these travails, the case of the Serb school at the sensitive Herzegovinian border town of Gacko shows how its own role could be a factor. In official reports it was a matter of an energetic District Commissioner winning local Serbs to agree to a government school in a nearby village. In a leading Gacko Serb’s account, however, the Gacko commune, realizing the threat to its own school, planned a boarding institution, as a result of which 130 pupils registered for the Serb school (instead
of the usual forty–fifty) and only eight for the communal one. After a month of
term, gendarmes surrounded the Serb school at night and led the teacher away
to Sarajevo. The school closed for a while and in 1886 a communal school was
opened in Gacko town.19 In another case, that of Varcar Vakuf, where the Serb
school was allegedly shut by an official, the parish priest, a nationalist, closed
the church in response, the upshot being the setting up of a communal school with
a Serb teacher.20

Obscure events like these can be followed because they occasioned such
interest in the Serb press and opposition circles.21 As the urban communes
kept watch over Austrian designs in their outlying rural territory and struggled
with finances—poorer Serbs who could not afford fees might desert to state
schools because they were free22—the Serb press regaled its readers with tales
of government intrigues against Serb schools, apportioning praise and blame
for steadfastness or defeat.23 Although by 1886 a calendar listed twenty-nine
government schools which were either converted Serb schools or had been opened
where Serb schools existed,24 official assumptions that the confessional system was
gradually withering away were premature. Fine new buildings for Serb schools
were opened in Prijedor in 1884 and Gradiška in 1887;25 where schools in larger
towns had been closed at the start of the occupation, they reopened.26 These
mini-wars, essentially for influence in the countryside, were to have considerable
significance in shaping the mentality of Bosnian Serb nationalism.

Where did the clergy and hierarchy fit in this picture? The breakdown of
relations between Kosanović and the government, leading to his resignation in
1885, became a kind of prologue to the wider falling out of the authorities and
the Serbs, in which his fall was depicted in nationalist accounts as a struggle to
defend ‘Serbdom’ from attack, while non-Serb accounts have tended to see him
as an exponent of Great Serbian ambitions. The contours of this significant affair
still deserve further definition. Arguably like the broader encounter to come, it
has even an element of tragedy, because neither party to it can be easily pinned
down as villain. Kosanović’s position can be over-simplified. On the other hand,
the government had good reason to accept his resignation. Two personalities and
two principles clashed.

Kosanović’s character played a big role. That he was temperamental and thin-
skinned all agree. He himself, in a strangely neglected correspondence with his
successor, Đorde Nikolajević, attributed his fall, not to a preconceived plan, but
‘to all those difficulties with the government, which because of my temperament,
I could not escape’.27 The Ecumenical Patriarch made the most interesting
remark, that Kosanović was impressionable and could be readily influenced,28
which might explain both his protestations of loyalty to government authorities
and his desire not to alienate nationalist circles, which Austrian officials stressed
most throughout his period in office. Certainly he was not in consistent league
with the latter. As has been seen, Zastava denounced him early in 1883, around
the time that Kállay recommended his decoration with the Great Cross of the
Franz Joseph Order for his ‘always correct and loyal attitude’—also intended as an encouragement for the future, however. But it proved a bumpy ride. Kosanović was suspected of Russian contacts and was in touch with people the government distrusted as nationalist agitators, like the 1875–78 activists Petar Uzelac and Petar Guteša, who were sending Orthodox church equipment of Russian provenance into Bosnia. In 1883 he issued two highly inconvenient pastoral letters, one warning in ominous terms of a threat to the Orthodox faith from Catholic propaganda, the other ordering that all new Church books should be sent to him to check their theological soundness—which Civil Adlatus Nikolics interpreted as directed at Austria-Hungary, since books from Russia could hardly be so doubted. In 1884 the metropolitan telegraphed congratulations to organizers of the transfer of the Serb poet Branko Radičević’s bones from Vienna to Karlowitz, saying his spirit was with them, which the Hungarian government took as a Great Serb demonstration. He was also held to be behind articles in Zastava on alleged Catholicization in Bosnia. This was certainly not the sort of prelate Austria had hoped to see at the head of the Bosnian Orthodox Church.

Tomislav Kraljačić’s statement that the authorities were therefore waiting for an opportunity to rid themselves of Kosanović and accepted his resignation as soon as it was offered is thus in essence correct. However, the fact that Kállay actually took five weeks to recommend acceptance to Franz Joseph shows the great sensitivity of the issue. Government had invested much in Kosanović, there was the difficulty of finding a suitable successor, and Kállay was no doubt sincere in saying that he would have acted against the metropolitan only in extreme circumstances. His handling of religious issues in these early years shows the clarity and consistency which he brought to complex matters where this had been lacking. Thus he ensured ministerial control over Provincial Government circulars, and ordered that officials should refer all questions of Church–state jurisdictional competence to the ministry and never to religious leaders:

The spiritual authorities of any confession will not be called on to determine the limits of the governmental authorities’ competence in internal church matters; on this important question of principle the government has to decide independently.

This position was thus even-handed, if authoritarian. It was applied both to Kosanović’s equivocal views on the state’s right to transfer unsatisfactory priests, on which Sarajevo had (wrongly, for Vienna) consulted him, and Archbishop Stadler’s apparent wish to ban Catholics from reading a government-backed calendar.

However, for all Kállay’s knowledge and intelligence, his policy towards Kosanović shows flaws. He commented on the Radičević celebrations that the Karlowitz Patriarch, German Andčelić, with his ‘wonted tact’, had stayed away. Did he want a Bosnian version of the pro-government but deeply unpopular Andčelić, or think it possible? At least Andčelić’s determination to assert the rights
of ‘Holy Church’ over lay usurpation rested on a clerical estate of wealth and tradition. This simply did not exist in Bosnia, where the tradition was one of Serb lay defiance of an alien hierarchy, and 255 priests in 374 parishes were kmets. Their poverty inclined them to discontent and, when not themselves leaders of nationalist tendencies, put them under great pressure from commune members to conform or be denounced. Creating a clergy in Austrian image was a daunting task in these circumstances. Insight into the unhealthy situation at the grass roots is offered by the case of pop Marković in Bijeljina, whose transfer was at issue because of his failure to inform the military of the time of the Sveta Sava celebration, so that they could officially participate and demonstrate their even-handed credentials. Marković’s nephew had been hanged some months before for robbery and insurrection, blaming his uncle for his errant path; his son was under arrest; he himself had agitated against the trećina in 1878–79, and yet, though thoroughly distrusted by the authorities, he was reportedly all outward loyalty and flattery.

This recalls the servile demeanour of a subject population noted by observers in late Turkish times. Kosanović justified his telegram to the Radičević event by the fact that ample press discussion of it had been permitted, earning the rebuke from Baron Appel that a constitutional government did not approve of everything which was said in the papers. In the absence of conventional civic society a milieu of conflicting behavioural norms made it difficult to read the runes, and suspicion was rife on all sides.

A puzzling aspect of Kállay’s attitude to Kosanović is how little was done to help him retain credibility with his own community—for Habsburg decorations were as much compromising as empowering. No doubt the demise of the vegetating Sarajevo Serb Lower Gymnasium he championed was a matter of principle for the government, but when Kosanović went to Vienna to put the Sarajevo commune’s case on the siting of the new municipal cemetery Kállay just told him the decision had been taken. Successive interviews with Governor Appel, taking him to task, appear from official accounts to have been fairly gruelling, and he was prodded to amplify denials of opposition rumours and issue circulars that left him open to the charge of being a government tool. Kállay based himself on the Orthodox Church’s traditional subordination to the state, going back to ancient canons, but he could be selective. Whereas Franz Joseph’s 1878 proclamation promised maintainance of existing customs, the ministry declared itself unmoved by claims that the Turks had not transferred Orthodox priests, as Austria followed quite different principles.

Kosanović, who was aware of being under surveillance, was essentially given the role of government enforcer. His frustrations came out in the pastoral letter affair of 1883. Kosanović’s intemperate allegations of a Catholic threat and dig at Stadler as preaching ‘papism’, not Christianity, set a pattern for Serb anti-Catholic polemic throughout the occupation. In Kosanović’s case, though, it seems unlikely to have been a calculated ploy. When the Catholic bishops counter-attacked in an Open Letter, Kosanović responded by disclosing the Uniatizing overture of Mieroszowski
(see p. 41); the case of a teacher who had distributed Catholic literature to Orthodox pupils (the metropolitan’s complaint had still not been investigated a year later); a German Franciscan who had used the roof of an Orthodox church as target practice; the widespread distribution of a work on Catholic–Orthodox relations in the Balkans, ‘undeniably propagandistic’, the Provincial Government conceded; and the ordering of a Uniate Church book by a district commissioner without consultation. Kosanović was particularly exercised by the Catholic bishops’ reference to the Catholic nature of the dynasty. His pastoral letter was occasioned by reports of the foundation in Vienna of an aid society for Catholicism in Bosnia, with aristocratic backing. It was not as proselytizing as Kosanović implied, yet rumours of a socially very similar body to be formed in St Petersburg for Bosnian Orthodoxy were treated as a political threat by the government, while it was made clear that church gifts from Russia (‘unpatriotic provenance’) were unacceptable. That Kosanović should fear the playing field was not even does not seem unreasonable. Dimitrije Ruvarac, a leading Karlowitz Church scholar and no friend of the Serb radicals, seems right to present his position as difficult.

The government pressured Kosanović and Stadler to end their 1883 polemic, so that the Open Letter and Kosanović’s rejoinder were not published in Bosnia. They appeared, however, elsewhere. The affair shows that the administration was not in as much control of its organs as the delicate confessional situation required. This can explain Kállay’s determination to assert his authority, making his masterfulness the counterpoint to Kosanović’s impulsiveness. The seizure of Russian church books occurred at a time when Austria-Hungary was actually in alliance with Russia. Since his Foreign Ministry days Kállay had suggested forestalling unwelcome Russian charity by providing Austrian-produced church goods, while the Russian consul in Sarajevo had been advised that further Russian gifts would not be popular, so Kállay plainly saw continued consignments as subversive. But was the ground well chosen? In 1885 he called for twenty sets of the fourteen church books required, to be distributed free to twenty suitable churches; that ten of them should be in luxury form was a characteristic touch, as was the political effect intended. The Serb commune in Čećava complained the District Commissioner had told them that if they were rich enough to support a confessional school, they could get their own church goods.

The dénouement came suddenly when, out of the blue, on 26 June 1885, Kosanović informed the Provincial Government that he had handed in his resignation to the Patriarch. In this and in the following weeks he acted as if the 1880 Concordat did not exist. The government initially assumed this was a pressure tactic, but observing Kosanović’s support had dwindled to the Sarajevo area recommended that the Emperor accepted the resignation, which he did on 2 August. Patriarch Joachim IV showed the obstructive potential of his office by telling Kosanović to stay at his post and claiming the Convention
did not regulate resignations—before falling into line in August, without Austria having to invoke the ultimate threat of ignoring him, and alleging Bosnians’ preference for an autonomous Church. Kosanović was not informed of the government’s acceptance of his resignation till the Holy Synod had approved it on 25 September, the date of Franz Joseph’s signature being suppressed to disguise the revealing time-lag. Kállay handled the affair skilfully in the only way open, since Kosanović’s second thoughts, which were to stay on provided the authorities guaranteed his Church against attack, were plainly inadmissible. Kállay required that he should enjoy his substantial pension in Vienna.

In his letters from exile to his successor, Kosanović professed disappointment at the ‘lies’ and ‘inventions’ of the Serb nationalist press and protested that he wanted nothing more than to return to Bosnia as a private citizen free from political cares. These letters may have been angling for his return, and their emotional tone, the too frequent disclaimers and Nikolajević’s evident suspicion all suggest that Kosanović was in fact a restlessly political creature. Seeing Kállay was immovable, the ex-metropolitan absconded to Montenegro in 1888, telling a student spy just before this decision that though he could embarrass Austria he chose not to, but felt intolerably tied down while Kállay remained minister, spied on at every point and unable to serve the national cause which had been his lifelong concern. Kállay was not reassured, fearing Russian exploitation of Kosanović; his doings in exile were regularly reported by Austrian diplomats, who took steps to prevent his acquiring an Ottoman see. Kosanović’s lonely fate became part of the lore of the Serb nationalist movement before his death, ironically, in the same year as Kállay’s.

Kosanović’s resignation exploded the original idea underlying his appointment, that of building up a religious figure as leader of the Serb community with whom the government could cooperate. As his successor the government overlooked the vigorous Dalmatian archimandrite Nikola Miloš and chose the seventy-nine-year-old Đorde Nikolajević, a member of the Sarajevo consistory. The new metropolitan vividly expressed his relationship with Kállay when Kosanović accused him of opposing his return to Sarajevo:

If his Excellency Minister Kállay from grace, conviction, or inclination to you, has promised that you can come to Bosnia, or Sarajevo, … do you think that I would dare or wish to oppose this mark of attention, and put in my ‘Veto’? … In such questions neither you nor I have a decisive voice; they are resolved by other factors.

As this phrasing shows, any accommodation Kállay reached with the Serbs would be on his terms, which envisaged concession only from a position of strength. Thus in 1887 the Banjaluka commune was permitted to continue calling its school ‘Serb Orthodox’, and on observance of the good impression made, district and Kreis commissioners were requested to use only this term in communicating with Orthodox bodies which so called themselves—though the instruction was to be kept confidential. The same concession to the Mostar commune enabled
negotiations for its statute to be successfully concluded the next year,\textsuperscript{62} when the opportunity also arose to get rid of the unpopular Phanariot Ignatios. He was replaced by a nationally minded figure, Leontije Radulović, and on his speedy death, the like-minded Serafim Perović.\textsuperscript{63}

The limits of concession are apparent from the administration’s private reservations, however. In the wake of the Kosanović affair, the Sarajevo Serb commune leadership threatened to withhold the metropolitan’s residence, claiming it as its property. The Provincial Government was drawn to note that while the Turks had not interfered in communal autonomy and no codified right in the matter existed, the Sarajevo commune deceived itself to conclude it had complete freedom from the supervision of a benevolent government. For tactical reasons, accepted by the ministry, it felt it unwise to antagonize Sarajevo Serbs by vetoing a decision on the metropolitan’s quarters, and reiterated its view that regulation of communal affairs could await the moment when the communes’ own mismanagement led them to request it.\textsuperscript{64} The context was that the Sarajevo commune had declined to cooperate with its Banjaluka counterpart’s attempt to organize a national assembly to elect Kosanović’s successor.\textsuperscript{65} But for a moment, before the danger of a clash on the immediate issue receded, Kállay anticipated the necessity of closing down the larger communes and playing the smaller ones off against them.\textsuperscript{66} This was the voice of authority and eventually it was to speak out loud.

A WORSENING OF RELATIONS

The decade or so between Kosanović’s fall and the first major collective Bosnian Serb protest was ostensibly one of calm. The Kállay system was being put in place, the minister’s international reputation began to swell, while the barriers between Bosnia and the rest of the south Slav world were steadily raised. By 1890 only two Serb-language papers loyal to the Bosnian administration were admitted in the province.\textsuperscript{67} Those suspected of contacts with Serbia or Montenegro—235 Serbs and forty-two Muslims—were having their mail monitored (1888),\textsuperscript{68} and the railway authorities had instructions to forward all suspicious consignments to the Provincial Government. Nonetheless, Kállay remained ever alert to potential challenges. In autumn 1891 he reported to foreign minister Kálnoky signs of heightened consciousness among the Serb Orthodox, which he connected with the accession to power of the Radicals in Serbia. Despite the fact that hostile newspapers were forbidden entry to Bosnia, ‘it is as impossible to stop their being smuggled in as it is even to check the exchange of ideas in oral communication, or in general any kind of intangible propagation of political tendencies’. ‘The unconquerable idea of our political supremacy’ and ‘incomparable spiritual and economic superiority’ had weakened the influence of impoverished Montenegro on Herzegovina, but the problem was now Bosnia’s mercantile links with
Kállay had shrewdly diagnosed the impact of the Serbian Radicals. The writing of the newspapers Velika Srbija (Great Serbia) and, later, Bosna, which profited from the liberal press regulations of the new Serbian Constitution of 1888; reports that Austria’s bête noire, the patriotic Belgrade Metropolitan Mihailo, was planning a priests’ association to extend Orthodoxy in Serbia, where, as an Austrian diplomat noted tartly, everyone was Orthodox already; the interception of a consignment of volumes on Serb history, geography and literature sent to Bosnia by the patriotic Society of Saint Sava, which had previously concentrated on Macedonia: all this raised warning signals. During 1889 representatives from Brčko, Prijedor, Banjaluka, Gradiška and Šamac sent in the names and contributions of eighty members to the Saint Sava Society; though these towns were all in the north or north-east, commercially linked to Serbia, the society claimed members ‘from every part of proud Bosnia’. Its aims, it replied to a Prijedor enquirer, were:

The fostering of national feeling and qualities in those Serb regions which to Serbia’s misfortune remain under foreign rule. For this aim the society particularly uses schools and books, sending material and moral help where they are most necessary. As a patriotic Serb you will find further explanation superfluous.

Probably more important, however, was a growing political sophistication in Bosnia itself. In 1886 four young men, three of them teachers and three immigrants from Vojvodina, founded the first Bosnian literary review, the fortnightly Bosanska vila. Their concession excluded treatment of political and confessional issues and entailed preliminary censorship, but reflected Kállay’s pragmatic side. Bosanska vila’s opening number advanced an emulative cultural nationalism:

Cannons and guns have had their day, and if somewhere their rumbling and clanking are still heard—it is for the last time; today peoples and countries are conquered by a far more convenient, but also a far more dangerous means—culture and books.

In many ways, the new journal’s approach was a muted echo of that of the Omladina twenty years before: the same identification of the national principle with moral progress, the same conviction that in developing a national culture the Serbs were following the example of advanced nations. If it advocated singing
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societies, it was because ‘today all educated nations found singing societies’; if it called for a Serb history for the masses, it was because in England the most important professors did not scorn to lecture to them.76

In place of the apathy it saw in Serb society, *Bosanska vila* proposed vigorous support for Serb schools, reading rooms, singing societies, theatrical performances and concerts, while wryly admitting that very many Serbs would ask why they were necessary.77 Most popular with the public were the January concerts in honour of Saint Sava, which in the late 1880s developed in nearly all communes having a confessional school. Tuzla, Mostar and Sarajevo had the first Serb singing societies with statutes formally approved by the authorities (1887–89).78 Significantly, the Sarajevo society, ‘Sloga’, was conceived in a meeting of Sarajevo teachers, and took shape as a society of these and artisans, at which the merchant-dominant communal council at first looked askance.79 But the young movers wanted to unite, not divide, and *Bosanska vila* praised the merchants’ role in forwarding culture.80 There was a deliberate attempt to reflect the popular taste of a patriarchal society; love lyrics initially hardly found entrance against the national epic tradition.81 Early circulation figures showed the extent of Bosnia’s isolation from Serbia: 387 subscribers lived in Bosnia (157 in Sarajevo) and 193 elsewhere, of whom Zagreb accounted for 24 and Belgrade only 9.82

Among the signs of assertiveness which Kállay noted in his letter to Kálnoky was an appeal by the Tuzla Serbs to Franz Joseph to be allowed their traditional right to elect their new metropolitan.83 It followed the dismissal of the last remaining Phanariot, Dionysios, for attacking the orthodoxy of one of the government’s new church books.84 Clerical discontent loomed large in the early 1890s. The combination of new times and neglect seem, beyond the habitual hyperbole of Bosnian public discourse, to have brought severe consequences for the Orthodox clergy, While the metropolitans enjoyed state salaries on the abolition of the *vladikarina* tax in 1884, the assessment of equitable parochial incomes through parish delimitation, prioritized by Szlávy, remained undone, leading Nikolajević to publish his own ‘provisional’ norms for the *bir*, the faithful’s annual payment in kind, and for clerical services.85 Accumulating petitions from protopresbyteriats (Orthodox deaneries) alleged that the clergy were receiving less from their flock at the same time as more was being expected from them. Income was falling because of the break-up of *zadrugas* (the traditional communal households of the peasantry) into smaller units, unable to pay, and through decline in popular demand for the old services. Clergy were increasingly associated with the state, not the people, and as such expected to be more punctilious. They had to dress smartly to keep up with Austrian officials, could not supplement their income from commerce or even agriculture and needed better education and office resources to fill in the monthly birth and death forms and attend to other duties, like sitting on commissions, initiating church and school building, and watching over school attendance, all unpaid.86
Kállay’s response to the protests about clerical income is fascinating. Implicitly discounting the Provincial Government’s biased view that the movement was got up by the usual suspects in the communes, he welcomed the opportunity to turn the clergy against the commune leaders. ‘It lies in the nature of things’, he wrote:

That bodies so organized and with such tendencies can but come on principle into permanent conflict with a uniform and purposeful lay power … It is therefore indisputably necessary … that the influence of the church commune, at present far exceeding its natural limits, should be curtailed and that the entire organization of the commune should be officially remoulded through a normative statute so as to lose its danger for us … One of the means to further this development is plainly to emancipate the clergy from the laity in general and from the church commune in particular and to bring them into close connection with the government.87

Nikolajević was to be consulted about parochial incomes, but not told of the government’s plan to set clergy against commune. While there is no record of the negotiations Kutschera was to have with him, the outcome followed roughly the course Kállay had outlined.88 The clergy were to receive sharply increased subventions, renewable annually according to loyalty; parochial homes and payments for religious instruction given in government schools were also part of the package. Subventions for Orthodox priests rose from 10,645 florins in 1891 to 30,251 florins in 1896, honorariums for religious instruction from 7,290 florins (1892–93) to 28,280 florins; and state funds for parochial homes from almost nothing to nearly 20,000 florins.89

A sardonic view of this policy would be that economic means were used where ideological ones had faltered. Of approximately ninety entrants to Reljevo seminary in the 1880s, fifty had qualified by 1892, but only half of these had taken up parishes. In 1892 the institution was reorganized, stiffening entry requirements, and ending the secular/theological bifurcation in the syllabus, which had had ‘a damaging effect on the strict clerical discipline’ required and left students inadequately prepared for and attached to their priestly calling. Entrants fell to four the next year and two the year after.90 Civil Adlatus Kutschera complained that in a national institution like the Serb Orthodox Church it proved almost impossible to find the sort of theologians the regime wanted.91 The ablest man in Reljevo, Professor Alagić, left under a cloud after being photographed with students flaunting Serb national emblems.92 Bringing in the Slavonian Lalić as Director in 1897, the authorities found opposition to him organized by the two most promising members of staff, including one who had himself been trained at Reljevo and at the Orthodox theology faculty in Czernowitz.93 In 1898 the son of an Austrophile member of the Sarajevo consistory was one of three students who fled to Serbia, writing to his father from Belgrade about Kállay’s forthcoming fall and the inevitable triumph of the Serb people’s will.94
Not the least interesting aspect of the intractability of the Serbian Orthodox Church was that in his last years the aged metropolitan of Sarajevo began to make Bosnian Serb schools substantial bequests.\(^{95}\) There was a logic to this. In a private letter of 1884 Nikolajević had regretted that the government did not follow the obvious course to Serb hearts, and assist their schools.\(^{96}\) In fact, both his largest grants, of 15,000 florins to Blazuj and 10,000 florins to Varcar Vakuf, were made to parishes with radical priests, and it seems that only great official pressure brought him to dismiss Stjepo Trifković, a consort of the Russian consul, from Blažuj.\(^{97}\) Kutschera, stressing the pressures upon the metropolitan from his flock, remained convinced of his loyalty; Kállay was coldly hostile.\(^{98}\) But on Serb schools their views were identical. As Kutschera put it:

The sincerity owing to the respected Ministry obliges me to confess that the Provincial Government indeed does not take up a favourable attitude to the Oriental Orthodox confessional school … here as in all Balkan countries the Oriental Orthodox school bears much less a confessional than an outspokenly national character and is in the first instance a political tool to educate the young people in a generally extreme political tendency determined by the leading circles.\(^{99}\)

An ordinance of 1892 demanding a certificate of political reliability from all confessional school teachers before they could take up a new post exacerbated tensions.\(^{100}\) As Serb teachers often came from regions in the Monarchy the delays in obtaining such documents could leave schools idle for long periods, particularly the many one-teacher schools. Where schools’ organization was already shaky, the effect of the ordinance could close them for longer periods: in Glamoč allegedly for four years, in Ljubuški for seven years at a stretch.\(^{101}\) In private, the authorities acknowledged sixteen cases over 1890–96 in which state schools had been opened to replace Serb schools recently closed or frustrate plans to open them.\(^{102}\) They were able to exploit the often poor working conditions in confessional schools; by the end of the decade only a few district towns had joined Sarajevo and Mostar in guaranteeing decent wages through a school fund, and the chance of a pension. From the start of the occupation to 1899 at least thirty-one Serb teachers moved to the communal sector.\(^{103}\) Offers of material rewards to priests, the provincial government opined, were the best way to prevent an ill-trained clergy from fanning the suspicions of a primitive people against state educational policy.\(^{104}\) Government pressure worked best on poorer members of the Serb community. In 1898 the Ljubinje district commissioner, by Serb accounts, leaned on peasants and tithe clerks to enter their children for the communal school, and after the start of the school year forbade further entry into the Serb one on grounds of its unsatisfactory arrangements. A Provincial Government report in 1897 had indeed commented on its cramped accommodation and recommended driving it out of existence.\(^{105}\) Of course there were intrigues on both sides. In Čajnica, where a pro-government priest had managed to coax thirty-five Serb children into the communal school with promises of secondary school scholarships, the
confessional school teacher, in his function as church choirmaster, discriminated against them. The Provincial Government got Metropolitan Perović to rebuke the choirmaster and fined the Serb parents who had subsequently withdrawn their children from the communal school.\textsuperscript{106} The strategy of haughty authority was a high-risk one. From a concatenation of such parish-pump politics grievances were created which would fuel the very opposition the government wished to crush.

As Serb social life diversified, so the petty local struggle between officialdom and the ‘Serbian spirit’ moved into new spheres. By 1895 the number of communes celebrating Saint Sava in January had risen to fifty-nine. In that year Sarajevo banned the opening address of greeting wholly four times, and partially twenty-nine times, amended the hymn \textit{Uskliknimo} thirty-five times and forbade altogether Prince Nikola of Montenegro’s patriotic poem ‘Onamo, ’namo’. This rigour was intended as exemplary guidance for local officials who would take on such censorship duties in 1896. It also targeted all attacks on past Ottoman oppression as offensive to Muslims.\textsuperscript{107}

The 1890s saw a tightening up all round: ‘Bosnian’ for the mother tongue on forms confessional schools had to fill in; prior notice of communal meetings, the banning of all historic Serb figures in schools, except Saint Sava. ‘Serb reading rooms’ were refused permission in Sarajevo and Livno because of their ‘national and religious exclusiveness’. Yet Kállay’s refusal to withdraw the concession of the ‘supremely dangerous’ Nikola Kašiković to edit \textit{Bosanska vila}, an explicitly Serb organ, casts into relief the complex motivation of this complex man.\textsuperscript{108}

From one viewpoint authoritarian and dogmatic, Kállay was also an intellectual and a carefully calibrating observer, who saw things from a variety of angles. It seems most likely that in the long term he did not envisage a crude crushing of the Bosnian Serb laity as a whole, but a defeat of their ‘radical’ wing, after which accommodation could be reached with those who had renounced their colleagues’ unrealistic dreams. The strategy of setting clergy against laity was means rather than end of this strategy, for ultimately lay moderates would be a securer support than the Serbian Church. This was the goal of government politics over the Karlowitz Patriarchate in Kállay’s native Hungary, and many of its features can be seen in Bosnia in the 1890s. It meant the showdown with the radical communes implicit in many statements of the Bosnian authorities which have already been quoted.

\textbf{THE BATTLE WITH THE LAY COMMUNES}

The background to this showdown requires some knowledge of developments in the Karlowitz Patriarchate, from where so many Serb cultural activists in Bosnia originated. The autonomy statute accorded this Church province by the liberal Hungarian culture minister József Eötvös in 1868 ensured a two-thirds
lay majority in the National Serb Church Congress and also in new quasi-democratic organs, the eparchial (diocesan) assemblies. Since all these bodies chose members of their executive committees collectively, the lay majority was able to put its clerical allies into these bodies, giving it potential control of the Patriarchate’s monastic wealth and a decisive voice in the Church Congress’s power to nominate Patriarchal candidates for Franz Joseph’s decision. In practice Hungarian governments after Eötvös frustrated implementation of this autonomy and supported the attempt of the conservative Church hierarchy to restrict lay influence at its base in the parochial communes, by means of a ‘Unitary Statute’ trimming lay powers. The united Serb National Liberal Party broke up into feuding factions, among whom the Radicals emerged as rather Pyrrhic victors in the 1902 National Congress elections.109

The Bosnian path to similar confrontation began in Mostar. From the end of the 1880s disputes over the right to appoint the parish priest and control Žitomislić monastery opposed the laity to Metropolitan Perović, while a communal redraft of its 1888 statute removed state supervision from the proposed new statute terms and obliged Serb children to attend the confessional school. Again Kállay turned to Professor Zhishman in Vienna for arguments from Orthodox canon law against the commune’s claims. On Serb protests against the requirement for teachers to produce certificates of political reliability, however, it was Banjaluka commune that led the way, with a deputation to the Provincial Government in 1893. None of this produced any concession from Vienna. While Kutschera requested the right of discretion on the certificates issue, so as not to hinder the functioning of Serb schools unduly, Kállay was adamant.110 That there were doubts about the hard line appeared from an eloquent despatch from none other than the Mostar Kreis Commissioner himself, Baron Benko, in May 1895. Benko believed a settlement could be reached with a newly elected, ostensibly more moderate commune committee. The commune could nominate parish priests and exercise substantial control of Žitomislić monastery, through the elected monastic tutori, while Perović could express his approval of the choice, without the commune taking this as a formal right of annulment. Benko also advocated the abolition of preventive censorship and internal passport regulations. In his view a line should be drawn between a legitimate Serb national consciousness and the ‘Great Serbian’ idea.111

Kutschera for the Provincial Government acknowledged that Benko’s proposals amounted to ‘a well-considered system, very different from the present one, very liberal and indeed very benevolent’. But its time had not yet come. Starting from the belief that the alleged moderation of the Mostar commune was a chimera, that the Serbs viewed the least concession as a sign of weakness, and that the hierarchy was too frail a prop for government policy, Kutschera reiterated that the struggle with the essentially separatist commune ‘must be fought out to the bitter end, without being cut short by any compromise’. The
only defence against cultivation of a Serb national spirit was to strengthen the specific consciousness of Bosnian nationality.\textsuperscript{112}

By this time the administration was committed to a strategy already introduced in the Karlowitz Patriarchate, that of a normative statute (\textit{Normalstatut}), incorporating all the official desiderata on state right of supervision and clerical control. Parish priests were to be \textit{ex officio} members of the communal committees,\textsuperscript{113} but the key power to approve members of these committees lay with the government alone; Perović had shown signs of wishing to assert the Church’s role here, so as a concession he would be consulted.\textsuperscript{114} The patriotic old metropolitan and former Žitomislić abbot, deeply unhappy at his breach with the laity but incensed by their personal discourtesy, as he saw it, was to be the figurehead for the \textit{Normalstatut}’s gradual introduction into rural Herzegovina, until the radicals of Mostar were isolated and forced to terms.\textsuperscript{115}

By late 1895 this strategy seemed to be making some progress. Čajnica commune, after the undermining of its radical leaders, prepared to accept the \textit{Normalstatut}, and in the next year Konjic, Gacko and Trebinje actually did so. The real focus, however, was Mostar, where Perović formally broke off relations with the commune leaders in autumn 1895 and called on the government to help him defend his rights.\textsuperscript{116} The communal assembly meanwhile resolved to take their grievances to Vienna. Kállay presented the matter to the Emperor as one of usurpation of Church powers at a time of weak government, behind which lay a battle with the state for influence over Herzegovina, as in 1881; thus even apparently possible concessions should be refused.\textsuperscript{117} The Mostar deputation’s proclaimed satisfaction with the minister’s readiness for Benko to mediate on its dispute with Perović was therefore misplaced. Kállay’s attitude was disingenuous. He and Benko knew that the written apology Perović required from the commune would kill off negotiations, but they made no effort to moderate the bishop, whose firmness pleased them.\textsuperscript{118} A circular to District Commissioners in rural Herzegovina to work in Perović’s favour followed, though Kállay was more circumspect than the Sarajevo government and wanted further local study before venturing to dissolve the Mostar commune committee.\textsuperscript{119} The Mostar Serbs, though somewhat discouraged as the government had hoped, surprised it by requesting permission to send deputations to the Emperor and the Patriarch. The authorities did not respond, thinking to wear down their opponents in a waiting game.\textsuperscript{120}

Meanwhile, in February 1896, Nikolajević died. The ambitions of his eventual successor, currently metropolitan of Zvornik, Nikola Mandić, throw a flood of light on the third party to the tripartite state–lay–hierarchy nexus whose relationship Kállay was now set to resolve in the state’s interest. Mandić was a product of Karlowitz; hence what concerned the government was not his basic political loyalty but his clerical pretensions. As he addressed Kállay:
After fourteen years of your wise and blessed administration you have achieved great works of renown! The Orthodox Church still lies in ruins, awaiting your powerful and sagacious hand."

His programme included a fourth diocese in Banjaluka, a higher Church court and more university theological training for priests. In the surmise of the Sarajevo culture department head Georg Trešćec, it had as its ultimate goal an autocephal Bosnian Church with Mandić at its head. The authorities noted that his own draft of a communal statute differed from their Normalstatut in giving the Church greater powers than the state in the supervision of communal meetings and approval of confessional schoolteachers; symbolically, the government representative would sit on the left and the bishops on the right in commune meetings. Trešćec, who ascribed an illness of Mandić to worry over his prospects for the Sarajevo see, observed drily that after their conversation Mandić was in the clear about government intentions; they were limited to its Normalstatut, which he could be won for, and ruled out his wider schemes.121

Events moved to an unexpectedly bruising climax. In December the Mostar Serbs, tired of waiting for an answer to their request, set off to Vienna to petition the Emperor. But not they only. Members of thirteen other communes joined them in the capital to present to Franz Joseph what became known as the First Serbian Memorandum. Among these was the Sarajevo commune which had given no significant trouble hitherto in the occupation, but had been annoyed by the obligation of prior notice of all meetings imposed since Gligorije Jeftanović took over as commune president from the more trusted Petro Petrović (Petraki).122 The memorandum itself, culminating in a request for a Sarajevo assembly to put things right, was a compendious ragbag of complaints of harassment of communal activities and Serb schools, forced adoption of illegal statutes, prohibition of Serb singing societies and the Serb name, obstruction of bequests made to Serb institutions, neglect of Cyrillic, in short, the denial of all aspects of the autonomy which Serbs had enjoyed in happier Turkish times.123

The Provincial Government indignantly countered the accusations, arguing on Serb schools that the root of the matter was the inability of these schools to survive their own inefficiencies.124 Yet enough should have been said to show that government was not guiltless for the show of Bosnian Serb opposition, which was to grow into a major movement. It seems strange that Kállay, whose speciality the Serbs were, should have so miscalculated. If the Orthodox masses were as remote from nationalist ideology as he plausibly said they were, why were fears so strong of a small urban elite sharing a nationality with a state which Foreign Minister Kálnoky in 1895 described as a ‘harmless neighbour’ because of its ‘semi-bankruptcy’ and ‘general weakness’?125 Alternatively, if Serb nationalism was worth taking so seriously, what chance was there that the restrictions on the Serbian name and forcing of Bosnianism could work? It has been suggested above that Kállay’s policies were multifaceted, as the cohabitation of Bosanska vila and
the campaign for Bosnianism implies, and that he can be seen at times seeking an accommodation with the Serbs, as in the initial Nikolics and Kosanović years, perhaps in the long-term goal of the Normalstatut. Yet difficulties remain, not least in the rejection of the concept of ‘moderates’ in commune ranks expressed above by his closest, if no doubt less subtle colleague, Hugo Kutschera.

One is led to surmise that, though Kállay was too intelligent to reject the concept of accommodation in principle, he found it difficult to know when best to concede in practice. Here his strong will, combative nature and lifelong view of the Slav peril, behind which stood Russia, combined with his ideological conviction of the ‘particularism’ of Oriental Serbs to shape his authoritarian stance. It is interesting that the Serb memorandum included the regime’s preference for oral rather than written procedure among its complaints. Of course, twenty-first-century values should not be read back into the past. Kállay no doubt had a point in believing that strong government impressed a ‘backward’ people. But democracy would not have advanced as far as it has in the modern world if there were not a flip side to such views. Hearts and minds were alienated by the elements of harassment of Serb schools and institutions, and the strategic error of identifying the Bosnian Serbs with a Church Kállay treated with some disparagement, as in the cynical handling of Serb clergy’s grievances and somewhat demeaning dependence expected of the hierarchy, whose rights government purported to be defending. In the case of the Bosnian Serb communes, he wanted to smoke out the hornets’ nest, and it began to sting.
5

Kállay and the Muslims

Bosnia’s Muslims had always had a key role in Kállay’s governmental strategy. They were the community most closely associated with the theme of Bosnian identity, the natural opponents of the Serb and Croat nationalism he sought to thwart. Besides, they remained the socially dominant community. Landowners were overwhelmingly Muslim, and free peasants very largely so. While only 7 per cent of Serb Orthodox lived in towns, a quarter of Muslims did so, comprising the heart of the artisanal class. Moreover, with upwards of forty madrassas at secondary level, the Muslims possessed a substantial cultural infrastructure, albeit of traditional stamp. Therein lay part cause of a relationship with government which remained more troublesome than Kállay’s plans foresaw. The armed conflict of 1878 inevitably cast its shadow but more was at stake: the aversion of most Bosnian Muslims not just to foreign rule but to the Europeanization at the heart of the cultural mission, and the hubris of the age which affected Europeans in their dealings with Islam and the Orient. From this Kállay was not exempt.

To most Europeans, the Bosnian Muslims appeared doubly doomed, as a lagoon cut off from the receding tide of a shrivelling Ottoman sea. Yet if the ‘sick man of Europe’ was less directly a support than Serbia for the Bosnian Serbs, the Ottoman empire remained a vast reality which absorbed up to 150,000 Bosnian migrants over the period of the occupation, while its great capital continued to act as a social and educational magnet for upper-class Bosnians and Islamic students. Nineteenth-century Turkey was undergoing its own modernization process, which strove to preserve the empire by adopting aspects of the seemingly successful European formula: equal rights for Christians and Muslims alike in a common ‘Ottoman’ civil society; creation of a European-style bureaucracy trained in a new school system separate from the institutions of the ulema; partial recodification of sharia law itself (the Medjelle Code of 1870–76); opening up of the economy, including overhaul of traditional land law (1826/1858). The conventional view of the reign of Abdul Hamid (1876–1908) as a despotic step back from the reforming spirit of the post-1839 Tanzimat has undergone some revision. Abdul Hamid, true, strengthened Islamic motifs in the new state schools, reflecting his fear of a potential Europhile intelligentsia opposition, but this was a plausible response to European powers’ continued neo-imperialist policies towards Turkey. Moreover, it was rational enough to seek to clothe the changes
taking place in a garb more familiar to the Muslim masses, particularly when the empire’s Christians resisted Ottomanization and became fewer with successive territorial amputations. The reserved, intelligent, understandably suspicious Sultan, with his fondness for European opera and supposed preference for the Gregorian over the Islamic calendar, was himself testimony to elements of westernization which were in fact penetrating his empire. The Tanzimat’s assumption of control of the vakufs and education through central government departments advanced in his reign, further marginalizing the traditional ulema institution; Abdul Hamid equally distrusted madrassa students. If literacy in the empire rose from 1 per cent to a still lowly 5–10 per cent over the nineteenth century, this still enabled a journalism with individual sales of up to 40,000 to appear, along with European-style novels, women authors and by the new century a mild feminism, not to speak of the Young Turks. Meanwhile, the orchestrated appearances of the world’s last significant independent Muslim ruler at Friday prayers retained the power to make an emotional impact on Muslim visitors from other lands.¹

What significance did the Ottoman fact have for relations in Bosnia? It was doubtless more diffuse than the influence of Belgrade. Prestige for Abdul Hamid was an important weapon in his fight to preserve what was left of Ottoman power and as such he could not be indifferent to his nominal sovereignty over Bosnia, nor Bosnian Muslims who reminded him of it. K’allay never trusted him. However, Realpolitik constrained him to keep on the right side of the central European powers, Germany appearing his best bet for support against the threat from Russia and her Balkan Slav protégés. For emerging Bosnian Muslim reformers, changes in the Ottoman empire were very important, though matched by those among Tsarist Muslims, who in some ways were closer to the Bosnian experience. For the bulk of Bosnian Muslims, however, the sluggish evolution of the old metropole was doubtless a closed book and it retained more sentimental, sometimes also familial, rather than direct political significance for them. In practical terms, Bosnian Muslims under the occupation had to rely very much on their own resources, which were, however, not quite as meagre as some observers assumed.

MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND HABSBURG POLICY

At the apex of the Muslim community were a few score beg families standing out among some thousands of lesser landowners, the agas. With an increase in kmet-holding landowners from 8,162 in 1885 to 10,463 by 1910 and some shrinkage of the kmet category, the number of kmts per aga dropped substantially, from seventeen to nine, testifying to a fall in agas’ prosperity and prestige.² Many of them lived little differently from their kmts, so not surprisingly there was a rise in the percentage of landowners living in towns, where they could supplement
their income. It was already more than half in 1895. Husnija Kamberović has arrived at a figure of forty-six leading beg families for 1911, controlling 14 per cent of all begluk land in Bosnia-Herzegovina (roughly equivalent to the European demesne) and more than 30 per cent of kmet holdings. Since begluk land covered just 9.5 per cent of the surface of Bosnia, these leading families owned on average a few thousand acres each, far short of the latifundia of Bohemia and Hungary, though in the low-lying Posavina to the north estates could be considerable. The Fadilpašićes owned 33,000 jochs and controlled 994 kmet plots, the Gradaščevićes nearly 32,000 and 328, largely arable.

The division between the directly owned begluk and the kmet plot was a sore point for Bosnia’s landowners. In their critique, Austrian regulations obscured the fact that begluk and kmet land was equally the landowner’s, and the kmet merely a tenant standing in a private relationship with his master. Kamberović does not share the view of some Bosniak historians that the category of begluk was an invention of Austria’s, but he too holds that the occupation notion of kmet right (kmetsko pravo) inhering in the kmet’s plot as an act of public law, as in European feudalism, entailed legal innovation. The problem is that the traditional Ottoman landholding pattern conformed neither to central European late feudal norms, nor the landlord-tenant system to which the Bosnian begs laid claim. The Ottomans had vested land ownership in the Sultan, registering most land as miriē or state property, and restricting private property (mulk) in the main to buildings and fruit trees on miriē land. However, with the breakdown of this system, by which spahis held state fiefs in return for military service, the notables who had replaced them, constraining peasant kmets to do them service, had increasingly sought to regularize their position as full owners. In this sense, developments in Austrian Bosnia were merely a continuation of late Ottoman trends, which had seen the struggle of aga and kmet to turn the breakdown of Ottoman norms to their own advantage, each seeking to emerge as the effective proprietor of the soil.

In this struggle, the Austrian occupiers, having refused to emancipate the mainly Christian kmets, found it politic not to increase their discontent. Landlords particularly complained that Austrian practice registered land they considered private (mulk) as state (miriē). Indeed, since mulk and miriē were inherited according to different rules, Austrian officials sought to prevent the splitting up of the peasant plot that this might entail by assimilating mulk to miriē whenever both these categories in a plot were held by the same cultivator, i.e. the kmet. Landlords also complained that land they considered theirs was being appropriated by the state under forestry legislation and that peasants claimed ‘servitudes’ or rights of use on private forest land. The 1890s were a time of falling agricultural prices, and landlords’ relative lack of demesne brought them into direct economic conflict with their kmets and political conflict with the government they accused of bias. The fact that the peasants were equally
dissatisfied only indicates the depth of the unresolved agrarian problem. The obligation to pay the tithe in cash, when market prices often failed to match those underlying the assessment; the growth of population relative to the cultivated area; the breakdown of the extended family unit of the traditional zadruga; the inadequacy of government measures (model farms, district loan funds, advice on best practice) to raise standards: all this acted as a drag on any notion of Austrian mission. Free peasants, including the largest component of the Muslim population, were in no way exempt from these strains. Indeed, most free peasant plots, preponderant in north-west and much of central Bosnia, were smaller than those of the kmets.

A psychological element mingled with landowners’ discontent. To live as subjects of their age-old enemies was painful to proud men who boasted a heroic tradition as border guardians of Islam. One of the characters in the novel *Zeleno busenje* on resistance in 1878 to Austrian occupation is disagreeably surprised by the taunting demeanour of his normally sycophantic Orthodox peasants, against which a kmet’s loyalty to his master later in the book provides a telling contrast. The Muslim emigration from Bosnia continuing through the occupation often featured well-to-do landowners leading whole communities into exile. The British consul remarked on the slackening of the old parental control, which led higher-class Muslim youth to drunkenness and immorality.

The occupation indeed compounded a sense of malaise that had affected the Bosnian Muslim world since the Tanzimat, of institutions in decline and values under siege. A certain melancholy can still be felt from the distance of the historian Hamdija Kreševljaković’s work on the last decades of Bosnian guilds in face of Austrian products and businessmen, which not only undercut Bosnian ones but often eliminated them altogether, as clogs yielded to shoes and individual textile guilds to novel styles. Thus the *ahibaba*, traditional head of Ottoman guilds, made his last visit to Bosnia in 1888. By the new century the traditional footwear guild had no more apprentices and the last traditional bookbinder had closed, whose guild had also copied books in a pre-print society. Only the saddlers maintained their old constitution till the First World War. Similarly, though several of the seven public *hamams* or Turkish baths which Sarajevo had had in 1600 survived till 1878, only one made it to 1914. The fate of the earliest foundation of all tells the tale. Damaged when the still unregulated River Miljačka flooded in 1887, it was blown up by mines and replaced by a bath of European design, though with one section in Turkish style. Mostar’s last hamam closed in 1896 when necessary repairs were no longer made. Modern baths opened there in 1913. The last performance of *karagöz*, the traditional Turkish shadow puppet theatre, was held in Sarajevo in 1930. While Kreševljaković’s retrospect bespeaks the wistfulness of a meantime scorned inheritance, contemporary German-language travelogues and art work and also the short stories of the prominent Mostar Serb author, Svetozar Ćorović, exemplify a somewhat patronizing curiosity about a waning
culture. In one of Ćorović’s best-known tales, a beg, driven to menial work, his pride confined to the outjutting corner room of his ramshackle, traditional home, chooses to die under it when the town authorities order its destruction to make way for a wider and more modern thoroughfare. Interestingly, most of Ćorović’s piquant short stories had Muslim themes, but when he essayed the more demanding novel, he wrote about Serbs.

The Muslim ulema, or Islamic intelligentsia, also felt the chill wind of new competition. Islam did not have a clergy in the Christian sense of a priestly hierarchy endowed with sacramental powers. Imams and naibs (responsible for mosques), vaizes (popular Friday preachers), kadis (judges) and hodžas, muallims and muderises (Koranic teachers, the last named at madrassa level) were functionaries in a religious system which aimed to create the Islamic state on the basis of the sharia or holy law. The world they served had quite different norms from Christendom, including calendar, script, even the means of reckoning time through the day. Hence the difficulties of intercultural communication. As in all cases of civilizational divide, the difficulty arose of distinguishing between the core and the incidental values of one’s creed, so that pupils sitting at desks rather than on the floor, or using Koranic textbooks in Bosnian rather than Turkish, could for the devout signify a falling away from the faith.

Here a strong conservatism of the Bosnian ulema was conditioned by its relation to its religious metropole. The faith was barely distinguished from the Ottoman civilization which had brought it. Most Bosnian ulema read only Turkish and Arabic; some two thousand Bosnians claimed a knowledge of the former and several hundred of the latter, figures that give an impression of the size of the traditional intelligentsia. The fact that Salih Muvekkit’s Turkish history of Bosnia, compiled characteristically in manuscript in these years, is believed to be the first work by a Bosnian Muslim to use Serbo-Croat sources, illustrates the intellectual disjuncture. Dissociation from western culture did not necessarily make the ulema a hotbed of discontent. The Turkish ulema had up to a point cooperated in the inception of the Ottoman reforms, if from opportunism rather than conviction, and the same may be said of some of their Bosnian counterparts under Austria. The mufti of Sarajevo, Hilmi Hadžiomerović, responded to Austrian pressure to issue a fatwa justifying military service of Bosnian Muslims in Habsburg ranks, and the mufti of Travnik, Mehmed Teufik Azabagić, published an Arabic work dissenting doctrinally from the view that Bosnia was a non-Islamic land from which emigration was a religious duty. They later became respectively the first and second Reis-ul-ulema. But it cannot be doubted that ulema instincts, certainly in the lower ranks, were opposed to what Austria was trying to do.

This was not necessarily a matter of the invincible conservatism and lethargy with which Muslims were charged in confidential Austrian documents. In a predominantly Muslim state, the terms of the compromise between western and
Islamic norms could, if with difficulty, be laid down by Muslims. Kemal Karpat’s pathbreaking work on the Turkish case sees modernization as proceeding from three sources: the bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, and commercialization leading to a kind of agrarian middle class. In Bosnia the Muslim minority had no administrative role and was commercially still more hard-pressed by Christians than were Ottoman Turks, so that hope appeared only in the preservation of an outmoded land system. Only an intelligentsia path to Europeanization was open, and though this was eventually followed by the thin Austrian-educated class that emerged, it was understandable if in the meantime Bosnian Muslims tended to see their situation in existential terms, whereby any renunciation of their traditional ways threatened the heritage as a whole. In fact, at the level of survival Islamic cultural institutions showed considerable persistence under the occupation. The number of mektebs and madrassas was roughly maintained. While one well-known Sarajevo madrassa fell victim to the regulation of the Miljačka (the compensation funded a Muslim student hostel), and such famous madrassas as that of Gazi Husrefbeg or (in Mostar) Karadoz-beg functioned at a humdrum or greatly reduced level, there is evidence of new foundations (Bihać, Rogatica, Brčko) or substantial rebuilding (Tuzla, Goražda, Fojnica, Zvornik, Gradačac). A far higher percentage of Muslim children attended some kind of schooling than of non-Muslims, though—symptomatic of wider strains—these schools had been losing something of their former prestige from the first half of the nineteenth century, often acquiring a reputation for brutal discipline linked to formalism and meagre learning outcomes.

It should be apparent from previous chapters that Kállay’s wager on the community depicted above was mainly a wager on the traditions of supposedly Bogumil-descended begs, not Islam. The cult of Muslim precedence and prestige was scrupulously observed: fifty-eight of sixty-one towns had Muslim mayors. The Bosnian administration, headed by Hugo von Kutschera, a Turkish-speaking product of the Habsburg Oriental diplomatic corps, established social relations with leading Muslim families, which were reinforced by Kállay himself on his extended annual visits. That said, he by no means neglected other sections of Muslim society in his plans. Characteristically abreast of the times, he devised the administration’s much-publicized network of craft schools with the Muslim and to a lesser extent Orthodox artisans in mind. In the cultural domain the Bosnian ruždijas which had fallen victim to the 1875–78 disturbances were revived in the Kreis towns in the form of alternative elementary schools teaching Oriental languages alongside the three Rs. By 1893, in the towns having these schools there were 400 Muslim pupils in the ruždijas, as against only forty-three in the conventional state schools. Further recognition of the distinctive Islamic heritage was the resumption in 1882 (under Muvekkit’s editorship) of the annual Turkish-language calendar first sponsored by Osman Pasha, and the launching of the weekly newspaper Vatan
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(Fatherland) in Turkish in 1884. It was produced by the vakuf administration official Mehmed Hulusi (1849–1907), who had edited the government paper for Herzegovina, Neretva, in the last years of Turkish rule. The Sharia School for training kadis, hailed by the Egyptian Islamic scholar Mohammed Abduh as a model institution, provided judges competent to operate in the modified context of a non-Muslim state. Between 1878 and 1900, 387 ordinances and regulations were issued relating to Bosnian sharia courts. The most important empowered them to deal with Muslim family, marriage and inheritance matters (1883) and, after the setting up of a Bosnian Sharia High Court, required them to refer to the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure where the Ottoman Medjelle provided no guide (1887). The fact that the sharia did not tie substantive law to the procedure for its implementation facilitated this evolution, which followed related lines in all Muslim or part-Muslim countries under European rule.

Yet not surprisingly these measures did not go to the heart of the Muslim sense of unease, for K´allay himself had reservations about Islam’s viability in the modern world. The work on Bosnian Muslims conventionally ascribed to him argued that the Muslim community had been given special protection because the government was aware of its inability to compete once shorn of its political dominance. The competitive motif is central here. K´allay was a conservative-minded noble, who looked for support among the Bosnian landowners. But his conviction of the power of progress, and of its conjunction with notions of civil society and economic freedom reflected the conventionalities of nineteenth-century Europe, and specifically the experience of his native Hungary, whose reform movement had come through the landed class’s renunciation of feudal privilege and embrace of market capitalism. The developmentalist perspective so engendered meant there were limits to K´allay’s willingness to shield social formations from the test of life as he conceived it. In practice the handful of craft schools he founded did little to stop the decline of the Muslim urban poor. Though limited resources played a role, it is also likely he thought good-quality institutions could give no more than a lead, to which society would or would not respond. The wider intellectual background needs pointing out. K´allay’s scepticism was common form in the age. The contrast between the science-based order and productiveness of their civilization and the seeming disorder, obscurantism and poverty of others made a deep impression on European minds. Recent scholarship using Foucauldian notions of social control helps to illuminate the reaction to difference of a European world governed by abstract, regimented norms; it casts light on western superiority complexes, even if it can romanticize an Islamic ‘other’. All in all, K´allay’s philosophical-cum-sociological speculations about East and West plainly fit within the ‘Orientalism’ described by Edward Said as characterizing European approaches to Islamic societies in this period.
MUSSLIM EDUCATION IN THE 1890S

As a result of this pattern of assumption, it was European education in its undiluted form that European administrators wished to inculcate in their most talented and receptive subjects, however much tactical expediency and limited resources made gradualism the means. Thus a Provincial Government headed by an Orientalist could refer to the ‘uselessness’ of Turkish and Persian instruction in its ruždijas; the mixed educational forms it had created for Muslims, like the revived ruždijas, were temporary compromises in its eyes. Kállay was prepared to be patient, advocating that ‘the work of reform’ should take place only in collaboration with Muslim leaders. Yet in essence he shared the reluctance of the bulk of the ulema to assay a real compromise between tradition and westernism, and awaited the moment when the realization would dawn among Muslims of the need for basic change, whereupon the government should set itself at their head.

Reports in 1890 on stirrings in the Muslim community after the controversial conversion to Catholicism of a young girl, Uzeifa Delahmetović, led Kállay to ask Kutschera whether that time had come. Were Muslim artisans more prepared to see that allowing their wives to undertake factory work or domestic service would supplement their declining incomes? For the only time in the occupation considerable thought was given to Muslim educational reform. In 1890, on the initiative of the ruždija teacher Ahmed Ribić, a reform mekteb (mekteb iptidaije) was founded in Sarajevo such as the Turkish state had been encouraging from the 1870s. Unlike the traditional mekteb (sibjan mekteb), these schools had a fixed three-year course with material graduated by year, pupils sat at benches and, above all, in Turkey, mother-tongue literacy was taught. Such an institution offered a way forward for Muslim pupils whose parents would be reluctant to commit them to a wholly western education. On Kállay’s direction the Vakuf Commission drew up plans for more reform mektebs, as an alternative to state schools in rural areas, and the Austrophile editor Hulusi was sent to Mostar to win the support of Mufti Ali Fehmi Džabić for such an initiative in Herzegovina. Successive plans approved by the Provincial Government envisaged an expanded network of reform mektebs staffed by graduates of Muslim teacher training colleges (Dar-ul-mualimin) and supervised by vakuf school commissions in each Kreis, which would also open ruždijas. Moreover, by combining Islamic and elementary western subjects, the Dar-ul-mualimin would begin the Europeanization of the hard core of Muslim conservatives, for the sofías or madrassa theology students would be required to attend them on pain of losing their free madrassa places.

Having initiated debate, the ministry repeatedly reined in Sarajevo’s enthusiasm. Muslim educational reorganization should not proceed through ‘the creation of a Muslim school administration’, as Vienna dubbed the Provincial Government’s proposals, but through grants from vakuf funds to individual schools.
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This recalls Kállay’s simultaneous preference for subventions to individual Orthodox priests, rather than income regularization for all. To build several Dar-ul-Mualimins would be to risk producing an unemployable ‘half-educated, in highest degree discontented proletariat’, the ministry claimed, since softas attending them would expect bigger salaries. One, in Sarajevo, was eventually somewhat grudgingly conceded as a test case.36 Alarmed at reports that as reform mektebs multiplied in rural Herzegovina, so Muslim numbers in state schools declined, the ministry suspected that Mufti Džabić’s energetic promotion of the new schools was intended to weaken Muslim access to western-style education, not advance it.37 Moreover, Sarajevo and Ribič were running ahead of conservative Muslim opinion, including Reis Azabagić, in pushing for the teaching of Bosnian in the reform mektebs.38 Above all, the authorities feared to sponsor an expanded Muslim confessional system alongside the Serb one, which would leave the state schools as a Catholic rump, unbalancing the official policy of even-handedness.39 Though Kállay had initially favoured teaching Bosnian as a step towards modernization, by autumn 1893 he engineered a compromise. Reform mektebs remained purely religious (that is, Bosnian would not be taught) but their graduates were obligated to go on to the state schools. They were thus to be restricted to where state schools existed, and the attempt to expand them as substitutes for basic western learning in rural areas was given up.40

The most significant outcome of the occupation’s one sustained period of concern for Muslim education was that the motor of change was to be the reform mektebs alone, and the cohorts they would provide for the state school sector. Vienna’s frequent enquiries showed the importance it attached to the reform mektebs. The fact that no complaints had been aroused by the discontinuance of some eighty ordinary sibjan mektebs was taken by the ministry in 1897 as an earnest that tradition would not stand in the way of further defunct institutions passing: by this madrassas were meant.41 By 1899 there were fifty-nine reform mektebs, with 6,187 pupils, financed by local subscriptions pledged to Kreis collection commissions for five years at a time.42 Here a potential shadow appeared. It emerged from Bihać Kreis that collections were being allocated not to reform mektebs, but to traditional ones whose transformation was merely envisaged. This had happened in Turkey, where sibjan mektebs were being dubbed reformed without any essential change of function.43 The ministry was not convinced by explanations that decrepit buildings had to be maintained and succour given to impoverished hodžas.44 The upshot was that one-third of reform mektеб graduates did not pass on to state schools.45 While Sarajevo had originally proposed overriding the ulema on this, by introducing various compulsory mechanisms for progression, Kállay did not follow, showing here his conciliatory face. However, the transfer of some pupils to the communal school before they finished their three-year reform mektеб course aroused many Muslims’ suspicions.46 The issue as to whether reform mektebs were to serve westernizing or Islamicist goals remained open.
The fortunes of the Sarajevo Dar-ul-mualimin were bound up with those of the reform mektebs, where most of its graduates were to teach. A survey showed that a third of the first thirty-nine graduates of this institution were awaiting posts to take up.\textsuperscript{47} Everything had to be planned for in a country with no opportunities for free professionals. Kállay confided, relatedly, that the destiny of Sharia School graduates had long been a preoccupation of his. While the immediate fate of most of them was to become sharia court scribes on a pittance,\textsuperscript{48} the very different careers some followed show how little an institution can ensure moulding people in a particular way. Osman Nuri Hadžić, the type of the westernized intellectual the regime wanted, was an 1893 Sharia School graduate; a graduate of the previous year, Omer effendi Zukanović, was publicly opposing the use of Bosnian in mektebs as late as 1910.\textsuperscript{49} Far more problematic still were the prospects of madrassa students, whose position Kutschera had plausibly argued was at the heart of the Muslim educational malaise. With the dropping of his plans for several Dar-ul-mualimins to shake up this sector, it remained essentially unchanged. In a partially successful experiment Muslim state school teachers taught literacy in Bosnian to softas of three provincial madrassas.\textsuperscript{50} Otherwise the only official action was negative, limiting exemption from military service to softas from ‘efficient’ institutions.\textsuperscript{51} Efficiency presumably related to willingness to observe a more structured teaching process initiated by the Medžlis-el-ulema in these years, but this appears to have involved no substantive changes and had little practical effect.\textsuperscript{52} In allowing the madrassas to drift, despite contemporaries’ agreement on their parlous circumstances, Kállay showed a dose of cynicism, thinking a touch of western education would make their graduates more demanding. Like the Governor General of Russian Turkestan, von Kaufmann, he presumed on the inability of Islamic institutions to survive benign neglect by the state.\textsuperscript{53} Both men underestimated the durability of Islam.

Girls’ education was something the regime showed a little more concern for, the restricted role of women in Muslim society being a staple of western commentary. But the one initiative proved unfortunate because the school for Muslim girls organized by the wife of Kosta Hörmann was held in his house and believed to be under Archbishop Stadler’s influence. Only when it was moved from there did the Reis himself send his daughter.\textsuperscript{54} Just nine would-be pupils could be canvassed for a school in Mostar and talk of one in Doljna Tuzla also came to nothing.\textsuperscript{55} By contrast, the ruždijas had been popular, yet the government seemed positively embarrassed at the halfway house it had created and did its best to assimilate these essentially Muslim confessional schools to the state system, discouraging even the name ruždija because of its confessional associations.\textsuperscript{56} The ministry pushed for Christians to attend, despite being told that they would never attend a school directed by a muderis, though there was hope to replace these by western-trained Muslim teachers. However, in 1899 the Provincial Government could only repeat what it had said six years before, that the factors which caused the ruždijas’ creation in the first place remained
and that a generation would be needed before Muslims would accept Christian religious education in what they felt to be their schools.\textsuperscript{57}

If Kállay’s concern for the interconfessional principle appears unrealistic in the case of the ruždijas, one can see him, as so often, as the man who took the broadest view. Appreciating the depth of ulema conservatism, he saw no alternative but to await the time when young Muslims themselves would reject half measures. His determination to maintain the interconfessional school as a bulwark of the regime, and means of Muslim integration, appears both politic and principled in the light of Bosnia’s circumstances then and later. However, it is also possible to see how Kállay became boxed in by his maxims. The policy of Bosnianism, which favoured Muslims symbolically, worked against them educationally, by subordinating their interests to the maintenance of the wider state school system. The ministry’s position was dogmatic: no schools were better than confessional ones.\textsuperscript{58} It is tempting to see a relation between this statement and Kállay’s disparaging view of the East and his over-developed desire for control. Since Muslim confessional education was mainly vakuf-financed, more halfway houses between Oriental and western forms, such as Sarajevo’s plans of the early 1890s entailed, need not have compromised the government (through appearing to subsidize Muslim education) as much as Kállay suggested. But by temperament and ideology the minister distrusted what he did not dominate. He preferred to work through the narrow but surer method of state-sponsored schooling. In view of Muslim dislike of these schools, this inevitably limited the rate of westernization.

Yet later charges of Europeanized Muslims that Kállay and Kutschera schemed to keep Muslims in ignorance, the better to rule them, were distortions.\textsuperscript{59} All the evidence suggests that the authorities carefully monitored Muslim school attendance and were anxious to encourage it.\textsuperscript{60} The way in which high officials Dlustuš and Hőrmann saw to the future novelist Edhem Mulabić’s admittance to teachers’ training college in the 1880s, though he had not even attended primary school, shows the regime’s readiness to exploit what signs of interest there were.\textsuperscript{61} However, the fact that the Turkish-speaking Kutschera played the Islamophile and arranged a room at his home for mevlud prayers made him all the greater hypocrite in his critics’ eyes. Actually, it was when he advanced Muslim interests as he saw them that on occasion Kutschera ventured to differ from his superior. Of course, both were loyal Habsburg bureaucrats, sensitive to Muslim opinion only selectively. Kállay was prepared to override its sensitivities where he saw fit. The best example of this was his handling of the Muslim charitable institution of the vakuf.

The appointment of a provisional Vakuf Commission and of corresponding district bodies in 1884 enabled the administration to maintain effective control of this paramount Islamic cultural institution, since all Commission meetings were attended by a government representative with wide powers. The system, with a Provincial Vakuf Directorate as executive organ, was made permanent in
1894, ostensibly on the wishes of an ad hoc assembly of notables. The aim was laudable, since there was a serious problem of misappropriation of vakuf funds by vakuf administrators (mutevellis), who were now obliged to transfer surpluses to a central fund. Vakuf income duly increased, as also the number of vakufs evidenced, from 250 to 622 over the period 1883 to 1899, but Muslims felt they had lost control and that priority was going to commercial operations—particularly building for rent—at the expense of charitable-religious functions. The vakuf issue highlighted most clearly the different cultural self-perceptions dogging the Austrian–Bosniak relation: on the one side European efficiency, saving Orientals from themselves, on the other a community whose elders had to accept manipulation by non-believers even in their most cherished institutions. Mufti Džabić’s first act of opposition had been to sign an unavailing protest against the bureaucratization of the vakuf. The issue was to play a big role in the worsening of relations which followed.

**MUSLIM RESPONSES TAKE SHAPE**

Yet the nineteenth-century encounter of Christian and non-Christian was not all about culture clash. Whether in India, the Ottoman empire or the Maghrib, there were many individuals who responded positively to European influences, just as the Austrian Enlightenment drew on ideas from traditional Protestant enemies and Gorbachev sought to learn from the West. Where individuals can experience the encounter as beneficial, however, whole societies find it more stressful and in circumstances of occupation opposition movements are born. This roughly reflects the Bosnian-Herzegovinian experience.

Individual Bosniak openness to western influence, of course, pre-dated the occupation. It can be seen in the journalist Kurtčehajić, who died young. Someone of his generation who lived to make a substantial contribution to Austrian Bosnia was Mehemmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak (1839–1902), whose interest in the wider world had been fired by extensive travels in Europe and Asia from 1869, and by his friendship with the Austrian vice-consul in his native Herzegovina in the 1870s. Kapetanović served in the Turkish administration but welcomed the Austrian occupation and attacked the Turkish record in Vienna’s leading daily, the Neue Freie Presse. His son Riza Kapetanović was the first Muslim to attend the German-language military school set up in Sarajevo in 1879. By 1885 he was a knight and Regierungsrat; from 1893 he was Sarajevo’s mayor. Kapetanović’s varied writings were concerned to underpin a Bosnian Muslim identity under Austrian rule. In his political pamphlets, he shared with his fellow Austrophile Mehemmed Hulusi Effendi the common themes of the accord between Islam’s progressive spirit and Austria’s reforms, Austria’s sincerity on religious equality compared to the Orthodox powers, and—this last more especially his own—the role of the Bosnian Muslim aristocracy as guardians
of Bosnia’s national character and a leading branch of the ‘doughty’ Yugoslav nation. As owner of the Muslim weekly *Bošnjak*, founded in 1891, he ascribed to the Muslims a clear prior role in Bosnian identity, as descendants of the medieval Bogomil people. Kapetanović’s career expresses the complex relation of commonality and specific identity linking Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats in the south Slav world. His pamphlets quoted non-Muslim poets like Ivan Mažuranić and Petar Preradović, while his collection of Muslim folk songs and folk wisdom, *Narodno Blago* (1887), earned him letters of appreciation from figures as diverse as Bishop Strossmayer, Karlowitz Patriarch Andelić—and Kállay—as well as a poem of tribute from ex-metropolitan Kosanović. Yet he opposed the idea that Bosnians were Europeans.

A generation younger than Kapetanović and maturing under Austrian rule were a number of writers who likewise found no difficulty with the Habsburg-south Slav framework. Edhem Mulabdić (1862–1954) made his way to western education from a traumatic family experience with the occupying troops in 1878, in which his brother and mother died. Like Kapetanović his family were already associated with reform in its Turkish garb as Tanzimat officials. He gave the speech at the graduating ceremony for his year in the teachers’ training college, on the subject ‘The Teacher among the People’. The Sharia School graduate Osman Nuri Hadžić (1869–1937) and Safvet-beg Bašagić (1870–1934), who studied in a ruždija before passing to Sarajevo Gymnasium, both owed something to Austria’s concessions to Islamic education. For Ibrahim Repovac (1860–1900) a wholly traditional course, through local and Sarajevo madrassas, led into the Austrian system via ruždija teaching and an eventual post as professor of Arabic at Sarajevo Gymnasium, when this was made an alternative to Greek for Muslim pupils.

Common to all these writers was a wish for self-expression which led them to contribute to the existing Serb and Croat press inside and outside Bosnia. Repovac was also active in *Vatan*, as was Bašagić’s father, another product of the Tanzimat, who retained his post as District Commissioner under Austria before joining the vakuf administration in Sarajevo. For a generation born into a wholly religious milieu, the impulse was the revitalization of Bosnian Muslim society through embrace of what was liberating in the new influences. Since, in literary terms, these came most directly from Croat and Serb sources, this first generation of modern Muslim intellectuals tended towards a Croat or Serb national orientation, which did not override the reality of rootedness in a distinctive Bosnian Muslim society. The inspiriting sense of a new age, in which the tools of battle were cultural, echoed in these young men as among their Christian contemporaries. ‘Our ancestors battled with arms … the times are changing … Such times seek heroes to defend us from evil with modern weapons, to cut a path towards progress,’ as Bašagić put it.

The Islamic underpinning was provided most systematically by Osman Nuri Hadžić, whose *Islam and Culture* (1894) stressed Islam’s rational roots and early
associations with scientific learning. His novels, written in conjunction with the
Croat Ivan Miličević, attacked the weaknesses of contemporary Bosnian Muslim
society, most sharply in Bez svrhe (Without Purpose, 1897), a critique of madrassa
education. A Young Turk figure in the story to apprise the leading character
that the Muslim bond between them is purely a spiritual one and alert him to
his duties to his fellow countrymen by race and language. The outstripping of
Muslims by Christian Bosnians more prepared to adapt to the new conditions is
a strong preoccupation of Hadžić’s work; already all porters were Muslims is one
observation. The collaboration with Miličević was symptomatic of a powerful
 Croatophile current in much early Bosnian Muslim literature, explicable in
education in Zagreb (Hadžić, Bašagić), the openness of Croatian periodicals
to Muslim work and the Islamophilism of the leader of the Party of Right,
Ante Starčević, whose flattery of Bosnian Muslims reflected views of Bosnia as
an integral Croatian land. However, the rising generation of young Muslims
writing in their mother tongue also published in Serb journals. Bašagić, later
a Croat identifier, sent early verses to Bosanska vila with a note declaring his
Serb allegiance which may, however, have stemmed from an intermediary, a
Serb Gymnasium friend. There were some Muslim writers of whose Serb
allegiance there can be no doubt, however, for it caused them difficulties. A
contemporary recorded how he and his friends shunned the leading Muslim
lyric poet of this first generation, Osman Đikić, when he went on from an well-
received account of parallels between Muslim and Serbian folk poetry to claim
that Muslims themselves were Serbs. The home of the poet Avdo Karabegović
Hasanbegov (1878–1900) was attacked by a mob when he began to publish in
Serb periodicals. He had been secretly taught western letters by a cousin, S. Avdo
Karabegović, also a Serbophile poet, after his father had forbidden him to attend
a state school. Đikić and S. Avdo Karabegović found their way to education in
Serbia; Belgrade contained the largest Bosniak emigration after Constantinople,
and an active Serbophile mufti. In 1900 with a third Muslim collaborator they
published a controversial collection of patriotic Serbian poems in Belgrade.

The difficulties of individuals who followed new courses show how popular
opinion still cleaved to more traditional Muslim allegiances. The growth of
opposition to the new order in Bosnia, as Robert Donia has shown, was none-
theless a slow process, overcoming habits of regionalism and fear. Opposition
to Kállay’s regime could bring fines, the loss of business licences, even short
periods of internment. Besides, Bosnians had little experience of legal opposition:
demonstrative events staged by radical Serbs to win Muslims to their side were
assumed by ordinary people to have government approval, as otherwise (to
their minds) they could not have taken place. The movement that did eventually
coalesce was thus the result of long-standing patterns of grievance, both economic
and cultural. Economically, it expressed the discontent of Muslim landowners
at the operation of forest and hunting law and the regime’s perceived favouring of
kmets. Its strongest spokesmen, from the Tuzla region dominating among
signatories of a petition to Franz Joseph in 1895, reflected, in the authorities’ view, an oppositionist spirit going back to Travnik’s loss of capital status in Turkish times. Mobilization took place through the social intercourse of the begs concerned. In Sarajevo the petition of 1897 had a more religious flavour, lamenting the threat to the Islamic way of life associated with the westernization of education and calling for Turkish as the language of instruction in the ruždijas. Sarajevo Muslims had bullied Reis-ul-ulema Omerović to join their protest over the Uzeifa conversion affair in 1890 and the regime rebuked his successor for not reasoning more strongly with the current protestors. In a third centre, Mostar, however, officials saw more hopeful signs in a move to associate a Muslim reading room (kiraethana) with a charitable society in aid of young artisans, led by an old-style ‘moderate’, the benevolent and (in his mother tongue) illiterate mayor Mujaga Komadina. But against him stood Mufti Džabić, a scholarly Arabist, coolly dismissive of the infidel government and key signatory of the 1886 protest against vakuf centralization. In Kállay, Komadina and Džabić, as in much cultural contact of the age of imperialism, more than two worlds clashed.

A feature of Austria’s difficulty with the Muslims was that even a traditionalist like Džabić was willing to envisage an anti-government alliance with the Serbs, which Belgrade fostered in line with a long-standing strategy. Such overtures to Bosnian Muslims were carefully monitored. A young Muslim employed by the Serbian Legation in Constantinople was actually an Austrian spy, keeping watch like the Legation on the activities of Bosnian softas vacationing in the Ottoman capital. Kállay warned as early as 1893 that Serbophile ideas were privately shared by many young Muslims ‘of the best families’, even in Sarajevo. The burgeoning Bosnian Serb opposition realized the asset a similar Muslim movement could be to their cause. At their concerts Muslims were given the best seats and the poorest Muslims were waited on with refreshments by wealthy Serbs. Kállay’s fears were coming true.

Full-fledged Muslim opposition was, however, sparked fortuitously. In May 1899 a Muslim girl, Fata Omerović, was abducted for conversion by Catholics from a small village of mixed religion near Mostar. Džabić organized a committee of twelve to demand action and redress, only to be told by the authorities that Fata’s experience was the fault of the Muslims themselves for failing to safeguard their religious and cultural institutions. This was a tactical error. By October 1899 the committee in the name of the whole Herzegovinian Muslim community presented a petition to Kállay and the Emperor which placed the blame for Muslim problems squarely on the shoulders of the government. The remedy the petition demanded was an elected Herzegovinian religious authority, in charge of vakufs and the appointment of hodžas (including state school religious teachers), and in receipt of government grants for Islamic purposes to disburse as it saw fit. It was a model of the cultural autonomy campaigned for by Serbs.
The Herzegovinian petition ushered in a period of wider struggle between the Austro-Hungarian regime and Bosnian Muslim leaders. The opposition, as Austrian officials complained, was an odd mix of economic self-interest and religious conservatism, wrapped up in a language of civil rights. It reflected an unusual community, where men learned in the three classical Islamic languages could not write their own, containing most of Bosnia’s wealthiest elite but slipping out of economic contention, consciously Slavic but asserting a Turkish identity. Kutschera’s idea that a Latin translation of a pre-occupation Islamic catechism in Arabic might help in the education of Muslim youth—presumably those attending the new Gymnasiums—is a choice example of the cultural confusion of the times. Haymerle had correctly anticipated the difficulty of winning over the Muslims. It was a tall order for any government to reconcile them as a whole to what Kállay pregnantly called ‘the cultural revolution and economic displacement’, with attendant material consequences, which they faced.

Yet by 1899 blaming the Muslims themselves for Fata Omerović’s fate cut no ice with the emerging opposition. The idea that Muslims would sometime awake to the inadequacy of their institutions and embrace westernization ran through the regime’s approach. It underlay the official response to the Sarajevo Muslims’ petition of 1897, which prodded the petitioners to accept that they could not have a separate supervisor for Muslim women factory workers or Muslim waifs and orphans, because there were no Muslims qualified for the tasks. Plausible though such arguments were in particular context, the assumption behind them derived from a Christian Eurocentrism, whereby Muslim difficulties were framed against the march of history itself, enabling the regime to discount responsibility for the impact of its own policies on Muslims and to treat Muslim estrangement in terms of ‘indolence’ and ‘obscurantism’. Though individual Muslims did come to share the Austrian perception of the need to reform, it was unlikely that a whole culture could accept the implicit disparagement and simply fall into line. Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims themselves felt the lack of sympathy, and their litany of graveyards turned into parks, mosques dishonoured and vakuf funds diverted provided a cultural cement in which other discontents, primarily economic, could be embedded. The resultant mélange of grievance seemed bizarre to Habsburg officials, but it anticipated the fusion of values, traditional and modern, religious and economic, which was to underlie non-western responses to the West in the twentieth century. That said, there was much exaggeration. It is doubtful if any other European power was as careful as Austria-Hungary in catering for new Muslim institutions or Muslim needs in non-Muslim ones, in flattering historical sensibilities or in fostering access to western education. Ironically, the micro-management with which much of this was planned infected the administrative apparatus as a whole, and opened it to charges of control-freakery, in the modern phrase, where government could make loyalty the test of every activity, economic or cultural. Both the virtues and vices of this system went back to Kállay.
There was a further spur to the Muslim rebellion for which the regime was less responsible: the alleged campaign of Catholic proselytization. Since, however, Habsburg policy from the start had aimed at attracting Muslims to Catholics and detaching them from Serbs, this issue figures large in any account of the occupation’s cultural politics. Hence the attention shifts next to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Catholic–Croat community.
Kállay and the Croats

The Austro-Hungarian occupation faced Bosnians with the shock of the new. In the case of Serbs, the chief challenge was to future aspirations. In the case of Muslims it was to old traditions. In the case of Bosnia’s Catholics, it was equally to both. The community which had the highest expectations of the Monarchy was shaken in its foundations as deeply as its neighbours.

Elements of trauma in Bosnian Catholic life had both internal and external causes. Catholics were the poorest section of the population and were sharply affected by rising prices and taxes in an unresolved agrarian situation. Things were better in terms of religious freedom, wrote two Franciscan students in a document that came to the authorities’ attention in 1888, but in everything else they were far worse. Another Franciscan, Josip Dobroslav Božić, wrote his work on the agrarian question in Bosnia and Herzegovina about this time and it figured prominently in a list of grievances drawn up for Kállay by the doughty old advocate of Bosnianism, fra Anton Knežević. That all these spokesmen of unease were Franciscans was only to be expected in a community which lacked any other social leadership. Yet the Franciscans felt the ground shifting under their feet. They still hankered after the dominant influence over the peasants which they had exerted and sometimes abused under Turkish rule, reported Baron Appel in 1884, adding that the new administration would not permit it in such measure. In the changed circumstances, Franciscans’ moorings to the Bosnian identity and Yugoslav sentiment of an Ivan Franjo Jukić were weakening and influences grew from nearby Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia. There, particularly in Banal Croatia under the unpopular regime of the Hungarian Khuen-Héderváry (1883–1903), the climate was one of grievance, favouring a shift in the balance of Croatian nationalism to the sharper tone of Ante Starčević’s Party of Right, the so-called pravaši. ‘How shall the Croats defend the Monarchy’ ran the pravaši Diet address in 1884, ‘when it has deprived them of everything and left them nothing which is worth defending?’ The ‘Right’ of the party’s title was Croatia’s historic right, which included the claim to Bosnia, ratcheting up Croato-Serb tensions as the influence of Strossmayer’s Serbophile Yugoslavism declined. Since the Franciscans were the only section of the population able to interpret these trends, the Bosnian Catholic response to Austrian rule is mirrored in their reaction to a novel and in many ways disconcerting situation.
The biggest revolution in Franciscan life came not directly from the regime but from the man it had put at the head of the restored Catholic hierarchy, Dr Josip Stadler. Kállay quickly diagnosed the character of the new prelate. He praised his zeal and learning, but lamented his tactlessness; later he was to comment that Stadler had every virtue but patience. Stadler indeed lacked finesse, but he exploited plentifully the strategic strength he drew from appreciation of his commitment in high quarters: the dynasty and the Vatican. Not arriving in Bosnia till six months after his appointment, he had prepared the ground for his mission thoroughly in Vienna and Rome. There was little room in it for the Franciscans. Stadler’s sense of their unsuitability for the great work to be done led him to believe the appropriate course was for them to withdraw to their monasteries, rededicate themselves to the Rule of their Order and leave the field to the secular clergy his new structures would create. Already in autumn 1881 in Rome he had raised two of the issues which were to embroil Bosnian Catholicism for generations to come: secularization, whereby those Franciscans who wished to remain parish priests should leave their Order, and the allocation of parishes between Franciscans and secular clergy. By 1883 he had broached the third great issue of ongoing conflict, the institution of a congrua, or regular salary for parochial clergy in place of the voluntary offerings of the faithful. Franciscans feared for the traditional relations with their flock if these were to be subject to a clerical tax, enforceable by state organs; they suspected parochial ties with the monasteries would be weakened, and they anticipated a drying up of the popular contributions which supported their educational structures. Horns were repeatedly joined as Stadler returned to the attack: on the parish question in 1882–83, 1888 and 1898; on secularization in 1883, 1889 and 1898; and on parochial salaries in 1883, 1891 and 1909. The almost permanent state of alert between the two camps could be maintained because both feared for their institutional survival at the parochial level and both had recourse to powerful weapons. Stadler exercised episcopal authority over parish priests but these, if Franciscans, were also subject to their Order’s discipline. Thus when the archbishop ordered them to provide details of parochial offerings, as preparation for the introduction of a congrua, Franciscan leaders forbade them to respond.

‘Already seven years have passed since he came to us’, Franciscans sighed audibly in 1888, and Stadler did not cease to importune them on secularization and other matters; it was ‘a rare example in the annals of the Catholic Church’. Stadler’s new order became for the Franciscans part of the challenge to a traditional way of life.

There was a political reflex to the new times. Though Anton Knežević retained his old Bosnianism till his death in 1888, this tradition yielded among the narrow educated layer to the Croatian cause. National feeling has been seen as a reaction
to the rise to power of Great Serbian Radicals in Belgrade, yet in Herzegovina at
least it had roots deeper than that. As among Serbs, resentment was roused by the
regime’s repression of national names, the pressures on confessional schools and
the intensified state supervision; it found a patron in the crusty Franciscan Bishop
of Mostar, fra Paškal Buconić (1834–1910). The authorities noted a ‘visible
political mood’ among the clergy there and became extremely jumpy about the
influences young Franciscans were exposed to in their theological studies in
the Monarchy. The ministry succeeded in getting their return to Innsbruck,
where there were no south Slavs, as opposed to contagious Ljubljana, unhappy
though the Innsbruck authorities were about eight Herzegovinians disturbing
160 Jesuit students by their Order’s choral practice. It seems likely that south
Slavs were considered a handful wherever they were. The shift to a Croatian
politicization in Hercegovina was signalled in the papers edited by Don Frano
Milićević, who followed his Hercegovački bosiljak, and its brief successor with
the longer-running Glas Hercegovca (1885–96). Official concerns for Croatian
nationalism are shown by the banning of the leading Dalmatian journal Narodni
list, which the Sarajevo authorities declared even more dangerous than Velika
Srbija (Great Serbia) because based in the Monarchy.

Kállay grasped the implications of the Catholic mood early. Government
could not further alienate the Franciscans without endangering its relations to
the whole community. The shift in policy came quite suddenly, when deadlock
between Stadler and the Franciscans over the division of parishes between them
gave Kállay a chance to intervene. The deal he offered the Bosnian Franciscan
Provincial was that if the Franciscans increased their offer of parishes to be yielded
to secular priests, he would ensure that the new see of Banjaluka fell to one of their
number. To the bafflement of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at the Vatican,
who for years had been instructed to run down the Franciscans, he was now told
to champion them ‘as the firmest core of Catholicism’, not only in the occupied
provinces, but in the whole Balkan peninsula, on whose satisfaction in the parish
issue hung ‘the future of Catholicism in Bosnia’. The provisional Curial decree of
April 1883 gave the archbishop a few more parishes than in Kállay’s compromise
proposals. But Franciscan leaders now realized that the government was their
protector, as it was to show again when Stadler returned to the attack. The
government assisted the Franciscans in another way by blocking Stadler’s plans to
introduce new Orders into Bosnia, namely the Hieronymite Order in 1886 and
the Redemptorists in 1889—the former included ‘colonization’ and ‘missionary
work’ among its aims. Only the government’s ‘intimate cooperation’ with the
Franciscans had enabled it to maintain close contact with the people, Kutschera
commented, adding that because of their popular touch Franciscans were better
pastors even than more educated priests. Moreover, since the occupation they
had raised their standards.

The question of standards was indeed a preoccupation of Franciscans in
these testing times. It was now forbidden for Franciscan parochial clergy to
be labourers (1880), and more effort was made to eliminate the custom of living together before marriage, by denying those concerned a full marriage ceremony. In place of the use of written texts (zapisi) to ward off illness, saints’ pictures were recommended, or the invocation to perform religious or merciful acts. Though observers judged the people already good Catholics in terms of church attendance and knowledge of basic prayers, Stadler found their religious understanding poor and mocked the way in which they prayed with outstretched arms. His remedies included printing published sermons which priests were to expound for thirty–forty minutes, preferably learning them by heart. Franciscan plans to raise the role of music came to little in this unsophisticated world. Before the occupation there had been four organs in Bosnia, concentrated in the most famous monasteries. At a more intellectual level early numbers of the newly founded periodical, Glasnik Jugoslavenskih Franjevaca (1887) expressed Franciscan defensiveness. They depicted the lay communal school, to which parents had regrettably sent their children, as a central feature of the new world, whose other marks were the decline of respect for the clergy and mockery of religious and monastic customs. These were the forces driving individual Franciscans towards secularization, a key preoccupation of the journal. Opposing them Glasnik Jugoslavenskih Franjevaca advocated keeping the glorious traditions of the Bosnian Franciscans in the minds of the people; retaining and improving a Franciscan educational system; and strengthening the link between clergy and people by encouraging the Third Order, the branch of the Franciscan Order open to the laity.

The new educational policies meant moving away from long-standing responsibilities for Catholic primary education, and a concentration on improving the Order’s own institutions. It was a matter of priorities, though Franciscans found it painful. In 1881–82 at least nineteen of the twenty-eight Catholic confessional schools were run by Franciscans. By 1890–91 there were only twenty-one Catholic schools, largely maintained by nuns, with the main drop coming quite early, in 1883–84. On the other hand, efforts to centralize secondary teaching in each Province led to the opening of the first class of an intended Franciscan Gymnasium in Široki Brijeg in the Herzegovinian Province in 1889, and in Bosnia to the transfer of existing Gymnasial classes to an impressive purpose-built home in Visoko, with six classes, in 1900. Progress was slow, as these fledgling institutions strove to readjust from previous Italian orientations towards Austrian-Croatian norms. Thus German was introduced in the Bosnian Gymnasium in 1888 and Greek in 1892. Široki Brijeg still had only thirty-seven pupils in 1905–6. Visoko was much bigger, with a higher proportion of non-Franciscans. It hopefully invited government inspectors to attend its examinations, but the coveted status of ‘public right’, or official accreditation, was not awarded it till the First World War. Meanwhile, the philosophy course for Franciscan novices was followed in designated monasteries, while the final training in theology came to
be centralized in new seminaries built in Mostar (1895) and Sarajevo (1909). Thus it was no longer necessary to send Franciscan students to the Monarchy, with all the problems that entailed, though many Bosnian Franciscans continued to go to Hungary. With this, the great effort to build and upgrade autonomous educational structures in the two Provinces moved towards completion.²¹

Part of the Franciscan sense of grievance was that Stadler’s main educational ventures, the Travnik Gymnasium and seminary for training secular priests, enjoyed substantial government subsidy. He was also the main conduit for funds flowing into Bosnia from Catholic well-wishers, like the French-based Society for the Propagation of the Faith, the Ludwig Missionsverein in Munich and various Austrian charities. In contrast, the great bulk of the 846,780 florins spent by Franciscans on buildings, between 1878 and 1900,²² came from their own direct fund-raising. Petar Vrankić has argued that, bearing in mind the Franciscans’ control of most parishes and a government tendency to equalize the funding for secular and regular clergy, the Franciscans were not disadvantaged.²³ While this may be truer of the situation by 1914, for most of the occupation period the various subventions the Franciscans received remained small-scale, and major projects like the Visoko Gymnasium building (which government refused to sanction for many years after the land had been bought) had to be undertaken independently.

Hence the Franciscans preserved their Cinderella sense of being the patriotic wing of the Croat Catholic people. The populist aspect entailed was not necessarily ‘progressive’. Franciscan writers bemoaned the tendencies of the age as much as Stadler’s neo-scholastic circle. One of the most radical figures of Bosnian Franciscans, Josip Dobroslav Božić, clashed with the leadership and advocated secularization before going to America, a not uncommon destination for the inconvenient, like Lauš, who had the temerity to review a biblical translation of Stadler’s critically. When in 1897 the four wings of the Franciscan Order underwent a general reorganization, Stadler took the opportunity to push again for its withdrawal to its monasteries. Twenty-seven priests accepted secularization and seventeen trainees left their seminaries. The letter of the Bosnian Provincial on this occasion is worth quoting, for it shows the sentiments which could be mobilized in his Order’s cause:

This our dear and glorious homeland, Bosnia, our brothers have drenched in their blood… Over four centuries of slavery our brothers remained heroically on the battlefield, holding high the banner of St Francis, keeping faith with their Order’s institutions. Would not their blood and glorious memory cry out for vengeance on brothers who thought of leaving the Order in which many of us… from peasant sons have become men, influential in our Church and nation²⁴

Mainly through this episode the Order’s strength in Bosnia fell from some 200 to 165 members by 1906,²⁵ which was actually fewer than the Trappists on the estate of the Maria Stern Abbey near Banjaluka. Its organization and mystique
survived, however, essentially unchanged. The paradoxical outcome of Austria’s chief initiative in the overhaul of Bosnian Catholicism—the introduction of a regular hierarchy—was that a Bosnian Provincial’s imprecations could be directed, not at Turkish or Austrian occupiers, but at fellow Catholics. The rivalry of Stadler and the Franciscans may well have benefited the Bosnian Catholic community by energizing the two sides, but the cost in internal division was high.

STADLER AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CROATIAN CATHOLIC MOVEMENT

The single most significant factor in the undoubted development of the Catholic community was Archbishop Josip Stadler. In 1878 there were only thirty-five Catholic churches in the two provinces as against 235 Orthodox. By 1896 Catholic churches numbered 188 and Orthodox churches 436.26 Whereas under the Turks the Bishop of Bosnia lived in lonely poverty far from the capital, Stadler by 1889 was planning a Bishop’s palace to go with a massive Gothic cathedral in the heart of Sarajevo, which cost the government 145,000 florins. Helped by immigration, the demographic position of the Catholics had improved, most of all in Sarajevo, where they rose from 3 per cent in 1879 to 28 per cent in 1895. Yet though they remained less than half the Orthodox population overall, the Provincial Government in the first seventeen years of the occupation spent nearly three-quarters as much for Catholic religious purposes as it did over eighteen years for the Orthodox.27 The Bosnian Catholic cause also benefited from leading international Catholic charities, impressed by Stadler’s zeal. Yet, in stating that caution and tact were the qualities necessary in the circumstances, Count Dahmen, the Austrian agent of the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, entered a reservation.28 The society spent large sums on the Travnik Gymnasium in the expectation that it would also house the seminary; but no sooner was the Sarajevo Cathedral completed than Stadler rushed into debt to build a seminary beside it, though the government did not want to give Serbs the pretext to transfer their Reljevo seminary to the capital. Dahmen lamented that his funds were being poured into unnecessary ‘monuments’.29

Stadler provides proof of the inadequacy of a simple antithesis between modern West and unmodern East. He illustrated the deep fissure in the West between a secular-tinged ‘liberalism’, identifying itself as modernity, and its religious critics. Trained in the neo-scholasticism of the Rome of Pius IX, he believed that stress of religious commonalties (‘we all worship the same God’) amounted to ‘indifferentism’ on the issue of religious truth and that the temporary interests of the state were subordinate to eternal interests of the Church. What was distinctive about Stadler was not so much his views as the uncompromising way he held them. Strossmayer once advised him when he was in the running
for promotion to the Zagreb see to avoid specifics if asked about the relation of Church and state.\textsuperscript{30} But guile was not in Stadler’s nature where principle was concerned, though he was a restless weaver of schemes for the advance of practical objectives. This mixture of intransigence and opportunism made him a headache for interlocutors. He could cope with difficult people, Kutschera was to lament, but Stadler was impossible; ‘he is absolutely incapable of taking into account any of the standpoints here (i.e. in Bosnia) diverging from his own, but always and everywhere demands absolute submission to his dictates’.\textsuperscript{31}

In fairness to Stadler, he saw himself as a critic of the equal dogmatism of the nineteenth-century secular state, which was what neo-Josephinist Austria and its regime in Bosnia were, for all their social conservatism. Nothing ultimately escaped its claim of \textit{Aufsichtsrecht}, or all-seeing eye of supervisory review. For a regime keen not to appear to favour the dynasty’s co-religionists, however, Stadler was an unfortunate choice because he exposed its potential Achilles heel. Rebuked for going over the head of the Provincial Government to the Emperor, he said bluntly that it would misrepresent him and that Franz Joseph had given him permission to do so.\textsuperscript{32} In the last analysis government could not treat the Catholic Church exactly the same as the other confessions, even if the difference was probably at the margins and largely a matter of form. Here lay the germ of Orthodox and Muslim accusations of state-backed Catholic propaganda in Bosnia, though the great bulk of these were exaggerated, precisely because at its core the state was ideologically secular, for all the Catholic sympathies of individuals in it from Franz Joseph downwards. The subtlety of the situation comes out in a letter of Kállay to Kutschera of 1889, to be communicated orally to Stadler and copied to the Emperor. The government approached the Catholic Church not only with ‘inmost respect’, wrote Kállay, but also ‘the warmest, goal-directed, sympathies’; the possibility was to be excluded that in any of its measures it could pursue ends damaging to the interests of the Church, though in matters relating to those of other faiths it was in the interests of both that they should proceed hand in hand. All this, Stadler would no doubt have rightly thought, was mere words justifying government interference in his plans. But such words would not have been used to a non-Catholic figure and were doubtless chosen with the Emperor’s sensibilities in mind. As such they were liable to encourage Stadler’s view of a special relationship.\textsuperscript{33}

Franz Joseph’s personal mix of Catholic piety and Josephinist determination to uphold the state’s prerogative mirrored wider patterns. While state organs and the urban intelligentsia remained under liberal influence, liberalism was losing its wider social impetus. German-speaking Austria was moving towards the social pattern of the early twentieth century, whereby the population became increasingly stratified into distinct groups according to ideological conviction: Catholic, liberal-nationalist or socialist. While such tendencies were much weaker in less-developed Croatia, they were not absent. In the Croatian case, a reaction against liberalism, never deep-rooted because of the limited bourgeoisie, was all
the stronger because in diluted form it was the creed of the Hungarian elite, and of Hungarophile ‘unionists’ in Croatia. Ban Khuen-Héderváry’s unpopular regime sought to widen its base by making concessions to the Serb Orthodox minority, he himself was seen as an irreligious man and national opposition to him had a strong base in the clergy. Broadly speaking, the parish priests supported the Independent National Party associated with Bishop Strossmayer, while their curates backed the Party of Right. In the 1890s a movement for a specifically Catholic politics began to take shape.

The development of Stadler’s career can be understood in this context to bear a double impulse, defensive in the face of a perceived liberal ‘establishment’, more expansive insofar as he moved increasingly towards national-political positions. But as a traditional ex-theology professor, he wished to give his institutional work an intellectual underpinning. Many of Croatia’s talented young clergy were so estranged from books, he wrote to Strossmayer, that they read nothing but their Missal and newspapers. The journal he established in Sarajevo, Vrhbosna, was intended as a counterweight. The context of Kulturkampf is clear from an article in the opening volume on how to behave towards unbelievers and strangers: they should be neither zealously sought out nor too carefully avoided, but if one felt confident enough to engage in debate, one should remember that unbelievers believed attack was the best form of defence and were on the look out for the inexperienced. The message on geology and natural science was that while such matters should not be neglected, it should be remembered that they could only bear out the teachings of the faith: ostensible discrepancies were merely apparent. The tension conventionally felt between saintliness and learning was mistaken because true knowledge came from God and learning led back to Him, uniting knowledge and will.

While such positions need no glossing in the intellectual context of the time, Stadler’s national evolution deserves an extra word. Its most enigmatic aspect is the evolving relationship between the political prelate of a previous Croat generation, the liberal Catholic, Bishop Strossmayer, and the anti-liberal Stadler. From the late 1870s Strossmayer transposed his political activities on to the cultural plane, fighting for the introduction of the Slavonic liturgy into the Catholic Church as a means of furthering south Slav union. Yet Josip Stadler was neither a Yugoslav enthusiast, nor in the 1880s showed any interest in the Slavonic liturgy. The leading Franciscan fra Grgo Martić told the Sarajevo authorities that its introduction in Bosnia would be seen by the people as apostasy. For their part Strossmayer and his collaborator Rački were cool about Stadler’s appointment to Sarajevo. Strossmayer distrusted his ‘Jesuitry’ and thought him lacking in independent judgement and decisiveness. No doubt Stadler’s quarrels with the Habsburg authorities will have modified these judgements, but though impressed by his visit to Stadler’s new cathedral, Strossmayer still thought him something of a Jesuit. It was during the long period of the vacancy for the Zagreb archdiocese (April 1891–November 1893), for which Strossmayer backed Stadler, that the
references become warmer, a time when the two were also collaborating on reform of the San Girolamo Illyrian Institute in Rome. A shift in attitudes in favour of the Slavonic liturgy was general in the Croatian hierarchy in the 1890s, when the issue became less associated with Strossmayer’s controversial Yugoslav schemes and more with an assertion of Croatian identity. Stadler’s appointment by the Pope as Apostolic Commissioner for religious unification among south Slavs (1894) may also be pertinent. It followed his despatch of copies of a papal encyclical on unity to Bosnia’s Orthodox bishops, together with a loaded agenda for a prospective meeting to debate them.

The change may have been in Strossmayer rather than Stadler, because disillusionment with his former Serb acquaintances seems to have marked the bishop’s last years. Stadler became for him God’s providential choice for Croatia in 1893 and the ‘adorable’ saviour of his nation by 1899. Stadler presented Rome proposals for the use of glagolitic in the San Girolamo Institute in 1897, signed by fourteen of the sixteen Croat bishops, and led the movement for its transformation into a college for young priests, with ‘Croatian’ instead of the traditional ‘Illyrian’ in its title. In August 1901 the apostolic breve Slavorum gentem crowned these endeavours with success. But the cup was quickly dashed from Croat lips when variegated opposition constrained the Vatican to change the title back again. The Monarchy feared a rise of Croatian nationalism, while Russia and France backed Montenegrin protests in the name of its Catholic subjects. Stadler was forced to withdraw his public claim that the Vatican’s retraction had been made under Habsburg, particularly Hungarian duress. This humiliation did not lower his standing as a Croatian patriot, which had been raised in 1900 when he had been publicly rebuked by the Emperor for saying that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be united to the Croatian motherland. On the same occasion, the first Croat Catholic episcopal conference in Zagreb, he also asserted the primacy of the Church over the state.

Stadler’s religious priority speaks through this claim. He was undoubtedly spurred to challenge state authority by what he saw as its illicit obstruction of his saving work, and a sense of being persecuted for the faith. But there is no reason to doubt the genuineness of his Croatian patriotism. Its increasing prominence as his ministry progressed reflected a broader pattern for the Bosnian communities to press beyond the narrow bounds Kállay had prescribed for them. Bosnian Catholic orientation towards movements in Croatia corresponded to Bosnian Serbs’ awareness of wider Serbian, and Muslim of wider Islamic trends. The efficacy of separate hierarchies in maintaining culturo-political isolation was thereby called in question. Besides, Catholic religious leaders in Bosnia had always played a representative role. One feature of the changes Austrian rule brought about, however, was the beginnings of a lay intelligentsia in the community, whose members were unlikely to view events from the standpoint of Stadler’s very distinctive formation. Here Croat–Muslim relations and in particular the issue of conversions, became the neuralgic point.
The issue of conversion went to the heart of the claim to a modernizing mission in Bosnia. Austria declared modern principles of religious toleration and confessional even-handedness the cornerstones of her administration, intended in the first instance to reassure Muslims. Yet modern principles also enshrined the freedom to change one’s religious profession, as opposed to traditional Islamic precept, which punished apostasy from Islam by death. Many Christians plainly thought that the conversion of Muslims was the ultimate expression of the Europeanization the occupation was meant to bring about. A suitable leader would suffice for the reconversion, according to Strossmayer, which would begin through the women, more in tune with old Pre-Islamic customs. For a group of Franciscans in 1884 it was simply a matter of the authorities respecting the freedom of conscience of Muslims, ‘already Christians in their hearts’, to return to the religion of their forefathers.

From the Catholic standpoint, the authorities in fact did everything to return prospective converts to their Muslim families. This grievance became the basis for a wider case that the regime discriminated against the Catholic population. Aspects of these charges have remained in Croatian historiography. Zoran Grijak, in an otherwise scrupulously researched work on Stadler, sees Austria’s policy of maintaining ‘confessional balance’ as entailing keeping the Catholics weak and appears to endorse contemporary Catholic complaints of under-funding in comparison to other confessions. In fact, Catholics received disproportionate aid in terms of their numbers, which could be justified in terms of positive discrimination in favour of an impoverished community. While Stadler resented official supervision of benefactions, Russian church goods for Bosnia were embargoed, as appears to have been the case with legacies for a Serb Gymnasium. The belief of all sides that they are getting the rawer deal is a staple of ethnically fraught situations, furthered by mutual ignorance. Apprised that government should have been informed of a meeting of all-Croatian catechets about to take place in Sarajevo in 1895, so that it could arrange for a commissioner to attend, Stadler appeared confounded and responded that unless this was the practice with other confessions he would call the conference off. It was, of course, out of the question for a conference of all-Serbian catechets to meet in Sarajevo under Kállay, and government representatives had sat in on Serb commune meetings for years.

The question of the freedom to convert to Catholicism took crisis form with the case of Uzeifa Delahmetović in 1890. Archbishop Stadler’s hiding of this young Muslim woman from her relatives and the authorities raised a storm of Muslim protest. Conversion had been one of the issues Kállay thought best left to the discretion of local officials, guided by specific instructions where necessary,
rather than a general directive. The Uzeifa affair induced a change of heart. An old Turkish law was hastily refurbished into an Austrian edict.

Kállay’s scheme laid out a complex procedure, involving application to the old priest for release, two months’ wait and then a Verification Tribunal to resolve doubts of age and free will. Finding, contrary to hopes roused by his discussions with the Vienna Nuncio, that its divergences from canon law would not be ‘tolerated’ by the Vatican, he gave confidential orders that the published edict (1891) should be ignored and new conversions handled on an ad hoc basis by the Sarajevo authorities. At first Stadler cooperated with the Provincial Government to the extent of informing them of applications for conversion and keeping the persons concerned in a specified safe place for two months before baptism. But in 1893 he began to secrete convertants in places unknown to the authorities and inform them only after conversion had followed. The need to redeem this situation inclined both Kállay and Stadler (who had been left out of the original discussions with the Vatican) to lengthy negotiations, which by 1895 produced revised procedures superseding the still officially valid edict of 1891. These the Vatican was prepared to tolerate. The essence of the deal was that while the verification tribunal was retained, convertants could spend the period awaiting it in a neutral place, and Stadler could instruct his clergy that they might take appropriate action where they judged convertants’ freedom of conscience to be threatened. Stadler intended on this basis to guard them in Catholic homes, though Kállay carefully reserved the government’s duty to uphold the parents’ legal rights. The former priest’s powers to impede the conversion process were reduced, but the new instructions still required the convertant to be twenty-one, or else ‘mature’—a deliberate ambiguity in view of Catholic canon law’s application of this concept even to young children. Not surprisingly, this secret arrangement broke down. Petar Vrankić puts the responsibility squarely on the government, repeating the complaints of the Catholic hierarchy at the time. In this view, each conversion to Catholicism became an occasion for non-Catholic agitation, officials regularly upheld the demands of relatives that intending young convertants should be returned to them and in consequence the three Catholic bishops were driven to withdraw their cooperation and revert to clandestine methods. The authority which Archbishop Stadler had invested in the 1895 arrangements was compromised by an unsympathetic government.

This is a somewhat partial analysis. While Archbishop Stadler was sincere in trying to make the deal work in his lights, Vrankić omits aspects which illuminate other realities. Most striking is Kállay’s response to Kutschera’s plea that a case by case approach without fixed norms was unworkable and risked discrediting the government with non-Catholics, who expected it to stand up to the Catholic Church as it did other confessions. Once Rome had condemned the conversion edict, Kállay replied, the Bosnian authorities had either to beat down Catholic opposition or accept the situation and smother non-Catholic disquiet with a judicious mixture of bribes and bullying. The former course
was impossible. The Catholic clergy would launch a resistance which could not be overcome, the Emperor’s attitude was in question and a conflict with Rome would cause more problems than all the activities of the Serbs put together. Kállay rebuked Kutschera for not being sterner with the Reis-ul-ulema for interfering in conversion matters. Implicitly he contrasted the supine corruptibility of Oriental leaders with the moral strength of a western institution.53

The Provincial Government’s case-by-case accounts of conversion problems after the 1895 compromise do not suggest an unbending hostility to the Catholic position.54 In its view the four cases Stadler complained about already in 1895 were ones which the clergy had long been preparing and which they brought forward once the compromise was agreed, only to be disappointed by the outcome. In one of them a nineteen-year-old Muslim youth, coachman to a Catholic family, was stopped from conversion by his mother’s claim that he was immature. Officials were plainly irritated with the youth for causing offence by publicly deriding Islam in his home town during Ramadan before formal conversion, but Catholic annoyance seems to have a point. Among many other cases discussed, however, are instances when parental objections were overruled in the verification process, dubious conversions by priests were ultimately accepted, trials of Catholic youths for abduction were stopped, escort was offered for a convertant to reach a monastery, four Orthodox girls converted after marriage despite Serb opposition—one was murdered! Cases like a gypsy convert to Catholicism whose Muslim partner in a ‘wild marriage’ demanded his child back—the outcome was pending—exemplify the sorts of things of which the Church complained. The authorities claimed that they were only too willing to give convertants advice on how to go about the process, but that these had often been poorly informed by Catholic priests, that some conversions flouted legal procedure ostentatiously and without cause and that some marriages following elopement were accompanied by provocative display of Croat symbols.55 The way these manifestations were organized made even the least prejudiced person, in one view, doubt that a free exercise of religious choice, ensured by the state, was involved.56 These official justifications are no less plausible than the alternative accounts.

Events occurring very largely among non-Catholic servants in Catholic families or in relation to youthful marriage, often entailing elopement, should not have engaged the Church in such passionate recrimination, as Vrankić concedes. While it is true that Serbs and Muslims attacked Stadler’s line from a standpoint of religious traditionalism, which took no account of the wishes of the individual, the claim that the archbishop by contrast sought to defend ‘the freedom of belief and conscience’ should be expanded to make plain that what he was defending was equally traditional Catholic doctrines on these issues, not modern civil society notions.57 In their withdrawal of cooperation in 1899 the Catholic bishops made plain that they were not guided, like the indifferentist government, by political considerations, but by the fact that one of the confessions must be right.58 The
hierarchy, followed to an extent by Croat historiography, tended to blame an unsympathetic state for holding back a cause so self-evidently just. The Catholic bishops rightly pointed to the fact that more Catholics than non-Catholics converted, without fuss; the majority of these were incomers, who mattered less in what were usually intensely local affairs.\footnote{59}

Not only government, but also the Croatian lay intelligentsia emerging in the 1890s, deplored the damage Stadler did to hopes for a Muslim–Catholic block against the Serbs. To a considerable extent this was an intelligentsia of incomers. Those who predominated in the singing and dramatic societies which sprang up, the most famous of the former being ‘Trebević’ in Sarajevo and ‘Hrvoje’ in Mostar, were officials and free professionals. For such people the movement of young Muslims towards Croatian periodicals and culture was an augury for a modern nation. The idea of nationality based on religion was anathema to the modern spirit. Only the bursting of the bonds of confessionalism would enable Croatdom to win out in Bosnia as a majoritarian force and thereby help fulfil the larger dream of a Bosnia restored to the historic unity of Croatian state right. Hence the attempts to encourage Muslim participation in Croatian social and cultural life. The celebration of the colours of ‘Trebević’ in 1899 was to be a major step along this road, which made Stadler’s insistence that they should be blessed by Catholic rites all the more unwelcome. The ‘Trebević’ affair highlighted two views of Croatdom, and initiated a process whereby Stadler lost ground before a coalition of the lay intelligentsia and the more flexible Franciscans, though on the Christian blessing itself the friars and archbishop were in rare agreement.

Grijak has argued convincingly that on the issue at stake over ‘Trebević’ Stadler has been misjudged. He did not, as his enemies claimed, identify Croatdom exclusively with Catholicism, but asserted that Catholicism was a vital component. Muslims were welcome to be Croats but the Muslim tail should not wag the Croatian dog.\footnote{60} These reservations about notions of a multiconfessional Croatian nation have been borne out by events. Of course, Stadler’s patriotism was always subordinate to his Catholicism. He was, for example, out of touch with mainstream Croatian intellectuals in his support for Stjepan Korenić, the Catholic editor who had attacked the prestigious Zagreb university professor, Franjo Spevec, for scepticism in religious matters.\footnote{61} But his greatest sin in the eyes of the emerging Croat laity remained his perceived blindness in equating Catholicism and Croatdom in such a way as to alienate the Bosnian Muslims. The conversion case of Sala Šivrić in 1903 led Tugomir Alaupović, the first native Bosnian secondary school professor, and the Croatian-born lawyer Ivo Pilar and poet S. S. Kranjčević, to circulate a memorandum for his dismissal. Stadler met the threat with characteristic determination, threatening to the government to excommunicate the three and throw the responsibility for fomenting Croatian divisions on its shoulders.\footnote{62}

Zoran Grijak sympathizes with Stadler’s view that the authorities were behind his difficulties with the lay intelligentsia over the ‘Trebević’ affair.\footnote{63} This goes too
far. Though the Provincial Government did write of exercising ‘influence’ on its officials who were members of ‘Trebević’, this was in the direction of moderating nationalist excess. Appel regretted that the decision to consecrate the banner had provoked disharmony, but the ministry opposed his recommendation that this decision, ‘reached by a large majority’, should be annulled.⁶⁴ Kállay could indeed be manipulative, but divisions among Bosnians lay in the nature of evolving social and ideological differentiation and did not need orchestration. That said, Austria-Hungary had chosen in Archbishop Stadler an unsuitable figure to preside over this evolution. Developments in the Croat Catholic community represented a great setback for Kállay’s policies. Instead of the Catholic–Muslim alignment against the Serbs he wanted, Muslims were moving into ‘sloga’, or concord, with the Serbs, spurred in part by Stadler’s conversion policy. Where Kállay had aimed to isolate Bosnia from outside trends, the leadership of all communities was involved with the politics of its putative reference group abroad and seeking closer contact with religious hierarchies there. This was not the scenario the accomplished minister would have envisaged. His last years would see him, so long the masterful orchestrator of events, everywhere on the defensive.
The Crisis of the Kállay Regime

Kállay’s regime reflected the mentality of a European age steeped in notions of economic change and cultural evolution. Applied to territories taken over by European powers, it presupposed a slow but steady advance in security and prosperity, accompanied by the contraction of militant resistance and growing understanding of the occupiers’ goals and values. Such processes can be seen at work in British India and French Algeria between the end of physical resistance and the emergence of modern nationalist movements. Different as Bosnia’s circumstances were, signs of accommodation were present there too. Only at the very end did opposition build up cumulatively to what one may call a crisis of the Kállay system. The oscillation between positive and negative forces lends Kállay’s last years the quality of a slowly mounting drama, whose resolution was frustrated by his sudden removal from the scene.

THE REGIME’S POSITION AFTER A GENERATION OF OCCUPATION

In many ways Kállay could view the late nineteenth-century situation with satisfaction. The Austro-Russian agreement of May 1897, putting the Balkan question ‘on ice’ and reaffirming Austro-Hungarian rights in Bosnia, made a strongly anti-Austrian policy on Serbia’s part impossible and led her to continue her plunge into Macedonian politics. Serbian internal affairs were still plagued by instability and insolvency, while her ex-King Milan, himself near bankruptcy, did not shrink from selling her secrets to Kállay.1 Desperate for a foreign loan, the Serbian state got it from a Viennese bank through the good offices of Kállay himself.2 On the whole Austro-Turkish relations were sound, though Kállay, ever alert to danger, was convinced that the moderation of Turkish ministers was outweighed by the secret antipathy of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. As to the Monarchy’s south Slavs, in Croatia there were signs of realignment in opposition politics in a potentially more conciliatory direction. As Starčević aged and ceded control, his Party of Right split, a section of it uniting with Strossmayer’s Independent National Party in 1894. The architect of the fusion, Franjo Folnegović, typified a new type of Croatian politician, aware both of Croatia’s weakness and of her strategic importance, and therefore hopeful of
winning concessions from Viennese circles in return for the abandonment of the Party of Right’s previous ‘treasonous’ policy. One of Folnegović’s most ostentatious acts was his visit to Bosnia in 1894, followed by his articles in praise of the Bosnian administration in the *Neue Freie Presse* and his moderation of the party paper’s critical line on Bosnia. Among the Serbs of the Karlowitz Patriarchate, the Radical Party was moving to its victory in the elections for the National Church Congress in 1902 and contacts between it and Bosnian oppositionists were at their height in these years. Yet overall the Serbs were a declining force in the Hungarian state, which backed the Karlowitz Orthodox hierarchy and effectively negated Radical control of the Church Congress. The Serb Liberal leader Polit-Desančić once aptly called Hungarian Serb efforts to implement the liberal Church autonomy statute a ‘labour of Sisyphus’, which exhausted their energies in unavailing internal wranglings.

Within Bosnia-Herzegovina itself energetic police and military cordon measures had achieved the classic goal of occupying regimes in establishing law and order. The Oriental face of the towns, particularly Sarajevo, was beginning to change; the modern railway map was taking shape and a wide variety of industrial enterprises had been established. From the mid-1890s the effect of these changes began to be seen in cultural life. A second Gymnasium was founded in Mostar in 1894, a Realgymnasium in Banjaluka in 1896, and a third Gymnasium in Doljna Tuzla in 1899. Catholics and Orthodox in nearly all district towns came to found singing societies, organize concerts and in the larger centres essay amateur dramatics. What Muhsin Rizvić has called the Muslim literary revival flowered in the 1890s in the work of young men educated in Austrian schools. In the emerging lay Catholic intelligentsia Ivan Miličević was a novelist and short story writer, and S. S. Kranjčević, albeit an incomer, one of the most prominent of Croatian poets. Among the Serbs, too, famous literary figures appear, names like the poet of patriotism, Alekša Santić, and the prose writer Svetozar Ćorović, who together founded the literary periodical *Zora* (Dawn) in Mostar in 1896. Much of cultural innovation worked in the Monarchy’s favour politically. People like Osman Nuri Hadžić, Edhem Mulabdić and Sahvet-beg Bašagić, as we have seen, adopted a Croat rather than a Serb orientation, and the new Croat nationalism was less hostile to the Monarchy than the old. The switch was symbolized in the replacement of irascible Don Franjo Miličević’s organ *Glas Hercegovca* by his university-educated nephew Ivan Miličević’s *Osvit*, whose ‘pronounced Croat national tendency’ was ‘hardly of much weight’, the Provincial Government opined, against its value as a counterweight to the Serbs.

True, these cultural gains were relativized by the alienation of the Muslim landed and Serb commercial elites, the plight of native artisans in face of Austrian competition and continued rural poverty, induced in part by stagnant agricultural productivity and a fall in livestock numbers. This and the dropping of the liberal Turkish law on debt default contributed to the emigration
movement of Serb peasants from Herzegovina at the turn of the century, which District Commissioners insisted on ascribing to economic factors when invited to identify political agitators. Economic distress reflected the disjuncture between the government’s carefully planned cultural policies and its economic laissez-faire, and weakened its habitual argument that its political opponents were unrepresentative of an allegedly loyal population. The leaders were indeed unrepresentative economically. Apart from the begs, Gligorije (Gliša) Jeftanović, was a landowner, builder of Sarajevo’s first modern hotel (1882), and owner of a brickworks and a lime-kiln. Vojislav Šola of Mostar and Kosta Kujundžić of Livno were the richest men in their respective towns; Pero Drinjača, the foremost radical in the Krajina, had spent 10,000 florins on a house for a Serb school. Ridiculing the idea that the clergy should stick to their traditional dress, an Orthodox priest once asked rhetorically if a thus attired would be received by Jeftanović. In a patriarchal milieu, however, political leadership was expected to come from local notables. The occupation challenged their economic interests without undermining their social prestige.

Yet the fact that protest was led by the most privileged section of society was not without potential advantage for the regime, for in these ranks there was a natural tendency to the authorities’ goal of ‘moderation’. Caution had been the dominant motif of Serb commune leaders under Turkish rule. The richest Serb in Sarajevo, Petro T. Petrović, Ottoman MP in 1877, then from 1885 to 1895 President of the Serb commune, resigned his post after opposing the commune’s campaign against the vetting of confessional schoolteachers. When the commune was dissolved after its participation in the First Serbian Memorandum, he took charge of its functions as government commissioner. He was not alone. The wealthy merchant Risto Đ. Besarović, Bosnia’s first native entrepreneur when he opened a cord factory in 1885 and one of only three native directors of the Privileged Provincial Bank, was officially designated Petrović’s assistant in his new task. The fact that such well-known figures ‘from the best families’ as Vaso Kraljević, Đorde Rajković, and Zastava’s bête noire from Turkish days, Jeftan Despić, were reported to be persona non grata with the opposition suggests that the tradition of gazda obeisance to authority was far from dead in Sarajevo.

What gives these tendencies greater interest is Kállay’s interpretation of them. Despite the fact that on 31 March 1897 Jeftanović and Šola handed Franz Joseph the Second Serb Memorandum from nineteen communes, demanding an independent enquiry into their grievances, Kállay wrote in May of his belief that the government had succeeded in organizing ‘the moderate and conservative Oriental Orthodox element’ in Sarajevo and that in the province at large there were signs that among intelligent Serbs the basis existed for ‘a moderate, viable party’, if a centre could be provided for them through an openly pro-government newspaper. Linked to this perception was his call for laws on association and assembly to be drafted, while Benko and Kutschera urged the replacement of
‘outmoded’ preventive censorship by a press law, ‘however draconian’\textsuperscript{14}. The year 1897 also saw the introduction of limited self-government for Bosnian towns. In the December Delegations Kállay announced his willingness to reach an accord with his Serb critics. Meanwhile, Metropolitan Mandić was summoned to Vienna to discuss Church reform, including any concessions which could safely be made in the communal normative statute. Kállay’s perspective was evolutionary. The Church’s ‘present unready and undisciplined structure can in the long run no longer meet the demands which can justly be made of our mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in view of the cultural progress of the Oriental Orthodox population and the hierarchy’.\textsuperscript{15} When, next March, Kállay invited Jeftanović and Šola to submit detailed proposals for a general communal statute, the assumption was plainly that the opposition could be worked on to make acceptable proposals. If not, Mandić’s statute draft could be submitted to the Ecumenical Patriarch.\textsuperscript{16} Government concessions envisaged included a Serb Gymnasium and the movement of Reljevo seminary to Sarajevo,\textsuperscript{17} but most striking in the build up to a deal was the breach with the Bosnianizing policy implied in the approval of Doljna Tuzla Serbs’ application for a ‘Serbian Reading Room’. It offered, said Kutschera, a formal opportunity to ‘change our former standpoint’. Kreis Commissioner Foglár, thanking Kállay for his ‘liberal’ attitude in the matter, wrote that it was inevitable in the prevailing unsettled circumstances.\textsuperscript{18} Undoubtedly, this was to have been a turning-point in the evolution of the occupation, at a time when the Habsburg authorities had considered the possibility of annexation and the Cretan rising and resulting Greco-Turkish war had put Balkan issues in focus in the wider sphere.

**The Development of the Serb Autonomy Movement**

There are several reasons why, if anything, the turn led away from Kállay’s vision. First, as often in the history of foreign rule, the posited collaboration of conservatives or moderates with the authorities proved disappointingly elusive. From June to September 1897 the government laboured to persuade Petraki that it was his patriotic duty to become owner of an Austrophile newspaper, but he declined even if guaranteed against financial loss, citing one of his sons’ threat of suicide at his involvement.\textsuperscript{19} The hope that Mostar ‘moderates’ could exploit public weariness with the stand-off to seize control of the commune and declare loyalty to Metropolitan Perović faded, as these wanted Perović to take the initiative. They hoped to benefit in terms of local power rather than enlist for the province-wide moderate party the regime sought.\textsuperscript{20} In fact, their leader Miličević had been described as ‘extraordinarily fanatically disposed’ by the Mostar District Commissioner some years earlier, and Kállay regularly referred to the ‘so-called moderate element’\textsuperscript{21}. 
Second, government remained wedded to unpopular techniques of informers, bribes and petty persecution. The signatories of the Serb memorandum were subjected to harassment varying from fines to Jefatanović’s loss of his hotelier’s licence; then an elaborate mobilization of secret service resources forestalled an opposition approach to the Austro-Hungarian Delegations in December 1897, enabling Kállay to announce his preparedness for a deal with the Serb opposition from a position of strength. The background to this action was Kosta Hörmann’s capture of a leading figure in the Sarajevo opposition, the former Bosanska vila editor and Vojvodina incomer Božidar Nikašinović; meanwhile the Sarajevo police chief Černy established contact with the drafter of the first memorandum, the Hungarian Serb Radical Dr Emil Gavrila. Other dealings were so secret that Kállay would not discuss them even in a private letter. The calculation was that Nikašinović could either win over Jefatanović himself or separate him from his followers. The Provincial Government was urged to seek out and exploit every possible intrigue among Serbs in the interests of the strategy, while approaches to Serb opposition editors played on financial difficulties or, in the case of Mostar’s new Srpski vjesnik, the editor’s son’s prospects of a further state scholarship. Key figures in the government camp were to be kept unaware of the full spinning of the threads. For an advocate of the western civic spirit, Kállay had a fascination for such methods. One factor in the ultimate fruitlessness of his simultaneous dealings with loyalists, moderates, radicals and hierarchy was his sheer lack of trust in any of them. Yet treating a man like Nikašinović just as an object of manipulation quickly made him valueless. Nikašinović’s well-rewarded willingness to work for the government was testimony in its way to Kállay’s course, which Nikašinović no doubt hoped to influence towards his own modernizing perspective; a Bosnian trade association and business-orientated newspaper. Such schemes had only tactical interest in Kállay’s eyes, however, as a means of forestalling the coalition of Serb merchants and peasantry against which Nikašinović warned. Kállay did not believe anything effective could be done to save the Serb artisans, nor was it. Since Nikašinović was not taken into the government’s confidence as to either Mandić’s plans or Gavrila’s role, he was in no position to moderate the opposition statute as was intended. In March 1898 Černy reported that the rift between Jefatanović and Nikašinović was complete. By late spring Kállay was writing to Kutschera to ‘warn you once more not to attach any weight to the so-called moderates or even the pro-government elements of the Orthodox population, since they had not helped the government in the slightest way’. The latter in conjunction with the hierarchy should formulate its own solution to the Bosnian Church question and proclaim it unilaterally.

The third difficulty then arose. People like Nikašinović opposed the gazda strategy of fighting on religious autonomy because it did not touch on the real, economic issues as they saw them. But it had the advantage of internationalizing
the Bosnian question, as the opposition showed when they took their draft statute to the Patriarchate in Constantinople. At the Phanar, Greek, Slav, Great Power and Ottoman interests intersected in a very microcosm of the Eastern question, as a Greek institution juggled the need for Great Power support with the shifting strategies of Orthodox Balkan states. The approach of Austria-Hungary’s long-serving ambassador, Baron Calice, was typically more emollient than Kállay’s. Against the presumption of the rich purse which a high ministry official took with him to Constantinople, Calice argued that the politically hard-pressed Patriarchate was all the more anxious to preserve its moral authority, while Russia and Serbia were not as antagonistic as Kállay supposed. The memoirs of Vladan Đorđević, Serbian envoy in Constantinople, show that Russia was often unwilling to back Belgrade’s push for more Serb bishops in Macedonia. The greatest diplomatic problem was that the Patriarch did not have full control over the Holy Synod, so that victories at the Phanar could have a sting in the tail. An encyclical of September 1898 rejected the opposition statute as contrary to the canons and the 1880 Convention (whose abolition it had demanded), but embarrassingly instructed the Bosnian metropolitans to comment on the evils in the Church which the opposition had alleged. Kállay went back on his original wish for the encyclical to be published in the Bosnian Church journal, writing of ‘our success, if it can be called a success at all’. It took Calice four months to get a second encyclical unequivocally dismissing the Bosnian Serb grievances as well.

The response to the second encyclical revealed the government’s fourth weakness, its misjudging of its opponents’ mentality. For they shared Kállay’s disparaging view of the Phanar and responded to the antiquated injunction to seek their religious leaders’ forgiveness by assuming the Patriarchate had been bribed. Serbs wore their religion lightly; had not Livno commune leaders said that lay people could interpret Church canons just as well as any hierarch? Many oppositionists maintained a boycott of all rites conducted by pro-government priests, eschewing baptism, weddings and funerals from 1897 to 1903. They continued with visits and protests to Constantinople because they were wealthy men, who were also generously funded by commune members and by Belgrade. Psychologically, they were proud men too, whose local status was bound up with service to ‘the nation’. Their return from early visits to Vienna became festive popular events. Regretting the material difficulties the movement caused him, Šola said he could not abandon it because he would be scorned as a ‘national traitor’. The ground for Serb resistance, the communes’ freedom of action, was symbolically well chosen, being closer to traditional Bosnian experience than either the highly supervised central European state or the nostrums of the Karlowitz higher clergy. To have given up the fight would have meant defeat at multiple levels: personal-psychological, social-economic, political-national, local and in the eyes of ‘Serbdom’.
A particular aspect of the opposition’s appeal, which reflected a major failure of Austrian cultural policy, was the support they gained from the lower clergy. Church statistics reveal that in 1901 only a quarter of priests in thirteen Protopresbyteriats of Banjaluka diocese had been trained in Reljevo (twenty-five out of ninety-eight), as against twenty in Vaso Pelagić’s much more short-lived seminary of 1868–74, and twenty in Belgrade, mainly in the 1890s at that.39 Kállay’s cynical response to the clerical petitions of 1889–90—politically tied subventions ad hominem rather than a general salary settlement—had helped produce a clergy riven by internal jealousies. This took political form when it became clear that Mandić would not take the firm line vis-à-vis the government some of his actions as metropolitan in Tuzla had implied.40 The movement seems to have developed mainly through the efforts of the radical priest Stevo Trifković, leading to a draft petition for submission to friendly Reljevo professors, then general circulation.41 Though nipped in the bud at this time, its focus was clearly to be threefold: adequate income for all through fair delimitation of parishes; condemnation of subvention policy, dismissals and transfers and favouring of non-Bosnian clergy; and foundation of a clerical association and insurance scheme.42 Since the delimitation of parishes had been first in Szlávy’s list of Orthodox tasks in 1881, its non-completion must be counted remiss on the part of the regime. Kállay immediately ordered the movement to be stopped, while rushing through a pension scheme for clergy widows and orphans calculated not to loosen clerical dependence on the government.43 By the time a Trifković memorandum appeared in a Novi Sad paper, alleging machinations of some twenty-four Austrophile priests, the bulk of the clergy was quiet.44 Kállay’s mix of repression and opportunism did not work, however. In 1899 the clerical movement revived in the most embarrassing form of petitions to Constantinople, with over a hundred signatures, which the Patriarch called extremely bothersome.45 At least the Patriarchate’s disavowal of the opposition had cleared the ground for Vienna to pursue its own Church reform programme at the Phanar. Creating a fourth diocese in Banjaluka and a higher Church court in Sarajevo were obvious benefits in themselves, but since they also strengthened the case for an autocephal Bosnian Church, the Patriarch’s subvention had to be increased before what Calice had predicted would be a hard and difficult struggle was won.46 On the further issue, Mandić’s statute, it was a measure of the opposition’s toughness that the government now decided in spring 1899 that this should first be discussed between the hierarchy and the opposition before going formally to the Patriarch. The official line—a piece of Kállay spin—was that this was purely an internal dispute in the Orthodox community, not involving the government. Mandić’s original draft was an extreme statement of Karlowitz clericalism, subjecting communal elections and decisions to bishops’ approval and mentioning the government’s right of intervention only in general terms.47 As a result of government pressure he came up with some concessions before the talks eventually got under way. Thus the acceptance of elected eparchial
(diocesan) committees with a lay majority, taking over from the communes the supervision of Serb teachers and priests, would allow the government to drop its much resented practice of sending commissioners to commune meetings.

In its negotiations with the opposition between December 1899 and March 1900, the hierarchy further conceded a province-wide Church and school administrative council, which the opposition saw as the motor of an autonomous school system in Bosnia. Kállay later professed himself unable to remember that the ministry had approved such an oral concession, as Mandić affirmed, but allowed it to pass— provisionally. However, all the other things the opposition statute had demanded, like a Provincial Congress and eparchial assemblies, and lay participation in the election of metropolitans were firmly ruled out. In the last analysis the question of the 1880 Convention, which the hierarchy refused to discuss, placed an unbridgeable barrier between the two sides. Finally despairing of a deal from Mandić, the opposition turned to Franz Joseph with their Third Memorandum in June 1900. It showed the ground they had covered. Whereas the First Memorandum had been a ragbag of grievances, the third now argued forcefully that the conflict was not, as government pretended, one between hierarchy and laity, but between the government and the Orthodox community as a whole, in which the hierarchy and many clergy were seduced from their national allegiance by systematic manipulation of subventions, salaries, teaching honorariums and clerical tenure. The 1880 Convention itself, through the choice and payment of bishops by the state, was declared the strongest link in the chain of Bosnian Orthodox subjection.

Of course, if this was coherent, repeal of the Convention was politically quite unrealistic. Even allies of the Bosnian Serbs in the Monarchy like the Young Czech leader Karel Kramár said they did not agree with all the Serb demands. Doubtless such arguments about the politics of the possible influenced those in the south Slav world of conservative stamp like Petrović, or who had other priorities like Nikašinović. It raises the question as to why the opposition movement was able to raise such a head of steam, particularly as a settlement was undoubtedly Kállay’s goal between 1897 and 1900, for which his regime was prepared to concede things it had previously opposed, even aspects of Bosnianism. Such concession can be reconciled with the historicizing framework of Kállay’s political philosophy, whereby different stages required correspondingly different policies. But this philosophy incurred the risk that the repressions of an earlier period would come to haunt later attempts at relaxation. In the case of the Bosnian Serbs, the opposition movement had become institutionalized. After the Third Memorandum its leaders decamped to Constantinople to renew their vigil with the Patriarchate. More potentially fruitful was the liaison they sought with the burgeoning Muslim movement set in train by Mufti Džabić. The regime now faced a struggle on two fronts.
THE MUSLIM AUTONOMY MOVEMENT
AND THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE

The regime reacted to the Muslim movement for cultural autonomy in Herzegovina as it had to the First Serbian Memorandum, by persecution of its leaders. Džabić was dismissed from his post as Mufti of Mostar and the Mostar kiraethana (reading room), which had fallen under his supporters’ control, was dissolved. The result, as in the Serb case, was to provoke further opposition. A large Muslim deputation visited the Austro-Hungarian Delegations in May 1900 and plans were laid for an all-Bosnian conference in September in Sarajevo. In June Kállay suspended the counterproductive government action. In the critique of the Muslim movement commonly ascribed to him, its mixture of modern autonomist slogans and Islamic conservatism was loftily depicted as a sign of Muslim disorientation in contemporary society.51 In retrospect the book appears as unperceptive sociology and bad tactics. Criticism of would-be modernizing regimes by conservative older generations and radical youth has proved to be a regular feature of developing societies, but response in the Habsburg monarchy to the reforms of Joseph II already suggested the possibility. In political terms, The Position of Mohammedans in Bosnia invited the riposte which came in the new Muslim memorandum of autumn 1900: that if Bosnian Muslims were still so immature, then this showed that the Austrian cultural mission had failed. While rejecting religious autonomy as amounting to a ‘confession of bankruptcy for a 22-year-old past filled with honourable intentions’, the book made no concrete suggestions.52 This reflected Kállay’s disinclination for a programme of reform, unlike his initial reaction to the agitation caused by the 1890 conversion controversy. Perhaps the failure of his plans to settle the Serb problem by reform initiatives played a role here. Though he spoke to Kutschera in spring 1900 of appeasing Muslim opinion by educational measures, he emphasized that he did not mean fundamental innovation with a serious academic purpose, but tactical moves here and there designed for immediate political effect.53 Thus he vetoed Kutschera’s scheme for madrassa reform but praised Baron Pittner’s proposal to build two reform mektebs at the regime’s expense in Nevesinje in return for a local declaration of loyalty.54 In fact, it soon became clear that neither punitive measures nor unilateral reform could bring the protests to an end. As in the Serb case, some kind of dialogue with Muslims on the issues the opposition movement had raised came on the horizon. Kállay did not obstruct the Muslim late summer conference in Sarajevo and from January to April 1901 Kutschera negotiated with the opposition on the basis of the autonomy statute they had meantime submitted to the Emperor.

It was not Kállay’s way that these dealings should be straightforward. The regime’s formidable secret apparatus existed to mould a political process unable
to take normal forms in an authoritarian regime. Through its confidential informers, its dealings with ‘moderates’, its journalistic ventures and its financial incentives, it aimed to isolate ‘radicals’ and cajole a sufficient body of opinion towards the government position, made more palatable by judicious concession where necessary. Almost all that is known of the twists and turns in the Muslim camp comes from informers’ voluminous coverage. Kállay’s preoccupation with this kind of process must explain repeated engagement with people he and his regime knew to be unreliable. A would-be Muslim Nikašinović was the Mostarac Mehmed Spahić, who through a deal with Černy in 1898 denounced his former Serbophilism in the Croatian press, alleging that Prince Nikola of Montenegro had told him he must return to the Orthodox faith of his fathers. Having later turned back to the Serbs, he was seen as an ‘unreliable creature’ and a ‘blockhead’ by Provincial Government officials, yet Kutschera still thought it unwise to lose contact with him. His crypto-radical activities in Mostar drew a lengthy exposure of his government links from the opposition leadership. A more effective instrument, because ideologically motivated, was the Croatophile writer and government official Osman Nuri Hadžić, author of a work denouncing what he saw as the opposition’s reactionary character. His favourite scheme was for winter reform mektebs in the countryside, so as to prevent the rural population falling into opposition hands. As with the Serbs, however, officials put most efforts into ‘moderates’, despite their own misgivings. Bakir-beg Tuzlić, a leading figure in the agrarian opposition, offered his services to alleviate his financial difficulties in 1900. Though Kállay did not trust him, he still got a 30,000 K loan through official channels two years later, without ever cutting his links to the movement. As to the Mostar merchant Komadina, how, asked Kállay, could a ‘man of absolute unreliability and ambiguous character’ be used without the same risk of trickery as in the past? Sarajevo thought the matter had gone beyond financial incentives:

It is indeed true that the chief actions of the malcontents are merely personal interest, but now that they have called such a movement into being, this movement cannot just be halted with a word. A positive proposal must be made.

After a summer tour in 1900 Kutschera suggested that a less ‘centralistic’ and ‘bureaucratic’ administration of the vakufs would probably appease the majority of influential Muslims. The idea caught on and, in the government’s strategy, Kutschera’s discussion of the opposition statute with the movement’s leaders in the New Year was to be confined to vakuf and educational matters, eschewing the agrarian question and the statute’s ‘declarative’ aspects, namely its attempts to assert a Muslim ‘autonomous national-political unity’. Since the handful of western-educated Muslims were in the government camp, the opposition relied on Hungarian Serbs to draw up their documents. Hence their family likeness in opposition statute drafts: the proscription of state employees from the autonomous bodies to be elected, the transfer of a
lump sum in lieu of government subventions to individuals, the assertion of autonomous organs’ rights of supervision. As to the highest Muslim official, the Reis-ul-Ulema, Franz Joseph was to select him from the Medžlis-el-Ulema, itself to be wholly elected by the autonomous structures, and then only after obtaining authorization from the Sheikh-ul-Islam in Constantinople.63 This invocation of the menshura (authorization) from the Meshihat, the highest spiritual authority in Islam, drove a coach and horses through regime attempts to keep the Ottoman factor out of Bosnian Muslim cultural politics. It was justified with reference to the clause in the 1879 Austro-Turkish Convention guaranteeing Bosnian Muslims’ right to maintain relations with their spiritual leaders. The opposition strategy could at the least expose the legal uncertainties hidden by Kállay’s masterful hand.

In Kutschera’s discussions with the opposition in early 1901 the government was willing to make concessions, provided it retained control of the hierarchy. The statute’s calls for debureaucratization of the vakuf administration were heeded, and the conservatives got their way over compulsory mekteb attendance before Muslim children could enter a communal school. The principle of a surcharge levied by autonomous organs for cultural purposes was also conceded. In all, 180 of the opposition statute’s 184 clauses were substantially agreed. However, on the appointment of the Reis Kállay was adamant. Since the Reis was to come from the Medžlis-el-Ulema, the government demanded full control of this body, accepting at most an electoral commission of Muslim notables who could make nominations for it from which the government chose—and then only for one vacant Medžlis post at a time. Over the complicated modalities of this process the conference broke up, but not before the government had totally rejected any role for the Meshihat.64

The radical wing under Džabić now moved closer to the Serbs, who had been angling for such an alignment. Indeed, winning the Muslims as a preliminary fore stage of Bosnia’s integration into Serbia had been part of Serb nationalist strategy since the mid-nineteenth century. In its new guise, influenced by Cretan autonomy after the rising of 1897, the strategy took the form of seeking a joint campaign for Bosnian autonomy under the Sultan. Dissident leaders in the two communities did not lose the opportunity to meet on their expeditions to Vienna and Budapest. Emil Gavrila wrote in September 1900 that an oral agreement had been reached about a draft document and that signing would follow. The document concerned was all but identical with one which Džabić was pressing for the next year among Muslims. Entitled an agreement between Serbs of Orthodox and Muslim faith, it pledged both sides not to settle unilaterally with the government on cultural autonomy and to work for an autonomous Bosnia under the Sultan’s sovereignty, with Serbian and Cyrillic as its official language and script. The articles on Bosnia’s Serbian character were, however, reserved for further Muslim consultation, which rather undermines the assumption of interwar Serb historiography of a firm accord of Serbs and Muslims from this
time. Whether or not it was ever signed—and provisions for signature of the 1900 version were shrouded in secrecy from the wider Muslim community—it has been convincingly argued that too much weight should not be read into a Serb–Muslim alignment on which the views of individual Muslims, whether ‘moderates’ or ‘radicals’, constantly fluctuated for mainly tactical reasons. Džabić, for one, cooled to it on news that the Turkish government was opposed.

Government exposure of the draft agreement was one victory in a wearing publicistic battle on ever more fronts, as the oppositionists widened their sights. The Bosnian Serbs had excellent contacts in Hungary-Croatia, which from 1900 were made available to Muslims. The Slavonian lawyer and Hungarian MP Nikola Gjurgjević drafted the Muslim memorandum, and the Serb–Muslim draft agreement discussed above may well have stemmed from Emil Gavrila in Budapest; Zastava editor Jaša Tomić in Novi Sad orchestrated the printing of a succession of oppositionist Muslim pamphlets. But the Muslim begs could make an additional pitch of their own, directly at Hungary’s gentry-orientated public which had backed the Turks against Russia in 1877–78. The Independence Party was only too ready to embarrass Vienna and the Dualist establishment. From 1900 the Muslim opposition maintained an office in Budapest. It was Kállay’s misfortune, though a patriotic Hungarian, to be associated with Vienna at a time of mounting Magyar chauvinism, a problem his haughty manner and distaste for the club culture of the Hungarian political class only exacerbated. Already suspicious of Kállay for allegedly favouring Croats and supporting Austria’s line on Bosnian and Dalmatian railway development, a large section of the Hungarian press was ready to denounce him as a Bosnian ‘Emperor’ whose selfish policies were cutting Hungary off from its rightful sphere of influence in the occupied provinces. Meanwhile, Visontai, the Magyar Independentist MP for Novi Sad, where he owed his seat to Serb support, launched interpellations for the Bosnians in the Budapest parliament, softened up for the role by the national egoism of the age, which allowed him to believe that Bosnia could one day return to its historic destiny—as a Hungarian land.

As the stakes mounted, Thallóczy became engaged on an exhausting counter-action against a press campaign orchestrated, the government believed, by Dr Gavrila’s ‘press service’. As a Magyar paper put it crisply in July 1902, Kállay had been an economic success but a political failure. But Thallóczy’s battle also extended to Austria, where Kállay complained he could find no support from the authorities against systematic attack, and even to Germany. The Austro-German nationalist organs Ostdeutsche Rundschau and Deutsches Volksblatt were the most aggressive opponents, but Czech Radicals and occasionally Catholic clericals joined their protests in the Delegations. Vienna papers often denied Kállay economic success as well. Moreover, there were signs that elements of the Bosnian opposition, notably the more radical Serb clergy and its student wing, were prepared to bring the social question, too, into play. The emergence of a
student movement was a twist of the knife at a time of multiple complications, making it harder for the regime to appeal to the uplands of a more enlightened future. A generation of educational policy faced its first political test.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE BOSNIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT

The student activism of Kállay’s last years lacked the self-confidence and range of the Young Bosnian movement a decade later, despite the fact that its participants were university rather than secondary school students. However, it already signposted some of the pitfalls in the way of building an Austrophile intelligentsia in Bosnia. Compared to its customary parsimony, the Bosnian administration’s scholarship policy was generous, and early student opposition could be seen as pursuing outmoded themes in a new age. Thus when Bosnians active in the Vienna Serb student society ‘Zora’ talked of overthrowing King Milan Obrenović and liberating Bosnia, the ministry in paternalist vein ordered that they should be informed of the ban on joining societies through their fathers. More disturbing than these youthful pipe dreams were the relatively meagre fruits of government expenditure. Between 1884 and 1897, 495,546 K was spent on training only twenty-one students to graduation. The quality of the intake plainly had something to do with this. When the ministry itself criticized inadequate vetting of local officials’ recommendations, over-tolerance of mediocre scholarship holders and shortfall in prioritizing native Bosnians over immigrant and official sons, it is clear how charges of discrimination and favouritism could arise. The leniency towards existing scholarship holders was due in fair part to the regime’s concern to popularize its schools, against pressures for revival of a Serb confessional Gymnasium, for which a number of legacies existed. Once Bosnians themselves began to push for more state secondary schools, from the mid-1890s, Vienna concluded that scholarship criteria should be toughened up. The intimation to Metropolitan Mandić not to lead a ‘secular’ movement for a Gymnasium in Doljna Tuzla was typical of Kállay’s tight rein on the Orthodox hierarchy. The Gymnasium eventually opened some years later (1899). By this time the failure of attempts to push up standards had led to the creation of a special government-run hostel in Vienna, the so-called Bosnian-Herzegovinian Institute, for all future scholarship holders in the city. Making the solution to perceived south Slav indiscipline an institutional life, banning smoking, frequenting cafés or joining societies of any kind, was to throw down the gauntlet. The large majority of the first intake of thirty-four students immediately went on strike against the regulations and the twenty-six who refused finally to submit to them were expelled. This began a story of protest which quickly moved into overt political opposition to the government.
A report by the ministry official responsible for the Institute, the Bosnian Serb Dr Zurunić, casts light on the background to student unrest. Zurunić implicitly targeted Bosnia’s continuing backwardness and confessionalism: educational improvements had outrun those in students’ home environment, while too little care had been taken in selecting suitable teachers. Here he fingered the preponderance of Catholic teachers, whose sometimes overt Croat political allegiance helped, he suggested, to embed patterns of communal strife among pupils from the start.78 Zurunić’s memorandum, like the ministerial responses to Sarajevo’s scholarship policy he had drafted, reflected the same doubt about the Provincial Government’s grip on events in the schools. The administration relied essentially on close oral contact with the headmasters, who after some untoward incidents were urged to investigate even apparently small cases closely.79 But the central European academic tradition was both liberal-humanistic and aloof, which was why Kállay had counselled warning university students through their parents, as the academic authorities looked askance at assuming such a role.80 The distancing was accentuated by the fact that almost all masters were from the Monarchy. In 1894 Sarajevo Gymnasium had no list of addresses of pupils’ homes or lodgings, while Director Nemanić continued to grant boys leave of absence without serious enquiry or their parents’ knowledge—it turned out in one instance that they were aiming for Belgrade.81 Ironically, the one time Nemanić firmly recommended expulsion, the Sarajevo government overrode him, adducing all the hopes a poor family might be pinning on one secondary school pupil.82 On another occasion it professed not to know if a (political) expellee had simply switched secondary schools, declaring this a matter for the Director concerned.83 The contrast between the close watch over the urban Serb communes and this far from draconian treatment is marked. No doubt an element of official idealism about their westernizing mission in the schools, and simple lack of resources, were both involved.

For Zurunić, such consideration was wasted on the Bosnian Institute charges in Vienna. ‘One could seek in vain, in this section of the youth, for modesty, gratitude, duty, a sense of decency, indeed, still more they seem to exert themselves everywhere to document the reverse of these qualities.’ Yet his implication that stricter supervision in the secondary school stage could have prevented political mutiny is probably illusory. Thallóczy’s report on Bosnian education of 1904 brings out the now familiar pattern of student politicization in backward territories, in classic colonialist terms. According to Thallóczy, from about 1887 growing numbers of Bosnian youth began to acquire western culture, without absorbing its inner spirit. As a half-educated caste, imbued with feelings of intellectual superiority and resentful of exclusion from positions they felt their due, they fell easy prey to nationalist ideologies. From 1900 Thallóczy dated a new phase of open clashes with the authorities.84 The Serb student movement’s first act was a memorandum attacking Croat claims to Bosnia, which they were persuaded, via Belgrade, to expand into an Open Letter to the Delegations. Besides
hackneyed charges of Catholic proselytism and discrimination against the Serb name, the Open Letter lamented Kállay’s preoccupation with religious issues and neglect of the truly ‘vital questions’ facing Bosnian people, notably the plight of the kmets. The later celebrated Serb activist and writer, Petar Kočić, and politician to be, Lazar Dimitrijević, were the driving forces here. The state’s formidable resources were activated to prevent further manifestations. However, in April 1902 some thirty Serb students demonstrated outside the Joint Finance Ministry building against regime persecution of the Muslim opposition, and issued a press release highlighting the lack of constitutional freedoms in Bosnia, despite Austria’s pretensions as a ‘Kulturland’. According to government information, they developed this theme into a political programme, including demands for an autonomous constitution; state redemption of the kmets, progressive taxation, confessional autonomy and equality, and a militia.

Running through this first Bosnian student movement was some overall uncertainty. It should be remembered that as the products of a scholarship policy, Bosnian students, as Kállay noted, were likely to be sons of peasants and ‘quite small’ traders and shopkeepers. Informers cited Dimitrijević on their intention, as soon as they could stand on their own feet, to take a different line from the opposition leaders, prioritizing the agrarian question. Yet youthful radicalism battled with the respect due to the gazde as national leaders, awareness that they were out of touch with ‘the people’—hence the information-gathering vacation tours planned in the countryside—and above all financial problems which made them dependent on Jeftanović and the Serbian government. Some twenty signatories of the 1901 Open Letter were debarred from public employment in Bosnia, after being wrongly assured by their elders that Kállay would take no revenge on them. Serb leaders realized the importance of humouring the students, so that ‘the Omladina won’t reproach us for leading them onto thin ice and then letting them fall’. No fewer than forty-seven Bosnians held scholarships from the Serbian government, according to one report. It was a campaign to finance poor Serb students at university that led in 1902 to the founding of ‘Prosvjeta’, which was to become the main cultural organization of Bosnian Serbs until 1945.

An insight into the ferment of ideas in the Bosnian Serb student body is provided by a remarkable letter of a leading student radical in Zagreb university. Lazar Brkić was one of several student informers, but having been suspected by his colleagues he had striven, apparently successfully, to reinstate himself in their eyes. He stressed to the authorities that the student agitation was a reaction against harsh conditions in the secondary schools and the anti-Serb teachers on whose whim scholarships depended. But it was something more, he claimed, an idealistic, humanitarian movement for the national and economic well-being of Bosnia with its own independent roots, influenced least of all by the autonomist leaders. It is tempting to compare Brkić’s soulfulness with Zurunić’s tart comments on students’ belief that they shared their ‘higher task’ with the youth
of other nations before them, building ‘castles in the air’ on ‘matters whose solution is reserved to other hands’.\(^9\) Indeed, Brkić advised the government to base itself on the Serbs and Muslims, stop Catholic propaganda and work to see national tradition and the economy flourish, whereupon Serbs, who were not irredentist, would support it. It was not the way of the government to be influenced by such naive effusions. But his letter indicates how easily people in non-dominant positions can come to feel threatened in their very moral identity: the government should show it realized, said Brkić, that Serbs were people and could judge what was right and wrong.\(^9\)

The government’s response to the first Bosnian Serb student movement was more hard-nosed. It concluded that access to Bosnia’s secondary schools should be curtailed. This was an unheroic comment on the development of educational policy, but one in line with the regime’s long-standing fear of the growth of an ‘intellectual proletariat’.

### THE CRISIS OF THE KÁLLAY REGIME

Kállay’s strategy no doubt envisaged that the strict tutelage of his initial ministry would be relaxed somewhat as the occupation took root. But the contrast between the seeming omnipotence of the early 1890s and the multifaceted opposition a decade later was not part of the script. The regime was everywhere on the defensive; for the first time Kállay and Kutschera showed signs of strain. In the face of Russia and Turkey’s sullen ill-will, the unappeasable nationalism of Serbia and Montenegro, the aversion of the Bosnian Muslims, the uncertain legal status of the occupation and the failure of Austrianization in the schools, it was not possible permanently to pursue a hard line, if only because of the increased importance of outside opinion. In January 1902 the Travnik Kreis Commissioner Rukavina argued that initiatives for a settlement with the Serbs should be made ‘for one thing with regard to the world outside’ and Kállay and Kutschera agreed that negotiations, to be conducted by Horowitz, were essential for that reason.\(^9\) Some months later the minister almost begged Kutschera to reopen negotiations with the Muslims so that he could have something to show the Delegations.\(^9\)

The situation was impasse at all points. At the Phanar Joachim III, signatory of the 1880 Convention, had returned to power, not unsympathetic to Austria but as before an active player of the game, who expressed himself perplexed at the failure of the Bosnian Church issue to die down. He spoke of presenting a Church statute himself and early in 1903 found a pretext to send his own investigative agent to Bosnia. On Metropolitan Mandić’s revision of his 1899 statute, the Austrian authorities were chagrined to have to conclude that it could never satisfy the opposition, which left Kállay in the embarrassing position of having to tell Foreign Minister Gołuchowski that there was still no regime statute available to show
the Patriarch. Following the failure of his negotiations with the Serbs, Horowitz implied that the government was hoist by its own petard, because having always pretended that the autonomy issue was one between the Orthodox laity and hierarchy, it had failed to define where it actually stood on many of the issues.\textsuperscript{97} Kállay and Kutschera urged Mandić to try revising his statute again, but began to wonder what would happen if in the end the Patriarch rejected it, or even Serafim Perović did so—a far cry from the hauteur of old. As to the Muslim opposition movement, the strategy was more the old Levantine specialist Kutschera’s than Kállay’s: an Ordinance refusing readmittance to Bosnia of Muslims charged with encouraging emigration from the motherland. In 1902 this Ordinance was applied to ex-Mufti Džabić, a dubious legal manoeuvre which only increased his popularity and made Kállay fearful about cooperation from the Foreign Ministry and Budapest.

The old levers of press manipulation and harassment could make life difficult for the opposition, but they could not kill it off. Thus energy expended on the possibility of winning over Serb papers only provoked another demolition of previous government policy by a high ranking official.\textsuperscript{98} It was irrelevant what happened to Mostar’s \textit{Srpski vjesnik}, wrote Kreis Commissioner Pittner on one such case, since it was losing prestige among the opposition anyway, and the whole notion of ‘moderates’ who in their hearts opposed the autonomy movement should be abandoned: ‘the Serb element today stands united behind Šola and Jeftanović’. Degrees of allegiance to the opposition indeed existed, from the ‘busily active townsman’ to the ‘almost apathetic peasant’, but moderation in this sense did not mean inclination to become ‘national renegades’, nor did the rural population stand closer to the regime than to the urban leaders—indeed, rather the reverse, especially after the lower clergy had shown ‘unmistakable sympathy’ with the lay leaders.\textsuperscript{99}

In the Muslim case, pressure tactics had more effect, including the trial of the secretary of the Muslim organization in Budapest, which led to the imprisonment of the Muslim radical leader in Mostar, Šerif Arnaoutović. Thallóczy’s Austrian press campaign also tried to tar the Bosnian Muslims with the Young Turk brush, unconvincingly in Džabić’s case. As the divisions between Džabić’s ‘hodža party’ and the party of the begs reemerged, the Muslim movement fell into the doldrums, but it did not disappear. The regime was now faced with an oppositionist frame of mind independent of specific organization. It was ‘the mark of the Oriental’, Kállay told the spring 1902 Delegations, to put his personal concerns before the public good. Hence ‘in the East a government must be strong and not yield to any demonstrations because otherwise it will give place to the demonstrators’\textsuperscript{100} Kállay no doubt hoped that the Muslim opposition would eventually run into the sand. Yet as far as the Serbs were concerned, he increasingly realized that some kind of settlement had to be reached. He saw that he no longer had time on his side.
Along with grand strategy, the details of regime cultural policy came apart in this period. On the publicistic front the illustrated literary magazine *Nada*, launched with such panache in 1894, struggled under the impact of the boycott imposed by Serb writers. In March 1901 its editor, Kosta Hörmann, proposed closure. Kállay replied brusquely that this was not discussable, and by dint of ending the Cyrillic edition and reduction in size *Nada* limped on.\(^{101}\) Meanwhile, the editor of *Bošnjak*, the western-educated Jusuf-beg Filipović, implored a higher subvention with tales of the decline of his legal business because of his paper’s unpopular stance.\(^{102}\) Symptomatic of the malaise was that Petrović, as loyalist commissioner for the dissolved Sarajevo Serb commune, had to register record communal deficits totalling 180,000 K between 1897 and 1902, while his lieutenant Besarović by 1903 was heavily in debt and faced certain ruin without government aid.\(^{103}\) Things were no better with the reform mektebs, the government’s major initiative in Muslim education. Because of anti-government feeling engendered by the autonomy movement, nearly half of the 145,925 K of local subscriptions promised for these schools for the years 1898 to 1901 remained uncollected. The result was a catastrophic burden for the central vakuf fund, which for the first time failed to expand.\(^{104}\) In 1903 mutinous vakuf administrators sent in barely half of the 30,000 K they were supposed to supply annually to this central fund—opposition to the use of surpluses for purposes not prescribed by the vakuf title deed was one of the chief points of the opposition statute.\(^{105}\) The government faced a perplexing dilemma. Allowing the reform mektebs to close would spell defeat; using government authority to raise the promised funds entailed odium; providing a subsidy would invite Serb calls for similar grants to their schools. Yet allowing the Muslim community to levy a tax for their schooling purposes would be to concede a principal plank of the opposition programme—though it was how Kállay’s more flexible successor brought the problem to an end.

There is evidence of growing depression on the part of the masterful minister as difficulties mounted. The man who had looked forward to following his first patron, Gyula Andrássy, to the Ballhausplatz, now brooded over the humiliation of possible dismissal.\(^{106}\) That he might lose the support of Hungarian prime minister Széll, originally premised on the assumption that the opposition would soon blow over, was also a factor.\(^{107}\) Indeed, Vuković, a former Bosnian official become Dalmatian MP, probably reflected a widespread feeling when he told the Delegations that, after great successes, Kállay’s regime no doubt needed a change of course as the opposition movements testified.\(^{108}\) Hence the press rumour orchestrated by Dr Gavrila in July 1902 that he had resigned—he had been temporarily indisposed—was a well-placed blow.\(^{109}\) Kállay’s relationship with his right-hand man Kutschera was sometimes tetchy in this period. His scepticism about Kutschera’s preoccupation with would-be moderate oppositionists was increased by other reports he was receiving of Muslim loyalists’ sense of neglect, and by the reluctance of ‘moderates’ to take any initiative which made them
confront Džabić. But here Kállay does not seem to have realized the extent to which the regime had become the prisoner of its own methods. His doubts about the reliability of such people were an implicit criticism of his regime’s resort to informers and personal manipulation, which were hardly the best means to cultivate ‘loyalty’ and made officials dependent on their would-be moderate allies’ assessment of the public mood. Moreover, the potentially biggest ‘moderate’ catch, Alibeg Firdus, could cite a new conversion furore involving Stadler. Kutschera had long held that leniency towards Stadler on this issue was a major obstacle to pacification of the Muslims. To Kállay’s suggestion that the father of the missing Muslim girl might seek her out, he responded that this was a mockery if the whole government machine was unable to do so.

Kállay’s stance on the Sivrić conversion case of 1903 can be fully understood only in the light of two guiding factors: first, support for the Croat Catholic cause as a counterweight to Serb and Muslim radicalism; second, compliance to clerical-conservative forces in the Monarchy on whom, in his isolation, he felt ever more dependent. The activist strain in him and relish for the broad perspective led him in the one direction a complex situation left open, to the Croats. The potential for such a move had long been present. As Consul General in Belgrade in 1868 Kállay had threatened Serbian leaders that Hungary could switch her support from a Serbian to a Croatian Bosnia. The evolution in Croatian nationalism meantime, away from Starčević’s intransigence, no doubt encouraged the views he expressed in an interesting document from 1902. Geography and in part culture destined the Serbs to be hostile to the Monarchy, he declared, but the Croats could only fulfil their aspirations within it; their growing conflict with the Serbs was the inevitable product of a conflict of interests which must redound to Austria-Hungary’s advantage. Hence the Bosnian regime should tactfully support the Croats against the Serbs. This is effectively what happened in the last years of Kállay’s ministership. Ivan Miličević’s Osvit was subsidized as a counterweight to Srpski vjesnik, though the regime knew of Miličević’s pravaša activities and his anti-Serb line positively embarrassed Kreis Commissioner Pittner. Subtler were intimations to Bošnjak to direct Bosnianism against Serb, but not Croat targets, and instructions to the Nada representative in the 1901 south Slav journalists’ conference in Dubrovnik, to ‘work on’ the Osvit correspondent whom the government had prevailed upon to go. The shift did not go unnoticed. In 1895 a Croatian MP complained in the Delegations that the Sarajevo government persecuted Croatian nationality. In 1902 another Dalmatian Croat dissociated himself from Kállay’s critics, urging only that the Bosnian authorities should fight with ‘open visor’, giving friend and foe alike to understand plainly that Bosnia was a Croatian land.

For Thallóczy this Croatophile course and Kállay’s streak of unscrupulous opportunism were the two things he deprecated in his otherwise revered chief. For students of Kállay’s career they can represent the two distinct levels at which
this remarkable man operated: on the one hand the grand sweep of historical
generalization; on the other the manipulative pulling of wires. Yet these apparent
opposites fitted together in the same person; indeed, it seems likely that Kállay
relished precisely the weaving of intricate knots into the great weft of history,
both giving the sense of mastery that appealed to a proud, ambitious nature,
whose talents dazzled contemporaries. In hindsight, personality and judgement
alike appear somewhat flawed. Kállay’s intellectual gifts were used to yoke reality
to his philosophical-historical speculations rather than to adapt his policies
to it: this is the story of the Bosnian scheme of the 1860s, the tendentious
theories about East and West, the Bosnian idea based on medieval precedents,
the determination to confine ethnicity in Bosnia to the confessional sphere. As
concerns manipulation, it fed the prevalent mistrust for his regime, mirroring his
disparaging view of Bosnian Orientals. By the end of his career there are many
signs that senior colleagues like Horowitz and Pittner were questioning basic
aspects of the regime.

Yet, though in the broad considerations he loved to adduce Kállay often
seemed dogmatic and obdurate, in tactical matters he could show flexibility.
Often in dealings with the more stolid Kutschera, it was Kállay who chose
the less confrontational option. If the intellectual framework of his policies
was questionable, he never deceived himself about the immediate difficulties he
faced, and his sense of the interconnectedness of events inside Bosnia and in the
wider Balkan world was unparalleled. Perhaps there was a certain flexibility in
his generalizations, too, in that, though they might not be formally disavowed,
new ones came in their place, as the concept of Bosnianism gave way to that
of Serb–Croat rivalry. Throughout, he retained a lively awareness of where
power was, for beyond his intellectual preoccupations it seems to have been
the great game of power that most fascinated him. This was what was at issue
in his disagreement with Kutschera about conversions policy. The intervention
of the clerical Viennese Das Vaterland in this matter, accusing the Provincial
Government of anti-Catholic prejudice, forced Kállay to explain his opposition
to Kutschera’s pro-Muslim views. The patrons of Das Vaterland, he argued,
consisted of extreme conservative circles ‘reaching to the highest places’. In
the face of their ‘position of power’, all considerations of Muslim influence,
even their relations with the Porte itself, were ‘quite infinitesimally small’. The
Bosnian administration could never oppose such forces. It was another sweeping
generalization, provocative enough to draw from Kutschera the scandalized reply
that if Das Vaterland’s influence on the Bosnian administration was such, then he
was an ‘unsuitable instrument’ of it and would know how to draw the necessary
consequences.  

Indeed, Kállay’s dismissal of Muslim protest over the Sivrič affair shows how his formidable knowledge of Balkan life could blind him to
the very changes taking place as a result of Austrian rule. His picture of widow
Sivrič and her illegitimate child by a Catholic, and of the Catholic peasants
taunting the Muslim relatives (conduct which scandalized Kutschera), as all part
of the age-old ‘sport’ of confessional contestation in the countryside, which Muslim leaders had no business to be taking seriously, overlooked precisely the institutional mobilization of Bosnian society which more modern government had brought about.  

However, it would do injustice to Kállay’s style to assume he had only one string to his bow. While rebuking Kutschera for indulging the Muslim protests, he used the incident to make private intercession in Rome for Stadler’s removal, though holding out little prospect of success. Since the Curia—and even the Bosnian Franciscan Provincial—approved Stadler’s conversion stance, this sober judgement was borne out. Stadler remained at his post till 1918, living long enough for triumphant Serbian troops to attend his funeral. It was Kállay who slipped from the scene, on 13 July 1903, having maintained the restless defence of his regime’s authority to the very end.
Kállay's death was a turning-point in the history of the occupation. For all the difficulties of his final years, he had remained a potent symbol of Habsburg power. Thenceforth the authorities gradually relaxed their grip until, after the assassination of 1914, they effectively abandoned the assumptions of cultural mission to turn fiercely on their tormentors. But the post-1903 story was not one of mere passivity on their part. In many ways, Kállay’s successor, István Burián de Rajeczi (1851–1922), proved an ambitious strategist who saw himself as building on the social and cultural changes the regime had brought about to usher in a new constitutional order. If this could, at a pinch, be seen as an extension of Kállay’s own modernization programme, the same could not be said of Burián’s attempt to forge a new relationship with the Serbs. The elements of continuity and discontinuity between the two regimes are what lend the Burián years from 1903 to 1912 their distinctive character.

Burián’s more flexible course part reflected, part stimulated a spurt of socio-cultural and proto-political activity in these years. Bosnia-Herzegovina had 266 clubs and societies in 1905 and 604 in 1908, with 79,000 members.¹ The main confessional organizations, Napredak, Prosvjeta and Gajret, grew beyond their original function of providing aid to students and apprentices into representative bodies of the culturally aware. Political journalism migrated from Mostar, where the organs of the 1890s, Srpski Vjesnik and Osvit, vegetated before folding, to the capital where the first native daily papers began to appear: Srpska riječ (Serbian Word, 1905; daily, 1907) and Hrvatski dnevnik (Croatian Daily, 1906), while the first oppositionist Muslim paper Musavat (1906) eventually induced the closure of the loyalist Bosnjak. Overall, publications appearing at least monthly almost doubled (to thirty-one) in Burián’s first five years, while the number of private presses went up from twelve to twenty-five between 1907 and 1909 alone.²

But these advances from a low base brought new problems for government, while not removing old ones. One new element was the working-class movement.³ Ilijas Hadžibegović estimates a heterogeneous body of 80,000 to 100,000 workers, industrial or artisanal, by 1914, acquiring new ideas largely from German-speaking incomers or via Zagreb and Belgrade. Typographers took ten years to get approval of a benefit society (1893–1903), but by 1906 a Central
Workers’ Alliance was approved, which organized some 10 per cent of the workforce. The Social Democratic Party founded in 1909 remained stuck at around 2,000 members till the war, denied any real impact by its internationalism, but contributing another dimension of discontent which radical nationalists could access. In the general strike of May 1906, which affected twelve towns for several days, the fiery Serb Petar Kočić sought to link worker and peasant grievance, the latter continuing to fester as the average peasant plot contracted by 11 per cent between the 1895 and 1910 censuses. These social clouds obscured vistas of dramatic advance. But then the new minister was not a dramatic man.

**BURIÁN’S NEW COURSE**

Like Kállay, István Burián was of Hungarian gentry stock, a former diplomat and a Slavist of bookish leanings, isolated by career background and temperament from the Hungarian political class. The son of a minor literary figure from what is now western Slovakia, he passed from a training in the Consular Academy, Vienna, and a succession of minor posts in the near east to major appointments as Consul General to Moscow (1883) and minister to Sofia (1886), Stuttgart (1895) and Athens (1898). This was a less striking trajectory than Kállay’s rise to high office, nor did Burián share his predecessor’s intellectual charisma. ‘He was never concerned for effect … always reserved and monosyllabic’, the *Neue Freie Presse* was to write after he left office. Indeed, Burián does not figure in the index of a leading five-volume history of Hungary published not long after his death, and the one brief Hungarian academic treatment of him, a discussion of his role as Habsburg Foreign Minister in the First World War, dismisses him as an inveterate dogmatist who doggedly pursued one misconception after another.

Yet it is possible to underestimate Burián. Certainly the man who eventually made it in 1915 to the Ballhausplatz cannot have lacked ambition, as Burián’s correspondence shows. He gave up plans to publish a book on his Russian observations for fear of revealing the insights he hoped to deploy in his diplomatic career. Would he ever make it to ambassador in Constantinople, he wondered in 1899. His diary entry on his appointment to the Joint Finance Ministry, that he felt the swish of the wings of fate, bespeaks the self-conscious gravitas of a cogitative figure, who sought to relate his observations to positivist evolutionary assumptions dominant in late nineteenth-century Hungary. ‘The development of peoples follows the law of growth of organic forms’, if at different rates, he had written in 1885. He was to interpret the Hungarian constitutional crisis of 1905–6, similarly, in the light of ‘predetermined historical developments’. Its cause, he argued, was Vienna’s failure to understand the advance of Hungarian national consciousness towards the demand for full constitutionalism, though he also blamed the nationalist opposition for not seeing the need to compromise with the dynasty. A tempered Hungarian patriotism was therefore the natural
base of Burián’s intellectual make-up, but it did not override his Dualist loyalty or his own specialist concerns. He followed events at home with anxious avidity; he told his long-time friend Thallóczy from Athens in 1899, but eastern events interested him more insofar as he was among them. The anxiousness is symptomatic. Burián belonged to the school of pre-1914 Habsburg politicians whose conservative desire to keep the show on the road was still liberal-tinged. The evolutionary paradigm so marked in his intellectual make-up obliged would-be thinking conservatives to seek to accommodate forces for change through gradualism, with all the difficulties this entailed. Fascism, with its intoxicating fusion of reactionary goals and modernist rhetoric, lay beyond the horizon. In this sense Burián was a conventional thinker of a certain type, more so than the bolder Kállay. But his early articles on Russia in the Budapesti Szemle reveal an impressive ability to draw plausible generalizations from a mass of detail. Nihilism as a symptom of a discredited bureaucracy, Russians’ tendency to take foreign ideas to extremes, their lack of attraction to moderate constitutionalism, simultaneous sense of size and insignificance, capacity for both pessimism and aggression, and their uniform belief in Russian distinctiveness together with their limited power of assimilation of other Slavs, which acted to undermine Panslavism: all these observations have stood the test of time better than the speculations of the more famous Kállay.

The ruminative Burián seems to have had an inner fund of confidence in his carefully considered nostrums. His criticism of Hungarian politicians for their lack of statesmanlike foresight no doubt pinpointed the value he himself prized. Burián extended his pertinacious moderation to political opponents; as a young diplomat, he predictably saw the Russian Panslav Aksakov as an enemy, but he endeavoured to understand him and came to judge him ‘as honourable an opponent as there will ever be’. The new minister was an interesting mixture of the conventional and the unusual: a Hungarian patriot and Habsburg loyalist with no Schwärmeri for the Slavs and a stickler for authority and order, but one who believed these could be upheld only by dispassionately respecting the realities of a given situation and its evolutionary context. The problem for Burián would be to reconcile these various traits.

Burián did not give vent to his policy views with Kállay’s loquacity. He discontinued the private ministerial correspondence with Kutschera and his diary entries until the Hungarian crisis of 1905 are mostly no more than the occasional note of a name or a place—as for his first visits to Bosnia in April and June–July 1904. His new course was set out in characteristically terse obita dicta on documents from Sarajevo, instructions or commissions reflecting privately reached insights and occasional programmatic statements in the Delegations. But it is not so difficult from these to divine his intentions. In the winter Delegations of 1903–4 he praised his predecessor but noted that government participation in industrial development, while appropriate in the past, would no longer continue—the start of a convention whereby Kállay’s policies were
justified as necessary preparation for the different age to come. The careful qualification that the government’s principle of confessional equality had been generally accepted, ‘if perhaps without enthusiasm’, was a typical touch. The dropping of the private correspondence with Kutschera was a statement in itself; by 1904 Thallóczy was having to mollify a Hungarian editor whose secret subsidy had lapsed with the change of minister. The announcements Burían also made to the Delegations of agreement reached in negotiations on the Orthodox statute, promulgated in 1905, and of the projected reform of the desetina (state tithe) let glimpse his determination to press on with changes Kállay had only contemplated.

The overhaul of the desetina was generalized in 1906. Henceforth this was to be calculated from the average crop yield over the previous ten years. In 1906 communal and municipal government was reformed. Bosnia’s first press law, in 1907, abolished preventive censorship; he had no prison leanings, Burían told the 1906 Hungarian Delegation. He showed his gradualist colours also in his response to the burgeoning movement for workers’ right to organize in summer 1905. While the Central Workers’ Alliance and its constituent trade councils were approved only as non-political organs, the minister warned the Sarajevo government that their evolution towards a political role would surely follow: ‘the provincial administration cannot resist this movement’.

Taking such a view of a nascent movement, Burían was unlikely to dismiss developments among more established constituencies. Both the Serb and Muslim opposition succeeded in establishing effective party organizations in these years. The Muslim National Organization, emerging from a meeting of notables in late 1906, succeeded in mobilizing 130,000 voters to choose national representatives, in whose name a memorandum on Muslim demands, both cultural and economic, was directed to Burían in June 1907. In November Serbs founded a similar province-wide body with a political programme of Bosnian autonomy under Turkish suzerainty and ‘sloga’ with the Muslims. The Croat National Association was to follow in 1908. These were the developments on the horizon when Burían broached the issue of political reform to his sovereign in spring 1907: the government’s once wise political colourlessness was in danger of turning into negligence in the face of events, he argued; the limits had been reached of what could be achieved by ‘the cold glitter of a well-led military-administrative enterprise’. Though the Sarajevo authorities remained in full control, only ‘the step by step inauguration of an extensive autonomy’ could frustrate Serbia’s shameless playing up of the constitutional issue in an increasingly politicized population. The Serbian threat was thus central to Burían’s analysis as to Kállay’s, but his assessment led to a different solution, that Bosnian Serbs as the relative majority and most politically active (regsam) section of the population, should be given more opportunity for participation in public affairs, in contrast to the ‘false political direction’ Kállay had pursued. In this context, however,
preference for a Croat rather than a Serb alignment for Muslims remained at the heart of government policy as before.

The turnaround in policy towards the Serbs was thus based on strict calculation. Incidental references show Burián had a sociological take on Serb patriotic rhetoric, believing Serbs’ clannish organizational traditions, reflected in Hungarian and Serbian Serbs’ mutual dislike—an echo of Kállay’s theme of ‘particularism’—meant Bosnia could be rendered impervious to propaganda from Serbia if it enjoyed autonomy and prosperity. The new minister’s pitch was unfailingly rationalistic, whether combining an offer of ‘confidence for confidence’ to Vojislav Šola with criticism of the opposition’s ‘points of a partly aggressive character’, or expounding to Provincial Government officials the ‘cold-blooded’ balance between authority and conciliation which he expected from them in implementing the new course. The evidence is that the parade of reasonableness could win trust, particularly in small-group situations, but the apparent assumption that his interlocutors were always on the same dispassionate wavelength, when plainly some were not, showed Burián’s Achilles heel.

Burián was even less forthcoming on his feelings about Muslims and Catholic Croats. Though he eschewed philosophizing, the references suggest a conventional assessment on the former. Deep insight into the Muslim mental world was needed to understand why a high vakuf official came out for the opposition on links with the Sheikh-ul-Islam, he told a Magyar politician, adding that he had done everything possible to reach agreement with the Muslims and save them from their short-sighted leaders. The element of condescension suggests that Burián may have part shared the view of a leading adviser, for whom Muslims were a ‘quantité négligeable’ whose importance lay in their relationship with the Serb opposition. His sharp condemnation of Kállay’s policy of reliance on Bosnian Muslims rested on the view that they had shown themselves ‘incapable of development’ and unsuitable as bearers of modern and progressive ideas. As for the Croats, they were too few to provide alone a basis for government. A Protestant where Kállay was Catholic, Burián met the return of seventeen anti-semitic MPs in the Hungarian elections of 1884 with four exclamation marks, while the 1912 Vienna Ecumenical Congress drew from him a sardonic comment on the ‘peculiar embrace of mysticism and politics’. But he gave Archbishop Stadler, as he did other Bosnian leaders, the impression of a man who gave a fair hearing. While Stadler came away from an early meeting thinking Burián was not averse to his plans for Catholic religious autonomy, the ministry’s response to the actual request was drily to ask Sarajevo to report on the real needs of the Catholic Church.

Burián’s confidential memoranda to the Monarchy’s inner circle confirm the historiographical consensus that the post-Kállay era saw a shift from politics by proxy, through the cultural autonomy movements, to politics in its own right. Patriarchal leaderships, based on alliances of local notables, faced the challenge of establishing a mass political base. As nationalists looked to extend their influence
over an increasingly mutinous peasantry and a nascent working-class movement, a contest was on between them and the administration over the framework within which a post-absolutist Bosnia would operate.

These Bosnian proto-politics were played out against a background of wider tensions. Burián’s first years in office saw the Hungarian Liberals and their Croatian National Party allies replaced by an Independence coalition government in Budapest and a Croato-Serb coalition in Zagreb. Meanwhile, a change of dynasty in Serbia brought the anti-Austrian Radicals to power, while the Ilinden rising in Macedonia began a destabilizing process in the Balkans which eventually undermined the Austro-Russian entente there. The favourable balance of forces within which Kállay had worked—roughly speaking, a consolidated Dualism in a stable international order—was increasingly challenged. Thus the annexation of Bosnia, for which Burián was preparing, could not but be a matter of high politics.

In these circumstances the politics of Church and school lost the centrality they had assumed in Kállay’s Bosnia. Burián’s emphasis was elsewhere, on structures of governance. He could leave to his friend Thallóczy the cultural agenda to which Kállay had devoted much energy. This theme of transition from a Bosnian proxy cultural politics to the real thing dominated both interwar interpretations and those of the communist period. In the former case it reflected what the writers—often former participants—wanted to happen; in the latter it could be slotted into a Marxist analysis of transition from the conservative politics of a ˇcarsija (mercantile) elite to bourgeois, even revolutionary norms. The purpose of the remaining chapters of this book is not to contest this basic perspective, but to suggest that it has led to some underestimation of the continuing role cultural politics had to play. While both Burián and Bosnians wished to see the post-Kállay era as a new departure, the nature of the situation and to an extent their own miscalculations ensured that old problems still got in the way.

Two comments need to be made. First, the transitional character of Burián’s regime meant that for most of it many features of the absolutist era persisted. The autonomous politics he thought had to be conceded explicitly presupposed the maintenance of the state right of supervision of all social and associational life, together with the ring-fencing of the political process to keep out the uneducated masses. He was no liberal. It was the politics of his native, gentry-dominated Hungary he was conceding. Second, Bosnia’s sheer backwardness kept the stresses and strains of cultural modernization on the agenda. Official talk of cultural mission had been internalized by the emerging educated minority, whose patriotism was charged with a deep sense of being the spearhead of their people’s emancipation from past primitivism to fuller life. The older tradition of freedom from an alien yoke fused with the Enlightenment theme of liberation from ignorance to create a strong sense of mission on the part of educated Bosnians. A clash of wills resulted. How a modern Bosnia would look was what concerned occupiers and occupied alike.
These complex circumstances made heavy demands of political leadership. For all his soundness of judgement in the abstract, Burián can give the impression of a man who conducted policy by numbers and lacked the flexibility to synchronize his grand strategy with the flux of actual events. This, and the tensions between liberal and conservative elements in his make-up, contributed to mixed signals on the part of his regime. Under Burián cultural politics remained important in part because, deprioritized, they were sometimes allowed to develop in ways that cut across the new minister’s wider goals. On the other hand, it was equally difficult for Bosnian opposition politicians to retain control in a time of fermenting change. The desirable future would seem different to a Serb gazda or a Serb professional, a Muslim beg or Muslim student, a Stadlerite or a Franciscan. Rivalry over what were as much cultural as political visions fed into a febrile climate not easily responsive to Burián’s cerebral approach.

CULTURAL AUTONOMY UNDER BURIÁN: THE QUESTION OF CONTROL

The autonomy movements had first to be wound up. After preliminary negotiations Serb opposition leaders set off for Vienna in December 1903. Reports of ‘indescribable joy’ at the deal then reached, citing words of appreciation flying towards government figures, even Kutschera, should not disguise the fact that for Jeftanović this was only a stage towards a new phase of activity, for which a new Serbian political paper, Srpska riјeћ, was to be the mouthpiece. The programmatic statement of its first number on 1/14 January 1905 highlighted the theme of economic uplift embodied in the newly launched Serb savings bank: ‘A solid, established programme of work is particularly necessary for nations which must struggle for their economic existence … every people must direct its own fate without external influence.’ The pursuit of ‘sloga’ with the Muslims continued to be a vital part of Serb strategy. Presenting his own movement as a success story for obduracy, Jeftanović urged the Muslim opposition leaders to continue their flagging struggle. Yet there was clearly a disposition to think that the rivalry would become healthier than in Kállay’s days. Burián’s first visit to Sarajevo was recorded by Bosanska vila in terms of his warmth and sincerity and his unprecedented message, recognizing the Bosnian Serbs’ numerical superiority and promising to defend their Church and school interests; Burián alluded to his twenty years’ sojourn in Orthodox lands. In fact, the actual working out of autonomy was to prove disillusionsing and divisive.

Actually, many celebrants of the autonomy breakthrough had only the foggiest idea what had been decided. Twelve unresolved points had been set aside for the Ecumenical Patriarch’s adjudication, including the statute’s explicit mention of the 1880 Convention on episcopal appointments and the opposition’s demand for joint lay-clergy election of clerical members of autonomous bodies. Nonetheless,
Jeftanović opined that the statute would be ready by Easter. It was ‘nothing much, God knows’, was his reported view, but the main thing was to have something to show people their perseverance had been worthwhile. This report certainly implies he was not over-concerned about what the Patriarch decided.

It is hardly surprising that things did not turn out smoothly. They rarely did at the Phanar. In his memorandum submitting the statute, Burián ruled the appointment system established by the 1880 Convention non-negotiable and claimed that joint lay-clergy electoral bodies would swamp the ‘conservative-minded clergy’. The Patriarch, however, singled this second point out as a likely source of difficulty. Soon the problem became much worse. Patriarch Joachim III, the signatory of the 1880 Convention, now back in office, faced a hostile majority in the Holy Synod which was angry at the pressures on the beleaguered Patriarchate from its non-Greek flock. A ‘regrettable concatenation of circumstances’, in Ambassador Calice’s phrase, made the Convention’s method of episcopal appointment the very issue on which this majority could turn on Joachim. He initially judged the issue too fraught for the ‘discreet means’ Burián suggested no less than Kállay, though the Patriarch thought imperial decorations might sweeten some opponents. Only after a year of tortuous negotiation, attended by high drama as Patriarch and Synod majority expelled each other from office, did Burián get what he wanted. The Patriarch obtained a one-off subvention of 50,000 francs and a gift of 1,100 Turkish pounds for charity, his secretary 150 Turkish pounds. It helped that Austria-Hungary still had an entente with Russia, whose ambassador considered the Synod a bunch of intriguers, and that Serbia did not want relations with the monarchy to be disrupted by the Bosnian Serbs. But from other sources the Bosnian authorities received reports of Belgrade’s expenditure on bribes and substantial contributions from Jeftanović and Šola, who had eventually gone to Constantinople themselves.

To present this extended episode as the souring of a beautiful friendship would be naive. From the Serb leaders’ side any discomfort was not so much over the contents of the statute, against which their protest was mild, as its delay till August 1905, since this allowed more radical opposition to build up a head of steam. The influence of Jeftanović and Šola indeed declined for a time, yet the revival of a Muslim movement in 1906 gave weight to the major political strategy which had matured by 1907, the assertion by Serbs and Muslims of the Sultan’s continued sovereignty over an autonomous Bosnia.

The re-emergence of province-wide Muslim activism in the Muslim National Organization (MNO) was most unwelcome to the government. Launched at Slavonski Brod on the initiative of Alibeg Firdus in December 1906, it emphasized begs’ agrarian interests in its programme, for Mufti Džabić, focus of the so-called hodža party, agreed to relinquish the leadership role originally lodged with exiles in Istanbul. What is striking about the MNO is that even the organs created by Austria herself declined to be used against it. The Provincial
Vakuf Direction accepted its representative character, while in negotiations opened between Kutschera and the opposition in summer 1907, the most radical proposal on the procedure for appointment of the Reis was put forward by a member of the Medžlis-el-ulema, leading Firdus to abandon his more moderate position. The break-up of the negotiations followed. Thus while the Austrian-educated Orthodox hierarchy from Kosanović to Mandić and Letica became steadily more reliable from the government standpoint, the opposite was true of its Muslim counterpart. Džemaludin Čaušević, the most reform-minded member of the Medžlis, supported the hard line. Appointed in 1905, aged only thirty-five, Čaušević had been the instigator of the reform of the Medžlis’s organization, whereby members acquired portfolios and offices in a house rented for the purpose. By the previous arrangement the Medžlis had used two rooms in a Sarajevo mosque, in the larger of which the Reis sat with his colleagues on cushioned benches around the walls, with a secretary on a stool in the other.

The problem went beyond stereotypes of Oriental idleness and fatalism. Whereas the reorganization of the Bosnian Orthodox Church had a native model in Karlowitz and governed and governors ultimately shared a Christian framework of reference, there was no Islamic model for a vakuf administration run essentially by Austro-Hungarian officials. Čaušević’s reform inspiration received its strongest spark from his encounter in Cairo with the Islamic modernism of Muhammed Abduh and the journal *El Menar*, rather than any Austrian or regional source. The sheer distance between Habsburg and Islamic worlds was still too great to be spanned by grafted-on Austrian institutions.

Burián’s expressed willingness to negotiate autonomy with Muslim leaders in 1906 was probably a debating ploy, pointing up the lack of clear Muslim leadership. Even when, with the MNO, that leadership appeared, his administration peremptorily broke off the resultant negotiations in 1907 over the Reis appointment question, without bothering to go on to discuss opposition agrarian grievances. From December 1907 all this changed. Nuri Šehić, the historian of the Muslim autonomy movement, ascribes this plausibly to the need to clear the decks for the annexation of Bosnia, while the formation of the Serb National Organization in the same month concentrated the official mind on the need to nip ‘sloga’ in the bud. Agrarian grievances over loss of forest land and property rights in kmet holdings were now dealt with in conciliatory vein, though implementation proved more complicated. The settlement of the Reis question took longer. The ulema’s proposal for Reis appointments to be agreed between the Monarchy and Turkey was totally unacceptable to the government, but Burián also hesitated to accept Alibeg Firdus’s more moderate demand that, after appointment by the Emperor, Vienna should approach the Turkish authorities for the bestowal of the formal menshura by the Sheikh-ul-Islam. This smacked to him too much of an intergovernmental negotiation. Only when assured by the Ballhausplatz that Turkey did not aspire to real influence on this process did he...
yield. By the time the autonomy statute was finally concluded, in 1909, the issue of external validation had lost its sting, because the annexation appeared to have made the Monarchy’s claim to Bosnia secure. The long struggle to sew back the threads snipped at the start of the occupation was over.

The wrapping up of the autonomy movements did not deflect Burián from his long-term, Serb-orientated strategy. A memorandum by ministry official Horowitz expressed the view of those elements in the administration who wanted a new deal with the Serbs. He stressed two factors:

One is that never since the start of the occupation has an attempt been made to incline the Serbs to any kind of rapprochement with the government. Antagonism to the Serb element runs like a red thread through the whole policy of the occupation. The second is the consideration that the Serb element is by far the strongest in the country.47

The government should not be distracted by the Muslims’ ‘childish demands’ over the menshura, but should negotiate with the Serbs whose ‘modest’ expectations since their autonomy statute had not been fulfilled. Burián did not take Horowitz’s dismissive attitude to negotiations with the Muslims, but his own memoranda show he accepted much of the case for an opening up to the Serbs. The question is how far his regime’s policies on the ground tallied with it. The case made below is that many of them did not. Burián’s preoccupation with grand strategy, prioritizing political institution building, permitted a cultural policy to continue which helped queer the pitch on the new, wider issues.

True, the intention of a new course in this field too was clear, sometimes ostentatiously so. The editor of Nada, Kállay’s special baby, was instructed—directly by the ministry—to report on its finances, whereupon it was closed down, and the Provincial Government’s request for decorations for its two editorial staff rejected with reference to ‘the failure of the entire undertaking’.48 Use of the term ‘Bosnian’ in a quasi-national sense was formally abandoned. Teachers renewing the pleas for wage rises which had met with deaf ears under Kállay received a mild concession, after an internal appraisal which foreshadowed a broader reassessment of educational policy.49 Vienna asked Sarajevo to consider whether madrassa students’ requests for exemption from military service (abolished in 1895) might be accommodated.50 Thus it was by appeal to the ‘liberal trend meanwhile inaugurated’ that the Provincial Government recommended permitting a new edition of a banned Serb history book for sale and private use, while maintaining the prohibition for the schools.51

The overarching government view of cultural development in terms of cautious advance and financial constraint did not, however, undergo change. The personnel associated with the previous regime remained the same, except that Kállay’s greatest admirer and Burián’s long-standing friend, Lajos Thallóczy, acquired added influence. Thallóczy is an intriguing figure. A brilliant historian of the medieval Balkans who could speak a new language fluently in three months, Thallóczy combined a deep and ever-watchful Magyar patriotism with
exact intellectual standards and a sardonic sense of human frailty. This was the ironic conservative entrusted by Burián with an enquiry into the whole gamut of Bosnian educational institutions after the Kállay years. On teachers’ pay, Thallóczy had already expressed the hope that dwindling employment opportunities would force enough of Bosnia’s multiplying secondary school graduates into teacher training to bring down the cost of expanding primary school provision for the state.52

The Thallóczy report on his autumn 1904 Bosnian tour is a key source for the ideology underlying the whole Kállay era.53 Identifying an educational success story overall, he also stressed weaknesses. The necessity of building a teaching corps from incomer, predominantly Croat, sources had brought nationality tensions into the teaching body. Old-fashioned teaching methods and overloaded, over-theoretical syllabuses gave pupils of the commercial schools unrealistic expectations relative to their poor training, accentuating the problem of a ‘half-educated intellectual proletariat’. In a society lacking opportunities for free professionals, the regime’s cultural mission thus ran up against the mounting problem of providing state employment for those it educated. The expensive Higher Girls’ Schools, attended by a large incomer majority who then mostly trained as teachers, were a special case of this. Thallóczy’s prescriptions were far from a native Bosnian wish-list. He recommended stricter control over the selection, training and supervision of teachers; restriction of secondary school entry, more regulation of syllabuses and textbooks, closer supervision of Serb schools in view of likely post-autonomy competition, a compulsory year’s observation in the Monarchy for prospective native Bosnian secondary school teachers, and perhaps celibacy for women teachers. On the Muslims he repeated his view of the unreformability of Islam; educated Muslims were Muslims no more, so that the various schemes of open-minded Muslim leaders did not even merit recording.54 All told, the social tendencies that were inclining Bosnians to greater urgency and activism produced in Thallóczy precisely the opposite response.

The analysis did not go unchallenged. In a sixty-page rebuttal on the Primary and Higher Girls’ School fields which had been his brief, Ljuboje Dlustuš opined grandly: ‘fiscal considerations are indeed ever the negative element in the cultural progress of mankind’.55 A Provincial Government conference on Thallóczy’s ideas only followed a second tour of inspection of Franciscan and Serb rural schools. Burián also wanted comparative statistics on primary education in other Balkan regions. The formula his friend came up with no doubt fitted his own thinking. The cultural and educational development of Bosnia was to go ahead ‘more intensively’, but ‘always in relation to the province’s financial circumstances’, which Burián had instructed Thallóczy to keep constantly before the conference. The methodical minister looked to the Provincial Government to produce proposals for primary school expansion, relative school compulsion, syllabus standardization and textbooks.56 Hence the new schedule to open some
twenty new primary schools a year over a five-year period (1908–12) and the raising of the elementary school budget over this period by 27.5 per cent—but through cheaper buildings and savings in other sections of the education budget.\textsuperscript{57} The comparison had revealed that 6.3 per cent of the Bosnian budget went on culture and education, as against 7.3 per cent in Serbia and 12.2 per cent in Romania. Other conferences considered how to bring secondary schools and parents (but also the former and the Kreis authorities) closer together, and paved the way for a disciplinary code to appear in 1908.\textsuperscript{58}

How little Thallóczy’s ideas reflected a new era appears from the fact that Vienna had already been prodding Sarajevo into restricting secondary school numbers before Kállay died. Measures it came up with, which the ministry stiffened, included harder entrance and scholarship criteria, no free schoolbooks except for the very poor or deserving, cutting parallel classes, and making pupils attend at their regional school rather than Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{59} As a result of these methods the 1904–5 intake fell from 421 to 284 for all secondary schools, but Vienna still felt more could be done. Did not a higher proportion of the Sarajevo intake make it to the eighth year than in the prestigious Akademisches Gymnasium in Vienna?\textsuperscript{60} Not till 1909 did the secondary school intake exceed the 1904 level, while in the case of Sarajevo Gymnasium the 1902 entry remained unsurpassed till 1920.\textsuperscript{61}

Other aspects of Thallóczy’s recommendations were also taken up. In official eyes the Technical Middle School, abolished at the end of 1906–7, had come to exemplify the difficulty of placing graduates given ideas beyond their station by too much theoretical work—and the ‘peculiarity of the native’ was to become sulky and apathetic when confined to lowlier positions than he had expected.\textsuperscript{62} The commercial schools Thallóczy had criticized were reorganized, with some reduced to extended primary school status, though in the event a rise in the number of commercial school pupils going into commerce by the late 1900s helped restore those demoted.\textsuperscript{63} The Higher Girls’ Schools were also given a vocational slant, with a division between academic and specialist streams.

In these and numerous other careful adjustments one senses for its managers the fine-tuning of a basically sound system. Thallóczy’s desire to restrict student numbers was not just political alarmism. It also reflected a sense that it was no longer necessary to entice Bosnians into education. Society could play a bigger part, just as the funding of students by confessional societies allowed a reduction of scholarship places in the Bosnian Institute and more attention to the quality of applicants.\textsuperscript{64} True, Institute director Otto Paul also wrote of ‘the constantly quarrelling clique of malcontents’ produced by postgraduate unemployment, but it was unruly youths rather than empire-toppling revolutionaries that Bosnian administrators saw as their problem. Government concern for unemployed youths had its benevolent side; the regime assumed that young people wanted good jobs, whereas nationalist ideology chose—no doubt utopianly—to see education as a means of acquiring knowledge to put to the national cause.
But alongside any benevolence was the almost obsessive desire for educational outcomes to be planned. The government wanted control.

The desire for control is a seeming paradox of this period in which Burián sought to smooth the road from absolutism. Yet the paradox can be resolved. The Kállay system sought control through manipulation, with widespread resort to informers, and *ad hominem* solutions in lieu of general norms. Burián wished to rule by due process and clear guidelines, secure in the vast powers the contemporary central European state invested in the executive. This is surely also part explanation of why Muslim education remained outside the tidying-up educational exercise Burián envisaged in these post-Kállay years, although both the Muslim movement and the authorities deplored its current weaknesses. Beyond ever-present financial considerations was the alienness of the whole Muslim system from the standpoint of a self-consciously European authority. The Sharia School could be slotted into government perspectives as provider for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s kadi posts, though there were too few of these for its graduates. But what could be done with the forty-odd madrassas, nominally secondary institutions? And as for the education of Muslim girls, Thallóczy opined that it was not the government’s task to intervene in Muslim family tradition. Muslim cultural institutions lay outside the Austrian framework of reference. They eluded control because no plan could be set for them. Hence none was.

**THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SERB AUTONOMY STATUTE**

Control was central to Thallóczy’s prediction of heightened competition between state and Serb schools after the passage of the Serb autonomy statute. The weapon proposed to deal with this was firm government application of the right of supervision given it by general and specific Statute provisions. It may seem strange that a measure intended to resolve dispute between government and Serbs should become the platform for fresh contestation, but politics goes on. The Serbs had made no secret of their view that cultural autonomy was merely a base on which to build up the national community; in Thallóczy they had the most vigilant of Magyar Slav watchers. One may ask, however, if the goodwill initially generated by the autonomy breakthrough need have been so quickly dissipated.

The aspect of these years which historians have discussed most fully is the socio-political differentiation which followed the ending of the cultural autonomy struggle: the decline of deference to the established leadership. The Serb opposition’s internal discussions of June 1903 had already envisaged a more active pursuit of social reform, but Jeftanović’s attempt to bar new initiatives during the long endgame provoked rumblings of discontent, among artisans as well as educated young radicals. The condemnation of the statute in a manifesto
signed by several young graduates in June 1905 was sharp—the failure to win control over bishops’ appointment or clerical education, the fact that Serb schools were defined in religious not national terms, and, in general, the alleged entrenching of divides between clergy and people.68 Balkan radicalism’s routine contrast of peasant purity with urban corruption, whereby čaršija culture became a prime marker of the Oriental inheritance progressives sought to overcome, made it difficult for merchant leaders to maintain a charismatic appeal to youth.69 While the joint-author of the student memorandum of 1901, Lazar Dimitrijević, now a qualified doctor, set up the society Srpska besjeda in defiance of Jeftanović’s ban on such initiatives, in autumn 1905 Čokorilo and Grđić, young editors of Jeftanović’s new daily Srpska riječ, were dismissed for publicizing youth dissent. They were to become stalwarts of the tendency around the paper Narod, representing a new class of Bosnian professionals, self-consciously aware of the need for a more systematic nationalism. Shortly afterwards, a third tendency, associated with the university-trained but pro-peasant writer Petar Kočić was to emerge.

By contrast to these familiar themes, little attention has been paid to the difficulties of implementing the autonomy statute itself. It turned out that the long struggle had won something of a pig in a poke. The autonomy structures did provide a means to channel central aid to struggling schools and offered communes a crash course in modern bureaucracy, but matters like the rationalization of parish borders hardly excited the imagination. Guarded comments came like that from Banjaluka diocese that much time would have to pass before all communes understood the obligations the statute imposed on them towards higher authorities.70 For that matter, the higher organs’ procedures were leisurely. The Mostar eparchial executive committee met four times a year instead of the statutary monthly stipulation.71 A good deal of the agenda of the annual eparchial council meetings was taken up in shunting matters back and forth with the General Council (Veliki Savjet), the highest autonomous organ. It was quickly realized that available resources were inadequate to any major initiatives, like the foundation of a Serb secondary school or teachers’ training college. Meeting the expectations of teachers and priests was no different. Priests’ pay was a major talking point, which came packaged with demands for quinquennial increments and free lodging.72 The statute’s stipulation that priests should either have a home or rental allowance, to be agreed with the commune, was rightly predicted to be a fruitful source of disputation.73 For their part, the newly formed Association of Serb Teachers presented a compendious wish-list to the first session of the General Council in December 1905, taking the wraps off a corner of Bosnian Serb life which many would have preferred to remain veiled.

The teachers’ cri de coeur was for the revision of a statute which did not give them security of tenure against feuding or bullying commune bosses, and which exposed their work to interference from these and the parish priest.74
But in playing the populist card, teachers made enemies: among commune officials whom they denounced for sending their children to state schools; among Serb state school teachers they wished to deny election to autonomy organs; and among priests angered by charges that they treated teachers like ‘twentieth century slaves’. By 1908 only a handful of their main demands had been addressed by autonomous organs, the pay issue was held up for alleged lack of information and their pension plans put on the backburner. Everyone has forgotten about us, was the teachers’ refrain. For all their stock-in-trade patriotism, some teachers looked askance at an autonomy strategy which devoted its resources to founding new schools rather than improving the existing ones.

This was a real question. What exactly was the role of the Serb school to be in the autonomy design? Was the expansion proposed more than a virility symbol after the lean years of Kállay’s pressure? Financially secure Serb schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be counted on the fingers of one hand, said one report. For Vojislav Šola the answer was dismissively simple. The task of the Serb school was the teaching of Serb history, so there was no point in fussing about revising other textbooks. What else did the ‘massive sums’ expended on Serb schools go for? As to the government requirement for confessional schools to conform to the state school syllabus and state interests, his reply was equally blunt: ‘Our case is such that national ideals and national aspirations stand in sharp contradiction to the current regime in our fatherland, and still more so to the aspirations of our rulers.’ In pushing to commission a Serb history textbook and defy the government to ban it, against the advice of metropolitan Letica, Šola exposed his view that if cultural autonomy did not allow Serbs to foster their own historical perspective it was not worth the candle.

The autonomy statute therefore did not take the sting out of the old vexed question of state supervision. Serbs claimed that the supervision they had accepted in the statute was only negative, directed against illegal acts, not towards active intervention. The authorities intended to show that it was more than a token formula. Battle was joined on an issue reminiscent of the Kállay era, a Provincial Government edict of 1904, requiring teachers on taking up their first post to produce a certificate of political reliability. Was not autonomy illusory if confessional teachers still had to be approved by the state, one eparchial authority asserted. Not till the General Council despatched a delegation to Vienna in June 1907 did Burián resolve to heal this festering sore, but only in the context of his scheme for overall regulation of the right of supervision, covering inspection, syllabus and textbooks. It took a further delegation in November to defuse Serb anger. Henceforth the relevant certificate, vouching for ‘civic’ rather than ‘political’ behaviour, could be issued by the Serb authorities and ‘viewed’ by the District Commissioner. A simultaneous deal on inspection entitled government inspectors to question Serb school pupils on any matter they wanted, but only through the teacher, and without seeking formally to establish teachers’ or pupils’
loyalty. The other issues (textbooks, syllabus) remained to inflame future relations. Srpska škola, embattled organ of Serb teachers, pronounced the whole deal a defeat. However, the moderate leader of the November delegation, Risto H. Damjanović, reportedly commented that Sarajevo had been the stumbling block; Burián had told him the Serbs only had to turn to him.84

This view seems largely but not wholly true. The certificates controversy was linked with a range of issues on which the Provincial Government were indeed taking a hard line. When Serbs claimed that the statute released them from contributing financially to state schools, they were told this was not so because these schools were not state, but communal organs. Yet when Serb schools claimed ‘public right’ status, this was denied them on the grounds that Serb schools were private, whereas communal schools ‘had all the attributes of state institutions’.85 The ministry called the Provincial Government’s argument that Serb schools were merely private ‘insincere’ and politically inappropriate.86 To Sarajevo’s argument that Muslim and Catholic teachers should be favoured for state school appointments because there were proportionately more Serb teachers than Serb pupils, Thallóczy retorted that Serb pupil numbers had fallen because Serb teachers had decreased, and that the state schools’ ‘amalgamative role’ actually required fewer Catholic teachers.87 Decisions on individual cases also showed the ministry less wedded to old vendetta attitudes still apparent in the provincial administration.88

However, the overall emphasis on affirming state supervision came from Burián. One of his motives, too, in extending local autonomy was that Bosnian urban communes could then be expected to bear a bigger share in funding educational expansion, leaving the government to allocate its limited resources to the countryside.89 It was a typically tidy-minded strategy, but in context shows Burián’s slowness to react to Serb discontent and his somewhat pedantic rationalism. The plan to fit the Serb schools into the overarching reorganization of syllabuses, textbooks and supervisory regulation was counterproductive. A miscalculation, too, was ministerial support for the Provincial Government’s application of the 1904 teacher certificate requirement to Serb students on vacation running literacy courses for peasants. The quality of literacy courses was as important as their quantity, Serb organs were told. In fact, the authorities not unreasonably feared politicization of the masses at a time when the Serb National Organization was establishing itself in the countryside.90 But the powerful propaganda weapon of a people’s thwarted thirst for knowledge was handed to the opposition, and figured prominently in subsequent historiography.

Burián’s administration faced an opposition determined to use the concession of the autonomy statute as a building block for further advance. That said, bad blood over school policy risked tarnishing his overall conciliatory strategy to the Serbs, a strategy with which administrative organs at the grass roots were not always sympathetic. Together, these factors meant that the authorities
remained detached from a welling up of native opinion which emphasized
topics of development and culture, but saw government as hostile to their
vision. This public opinion took similar forms in all three major confessions
and, in considering it, Muslim and Catholic circumstances can be taken up
which have been neglected in this Serb-dominated section. The Serb orientation
reflected, though, the hold Bosnian Serbs continued to have, as under Kállay,
over their rulers’ imagination.

CULTURAL MISSION BOSNIAN-STYLE:
COMMONALITIES

The opinion of educated Bosnians in the Burián era was synthesized in the work
for the Muslims and ‘Napredak’ for the Croats. Government approval despite
initial reservations reflected Kállay’s pragmatic side. Originating as benefit
societies helping to fund secondary and university students, they expanded their
activities to cover student hostels and would-be artisans (the initial constituency
for Napredak), and variously literacy courses, agricultural cooperatives and
temperance and gymnastic societies. All three were organized on parallel lines,
with a central committee in Sarajevo, branches, local agents and membership in
various categories, paying corresponding levels of subscription. The achievement
of these societies was to set plausible perspectives for community development in
a time of confusing change, as has been recognized through their revival after the
fall of communism. Their activities offer the best starting point for investigation
of what cultural development meant for Bosnians themselves.

Essentially, the societies updated motifs which had been voiced twenty years
earlier by Bosanska vila, or forty years by Sarajevski cvjetnik. But they carried
sharper overtones of the contemporary age, less romantic and more positivist
and neo-scientific than formerly. In ‘today’s whirlwind’, time did not stand
still, you either went forwards economically or back. Though the idea of a
battle to be fought not with guns but culture was familiar, it now commonly
appeared in the social Darwinist garb of the ‘struggle for existence’. The
weapon in this ‘world competition’ was enlightenment. For Gajret’s first
president, Safvet-beg Bašagić, a struggle was underway between ‘progressive and
obsolete principles’ in which Enlightenment had won and Gajret stood as its
memorial. ‘Enlightenment and culture: this is the society’s programme’, read
the opening statement of Prosvjeta’s journal. Napredak was none other than a
collective harvest, produced by the love of the people itself and its yearning for
enlightenment and freedom, exclaimed an account of the foundation stone laying
of the society’s new headquarters. What these principles were understood to
be appears from an early leading article in Gajret resuming the consequences
(‘obvious to all!’) of Giordano Bruno’s and Galileo’s triumphant ideas: freedom
of person and property, a modern press, economy and school system, freedom from hunger, plague and human rights violation, and the conquest through speedy communications of time and space. The most emphasized practical application of these principles was to send one’s children to school, for the ignorant, whether individuals or nations, could not assert their rights.

Insistence on education and work came with repeated stress on the role of organization, which had an ideological underpinning for younger, university-trained writers, reflecting a received understanding of sociological concepts of the social organism, as well as their repudiation of unsystematic patriarchal ways. If the nineteenth century was the age of communications, the twentieth century would be characterized by organization, stated an article in Prosvjeta. There was a whiff of new language in Prosvjeta’s talk of colonialism. The justification of nationalism through the instinct of all animal life to cleave to its own showed how old ideas could be clothed in new terminology. The nation was not associated merely with the rhetorical ‘freedom’ of the liberal age, but with democracy, a concept which was being filled out in early twentieth-century Europe with expanding electorates and the move to mass politics. When Stojan Novaković stressed ‘demokratizam’ in Prosvjeta’s tenth anniversary celebrations he was identifying a key component in the ideology which sustained activists of non-dominant nations in a period which offered them grounds for hope and fear. The ‘immeasurable sufferings of our stock and its barely visible successes’ might incline some faint hearts to conclude that ‘an ill fate ruled our Destiny’, ran a Prosvjeta leading article after Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia, but:

At such a time our deep national instinct appears, long extinguished by struggles over external interests. And again our national morale must of necessity rise to irreproachable heights and our faith in the final infallibility of Eternal Justice become absolute. This was a fairly lofty pitch for the moral high ground.

The reference to moral backsliding reflects a constant subtext in such discourse. Bosnian invocations of the need for ‘sober’, ‘serious’, ‘united’ and ‘persevering’ work amounted to an internalization of Austrian stereotypes of the ineffectual south Slav. It is true that we are ignorant and lazy, conceded a primary school teacher in Napredak, but laziness was a habit, however, not innate, so remediable—another reflex of the scientistic respect for the psychological and physiological springs of action. Ignorance was often described as a disease. An educated Bosnian was subjected in his reading (only male readers were ever implied) to an unremitting stream of messages about the backwardness of his land and people, the extent of their suffering and wrongs, the need for maximum exertion on behalf of progress and the nation and his tendency to fire for something, only to slip back into listlessness and apathy.

Crusading organizations are never satisfied and the columns of the societies’ journals are full of references to passivity of branches, non-payment of subscriptions and lapses in membership. Prosvjeta’s exalted goals were still unknown to
the population at large, it was reported to the 1906 annual assembly. Likewise, Napredak’s 1912 assembly was told the people were not yet enlightened enough to appreciate its noble task. With memberships of 5,101 (Prosvjeta, 1909), 2,089 (Gajret, 1910) and 3,156 (Napredak, 1912), they only scratched the surface of a total population of 1,900,000. However, in their original function, as funders of an emerging Bosnian intelligentsia, they must be considered a success story. In the pre-war years Prosvjeta gave scholarships to some 160 university-level students, while the number of its secondary school scholarship holders rose from 68 to 198; the total expenditure on scholarships and other aid was some 691,000 K and for student hostels 134,000 K. Napredak’s expenditure was about a third of this, and some ninety university-level students were funded. Interestingly, the pattern reflected government bias towards technical and vocational fields and university as opposed to secondary school applicants. For 1912–13 Prosvjeta rejected a half of the secondary school applicants but only a quarter of the technical and vocational ones, and aided nearly as many would-be vets as philosophy faculty students. Serb applicants were absolutely and proportionally the most numerous; thus Napredak rejected fewer applicants (about a third) and Gajret fewer still, reflecting this community’s narrower range of choice. A moot point in annual assembly debates were schemes for the repayment or part repayment of funding, where idealism came up against the vagaries of human nature. In high-minded views scholarships were not intended to benefit individuals but to train these as agents of a wider educational process, redeemable by journalistic contributions to the cause. Other views were that gratitude could not be constrained and that it was a matter of the individual’s sense of moral responsibility, though university students could be required to sit their exams at regular intervals, to prevent them from earning good pay in Bosnia when they were being funded for studies in Vienna.

As they moved beyond formal education to their coveted wider social domain the three societies tended to become less effective. Organizing prospective artisans was dogged by ‘backwardness’ and ‘primitivism’, terms educated Bosnians were as free with as Habsburg administrators. Napredak’s officials continually reported that many of its would-be apprentices arrived on their premises half naked and barefoot, and after being expensively kitted out often vanished back to their homes within a few days. It was all the more irritating if they did this when sent to the employers Napredak had lined up for them, sometimes outside Bosnia altogether, shaming the society before ‘foreign parts’ — a not insignificant term for the Croatian motherland. Prosvjeta’s training activity also entailed external links, most of its work with apprentices being arranged through the established Croatian Serb economic society Privrednik, till a Bosnian equivalent, Privreda, was founded in 1912. The issue of socializing the young applied to students as well, and led all the societies to found hostels for their charges, where the hope was they could be guaranteed proper food — health
Towards Constitutionalism, 1903–10: Divergent Visions

Concern was a science-related issue characterizing the new period. Inmates of the Muslim hostel in Sarajevo had to bring with them four shirts, three towels and pairs of trousers, six handkerchieves and pairs of socks, one pair of shoes and a complete suit. But hostel conditions could be as bad as those outside.

Prosvjeta went furthest in organizing wider socio-economic activities, launching a campaign for agricultural societies and organizing the first temperance societies. Gymnastic groups (sokols) developed largely independent of the three societies and as an urban affair; halls were difficult to provide and peasants were reported to think the whole thing was a waste of time. The most successful activities were undoubtedly the socials put on in aid of society funds in leading towns, which served wider purposes than just financial ones. Napredak’s annual event in Sarajevo was substantially organized by women, while the Muslim social evenings in Sarajevo were unprecedented in their community. Yet contemporaries felt the immaturity of their new activities. The rapid growth of association was all quantity, not quality, according to an article in the Serb paper Otadžbina.

One senses a certain exasperation in Napredak President Alaupović’s often testy response to criticisms from provincial representatives in AGMs, and in Prosvjeta secretary Grđić’s irony on the expense of having to print the names of all financial contributors, who liked to see them in print as soon as possible. Characteristically, though, Grđić prefaced his wry remarks: ‘we are all uncultured’. It was as if ‘our’ primitivism was a familiar cloak which no Bosnian could shed, an all-purpose explanation which the educated alternately railed at and accepted.

The journals reflected the nascent Bosnian intelligentsia’s continued cultural dependency. The point of reference for Croats was Zagreb, for Serbs Belgrade and for Muslims the wider Muslim world. The visit of the Novi Sad Serbian National Theatre to Sarajevo in 1904–5 paralleled that of the cast of the Croatian National Theatre in 1897 and 1899 as significant events, since Sarajevo remained without a professional theatre company. In fact taste was shifting, but only from romantic and historical melodrama to operetta, light comedy and vaudeville. New writers were appearing—more than thirty plays by Bosnians were printed and performed between c.1895 and 1906. But real literary taste was a rare commodity anywhere, in the eyes of critical youth, and the circles of traditional leaders were philistine. Similarly, the absence of a quality reference library made Bosnia stony ground for would-be scholars. Characteristically, the struggle to establish a public library system took place in a confessional framework. Prosvjeta took up the idea, where the General Council dragged its feet, reflecting the lack of support from merchant wealth. The book stock for the Sarajevo Serb central library, opened to the public in January 1913, came very largely from bequests solicited from Serbia and Vojvodina. It was flanked by branches in Kreis centres, while for the villages ten travelling libraries, each with fifty-four volumes, had been organized in 1911. The threefold approach was an attempt to grade cultural work in Bosnian circumstances, where some doubted whether it was worth trying to cater for peasants, who had taste only
CULTURAL MISSION BOSNIAN-STYLE: PARTICULARITIES

The three societies showed the virtual mirror image so often the story of Bosnia’s three nations, down to the cigar paper, cigarettes and matches which they endorsed or produced themselves. They all, however, faced distinctive problems and the internal tensions their communities faced took different forms. The Croats were the smallest and traditionally the poorest; the Muslims were in the mass most estranged from the very idea of westernizing change; the Serbs faced the greatest ill-will from government. Moreover, the mental maps of each community’s leaders were also quite different, lighting up Croatia and the Catholic world, Turkey and the world of Islam, and Serbia and the Serbian diaspora as the case might be. Thus any community could plausibly construct a picture of itself as peculiarly disadvantaged. Not surprisingly, all did.

For the Croats a basic problem was how a community with a traditionally religious identification should adapt to a nationalist age. Educated members of the community already had a Croat identification, which Napredak was committed to foster more widely. That such a campaign was necessary with wide swathes of the peasantry appears from a Napredak short story. Poor peasant Ivan Jović is puzzled when his parish priest addresses the congregation as brother Croats, a name that has positive associations for him but needs to be explained in this context. As speakers of German are Germans, so speakers of Croat are Croat; it is language which should define identity, he is told. The magazine pushed the idea of the narrower Bosnian and the wider Croatian homeland; it seems that after ‘Christian’ or ‘Catholic’, Catholic folk who considered themselves a little more educated would call themselves Bosnian. Napredak’s leading articles were regularly about figures from the history of Croatia or Bosnian Franciscans, and the Croatian national anthem appeared there as ‘our Croatian national anthem’. In its exemplary tales the peasants are biddable, Ivan quickly joins the Croatian National Association, paying his subscription with good grace once he is reminded that a peasant plants trees for the use of generations he will never see. Napredak was urged in general assemblies to adopt a more popular style, specifically to cast more of its fictional exhortations in dialogue form, which it duly did. Nonetheless, the society’s president complained in 1913 that religion was still the identifying factor for the general population.

On another front, some incoming Catholics from the Monarchy suspected Napredak of pushing an anti-‘carpet-bagger’ agenda against them. The issue could flare up on issues of scholarship policy, where native Bosnians resented
funding officials’ sons.\textsuperscript{125} Indeed, only a sixth of Catholic secondary school teachers and a third of Catholic university state scholarship holders were native-born on the eve of war, and building up an intelligentsia from native Bosnian stock was seen as crucial by Napredak’s first president, the poet-educationalist Tugomir Alaupović.\textsuperscript{126} We have no rich men for benefactors, he observed in allusion to the Serb merchants and Muslim begs.\textsuperscript{127} The sense of victimhood, of being the benighted poor in a neglected land, was particularly strong among Bosnian Catholics, not least Alaupović.

In their struggle for regeneration, Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats were ill-served by the Stadler–Franciscan feud, which became fully politicized with the foundation of the Croatian National Association (HNZ) in 1908 and Archbishop Stadler’s rival Croatian Catholic Union (HKU) in 1910. Though formally neutral, Napredak inclined to the Franciscans and the HNZ. This was more or less inevitable given the Franciscans’ popular hold and Stadler’s opposition to the modernizing discourse which Napredak was cautiously advancing. Modernism in the sense in which Pope Pius X condemned it in 1907 was the theological tendency which sought to build bridges between traditional doctrine and contemporary insights. In broader connotations it was ‘liberalism’, of which socialism for Stadler’s circle was only a stronger form, namely, the substitution of human wilfulness for faith in the supernatural world view of the Church. Stadler’s association with a rigorous anti-modernism in the 1900s reflected the eclipse of the kind of liberal Catholicism assumed by the younger Strossmayer. By the turn of the century, as militant anti-clericalism in France moved towards its goal of formal separation of Church and state, and in Croatia itself the small but vocal anti-clerical Croatian Progressive Party gained influence, the new position in the Croatian Church, set out in its weekly \textit{Katolički list}, envisaged the Church’s active engagement in ‘cultural struggle’ through the press and other potentially political means.\textsuperscript{128}

Thus Archbishop Stadler’s path to the formation of the HKU was guided by ideological as well as power considerations. The preoccupations of the wider Catholic Church and \textit{Vrbosna}’s highly educated, mainly non-Bosnian contributors, combined to explain the disproportionate attention paid in Stadler’s organ to threats to the faith barely present in traditional Bosnia. Yet \textit{Vrbosna} no doubt rightly discerned an incipient challenge in the attitudes of the emerging lay intelligentsia. ‘Modern science kills and does not ennoble the spirit’ was its leitmotif.\textsuperscript{129} Hence the profusion of ‘harmful literature’ and the rising complaints of ‘the decline of modesty, thrift, sobriety, industriousness’ in proportion as ‘so-called civilization’ made inroads.\textsuperscript{130} Anti-clericalism spread faster in modern society than the TB bacillus, wrote one contributor.\textsuperscript{131} For men with cultural pretensions like Sarajevo Professor Dr Ivo Dujmušić and Canon Šarić, from 1910 Stadler’s Assistant Bishop and his ultimate successor, aesthetic and religious values were indissolubly intertwined in a traditional idealism of beauty, harmony
and spirit which made the materialist baggage of ‘progressive’ ideology doubly abhorrent:

Culture as the very name implies denotes nobility, the ennoblement of something in the interior of man; it denotes a psychological fact, a positive outcome of thought, will and feeling, such as makes it equivalent to the total development of humanity in religion, learning, art, law and economic life.132

It was galling for such men to be accused of hostility to culture when the Church stood for a millennial tradition of reflection on ultimate questions, for a synthesis of idealism and reason, and the complementarity of science and faith. Our own age can share some of their disquiet, given that so much reformist idealism in the culture wars of the twentieth century was underpinned philosophically by the ultimately bleak perspectives of Darwinism. But if Vrhbosna hoped to sponsor a lay Catholic intelligentsia such as it admired, for example, in Belgium—and it often said it did133—it went about it clumsily. No systematic analysis of modern society appeared in its columns, only brief snippets on matters like juvenile delinquency in godless France. In long, abstract articles writers indulged the habits of their intellectual training, lining up the Greek sophists, Bruno, Luther, Bacon, Descartes, Rousseau, Kant, Heine, Proudhon, Haeckel and Nietzsche on the path to irreligion. Rebutting charges that religion was against modern learning, contributors cut the ground from under their feet, as far as persuasion was concerned, by assertions of the subordination of science and reason to the absolute truth of the Church’s revelation and the need for total obedience.134

It speaks volumes for the paradoxes of transition that learned divines should fill their pages with such matter in a land of illiterate peasants.

In a patriarchal society the Franciscan journal Serafinski perivoj likewise greeted Pius X’s suppression of Modernism and railed against moral laxity.135 ‘Our youth in secondary schools and higher schools is in physical and moral decline’, wrote one contributor, citing the abundant reading material in Sarajevo which did not feed but poisoned the mind.136 ‘Progressive youth thinks it the height of wisdom to make some silly jokes about the Catholic Church and its activities’, commented another.137 It was common Christian coin that the peasants were untouched by modern ideas.138 The difference between Stadler’s camp and greater Franciscan flexibility comes out, however, in the case of the leading poet and free thinker, S. S. Kranjčević. Serafinski Perivoj, declining to comment on his philosophical and esthetic views, proclaimed him an innovative genius. Vrhbosna accepted his pre-eminence in matters of form but argued that little of his work would be remembered. Lacking a personal God he was ‘the type of the modern man’, for whom man was his own goal, along the lines of Kant, the philosopher who had perhaps done most harm to mankind.139 ‘Free thought’ was to be eradicated, the common people (puk) should remain as they were, as education was tailored to each social order (stalež).140 Behind these uncompromising strictures it seems likely there was an assumption that traditional authority would eventually win
obedience in a traditional society. This is the conclusion that has been drawn about Archbishop Stadler’s motivation in taking on the HNZ in the political sphere. Actually, the intense rivalry was played out carefully on both sides. The Franciscans recognized that they could not openly oppose their archbishop’s claim to leadership of the Catholic community, while Stadler could not appear to be subordinating the national cause. His camp’s position was that while the Church was international, it did not oppose nationality, any more than the soul negated the interests of the body. Both wings supported the pravaša tendency of the wider Croatian movement, and its belief in Bosnia’s place in a Croatian Nationalist unit, though the Stadlerites had hopes of an evolution towards a Croatian Catholic party of Christian social orientation.

Thus developmental and political perspectives in the Croatian Catholic community were quite diverse. A study of Napredak suggests that a mild version of the ‘progressive’ position proved able to maintain a modicum of unity, led by the kind of lay intelligentsia whose ideas have been the main focus of this section. While religion’s role in social life and upbringing remained unquestioned, it was subtly downgraded by the campaign to cut the umbilical cord between Catholicism and Croatian nationhood for the sake of Muslims. The emphasis on the individual’s responsibility to seek education and work hard could acquire self-help overtones which explicitly contrasted with an older providential order, though the reference points were still religious. Thus the age of miracles had passed; God had given man a brain in his head and labour was blessed. Contributors to the calendar included both the Vrhbosna author Ivan Dujmušić, and teacher training college lecturer Ljudevit Dvorniković, whose prolific publications had attracted the attention of Croatia’s leading radical educationalist and freethinker, Davorin Trstenjak. Dvorniković’s field of evolutionary psychology set him at odds with concepts of innate ideas entertained by the Church. Less overtly provocative in his Napredak contributions on the origins of language and the human nervous system (though he pointed out the links between humans and all higher animals), Dvorniković in the regime’s pedagogical monthly discussed human origins and the thought of Herbert Spencer, including Spencer’s view that religion had emerged from a belief in spirits occasioned by shadows. That this immigrant intellectual shared an organization with the many befezzed members of Napredak branches pictured in its calendar piquantly illustrates the complexity of the nation-building process among Bosnian Catholics.

While the Franciscan–Stadlerite split disguised a measure of Catholic agreement on Croatian nationalism and religious orthodoxy, among Muslims there was overwhelming popular support for the Muslim National Organization, but a lack of clarity over ultimate goals. How far did modernization mean an abandonment of traditional institutions for western models, or their regeneration along syncretistic lines? Were Muslims Serbs, Croats, a separate branch of a common Slav nation, a nation to themselves or primarily brothers of Islam? Here the
Muslim debate was spurred by growing familiarity with Serb and Croat cultural trends, but it took place against a wider backdrop of related discussion in the Islamic world. It was still more complicated for Muslims than Catholics to switch from religion to nationhood as the organizing principle of ‘modern’ life, when that modernity’s origins lay in the Christian west. Hence the most distinctive feature of Muslim reformist journals was the wide space given to religion, also in ‘progressive’ journals.

Thus the first Muslim literary journal Behar, introducing its purpose as the spreading of knowledge, presented ‘secular knowledge, general enlightenment’ as necessary to subserve the higher goal of ‘religious knowledge’. Its early numbers contained articles such as ‘Islam and Knowledge’ and ‘Islam is Always Just’, while one opened with the words ‘Religion is the soul of the national body’. Gajret’s authors sought to counter charges that modern learning and religion were incompatible by asserting a case of mistaken identity: conservatives associated modernity with dissipated youths aping its worst aspects, while others falsely imputed Muslim society’s decline to Islam. Yet there could be an upbeat message from history. How terrible the state of Arabia had been before Islam, wrote Osman Nuri Hadžić. Islam was given by God for Muslims’ salvation, the source of strength in endeavour and ennoblement of hearts and minds: ‘Without real, deep-rooted religious upbringing … we can do nothing nor are we anything … Islam is a religion of reason; in its fundamentals are contained the principles of progress, perfectability, benevolence and mercy.’ While some of the homage progressive journals paid to Islam may have been tactical, their themes could draw on wider trends of Islamic modernism. The Islamic reform movement associated with the Rector of Al Azhar University in Cairo, Mohammed Abduh, sought to rescue the rational core of Islam from the perceived distortions of later custom. References to ‘honourable exceptions’ to ulema obscurantism in Constantinople and Cairo and the ‘idea of cultural rebirth’ burgeoning in all Muslim countries show that many of Behar and Gajret’s correspondents were well aware of the reform movement, even though, symptomatically, the most detailed description of this was taken from a non-Muslim source—for Muslim writers avidly followed European comment on the Islamic world. In view of cultural and psychological links with Turkey, Turkish novels and dramas formed the largest corpus of foreign material translated in Behar, and even more in the later Biser, while close attention was paid to the progress of women’s education there and the emergence of Turkish women writers. Muslim reformers contrasted the exhortations to learning in the Koran with the New Testament’s other-worldliness. Christian dogmatists’ problem with the Enlightenment need not be repeated for Islam, for this was a creed of reason and moderation which enjoined active concern for the good society here on earth. Social reform would produce a better understanding of Islam, not undermine it. Reformers denounced as hypocrisy the trust in God’s providence that devolved exertion on to others’ shoulders, and decried the indifference to youth
lost to drugs and alcohol, the loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis others and the prejudice against the one sure remedy: education.

Alongside these jeremiads was a repeated sense that Bosnian Muslims retained a powerful stake in Bosnian life, the obverse of regrets that ‘lordly’ Muslims spent too much time in the saddle while others were setting up businesses.\textsuperscript{153} It was a sign of Gajret’s impact that the landowning elite who had looked askance at its anti-traditional tendencies decided to assert control. At its 1907 annual general meeting, after an influx of MNO activists, the existing executive committee was replaced by one in tune with the MNO’s Serbophile line, though the community’s relative political cohesion was reflected in a smooth changeover, with the Croatophile Mulabdić continuing in office. Moreover, its impact was rather slight, since the MNO was more interested in agrarian than in cultural issues.\textsuperscript{154} Though somewhat later Gajret’s journal experimented with Cyrillic editions, the whole ostensible shift from one national camp to another showed how lightly educated Muslims wore their national tags.\textsuperscript{155} Uncertainty over national identity was not, on the whole, an active source of discord, though it did deprive Muslims of a motive force for passionate commitment such as they saw among the Serbs.

The biggest difficulty remained developmental. Gajret’s aim of increasing the numbers of western-educated Muslims touched on the core of the westernizing dilemma. Could ‘progressives’ simply ignore their inherited Islamic educational system or should they try to reform it and if so, how? The traditional institutions repelled modern-minded Muslims. In the madrassas, these damp TB-breeding grounds gave rise to comments such as: ‘Misery, want and often humiliation seep into young men’s spirit, weaken their will and shake their culture, so that later they are fit for nothing, nor can our people derive much benefit from them.’ Whereas Christians had much to thank their clergy for, the Muslim clerical profession had proved unfit in the struggle of modern life.\textsuperscript{156}

This, however, was just one side of the argument even in Gajret’s reformist pages. The idea that salvation for the community could come only from the modern sector seemed pie in the sky to other observers: a capable vakuf director could do more good than any number of secondary schools in one view.\textsuperscript{157} For many young Muslims educated in Austrian schools, according to their critics, the east was a closed book, and their censure of the institutions they condemned was as condescending as it was ill-informed: what did the plight of madrassa students, whose life expectations as hodžas were limited to keeping body and soul together, matter to secondary school students who expected a career as gentlemen?\textsuperscript{158} Whereas teaching children to read their mother tongue in arebica, the adapted Arabic script, was a backward step for many state-educated Muslims, for Čaušević, the script’s sponsor, it was a vital part of a reform agenda. These educational discrepancies set any programme of Muslim uplift unique problems which were fully engaged only after the introduction of Muslim cultural autonomy.
Reconciling religion and modernity was low among the concerns of educated Serbs, for whom Serb Orthodoxy was a national faith and obeyed national priorities. The time of religious fanaticism was past, a teacher wrote in *Srpska škola*. Their distinctive problem, as Serbs saw it, was the attitude of the authorities. Whether it was a matter of Serb schooling, the procrastination in approving Serb agricultural cooperatives or the fine imposed on Prosvjeta for distributing the Belgrade health periodical *Zdravlje* without permission, these perceived attacks on Serb attempts to better themselves fed paranoia built up over the Kállay era, but latent in notions of five centuries of Turkish oppression. Like Croats in *Napredak*, the different groups around *Srpska riječ*, *Narod* and *Otadžbina* cooperated in Prosvjeta, but it was the educated professionals who gave the tone. Cooperation was not without tension; there was resentment that Jeftanović’s printing company charged Prosvjeta’s organs commercial rates and was unreliable. However, divisions reflected social differentiation in a developing community rather than ideology. Vasilj Grđić tersely expressed educated Serbs’ embattled self-consciousness when asked by the Sarajevo government to state the programme of *Narod*:

The paper *Narod* will be the organ of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will concern itself with politics, culture and economic matters from a standpoint of democratic principle, and starting from a position of truth and justice will criticize your public work, sparing no one.

For his part, the government commissioner for Sarajevo condemned Grđić as ‘a bitter enemy’ who ‘in lies and calumny reaches truly astounding heights’.

In such an atmosphere Burián’s policy of press freedom with safeguards was problematic. The obligation to eschew politics enjoined on all but a few papers, like *Srpska riječ* and *Hrvatski dnevnik*, targeted day-to-day party controversy and did not stop a formally non-political journal like Prosvjeta from conveying an oppositional stance just by detailing the censorship regulations to which it was subject in its opening number. The journal spoke the language of combat. ‘Divided, at odds, surrounded by enemies who wish to divide us further, the better to overcome us, what are we but a straw in the tempest unless we come together’, Prosvjeta urged. Praise of Serbia’s democratic methods of rule in cooperation with its citizens pointed a clear moral. Prosvjeta introduced a novel note into Bosnian discourse by relating the province’s economic ills to its ‘colonial’ position; it was an *Absatz Gebiet* (sic), where everything was arranged to make it the ‘object of exploitation of foreign capital’. Because of government irritation, Prosvjeta had to hand over a substantial deposit, but the threat to withdraw its concession was not carried out.

The colonial theme went to the heart of Bosnian Serbs’ evolving critique of the occupation regime. It was the theme of natives versus incomers. Westernization still meant westerners. Three-quarters of all employees were in the large enterprises dominated by foreign owners; and while non-Bosnians made up a fifth of railway
workers, they filled 70 per cent of the skilled posts. In particular the world of power and modern culture to which native elites aspired was to a remarkable extent dominated by foreigners. In 1905 Bosnians made up just 27.6 per cent of all officials, largely in the lowest levels, not surprising since the internal language of administration was German. An internal report of 1905 noted that only six of the fifteen first-time university scholarships awarded that year for the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Institute in Vienna went to Bosnian, as opposed to Austrian or Hungarian subjects. This reflected a situation where just twelve doctors out of 114 listed in a provincial yearbook in 1904 had native-sounding names and probably no more than eight of the nineteen advocates. Incomers composed the architects changing the face of Bosnia’s urban landscape—largely Czechs—and the Sarajevo painters’ group founded in 1899 by collaborators of Nada. Croatian officials and some Croatophile Muslims predominated in the first organized, if short-lived, literary circle of 1900–1. The first professional associations, for police, railway officials, post and telegraph workers, also had an immigrant core, and functioned bilingually. Muslims bemoaned the disappearance of Muslim businesses from main streets, Serbs the decline of the Serb character even of small towns, and Croats the greater productivity of industrious German settlers. In its first year Srpska riječ ran an article series on Germanization, which dressed up Herderian assumptions in positivist terms to assert the ‘undeniable social law’ that language was the chief basis of social life: German ‘poisons the Serb soul, blocking the evolution and thereby the cultural advance of the Serbian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina’. Bosnian Serbs, it concluded, were face to face with the Drang—code for Austro-German imperialism (the Drang nach Osten or drive to the east) in the Balkans.

The attack on alien incomers enabled the Serbs to kill two birds with one stone. Images of prosperous immigrants compared to poverty-stricken raya symbolized the theme of colonial exploitation. The tendency of Slav Catholic newcomers to gravitate towards the Croats encouraged charges of the alleged artificiality of Croatdom in Bosnia. While between 1879 and 1910 Catholics rose from 18 per cent to 22 per cent in the occupied provinces, in the capital they grew from 3 per cent to 35 per cent. Immigrant officials and professionals help explain why Catholics showed the highest numbers of matriculators from Gymnasiums (Sarajevo 43 per cent; Mostar 37 per cent; Tuzla 44 per cent), and almost equalled the Serbs among state scholarship holders for higher education (36 per cent to 37.3 per cent). Though native Catholics were only very minor beneficiaries of this process, Serb nationalism identified a hydra-headed foe: Austria, incomers, Croatdom and—Catholic ‘propaganda’. Burián seems initially to have envisaged tackling the issue of conversions. Horowitz drafted a revised regulation in autumn 1903, which was submitted to the Catholic bishops for comment. Other officials thought Horowitz’s draft would only antagonize non-Catholics, for whom the 1891 ordinance was, in Kutschera’s phrase, ‘the
palladium of their liberties’. As the bishops’ response was negative and non-
Catholics had not so far complained about the present situation, it was decided
to take no initiative. The fact was that the ‘Catholic propaganda’ boil could
not be lanced in a climate of communal rivalry.

A street fracas of October 1906 in Sarajevo showed the febrile nature of the
situation. The aggressors apparently were the Prosvjeta secretary Petar Kočić and
a bevy of teacher training college students. Kočić protested that no nation could
permit itself to be called ‘a maffia, arsonists, a robber gang and escapees from
the scaffold’, as he alleged Hrvatski dnevnik had said of the Serbs. The Croatian
editor retorted that his paper had passively endured ‘daily sneers … at everything
which must be holy to us as Croats and Catholics’. The authorities expelled
the two editors, who were not Bosnians, from the province, and Kočić, who was,
from Sarajevo.

This pot-calling-kettle-black episode is significant because of the role of Petar
Kočić in Bosnian history. Quarrelsome, passionate and a brilliant writer, he was
the type of the ‘temperamental’ south Slav of Habsburg accounts and the defiant
rebel of Serb and communist hagiography. He was not a comfortable person. The
official account of his expulsion from Sarajevo Gymnasium as part of a group
of rowdy Serbs abusing Muslims in a hotel bar seems plausible. His letters to
his father, a priest, pressing for money, and to his girlfriend, saying he would
kill her and himself if she married another, bespeak a hotly emotional ego. A
curious but characteristic feature is the passionate Serbdom combined with his
misery studying in Belgrade—‘although Serbian, a foreign world’ —and the
strength he felt he drew from his native mountains and the Kočić clan blood,
which kept him from bending to beg favours. ‘I will kill myself, to put an end
once and for all to all the sufferings and torments that have pursued me from
my birth. My life in Banjaluka was hard and dark, in Sarajevo still worse and
in Belgrade it reached the very climax of suffering.’ Whatever the turbulent
personality factor, these lines are a reminder of the stresses on young students
in this first transition from patriarchalism, particularly without funding, when
illness and hunger were recurrent. It is tempting to think that nationalism was
clung to so passionately partly as a faith which could elide the difficulties of the
‘struggle for life’ (Kočić’s phrase too), including the paradoxes nationalism itself
entailed.

Kočić’s nationalism had a strong social content, reflecting the high proportion
of Serb kmets in his region. His short stories depict impoverished peasants before
supercilious Austrian courts, as well as harsh social mores. Of his depiction of
peasant love in the tale ‘Mrguda’, where the girl of the title, after yielding to her
passionate nature, kills herself, he wrote disconcertingly ‘in this savage bestiality
there is sublimity, a wonderful, unattainable sublimity which can be felt only
by strong nerves’. Expelled from Sarajevo, he founded the radical Otadžbina
in Banjaluka in 1907 and was three times prosecuted in a year for its contents.
The whole episode showed the limitations of the new, purportedly liberalizing
Towards Constitutionalism, 1903–10: Divergent Visions

press law. The court’s basic position was that concrete criticism would have been legitimate but that Kočić was just concerned to bring the regime into disrepute, an accurate charge but hardly damning in a conventional legal state. The articles were wide-ranging but the title of one of them, ‘Injustice, the Bosnian Government is your Name’, conveys their flavour, as does the barbed assault on anti-Serb policies in education and the ‘dark and scowling figures’ who inspected the Reljevo seminary. ‘There is not one means upon whose deployment in the field of intellectual development the children of Loyola may pride themselves that was left unused and unexploited by our civilizers in their honourable and humane struggle against national enlightenment, wrote Kočić.’ The po-faced repetitiveness of the Bosnian authorities’ indictments perfectly matched the mockery he heaped on them in his famous satires, in which a donkey is tried by the full panoply of court procedure, and peasant Čiko, recte Ćiro Trubajić, known as Kul-jić, is led through a maze of paligraps, as Bosnian peasants referred to the paragraphs of the kulturtregeri’s legal codes. Indeed, Kočić and the authorities may be said to have brought out in each other the quintessence of their different sensibilities. In one view, the ‘well-known agitator’, ‘extremist’, ‘proselytizing subversive’, ‘fanatical revolutionary’, ‘destructive influence’, ‘spiritus rector of disaffection’, ‘boundlessly excitable demagogue’, ‘most zealous champion of the Great Serb cause’; in the other, the kulturtregeri, the ‘carpet baggers’, the ‘dirty, dark individuals who since the occupation slink about our land’, the ultimate cause that abandoned, desolate Bosnia found itself on the ‘brink of ruin’ and of Kočić’s own nameless pain. ‘Maybe I shall spend the greater part of my life in prison and detention, because all we students will launch a struggle against the Švabi who fleece our nation, take away its freedom and kill its happiness,’ he had written to his future wife from Vienna in 1901.

Kočić’s Otadžbina went furthest in the Serb camp in depicting the occupation as a downright barrier to progress. Its article ‘The Cannon is Smoking’ in February 1908, all but calling for war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, caused a sensation. Apparently the decision to go ahead with it was made by the editorial board in profound silence, reflecting awareness that a gauntlet was being thrown down. The article also reflected the Serb movement’s radical hostility to Catholicism and Croatdom, alike tarred by Kočić with the ‘Jesuitical’ brush. The authorities were right to think that Kočić went too far for many Serbs, but his tendency confirmed that the aspiration to social modernization would not necessarily lead towards a more united Bosnia. The chief motor-force of change was the ideological conviction of the nascent intelligentsias, and was rooted in their respective cultural identities. The fact that educated Serbs saw the occupation as the chief barrier to their advancement meant that they regarded others who did not match their anti-Austrianism as reactionary or opportunist. All communities were split to varying degrees by the strains of modernization, even in the educated strata; but the Serbs were generally seen as the most
cohesive. This suggests, at least in hindsight, that the Serb drive for affirmation would be the most powerful, and dangerous for Austria, but that it would become harder to maintain the principle of Serb–Muslim ‘sloga’ on which the autonomy movements had operated. It faces us again with the question as to how far Burián understood these processes and how well his new regime played its cards.

THE NEW COURSE: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

A final assessment of Burián’s project must await the constitutional era for which he was working. What can be said now is that he was willing to envisage some of the rough and tumble of post-absolutist political life. Despite the Sarajevo authorities’ scathing assessment of Kočić, he was allowed to become editor of Prosvjeta. What progressive journals lamented as the apathy and self-seeking behind patriotic rhetoric the regime saw, often sardonically, as reassurance that it faced no immediate threat from mass mobilization. Burián has been accused of naïveté towards the Serbs, but there is no evidence that his more elastic line towards them was more than a bid to hold them in check. The concessions bringing to an end the Muslim autonomy campaign show how important he felt it was for the regime to break ‘sloga’, weakening opposition to the annexation of Bosnia which he proposed to his ministerial colleagues in December 1907. The overall strategy seems sound. While it certainly derived from Burián’s political philosophy, it met no opposition from big hitters in the Bosnian administration who had from time to time shown their frustration with the practical results of Kállay’s inflexibility. Contemporaries thought that the leaders of the autonomy struggle were prepared to play ball and some feared Burián would succeed in what they took as his goal of splitting the Serbs.¹⁸⁸

Nonetheless, the emergence of educated professionals’ challenge to the old leadership was swifter and their attitude to the regime more abrasive than it might have foreseen. After the annexation, Kočić and others were amnestied on the grounds that even the most radical Serbs should not be seen as a lost cause and that the annexation had changed the terms of the game. This was over-optimistic. Moreover, there was unhappiness in the Bosnian government about the way in which Serbs were perceived to have taken advantage of the softer line. Burián’s correspondence with General Winzor in spring 1908 betrayed a disconcerting faith on Burián’s part that his policy would be understood and acted upon if rationally expounded.¹⁸⁹ However, the provincial authorities by and large retained the old habits of obstruction to Serb activity.

Yet continued tensions cannot be put down just to long-standing intransigence. Burián’s strategy does not seem to have been wholly integrated. The conservative belief in upholding state power and the tidy-minded desire to regularize state rights of supervision produced tactlessness in the cultural field like the teachers’
certificate affair and the ban on student-led literacy courses which kept indignation at high levels. A factor in this was almost certainly Burián’s underplaying of cultural matters. It was part of his methodical approach that he now considered the attention should switch to politics and the social questions Bosnian leaders themselves were stressing. But this native concern for socio-economic issues was as much programmatic as functional. It was what educated Bosnians themselves thought they should be concentrating on. The perception that their communities were being held back by backwardness and poverty had become a conventional wisdom of the emerging intelligentsia. It was not yet something being pushed from below by strong labour or peasant movements. What actually engaged the intelligentsia was on the one hand the ideological battle, the formulation of mobilizing messages for itself and a mainly urban penumbra, and on the other hand self-propagation. The three societies prominently featured above, Prosvjeta, Gajret and Napredak, were founded to fund students and remained most successful in this role. The modernization of Bosnia continued to be a substantially cultural project, attended by the psychological and practical discomforts of a transitional generation, aghast at the continued illiteracy and poverty of most of their compatriots, disillusioned by the limited fruits of cultural autonomy and believing the regime had a hand in their divisions. On most of these matters Burián’s administration was fairly passive.

That did not necessarily mean that the vision of a modern and manageable Bosnia had to fail. The introduction of constitutionalism and a functioning Diet might indeed shift the terms of the debate towards economic stakeholders and power-political coalitions of interest. For this project the annexation of October 1908 and opening of the elected Diet in February 1910 left much to play for. Despite weaknesses in execution Burián’s strategy was still positioned in the centre of the road and offered the most plausible perspective for a divided province.
A Public Reckoning: Cultural Policy in the Bosnian Diet

The constitutional era set in train in 1908/1910 was delivery time. Early Indian nationalists aspired to Indian self-government within a liberal British Empire. Given the movement in early twentieth-century Europe towards mass public participation, this was the optimum solution for Austro-Hungarian Bosnia as far as its Habsburg occupiers were concerned. The wager had been that Bosnians should enter the constitutional arena as loyal subjects of a multinational Kulturstaat. This hope was not entirely disappointed. The members of the Bosnian Diet lambasted the record of the previous authoritarian regime but on cultural issues they did so by accusing it of not living up to its own professed principles. The government seemed willing to work with educated opinion for a big leap forward in schooling, and grievances which had festered for decades were addressed and sorted out surprisingly easily, considering previous immobility.

Yet the opening up was not only a move towards greater freedom but towards Habsburg politics and its national/constitutional imbroglios. The importunities of Dualist (and Trialist) politics which Kállay and in fair measure Burián had succeeded in fending off became more pressing. Burián’s removal from office in February 1912, and the subordination of the Civil Adlatus to the military governor Oskar Potiorek, which followed, were both aspects of the politics of the centre, not the new Bosnian constitutional forum. Bosnia’s integration with the Monarchy therefore took the form of increased political dependence and gave fresh grounds for Bosnian opponents of integration to fear for their social and cultural identity. The irony of the occupation grew stronger, that it had been carried out to lessen the negative effect south Slav nationalism could have on the power centres of the Monarchy, yet it only spun new complications. In circles of the best-educated youth of Bosnia some even began to prepare for a secret reckoning with the Austrian presence, which in the imperial and international context had more impact than the public deliberations of elected representatives.
Arguably Burián, and not the more famous Foreign Minister Count Lexa Aehrenthal, was the true architect of the annexation of Bosnia. Such an interpretation is supported by the central role of annexation in Burián’s whole enterprise in Bosnia: his interpretation of his favoured laws of social evolution to mean that Bosnia’s modernization was bound up with its fuller integration in the Monarchy. His diary just before the event stressed the importance of annexation for ‘the idea of solidarity’ (Zusammengehörigkeit) and the need to combine it with the grant of political rights. The promise of a constitution and Diet duly came in the annexation proclamation. In February 1909 a constitutional enquête was held in Sarajevo, only patchily attended by still sulking Serb and Muslim politicians. The real nitty-gritty of constitution-making was drawn out behind closed doors with the Austrian and Hungarian governments. The result Burián confided to himself on its promulgation in February 1910 was as good as could be expected in the circumstances. The minister’s private comment at the year’s end, accompanied by a deo gratia, was that everything had proceeded smoothly, not to victory but to the arena of struggle (küzdére). Plainly, getting the constitutional show on the road was only the end of the beginning, for annexation and constitutionalism now meant that Habsburg statecraft had not only to keep control in Bosnia, but to triangulate the interests of the new Bosnian polity with those of its Austrian and Hungarian masters. The ‘solidarity’ Burián aimed at had to be threefold: between communities inside Bosnia to work the new representative system, between Bosnia and the Monarchy, and between the Monarchy’s Austrian and Hungarian halves.

Burián’s whole policy presupposed that the first of these tasks was practicable. In this he was not alone. Civil Adlatus Baron Benko judged that the splendid popular reception given the Emperor on his Bosnian visit offered the administration the chance of a fresh start, above all to win the new Diet’s confidence. There were none of the old attempts to deny the representative nature of opposition politicians. The Serb candidates were ‘the flower of the Serb intelligentsia’, opined Benko’s leading colleague, the head of the political department, Baron Pittner, and all of them except Kočić were formally loyal. The veteran official Shek in an October 1909 memorandum went further: ‘The good sense of the population offers a surety that in all questions related to the advance of welfare and the material and cultural progress of the province the Diet will show much understanding’; ‘the exceptionally powerfully developed acquisitive instinct of the Serbs’, Shek reasoned, would restrain them from indulging ‘unfeasible ideals’. Even the regional army commander, General Auffenberg, who shared the military’s conviction of the ultimately unreconciled nature of the
Serbs, believed that their differences with the Muslims on the agrarian question might make them a party of government. These various opinions reflected, after all, the premise on which the cultural mission was based, that Bosnians could be attuned to the processes of a civic, constitutional order. But then Bosnia was not some distant colony which could be gradually advanced towards full self-government. It had been brought into the Habsburg orbit precisely because from the Monarchy’s standpoint it had to be controlled.

The 1910 Constitution itself was a reminder of where power lay. The Diet was formally allotted only a collaborative role in Bosnian law-making because ultimate approval lay with the Emperor, with the assent of the Austrian and Hungarian governments. In other words, the 1880 legislation assuring the two governments’ influence on Bosnia’s administration remained in force. Not only these governments, but the common ministers of war and foreign policy now acquired the right to see Bosnian bills before they were submitted to the Diet, though Burián maintained this was for information only. Matters of defence, foreign policy, customs and all others dealt with in the Monarchy’s common institutions were withheld, though the Diet was not given access to the Delegation system by which Austrian and Hungarian parliamentarians supervised policy in these fields. The Diet approved the annual budget and was responsible for direct taxation but not for monopolies, most indirect taxes or railway administration, nor did it have any control over the Provincial Government, the executive power. None other than Baron Benko held that the ‘unbounded tutelage’ of these arrangements disadvantaged Bosnia, so that ‘in reality a colonial situation exists’. Burián’s more careful formulation was that while the Constitution represented the maximum possible at the time, Bosnians would feel discriminated against as long as they were only ‘citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina’. Besides, leaving the two provinces effectively as a separate unit raised the spectre of Trialism, which Burián as a good Hungarian rejected. As he had already privately argued in his diary, Burián thus proposed Bosnia-Herzegovina’s incorporation into Hungary, not by way of a Trialist union with Croatia, but directly.

Yet this was to open up the bag of worms of Habsburg Dualism. On the eve of Bosnia’s annexation, which rocked the politics of Europe, the Monarchy’s leaders spent much of their time arguing over the precise form of reference in the proclamation to Hungary’s medieval state-right claims to the province. It was no accident that Franz Joseph signed the proclamation in Budapest. Seeming minutiae—like whether the Bosnian Constitution should refer to a common ministry or a common minister, or Bosnian laws be countersigned by all the common ministers or only the joint finance minister—disguised major divisions of principle, which help explain the Constitution’s long gestation. In both cases Austria wanted the first formulation so as to emphasize that the empire had a collective government; Hungary wanted the second to emphasize that no such government existed, and that the joint finance minister acted in Bosnia only as the agent of the two Dual states. Verbal adjustments were made after long
debate, but in practice Burián continued to operate more or less autonomously as before and the common ministers, together with the Austrian and Hungarian prime ministers, continued to discuss big Bosnian issues together.

Behind the endless chewing over such matters was a psychological climate made fraught by the shifting balance between Vienna and Budapest. Steadily increasing its share of the empire’s wealth, and with its non-Magyars apparently under firm control, Hungary was flexing its muscles and arousing a resentful backlash in crisis-torn Austria. Propaganda for a ‘Magyar empire’ of thirty millions targeted the Balkans as Hungary’s sphere of influence; the visit of leading Budapest businessmen to Sarajevo in 1910 was an earnest of intent; even in the cultural field increasing provision for Hungarian as an optional Bosnian school subject was being made. The most controversial extension of Hungarian influence was the choice of the Hungarian Commercial Bank to finance kmet redemption payments. It earned Burián the venom of the Viennese press and led Austrian Prime Minister Bienerth to vow to exert Austria’s full influence on Bosnian affairs by the 1880 laws. No one in Austria was more resentful of Magyar pretensions than the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, friend of the Austrian Christian Socials and the so-called Great Austrian tendency. As heir to the throne he saw the Hungarian political elite as the main obstacle to his plans for the recentralization of the monarchy, for which he intended to enlist the support of Hungary’s non-Magyars, particularly, as he saw them, the still loyal Catholic Croats. Here he banked also on Croat rivalry with Orthodox Serbdom, which the irascible archduke counted a veritable hotbed of disaffection.

Austrian-Hungarian tensions thus implicated the strategy for defusing the south Slav question. For Vienna the Serbs were still the major concern, while early twentieth-century Hungary was more worried about attempts at self-assertion by Croatia. Since the Omladina movement in the 1860s, when Hungarian Serbs had seemed the centre of Great Serb aspirations, they had become the demographically slowest-growing Hungarian nationality (half a million), and embroiled in internal bickering. In 1907 Burián sought to soothe Aehrenthal’s alarm over Prime Minister Wekerle’s exchange of courtesies with Hungarian Serbs on the grounds that these Serbs accepted the Hungarian state idea, disliked Serbs from Serbia and, besides, were well-to-do. By contrast, Croatia had become harder to govern after the Croato-Serb coalition defeated the former ruling party of Khuen-Hédervary. Old Khuenites remained and also a wing of the pravaša movement under Josip Frank which had held aloof from the Coalition, maintaining the anti-Serb line of Ante Starčević, but unlike him prepared to look for support to Vienna. Thus politicians in Budapest and Vienna who were unwilling to yield ground to the Croato-Serb coalition’s mildly democratizing tendency could either work to restore the Khuenite system (the preferred Hungarian course), turn to Frank’s third force, like the Great Austrians, or install a strongman, which appealed to the military but was acceptable to most others. It was the course actually followed in Croatia as the way was prepared for the
annexation of Bosnia. The Magyarophile Rauch was appointed and sustained as
Croatian Ban despite lamentable electoral failure, while a Frankist and Christian
Social press campaign set the agenda for a treason trial against Serb members of
the Coalition to accompany a prospective war with Serbia. When no war took
place, the legal process lost its *raison d’être* and ended in embarrassment because
the documents underpinning it were forged. Rauch resigned and was replaced
by a Khuenite, reflecting the relative weakness of Franz Ferdinand’s hand in the
south Slav lands. His Croatian policy was anyway based on mutual illusion. Josip
Frank, like the Bosnian Croats, wanted annexation to presage the unification
of Bosnia with Croatia in a Trialist state, which the Great Austrians had no
intention of granting. The archduke’s secretary confined his remarks on the
annexation to praising Croats’ fabled loyalty, although more Croats supported
the Croato-Serb coalition than Frankists. The fact that policies kept going up
dead ends only helped feed the paranoia and frustration characterizing the south
Slav imbroglio on all sides. The suspension of the Croatian Constitution in 1912
fed the atmosphere of disillusionment in which the Croatian student movement
turned to violence and Yugoslavism.

It was inevitable that Burián’s regime should be drawn into the fray and his
attempts to neutralize Serb nationalism by inclusion stigmatized as Serbophilism.
Privately, he hit back at his critics, ironizing on the Vienna press’s thesis
of a Magyar–Serb conspiracy against the Croats, behind which ‘the Magyar
minister for Bosnia’ was the target; Thallóczy’s diary reads at times almost
as if the main enemy were not Serbs and Russians, but Great Austrians and
the military. Part of the strong man approach for Bosnia meant making the
military commander in Bosnia real, not just nominal head of the Provincial
Government. Lengthy discussion on the military commander’s powers increased
them only tokenly in 1908 and 1911. The Croat General Varešanin replaced
Winzor with this implicitly anti-civilian agenda in mind in 1909, but Burián
commented sardonically on reports on his departure a year later that he had
disappointed the hopes of those who wanted him to bring down the Bosnian
system of government. There was one quarter Burián had to defer to, however,
and that was the Emperor. Any idea of liberalizing the Bosnian Constitution
ran up against Franz Joseph’s innate conservatism. In the summer of 1910, as
a widespread agitation of Serb kmets in north-east Bosnia developed, attempts
of Civil Adlatus Benko and political department head Pittner to dispel distrust
through hinting at flexibility met with four uncompromising letters from the
imperial cabinet office:

> His Majesty must insist that the laws determining the constitutional position of the new
provinces should be unconditionally observed, and urgently repeats that the authority of
administrative organs should be maintained as decisively as possible.

What with Budapest, Vienna, the military party and the Emperor, not to
speak of the interdependence of events in the whole south Slav world, governing
the new Habsburg provinces was like riding a seesaw. Bosnian history in the constitutional era has a dual aspect. On the one hand the emergent educated elite had the chance to pronounce on the products of cultural mission, and the necessary settlements had to be negotiated between its often bruising criticisms and the interests of the authorities. On the other, a nascent younger intelligentsia in the ranks of student youth was persuaded both of Austro-Hungarian imperialist designs in the Balkans and the sell-out of its elders. This is the context to the cultural debate in the constitutional arena and to the youth movement that produced Young Bosnia.

**CULTURAL MISSION IN THE MIRROR OF THE BOSNIAN DIET**

Three themes dominated the politics of the constitutional era: whether the festering kmet–landlord relationship should be abolished on an obligatory or optional basis; the Bosnian railway investment programme and Vienna and Budapest’s prior rights in this matter; and the official language question, since the railways’ use of German frustrated the Diet’s efforts to Bosnianize the administration. All these questions could become intertwined, if a nexus was established between matching concessions by different groups in different spheres, as became well nigh standard practice in the Diet’s annual budget debates. The politics that resulted was characterized by tactical alignments and realignments, the emergence of splinter groups in all three communities over issues of nexus, and the repeated attempts of the administration to secure workable coalitions, seen as coalitions containing representatives from all three nations. The rationale here, sometimes challenged by Potiorek, maintained Burián’s principle that no community should be excluded from a role in Bosnia’s governance. In practice this revolved round the inclusion or non-inclusion of Serbs. The degree to which Bosnian politicians were ultimately willing to cooperate in providing pro-government majorities can provide a pointer to the success of Habsburg rule.21

The Diet’s cultural agenda helped set the scene for these alignments. While old accusations of preferential treatment of Catholicism could initially unite Serbs and Muslims against Croats, and later the language issue could set Serbs and Croats at odds over name and script, cultural politics also saw Diet politicians aligned together against foreign rulers, in the common rhetoric of progress and enlightenment now shared by all educated strata. Official restrictions on illiteracy courses and the unidiomatic style of official documents (a butt of Kočić) were broached in some of the Diet’s earliest acts. The first budget debate brought stinging attacks from all sides on the snail’s pace of schooling. Primary school teachers for once obtained some political leverage, as they found their petitions on compulsory education, and pay and status, turned into draft bills more or less word for word. There were too many teachers in the Diet, growled Thallóczy.
Elements among the authorities had come to appreciate the importance which the schools issue now had for educated opinion. When the Provincial Government reported on the school-building programme for 1909 and the continuing reluctance of Muslims to school their children, the ministry requested proposals for a law making attendance mandatory where schools were available—the principle of relative compulsion. To the Provincial Government’s positive response, suggesting that the Diet might even find the measure belated, a marginal comment in the ministry added ‘Quite right!’ Vienna overrode Sarajevo’s proposal that girls should be omitted from the law, except in the case of Muslims. In anticipation of Diet questions, particularly from Serbs, it also reversed its view that a women’s teacher training college should be put on a backburner and ordered reports which led to such an institution opening in Sarajevo in autumn 1911.

The ministry had correctly foreseen how the wind was blowing. The first budget debate allowed Diet members to outdo each other in depicting the importance of education and denouncing government policies. The Mostar Serb writer Svetozar Ćorović set the tone for generations of historiography: Bulgaria had ten times as many schools as Bosnia; the Sarajevo administration spent two and a half times more on gendarmes than on all education; its textbooks were devoid of national spirit, professionally inadequate and atrociously written; Serbs were discriminated against in the skewed distribution of state elementary schools and the under-representation of Serbs at every educational level; expenditure was lavished on the Higher Girls’ Schools attended by officials’ children and offering cosy jobs for incomers’ wives. In an image vividly illuminating what an educated Bosnian thought modernization should expunge, Ćorović lashed the hypocrisy which threatened Serb confessional initiatives with health and safety regulations while maintaining premises hardly tolerable even in days when ‘teachers in pantaloons and long-sleeved robes, camerbanded and befezzed, entered the classroom stout cane in hand and threatened their pupils with blows’. Ćorović’s arguments were complemented by many other contributors on the divisive use of Latin and Cyrillic script, the Germanizing spirit of Catholic schools, the stifling atmosphere of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Institute in Vienna and the anti-national proclivities of veteran school administrators Dlustuš and Trešćec. Muslims joined in, equating the Muslim autonomy statute clause compelling mekteb attendance before entrance in an elementary school with the infamy the British government would incur if it upheld Buddhists’ (sic) appeals for the right to burn their widows. Muslim experience was like that of unhappy Tantalus, for government dangled the prize of modern schooling before hungry Muslims but by various machinations withheld it from them, and then unjustly accused them of conservatism.

Interestingly, Croat Diet members joined enthusiastically in this free-for-all, though much of it had been a mutually supportive polemic exchanged between...
‘Brother Serbs’ and ‘Brother Muslims’ against Catholic officials and immigrants. Their leading speakers urged their colleagues that native Bosnian Croats had been just as much the victims of non-national renegade incomers—‘Croats’ only in name—and of absolutism’s interest in the ignorance of its subjects. The Franciscan Provincial for Bosnia, fra Alojzije Mišić, spoke warmly of centuries of Catholic–Muslim friendship. The fraternity of the anti-government assaults in the cultural debates was thus based on a common enemy: Archbishop Stadler. The Diet resolved that 30,000 K of government aid to Catholic culture should be transferred from Stadler’s institutions to the Franciscans, which proved more controversial than its resolution in favour of proportional government funding of the three confessions, taking existing Catholic funding as base. When Stadler rose to protest in the Diet, most non-Catholic deputies withdrew, not without parting aspersions on the archbishop for starting his speech before they had completed their departure.

How did the administration respond to these swingeing attacks? In the ringing words of Baron Pittner to the Diet:

Schools are the base and starting point of a people’s future and happiness. Every measure, every change in the principles of public education has necessarily more far-reaching importance than similar measures in other branches of state administration, because schooling can and should put its stamp on an entire generation.

Only lack of funds, he added, had held the Bosnian government back so far from achieving the common goal. Even in confidential documents officials wasted no time deploring their critics in the style of yore, but concentrated on seeing how they could meet them. Far-reaching matters like the formal equality of state and confessional schools, strictly proportional government funding, the closure of the Bosnian Institute in Vienna and the introduction of relative obligatory education were approved if not on the nod, then with essentially technical adjustments. It was almost as if the administration was experiencing its own 4 August, when the French nobility renounced its privileges in 1789.

The hardest problems were those involving outside factors. The Diet resolution opposing grants to foreign language schools in Bosnia provoked a not unrevealing storm in a teacup. Only the German boys’ school in Sarajevo, heavily attended by children of mobile soldiers and railway workers, was relevant, as the Diet’s demands concerning the colonists’ schools were seen as reasonable. Small though the sum involved was (9,540 K or some £400 in contemporary terms), a lengthy correspondence with the common war ministry ensued, in which the latter first opined that the Bosnian statute should be simply altered to remove the Diet’s power to interfere, before it coughed up 3,000 K to help keep the school running. More serious was the cutting of Stadler’s subvention. The archbishop claimed that with reduced funds he would be unable to maintain the Travnik Gymnasium—‘you want to destroy a man’, he told the Diet. The authorities did not believe him, without doubting that his finances were
in deep crisis. However, faced with the archbishop’s argument, though not foolproof, that Travnik’s funding was part of the 1881 treaty with the Vatican, they characteristically backed off offending Rome and the Emperor. Burián wrote humbly to Franz Joseph that, inexpedient as it was to reject the Diet-modified budget on this issue, Stadler could stake his claim by international agreement. His subsequent meeting with Franz Joseph presumably influenced his crisp letter to the Austrian prime minister, to the effect that Stadler’s full entitlement would be reinstated in the budget and defended this time with the necessary vigour by the Provincial Government in the Diet. That this episode coincided with the imperial cabinet office’s criticisms of regime slackness towards agrarian riots no doubt sheds light on the outcome.

Overall, the alacrity with which the authorities adopted Diet resolutions which considerably increased expenditure (proportional confessional funding) or demolished long-defended institutions (the Bosnian Institute) is almost bemusing in view of the years of unresponsiveness on much smaller issues. It shows how serious the regime was about making the new order work. Alternatively, it shows up the earlier stepmotherly attitudes which had provoked the strictures of Bosnia’s first elected representatives.

**PRIMARY EDUCATIONAL POLICY APPRAISED**

How justified was Pittner’s apologia for the regime’s educational performance? Many of the charges against it were dubious. To say that the occupying authorities should have started by giving Muslims modern schools in a religious spirit was to forget that that was just what they had tried to do with the ruždijas. The separate use of textbooks in Cyrillic for Orthodox and Latin script for others was originally intended to reassure Serbs rather than to divide and rule. Nor were Ćorović’s figures for skewed school building so telling as of 1910, for the authorities’ policy of prioritizing non-Serb areas made sense in view of the Serb autonomous organs’ declared intention to build up their own network. Yet there were some palpable hits. The Muslim conservatism by which the regime explained the pitifully low figures of Muslim pupils had not stopped the government obliging them to military service as early as 1881, for example. The outpouring of complaints reflected a psychological reality which Kállay’s policies had done much to create. In criticism of the scale of government achievement, however, the Diet moved from psychology to substance.

In 1910 illiteracy in Bosnia stood at 88 per cent, compared to 56 per cent in Croatia-Slavonia and (1900) 77 per cent in Serbia. In 1894 the ministry had rejected Sarajevo’s proposals to accelerate elementary school building—152 schools in the next five years—because of lack of suitable teachers. But Thallóczy, no radical, was plainly struck by the fact that only twenty-five of the schools then projected had actually materialized by 1906, when a new list was drawn up.
for schools to open between 1908 and 1912, with a more speculative list going up to 1929. Did the end of the Kállay era see a change of tempo? The rate of annual increase up to 1912 was to rise from six to nineteen and budgetary provision for new schools from 120,000 K to 320,000 K. In the event, of the eighteen new schools eventually undertaken in 1909, only eight corresponded to the figure listed for that year. By 1911 none of the ten schools to be built had figured originally, though most of them had been listed for some other year. In 1912, it was one in fourteen, and only three had appeared anywhere in the master plan. These are odd findings, in view of the ostensible focus on growth in this period. The 1909 details show something of the problems: in three of the projected schools the building plot had proved unsuitable; elsewhere negotiations for local contributions had broken down, people had proved too poor, or they now favoured a Serb confessional school. Whatever the inherent difficulties, it seems a sloppily planned exercise quickly became a dead letter. The ministry showed its concern, rebuking the Provincial Government for not using up the whole 1912 school-building budget, which it said risked causing unrest in a population that set great store on rapid expansion. This was certainly true among Diet politicians. The three major schooling bills, on school building and maintenance, limited compulsory attendance and teachers’ status and pay, eventually reached the statute book in 1913, the first as part of an investment programme which talked big money: 9,700,000 K was to go on providing 240 rural schools over six years and on various building projects in Sarajevo. This compared with 35.5 million K for railways and 7.5 million K for roads.

Teacher supply, a major problem in the way of expansion, was to be tackled by a settlement of teacher demands designed as long term. A state female teacher training college opened in Sarajevo in autumn 1911, a second male college in Mostar in 1913, and only the war interrupted plans to establish teacher training courses in existing secondary schools where necessary. Was this the final start of the big push to make up Bosnia’s huge deficit?

Perhaps, but one cannot be sure. Could the Bosnian administration deliver? Twenty-five new state schools appeared in 1913–14, but the investment programme had promised forty a year from 1913. In May 1914 Potiorek presented a list of forty schools for opening in the autumn, with a budget allocation of 1,200,000 K (of which little more than half was scheduled to be spent); but the total later recorded only went up by two, though the war might not have been expected to depress growth so soon. The possibility that administrative weakness might be involved in shortfall is strengthened by signs of interdepartmental infighting. Dr Paul, head of the education department, argued to keep the building of the projected rural schools under his own brief since it ensured buildings were as cheap and practical as possible, without bureaucratic delays or unnecessary technical finesse. The chief of the newly created building department eventually yielded, but on the equally provocative grounds that if he built them
the education department would only criticize them anyway, even though it had only one official competent for the work.\textsuperscript{42}

Certainly the Provincial Government department had limited resources: back in 1906 it had to request extension of a significant report deadline on teachers’ pay because of the circumstances of the single official working on it.\textsuperscript{43} Pittner in the Diet extenuated slow progress through regional variations, claiming that many schools were half empty, but the figures he gave were far below those stated in official reports.\textsuperscript{44} Politicians seemed able to quote cases where long-standing local aspirations for a school had been ignored, though such complaints require corroboration.\textsuperscript{45} Appraisal of individual efficiency is difficult. Though much Diet criticism has the mark of tittle-tattle, the ministry official in charge of education wrote later that his counterpart in Sarajevo was not up to the mark, presumably referring to Dr Otto Paul, whose background lay in Oriental languages.\textsuperscript{46} Paul’s predecessor Treščec was unpopular on all sides and was pensioned shortly after the Diet criticisms of 1910; he had only legal experience before his appointment as Provincial Government school referent in 1895.\textsuperscript{47} By contrast, yet another Banovina Croat criticized, Ljuboje Dlustuš, just retired from long-term possession of the primary school brief, was a deeply engaged educationalist by training, and was mainly the butt of Serbs.

The truth is more complex than Serb depiction of a clerical Croat chauvinist, however. The official \textit{Školski vjesnik} Dlustuš edited from 1893 was an ambitious monthly, which included the radical secularist Croatian educationalist, Davorin Trstenjak, among its contributors, though only the earnestness of the times can explain much material surely too weighty for its Bosnian elementary teacher subscribers.\textsuperscript{48} Dlustuš’s 1915 work on the Croatian poet-educationalist Franjo Marković, praising him for his opposition to the ‘illiberal’ Croatian school law of 1888, shows Dlustuš’s own formative allegiance to have been to the liberal Croatian popular school movement of the 1870s, whose achievements that law undermined.\textsuperscript{49} The textbook issue was probably a generational problem. The didactic pedagogy of the Herbartian school to which Dlustuš belonged was being challenged by younger believers in a fresher style of child-led teaching.\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, Dlustuš praised Marković for his heart-warming poetry, which aspired after the beautiful and sublime, as opposed to the ‘štokavian modernists’ whose work, he grumbled, was a classical example of where artistic anarchy could lead.\textsuperscript{51} But he criticized his hero’s stress of Croatian Serbs’ autonomous rights, believing Serbs were bent on exploiting any concessions in a separatist direction, which would lead to the absorption of Croatdom in their Balkan grand design.\textsuperscript{52} Writing in 1915 no doubt helped sharpen Dlustuš’s suspicions of the Serbs, but it is also likely that his reservations about them were not new, not least for personal reasons. Kosta Hörmann, the \textit{éminence grise} of much Bosnian cultural policy, wrote unsentimentally after the Diet debates that he did not envisage Dlustuš continuing with the editorship of \textit{Školski vjesnik}, following the criticisms.\textsuperscript{53}
In the event, in 1913–14 the intake of 568 primary schools (399 state, 154 confessional and 15 private) with 1,120 teachers teaching 56,605 children, amounted to just over 30 per cent of the school-age population. Kállay’s principle of quality if not quantity was not maintained in the new rural schools planned, which were to have eighty pupils a teacher. The 1913 legislation included what the Provincial Government envisaged as a lasting settlement for teachers, an optimistic assessment since the terms offered in 1912–13 seem little more generous than the alleviation of 1908, which the Provincial Government admitted teachers had rejected. On that occasion basic pay rose from between 17 per cent for a head teacher to 25 per cent for an assistant (from 720 K), while the ex-teacher Dr Đzamonja claimed in the Diet that the cost of living had actually risen by 40 per cent to 50 per cent. In 1913 teachers got a further 200 K rise on the basic rate, but headteachers only a reduction in their teaching load. Teachers had to be content with a ‘just and humane’ approximation to the coveted status of ‘official’ (Landesbeamte). Both 1908 and 1913 settlements envisaged equal conditions for women teachers—but only unmarried ones—since respectability obliged them to rent more expensive properties and their circumstances in smaller places could be ‘unbearable’. Celibacy was still required for women unless married to a fellow teacher.

Teachers’ views before and during the constitutional era continued to express the tension between conventional lofty ideals of mission and disenchanting experience. Subscriptions to professional journals and other intellectual outlets in environments most found primitive, contributions to charitable and community causes, a constantly expanding unpaid leadership role, the expense of keeping up appearances, above all the difficulties of providing their own children appropriate education and health care: all this made teachers’ lives a daily struggle, particularly in the countryside. One of the main Serb charges of discrimination against Serb teachers was that they were kept in village schools. Pay was always the first complaint, but running quite close to this were pleas of injured status. In every well-organized land—this ceaselessly recurring theme of the modern utopia!—the state organism which acted as the spiritus movens of society should be in balance; hence teachers should be equalized with officials, the more so because ‘the higher cultural mission which Austria-Hungary has undertaken in these provinces and to which a well-organized and contented teaching body can most contribute’: thus Učiteljska zora (Teachers’ Dawn). Teachers had yet to acquire the character-building food necessary to ennoble and dignify them, so that they burned with holy enthusiasm for their sublime calling: ‘We must … open wide the doors and windows [of our teaching institutions], so that the new spirit of modern culture may enter free and undefiled’. Unfortunately the isolated young teacher on being first inspected met not fatherly care but the cold shower of bureaucratic pedantry. Should teachers continue to suffer ‘the stifling ambience sated with medieval ideas’? The mood did not lift. In 1911 Učiteljska zora was still writing that lethargy was shackling teachers’ moral and
material rebirth; they looked fearfully to the future, unable to give themselves body and soul to the service of modern culture, as it required.\textsuperscript{61}

The verdicts pronounced by Bosnians on their own confessional schools were no less harsh. A two-part enquête into Muslim education was held under the Reis’s presidency in December–January of 1910–11 and again in 1911–12. Among the sixteen participants was the medical doctor Dr Karamehmedović, who had berated the Provincial Government for permitting obligatory mekteb attendance in the Muslim autonomy statute. Others invited displayed a fascinating range of opinion, shading from highly conservative members of the Medžlis-el-Ulema, through a medressa muderis, then representatives of the Dar-ul-Mualimin and Sharia School, to the moderate Gymnasium teachers, till the liberal wing was reached in the teacher training college spokesman, the elementary school teacher and the lay professionals from the Diet. The Medžlis representatives showed what the Provincial Government had been up against over the years. Though pupils would doubtless learn their Koranic studies better with mother-tongue rather than Turkish textbooks, one admitted, the time had not yet come for so radical a step.\textsuperscript{62}

The compromise reached was for religious textbooks in Bosnian and modified Arabic script, the arebica. Mekteb instruction would be compulsory for both sexes for three years in a reform mekteb, three hours a day. Where there was a communal (state) school, this course could be reduced to two years before pupils transferred to it. In cases where there was neither a reform mekteb nor a communal school, a five-year Muslim confessional school was to be set up, teaching both religious and secular subjects. For girls this was envisaged only in Kreis and District towns, and a Muslim girls’ teachers’ training school was to be so organized that transfer to any state institution would be impossible. Only Diet member Šefkija Gluhić emphasized that the new five-year confessional schools were financially quite unrealistic. The long discussion of reform of the traditional sibjan mektebs, though presented as a merely interim measure before the new five-year schools appeared, suggests members knew what would actually happen, even if their prescription for additional training of traditional hodžas was doubtless here too over-optimistic. The differences remained. ‘The Europeans do not have good fortune in setting their women to learning’ commented Medžlis member Zukanović: witness France’s stagnant population. ‘Our woman is not allowed that,’ he affirmed. ‘She is for the house, and the man is for the world. Nowhere in history do we see that Islamic women took on God knows what important roles.’\textsuperscript{63} For his part Dr Karamehmedović tartly demanded that members in the next stage of the enquête should be educated. This stage, a year later, reaffirmed these decisions and added that madrassas in Kreis towns were to become eight-year institutions teaching religious and secular subjects, the latter to lower Gymnasium standard. The Diet’s proposals for Muslim girls’ education were opposed, whereupon the teacher training representative and the novelist
Cultural Policy in the Bosnian Diet

Edhem Mulabdić demonstratively left the room. As to Karamehmedović’s hopes, whereas he had edited the first session’s minutes in Latin script, this session’s were to appear in arebica. Serb autonomous schooling was more vigorous but little more united. The debate over the very raison d’être of separate schools continued. Weighty figures in the community, like the General Council member, Professor Ćuković, and the Narod editor Risto Radulović, were sceptical. The argument was that the schools were very expensive for the limited distinctive role they could play, bearing in mind the obligation to follow the state school syllabus. Besides, Serb consciousness was strong enough and the Orthodox character of Serb schools put Muslims off from embracing Serbdom. Against this Serb teachers played the international card, Bismarck’s purported claim that the battle of Sadowa had been won by the German schoolteacher. National consciousness was not spontaneous but needed to be cultivated, particularly in the position in which Serbs found themselves in Bosnia. And it did matter whether air was called ‘vazduh’ (Serbian) or ‘uzdah’ (Croatian). It was no doubt the tenacity of communal tradition as much as these counter-arguments which ensured that the status quo was in little danger from isolated intellectual voices. But the confessional teachers’ organ Srpska škola observed that its support of the national school principle no longer won it the kudos it would earlier have gained: the introduction of the Constitution had made the operation of cultural autonomy second- or third-grade matters for ‘our politicians’. It rankled that the autonomous organs put discussion of disciplinary matters before their pay, that the Serb Teachers’ Association was given so little role in the educational enquêtes the General Council organized, and that the clergy got the lion’s share of the extra funds provided by proportional confessional funding. Interestingly, teacher resentment was also directed at the emerging professional intelligentsia, whose secular national ideology they shared. The intelligentsia created an agitation and then sent in the teachers as foot soldiers, claimed the radical Stevo Stanojević. Stanojević showed just how the criticism of pallid routinism directed against the state school system could be levelled at confessional schooling too. In the name of turn-of-the-century motifs, not without a whiff of Nietzsche, he lacerated the laboriously devised new Serb school syllabus for its ‘unexampled’ superficiality and the moral didacticism of its outmoded Herbartian ‘humanism’. In their place should come a stress on awakening the energetic and independent spirit, allied to strong national consciousness. Peasants did not want to be preached at, but needed national tales, light humour, puzzles and proverbs, and a determined engagement with religion, or rather superstition, which was destroying the nation materially and morally. However, the sharp criticism could be directed inwards at teachers themselves. The 1912 AGM of the Serb teachers’ association lambasted members’ ‘indifference’ and lack of professional consciousness. There had been hardly any communication from them except when they wanted a certificate for rail
fare reductions, the regional gatherings planned to recharge batteries had been a dismal failure, barely a third of all primary school teachers were enrolled and it was no wonder the General Council asked teachers to be politer in correspondence. Behind this last point was a decision of the autonomous school inspectors, on a powerfully symbolic issue, that teachers should perform church singing duties, but for pay, and should exercise more tact towards other autonomous organs. It seems that the high point of associational activity came in 1910, contributing to the General Council finally taking the decision on pay, which disappointed teachers, though it was not so out of line with state school norms.

For all the Jeremiahs, the Serb school network initially made fair progress after the passing of the autonomy statute. From seventy-six schools in 1905 the number rose to 114 in 1910, almost entirely through rural growth. The Sarajevo girls’ school library, with 2,498 books as of 1909, matched those of most state secondary schools. However, the next four years saw only eight more schools added. Already in 1911 the chief autonomous school inspector commented on the cooling of interest in Serb schools and let slip that earlier pressures from below, even such things as dislike of the government school teacher, had led to schools being opened which were not strictly necessary. By 1913 the General Council was upbraiding the failure of the ‘huge majority’ of commune committees to establish school funds as negligence shaming the ‘Serb Nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. No attempt was made to re-establish a confessional presence at the secondary level. The tacit decision had been taken to concentrate the cultural struggle on the level of the state secondary system. The outpouring of Diet criticism of the regime’s effort at the primary school level was significant, reflecting educated Bosnians’ rejection of Austria-Hungary’s cultural claims. But now that this educated stratum existed, its active concern was self-propagation and rivalry with the incomer bureaucracy for the leading role in Bosnia.

**ASSESSMENT**

A case could be made that this amounted to a relative success for the Habsburg ship of state in treacherous waters. The secondary school system received a tacit vote of confidence; the primary schools were affected by problems of limited resources and methodological flux not unique to Habsburg rule. Above all, the main criticisms came from graduates of the Monarchy’s schools who had thoroughly internalized the western civilizational model it had introduced.

Such a judgement could be fitted into a wider picture of the constitutional era. The Diet worked after a fashion. The Serb–Croat coalition of autumn 1910, based on the agrarian question, broke down in spring 1911 over disagreement on the naming of the mother tongue. Sufficient Croat deputies were persuaded to accept an optional rather than compulsory abolition of kmetstvo for an agrarian law on that basis to pass that year, while the Diet eventually agreed on the
term Serbo-Croat to resolve the language difference. Muslims demanded that road signs should also appear in Arabic script, which the government vetoed; but by 1912 they no longer insisted on this essentially tactical demand. The language question now metamorphosed into a more intractable form, in that the Diet’s demand for exclusive official use of Serbo-Croat ran up against wider imperial forces’ determination to maintain the exemption of the railways. Here the native versus incomer question was sharpest, since most railway employees knew no Serbo-Croat. However, the authorities were still able to avert a total nexus being made between the Diet’s language demands and the passing of the budget, so that the latter went through in December 1912, even though the Diet’s full wishes had not been met. This time Serb notables around Srpska riječ were willing to compromise. The process was sufficiently bruising for the Diet to become unmanageable shortly after, when the language deadlock recurred. It was prorogued and did not meet for a year. Yet on its reassembly, the politics of coalition building continued. On the resignation of the Srpska riječ deputies, who felt compromised by their collaboration, a new Serb group around the lawyer Danilo Dimović appeared, prepared to assist the government in maintaining a Diet majority.74

By the shaky standards of Austro-Hungarian parliamentarianism this could have been roughly what Burián was hoping for. Certainly his disappointment was plain when in February 1912 he had to yield office because Berchtold, who had become foreign minister on Aehrenthal’s death, was technically a Hungarian citizen and two Hungarian common ministers were deemed constitutionally unacceptable. It was one of the most terrible changes of events to befall a man of long experience in the middle of his labours, wrote Burián privately.75 In fact, it was a stitch-up. ‘[Burián’s] policies have not, however, met with the agreement of powerful and influential circles’, as the Neue Freie Presse put it: code for Burián’s Great Austrian and clerical foes. The blow was the more galling for being unexpected. Burián had been preparing to yield to ‘the mysterious decree of fate’—and pass on to the Ballhausplatz.76 His fall enabled the Great Austrian military wing to push its agenda of a stronger Governor General in Sarajevo vis-à-vis the Civil Adlatus and the ministry. The new Joint Finance Minister, Leon Biliński, a Pole, had to concede the reorganization in April 1912, whereby General Potiorek became effectively overall civil-military head, to whom the Civil Adlatus, now renamed as his deputy, was clearly subordinate. The role in these circumstances of Biliński, former governor of the Austro-Hungarian Bank with no Balkan links, was clearly intended to be technocratic in character, and he developed no distinctive strategy for Bosnia.77

Had Burián thus been deprived of the triumph of his deep-laid plans? Unlike Kállay, Burián’s role in the occupation has not aroused systematic commentary, but Vrankić implies that his ‘pro-Serbian policy’ was naive and the Hungarian historian Díószegi has been dismissive of his performance as wartime foreign minister.78 This book has argued that he did bring a distinctive and considered
approach to the Bosnian administration. In principle, his evolutionary philosophy of history was more flexible than Kállay’s; he recognized at the time some of the problems of the 1910 Bosnian constitutional settlement, just as his memorandum of December 1914 on the Hungarian nationality problem showed awareness that both poverty and economic progress spurred nationalism.79 His belief that Serb nationalism must be taken on board was a pragmatic way of dealing with the Serb challenge, and was backed by other leading officials, like Benko, Pittner and Horowitz, who had variously expressed doubts about Kállay’s hard line. It was characterized by reserve on both sides, tellingly caught by Vojislav Šola’s effusive compliments about Burián’s fairness to the Serbs on the latter’s resignation, which culminated in the plea that Burián would do him the final honour of crediting their sincerity.80 At the broader Balkan level Burián advocated an Austro-Hungarian policy of friendship with Athens, Sophia and Constantinople against Bucharest and Belgrade, while allowing economic benefits to the latter.81 In the circumstances, these policies seem to have more going for them than the aggressive Great Austrian line which Burián opposed.

Two criticisms might be made. First, rather than naively pro-Serbian, this policy may have been more conservative and less flexible than it appeared. Diószegi’s criticism of Burián’s wartime policy as one doctrinaire failure after another catches something of the ponderousness already noticed in this study, and Burián’s difficulty in matching theories to circumstances. His post-war memoirs are certainly open to the charge of being wise after the event. He wrote eloquently of his pre-war conviction of the Monarchy’s ability to adapt and survive, in a new phase of the south Slav question in which the influence of neighbouring Balkan states could only be countered by ‘a real national equality encompassing all areas of civil life’; unfortunately this was hindered by the Monarchy’s Dualist structures. But what this ‘real national equality’ could have been is not clear, since his book still identified Austria’s disinclination to recognize Hungary’s historic claim to Bosnia as part of the Dualist problem.82 Second, the gradualist assumptions behind his accommodation of Bosnian society to the Monarchy was based on the Bosnian elites keeping control of their constituencies. The other side of the coin was that radical dissidence was partly defined by the readiness to condemn Diet politicians as sell-outs to a colonial regime. Observing a Diet debate, the assassin Nedeljko Čabrinović told a friend that he would like to gather the prating politicians in a bag and throw them in the river.83 Neither in office nor in his memoirs did Burián discuss the student movement. The previous chapter ventured the view that Burián’s view of modernization, like his political philosophy in general, was somewhat schematic and seems to have neglected the cultural aspect of the process, and its attendant psychological dynamics. This may, barring a successful bullet and an unsuccessful European Concert, have been a practical enough perspective. But the student movement must at least be brought into the picture.
In 1908 the British consul in Sarajevo dismissed the Serb opposition programme of autonomy under the Porte as ‘contradictory nonsense worthy of a schoolboys’ club’.\(^1\) The disdain implied for student politics overlooked the impact it could have outside Britain’s island walls. From the German *Burschenschaften*, through the Vienna Academic Legion and the Prague students in 1848, to the relatively innocuous literary society of Vienna Serb students, *Zora* (1863), and the more famous *Omladina* (Youth) movement among Hungarian Serbs (1866–72), they became bearers of liberal nationalistic sentiment through central and east-central Europe. Further east, the dramatic expedition of Russian students ‘to the people’ in 1874 showed how the urge of educated youth to assist a backward country’s emancipation could have political consequences, welling into bloody episodes of Populist terrorism from the 1880s. Both these traditions, the central European and the Russian, influenced the Bosnian student experience.

Yet a distinctive feature of the Bosnian environment was that to a greater extent Bosnian students were not idealist members of an elite acting on behalf of ‘the people’, but came themselves from its ranks.\(^2\) The Bosnian case points forward to twentieth-century patterns in extra-European societies under alien rule. The conceptualization of the occupation as a process of acculturation led the authorities to see turbulent youth in terms of primitive social circumstances and inadequate adjustment to modern norms. Immaturity was, of course, present. But after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, a rattled administration turned turtle and an event which could have been interpreted in the former terms of cultural maladjustment was invested with almost apocalyptic significance.

### SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN CRISIS

The authorities were right to point to the difficult social background. Western-style post-primary education was a novelty in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which even at the end of the period involved barely 2 per cent of the age group, in some dozen institutions. Many of this small group were from an urban milieu and/or were children of incoming officials, for whom problems of acculturation were not so
great. However, in an overwhelmingly rural society, and helped by government grants, a higher proportion than elsewhere of secondary school students remained the children of peasants, priests and artisans from the provinces: 642 or 40 per cent of them were living away from the parental home in 1909. Getting to the towns was often a matter of walking there. Gavrilo Princip once tramped from Sarajevo to Belgrade. On arrival pupils might have relatives with whom they could lodge, but clean, healthy quarters and nourishing food were rarely assured. Mortality rates were pre-modern. Of Princip’s eight brothers and sisters only two boys survived. ‘Most numerous are the graves of children,’ noted a *Napredak* article. It was such conditions which led to the building of student hostels on an accelerating scale by the state, the vakuf administration and the cultural associations, so that 1,515 places were available there by 1914. Yet institutionalization was no guarantee against malnourishment and disease. It was only the increase in the Franciscan state subvention won by the Diet in 1910 that finally assured students in the Franciscan Gymnasium in Visoko a square meal; four years earlier a third of them were reported not to have shoes. The memorial volume of the Travnik Gymnasium expressed pride that only one inmate had died there each third year on average, whereas other institutions recorded several deaths a year. Even if healthy, students had few outlets for their energies. In the Catholic institutions they had to rise at 5 a.m. (5.45 on Sundays) and be in bed shortly after 8. State school disciplinary regulations with some 159 articles, codified in 1908 and published in 8000 copies, forbade pupils to attend the theatre or other grown-up locales like reading rooms, or to participate in societies. Organized team games had as yet no place; Princip seems to have attended a Serb temperance club chiefly to play billiards.

These rather bleak circumstances were not alleviated by school collegiality. The authorities acknowledged the poor relations between students and staff, exacerbated by the high proportion of incomers among the latter. Alienation was heightened by the central European practice for Gymnasium staff to operate more like university teachers, appearing stiff and bureaucratic in native eyes. Interestingly, the vast amount of time devoted to dead languages did not really figure in Bosnian student complaints, since south Slav culture was overwhelmingly literary in this period and public opinion favoured classical over technical training. Thus the debate between traditionalists and modernizers raging about the classical syllabus in the German-language press in this period passed Bosnia by, though it was reflected in a very modest dose of reform in a ‘realist direction’ in Bosnia in 1909—which still left Bosnian schoolboys with forty-eight hours of Latin and twenty-eight of Greek a week. More prominent in the ‘learning experience’ were flexible central European norms, which allowed secondary school students, like university ones, easy transfer between institutions and, in practice, the freedom to take the annual examinations of the formally eight-year course to the final *matura* at the pace they chose. The whole process was far from the smooth escalator of the modern western student. Princip’s
course from the Sarajevo commercial school to Gymnasiums in Tuzla, Sarajevo and Belgrade, with months in his brother’s home after his failure to enrol in the Serbian army in the Balkan wars and renewed interruption of his studies in the winter of 1913–14, was far from unique. The Muslim poet Musa Ćazim Ćatić’s education took him from mekteb to primary school to madrassa, then a move to Constantinople, return to Bosnia to do military service, back to a Constantinople madrassa till money ran out, successful exam to enter the Bosnian Sharia School, exclusion from the hostel for bohemian lifestyle but permission to take his final exams and passage to the Zagreb law faculty for eighteen months, only to die of tuberculosis at the age of thirty-seven.9

The Austrian educational system functioned on central European lines as an outpost of liberal humanism, in however desiccated a form. It seems likely that it was this system’s pedantic spirit rather than draconian discipline which lay behind much student criticism. Thus the Czech Tuzla Gymnasium director, Eiselt, ‘bureaucracy incarnate’ in a student’s recollections, instructed pupils how to walk on the streets and up stairways and never removed his golden collar even in his office; ‘of the development of young intellect, the education of the soul, the ennoblement of the heart there was hardly a mention and of national consciousness not a word’.10 Like British workers faced with time-control in the early Industrial Revolution, so many young Bosnians plainly bridled at institutionalization. Yet various factors had to act on this seedbed to produce a student movement: tensions between Catholic staff and non-Catholic pupils and inside the teaching body itself; politicization of these through a nexus with local politicians and press; and the failure of the authorities to get on top of a difficult situation. For, curious as it may seem in the aftermath, these authorities had no inkling of the full nature of the student protest they faced until Princip’s assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand on Vidovdan, 28 June 1914. After a failed attempt on Governor General Varešanin in 1910, it faced only two large-scale demonstrations, involving some hundreds of youth, before Princip’s coup de grâce: in Sarajevo over repression in Croatia in February 1912 and in Mostar in April 1914, celebrating two seventeenth-century Croatian heroes. In both of these older figures were conspicuous: the Croat Professor Tandarić, who left his classes to accompany the demonstrators in Sarajevo, and politicians of all confessions in Mostar, who intervened with the authorities on their behalf. What the authorities quite frequently saw were things which could only strengthen their conviction that student politics was a matter of adult puppet masters stirring up immature youths.

One issue was marking, which reflected fissile issues of pride, distrust and fragile egos. A Muslim play centred around a youth who decided for western education, then dropped out because of a harsh mark, only to fall in with his dissolute former friends and out with the law.11 The incubus of the matura is vividly described by a Travnik Gymnasium student: ‘I live in constant dread, day
and night; sometimes even in dreams the thought of the matura frightens me …. I have grown weak and thin from worry and exertion.' The correspondence of Young Bosnians quite often mentioned exam preparation, which was recognized as a valid reason for temporary decline in activism. ‘I and Miloš [Pjanić] ask you please to come back and work seriously for your matura’, goes one letter, ‘and then when you pass, you will have a world open before you and will be able to work for the nation and yourself, but as it is, believe me, you cannot do either.’

Marking issues provoked several storms in the running of the secondary school system in the pre-war decade. In Tuzla Gymnasium in 1906, a cross-confessional student demonstration was organized when a seventh-year Serb student named Milišić complained of being unfairly classified. According to a student account, the main organizer and later pro-Kočić Diet member, Đorđe Lazarević, offended in his ‘youthful pride’ by the way the demonstration was dispersed, ‘politely’ rebuked headmaster Eiselt for treating grown-ups in this way, and was suspended. A student strike followed. Next year, Milišić, who had left to study in Belgrade, returned to Tuzla and on meeting Eiselt on the street struck him twice in the face. Both episodes led to fraught teachers’ conferences, pitting Eiselt and his supporters against Serb staff, who were supplying Srpska rič with tales of their Croatian colleagues’ alleged abuse of Serbdom. Several were transferred or censured, leading to impassioned protest from local Serb leaders. In June 1908 Eiselt was removed because of his lack of authority and poor handling of a divided staff. Meanwhile, in Sarajevo Gymnasium Professor Poljak, a Croat, provoked a demonstration by his high expectations and strict marking. The government was not as critical of him as his colleagues, warning against attempts to motivate students by over-indulgent grades. By 1912 he was Gymnasium Director in Mostar, where the Serb Diet member Svetozar Čorović petitioned unsuccessfully for his removal. Spring 1914 found Poljak still in place in Mostar, when a major incident broke out. A sixth grader ‘insolently’ called on a teacher to account for his low grade in German and got the class shouting behind him. Later, he gave another teacher a bloody nose with a well-aimed inkpot, sending him ‘fleeing’ and inky head to toe. A staff meeting excluded him from all Bosnian-Herzegovinan schools, but the next day a previously quiet Serb student struck Poljak in the face, crying ‘You have insulted Serbdom’. Just after the chief secondary school inspector, Tugomir Alaupović, allowed suspended teaching to resume, another inkpot was thrown at a master to classmates’ cheers. The following staff meeting under Alaupović’s aegis saw bitter altercation between Serb and Croat teachers, and the inspector’s threat to close the school unless order was restored. Sarajevo’s view remained that Poljak was ‘a warm friend of youth’, but his lack of contact with society and much-mocked Catholic piety counted against him.

Such episodes demonstrated a breakdown of collegiality among teachers, which made their staff meetings a source of tension rather than resolution. Mostar Gymnasium Director Kudlich reported in 1908 that Serb teachers’
refusal to go along with majority proposals for the punishment of Serb student demonstrators had caused a ‘distressing sensation’, while the arguments they adduced had, he thought, plainly been leaked to the opposition press. The press gorged on every bit of tittle-tattle. Well might a Croat teacher say to a Tuzla pupil, according to his detractors: ‘I hope to God I don’t have to teach you next year, so you don’t tell your parents and it gets into the newspapers.’ Whether Director Poljak intended to insult the Serbs by arranging his school’s Sveta Sava celebration near the toilet, or another Croat actually taught about the Illyrian movement for three months and dismissed four Serbian literary giants in two hours, is impenetrable now, but motes and beams is the parable most appropriate to such accusations. What for Hrvatski dnevnik was propaganda about the Serb nature of Bosnia, for Srpska rič was just Professor Glušac informing students about the origins of Cyrillic in the province—part of what another Serb paper deemed Serb teachers’ attempts to set the record straight.

Symptomatic of the prevailing climate is that in almost every case the cry was raised that the other side were trying to nobble Muslim pupils and ‘nationalize’ them for their cause. Staff were regularly attacked for not permitting Serb, respectively Croat, pupils to walk with Muslim pupils on the street or instruct younger Muslims, by a common practice of older–younger linkages which the authorities plainly thought had political purposes. But the Serbs and Croats thus allegedly inhibited regularly turn out to be Muslims of Serb or Croat national conviction, in the contemporary phrase. Control of hostels was important in these wrangles. At the root of the demonstrations of Mostar Gymnasium students at the turn of 1908–9 were press allegations that the Muslim hostel head Bulić was a Croatian nationalist; the allegations were caused, the Director thought, by Bulić’s prevention of the Muslim opposition leader Šerif Arnautović from getting at the inmates. He suspected Serb professors of national agitation but could not definitely link them to the press furore. The strike of Serbs and Serbophile Muslims in the same Gymnasium in 1912 began over the planned transfer of the ‘nationalizing’ Serb hostel warden Zečević, while the Osman Dikić hostel in Sarajevo proclaimed its allegiance by being named after the most famous of Muslim Serbophiles. Indeed, if Novi vakat is to be believed, the Bihać Gymnasium headmaster, a Serb, asked one Muslim pupil if he had used his head and decided to be a Serb, because otherwise—a reference to a Serbian takeover—it would be too late.

Two questions are provoked by these disordered circumstances. How could they come about in a supposedly authoritarian regime? And why did authorities well aware of the problems in their schools not get wind of the murderous conspiracy that was being hatched? On the second issue, the ministry was to complain that following the extension of the Provincial Government’s competence in 1912 it had been kept in ignorance of the full extent of misbehaviour directed against teachers. As for the Provincial Government, the appearance of authority was deceptive. While there was a battery of grades of discipline,
the seventh being expulsion from the institution, expellees could usually transfer with no questions asked; even exclusion from all Bosnian institutions could be negated by going to Belgrade—or Zagreb or Prague. Thus expulsion merely spread the virus of student radicalism the authorities wished to eradicate. Ivan Kranjčević, for example, one of about twenty Sarajevo students expelled for the February 1912 demonstration, went to Zagreb, financed by a Zagreb source, and then to a Dalmatian teachers’ training college, meeting radical Croats and Slovenes en route, before returning to Sarajevo to enter the newly opened Commercial Academy in the autumn.

Discipline was even more ineffective against nationalistic teachers. The standard technique of transfer, in the small world of Bosnian secondary schooling, simply produced a bizarre merry-go-round. A list of proposed transfers for the 1912 school year was dominated by three cases of teachers in conflict with their colleagues and/or head, whose transfers to other institutions had to be matched by corresponding switches, which then upset the ethnic balance in particular schools, necessitating further transfers. It was in the logic of such a system that Director Eiselt’s bête noir in Tuzla, the Serb junior teacher Nedeljković who called Eiselt’s assailant a hero, having been transferred to Mostar should a couple of years later be causing exactly the same irritation for Director Kudlich. Another of Kudlich’s nationalist suspects, Professor Ćuković, turned up later as the first headmaster of Derventa Lower Gymnasium, leaping over six others with higher seniority—official policy was to increase the number of Serbs in leading positions. That Ćuković was highly intelligent, tactful and objective in his handling of pupils, as the recommendation on his appointment stated, may well have been true. But the bland statement that he devoted most of his free time to Serb cultural associations passed over the fact that the authorities had some years earlier seen a letter from him to the fiercely anti-Austrian Prosvjeta secretary Vasilj Grđić, proposing that a thousand copies of a Narod article ‘Bosnia is Serbian’ should be distributed free among Muslim student youth. Kállay would have turned in his grave.

Certainly the school administration suffered from some lack of leadership in these years. Ministerial Sektionschef Čerović’s view that his Sarajevo counterpart was not up to the job has been noted. Successive secondary school inspectors were lack-lustre, not helped by the fact that this post was held by ex-directors at the end of their career. The Slovene Davorin Nemanić, ‘exceptionally scholarly’ according to his career dossier, was the type of the central-European academic liberal. And we wonder why Bosnian youth does not learn more, growled Thallóczy in his diary after a teachers’ conference where the inspector had opposed confiscating newspapers from boys in school as a breach of their personal liberty. Reacting to pressures from the new Diet and ‘the rut’ into which things had fallen under Nemanić, Baron Pittner wished to replace him by Kudlich rather than the more senior but arguably less energetic Gymnasium
Director in Sarajevo. He was overridden by Burián himself. But the Pittner strategy of conciliating the Diet ultimately proved to tie the administration’s hands. The last pre-war secondary school inspector, Tugomir Alaupović, claimed plausibly that disciplinary regulations were illusory, because Diet members could intervene and save misbehaving students from the consequences: Atanasije Šola allegedly told demonstrating Mostar Serb students in spring 1914 to have no fear, because he could get them further education somewhere, if necessary in Serbia.

The school administration therefore disposed of little more than the power to exhort and harangue. After the Sarajevo demonstration of February 1912 it concluded that a ‘gradual’ improvement would have to come from Directors’ suasion on individual teachers rather than through the compromised staff meetings. The daunting ideal to which these individuals should aspire emerges from the instructions for Bosnian junior teachers (Supplenten), on secondment as observers to the Monarchy proper. While away, they were expected to acquaint themselves not only with subject-related issues, but with the ‘extra-mural moral-disciplinary conduct of the pupils’, nature, number and causes of their offences, the school’s method of maintaining contact with the home, pupils’ dress, diet, hygiene and exercise, local charitable provision for the poor, in short with ‘the totality of the social relations’ impinging on the area from which the pupils came. The scheme derived from Thallóczy’s report of 1904/5, and shows normally cheeseparing authorities’ concern over teacher quality among now mainly Bosnian new staff, since all the expenses had to be borne by the Sarajevo government. The utopian element appears in the call for form masters, who along with directors now acquired a central role in the administration’s hopes, to see their students as individuals, know their home circumstances, ascertain their moral and scholarly growth, encourage their physical development and inculcate the patriotic sense and mutual love which would lead them to ‘higher spiritual life’. One irony was that the masters who did most to cultivate personal relations with their students were those accused of subverting them politically.

Teachers not surprisingly had their own take on all this. In addition to an excessive teaching load and large classes, they complained of the burdens of the form master’s role, coming on top of the duties expected of them as national cultural leaders, newspaper contributors, concert organizers, student literary society mentors and contributors to good causes. They gained a rise in 1908 of about 18 per cent in initial and 14 per cent in final earnings, leading to a rather small budgetary increase of some 61,000 K. In 1912, by which time the Provincial Government admitted a 40 per cent rise in the cost of living, Thallóczy gave most of their requests short shrift. Revealingly, the Sarajevo government said the teachers’ ‘significant over-burdening’ was not because of a basic shortage of teachers, but frequent illness and the time allotted for career development. Potiorek himself noted the lack of professional qualifications of native Bosnian
teachers compared to immigrants because, being given posts immediately after graduating, they were too preoccupied thereafter to prepare for the necessary state examinations. The official line was that Bosnian teachers’ pay was well in line with Austrian practice.

By comparison, the Provincial Government poured out a stream of circulars in the final pre-war years, with which it sought both to plug problems—identity cards, then photos for students, certification of lodgings, teacher promotion to depend also on correct behaviour outside school, supervision during breaks, regulations on transfers and much more. Some of its regulations read almost like the rescripts of Louis XVI’s France, which, as Tocqueville pointed out, in their flowery preambles of enlightened rhetoric seem in hindsight to have been inviting the forces which would overthrow the regime:

The social development of today awakens in the upper ranks of our secondary school youth too the desire for self-determination and therewith self-activation. In order that the effect of their voluntarily undertaken extra-mural work should be the more evident and complete, they seek with united strength to achieve predetermined goals and to that end found more or less organized student societies with certain definite rules.

Thus began the instruction sent to all secondary school directors permitting the formation of school societies in 1911. A further concession in 1912 allowed secondary schoolboys to join sokol or gymnastic organizations, possibly prompted by a suggestion from the Sarajevo police chief that sport might be a healthier outlet for disruptive youth’s energies. But most remarkable here is the frank recognition of the power of nationalism:

That the sokol associations put themselves in the service of the national idea cannot be seen on principle as a bar to permitting secondary students to exercise in them, because as things stand there is little point in opposing the cultivation of this idea, or treating it lightly. On the contrary, the development and strengthening of physical fitness only gains an educative value when it is ennobled by a higher ethical concept.

Yet the crippling conditions set were almost ludicrously out of proportion to these sentiments, for all applications for membership had to be individually approved by the school staff meeting, and boys were not allowed to join adult clubs but only groups created specially for them, led by qualified personnel.

With a dissatisfied and divided teaching body, increasingly undisciplined students and official policies often divorced from reality, the secondary school scene was bleak for lovers of order by 1914. In early summer things came to a head in Mostar Gymnasium. The fracas over marking already described followed a series of incidents, which had seen an allegedly anti-Slav Silesian theatre company driven out of town by student uproar, then the attendance of over 300 students at a forbidden mass celebrating Croatian heroes. On the very eve of the assassination these events forced the Bosnian administration to an unwelcome admission: ‘In fact, our secondary schools, both as concerns the teachers and the educational administration, are not quite on top of the situation.’ The analysis
went beyond the familiar theme of inadequate home background to confess that it was a matter of political pressure from outside:

The Provincial government therefore intends in the first instance to direct the political authorities in towns with secondary schools to mobilize their entire apparatus to unearth the threads which have been spun between the schools and public life, so that they may be cut by appropriate counter-measures.50

This official view of unscrupulous politicians preying on impressionable youth reflected a near universal consensus, including the Bosnian press. The last barrier had now fallen in pupils’ physical assaults on their teachers, opined Bosnische Post, yet the guilty ones were the teachers who had brought politics into the school.51 Hrvatski dnevnik commented on idealistic students’ capacity to be led astray by various prophets.52 Srpska rič had condemned the role of Croatian teachers in bringing about the Sarajevo demonstration of February 1912, distracting students from the true instruments of national progress: culture and enlightenment.53

Here lies much of the explanation for the authorities’ failure to detect Young Bosnia in the ferment of Bosnian academic youth. They were not inactive. Žerajić’s assassination attempt in 1910 was thoroughly investigated,54 while heightened alert after the fraternal expedition of Zagreb students to Belgrade in April 1912 led on to the arrest of Miloš Pjanić, a student close to what became Young Bosnia, in the autumn, and many interrogations. Student unrest was one of the factors inclining Potiorek to push for emergency powers. Yet his frustrated cry that in his absence the school authorities took no action against student participants in an anti-Austrian demonstration shows part of the problem: ‘the government machine only works when it is instigated from above’.55 Post-1918 testimonies show that many members of the multinational Austrian administration were not wholly in sympathy with it, quite apart from assumptions about the ‘dreams of youth’, which help explain how officials were ready (not necessarily wrongly) to accept as youthful jokiness phrases like ‘Long Live the Republic and Revolutionary Greetings’ in a confiscated student postcard of 1912.56 The overriding reason, however, is that government shared the general view which related everything to the influences of older radicals. In a patriarchal society it did not envisage how there might be young people whose rebellion was directed against the authority of their elders as well as the state. Ironically, the one case where autonomous activity by a youth group came to public attention was not likely to lead to youthful initiative being taken seriously. Early in 1914 Sarajevo was awash with rumours of the existence of a ‘Club of Free Love’ and ‘orgies’ committed by members of the city’s schools and teacher training colleges.57 The government’s investigations revealed that a loosely organized mixed group of young people did eat, drink/get drunk and go on outings together, and that among them trainee teacher Viktor Rubčić had pornographic and more serious material on sexual themes, and had explained the free love idea to some of the girls.58
After Princip’s act, analyses became more polemical, as Sarajevo and Vienna passed the buck. The ministry accused would-be strong man Potiorek of failure to keep it informed of the true state of affairs and asked why, if Sarajevo knew how dangerous certain Serb teachers were, they had received such rapid promotion. In reply the Provincial Government argued that it had to take its teachers where it found them, and that the whole sorry mess stemmed from Serb cultural autonomy and a premature constitutionalism. It was unable to act against questionable teachers because they were protected by Serb politicians needed for Vienna’s policy of a comprehensive government bloc in the Diet. Potiorek referred to a conversation in his office with Bilinski in 1912, when the Provincial Government had been told not to arrest a suspected student subversive because of negotiations with Diet party leaders. The ill-feeling between Vienna and Sarajevo reflected the fact that the latter had indeed been acting on its own initiative in a way unthinkable in Kállay’s time. The 1911 ordinance allowing secondary school students to organize societies had not been discussed with the ministry, which should have been reading the official educational bulletin it received, Potiorek implied. His point that open societies like these were not the problem is a fair one.

However, the nature of the problem was not fully exposed in these exchanges. The emphasis lay constantly on the schools’ penetration by nationalist politicians. Only one document, a neglected report of 1912 retrieved by the Sarajevo police commissioner, showed a capacity to think beyond this received opinion. In it he noted, alongside the exclusive nationalisms or the Croato-Serb coalition tendency of the charismatic Tandarić, a third tendency: those Croats who had tired of following others, and joined forces with Serb youth, along lines of federal republicanism, directed against the Habsburg, Serbian and Montenegrin dynasties. This idea of a student youth movement ‘already emancipated from adult influences’ pointed to an aspect of the jigsaw which the authorities in the immediate aftermath of the Sarajevo assassination were still inclined to overlook, but it is a significant part of the jigsaw of Bosnian society before 1914.

THE YOUTH MOVEMENT AND YOUNG BOSNIA

The movement which officialdom was still largely misreading in 1914 had complex roots. The clash of values in a modernizing context, longer-term Balkan traditions of tyrannicide and parallels with Russian populist violence may be adduced. Nor can the politicization of student youth in the Habsburg monarchy be irrelevant, for the lines of fragmentation among Austro-German students between clerical and nationalist cohorts, and between more liberal and more radical versions of the latter, bear some relation to south Slav student divisions. More directly, the Czech youth movement of the 1890s, mediated in part via Croatia, united Slav nationalism with a new ‘progressive’ tendency,
anti-clerical and positivist in ideology, in ways which enabled south Slav students to link their ethnic rebelliousness with the 'modernist' spirit of the age. The contradiction apparent between the non-revolutionary Czech influence and the Russian can be softened by observing a distinction between the Bosnian youth movement which engaged large numbers in Bosnian secondary schools, and the inner core of terrorists involved in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. The distinction is not absolute, nor is it wholly accurate to subsume the terrorists under a label like Young Bosnia, which was an intellectual tendency, not a formal organization. But Young Bosnia has come to be applied as a term particularly to the most radical section of Bosnian youth and will be so used here.

The Czech influence in shaping a ‘progressive’, secular nationalism was a key building block. Croat students who relocated to Prague with their journal Hrvatska misao, after being expelled in large numbers from Zagreb University in 1895, experienced it particularly through Professor Tomáš Masaryk, the advocate of national advance through ‘small deeds’ rather than romantic bravado. By 1901–2 the progressive tendency had become dominant among Croatian academic youth. In subtle response to shifts in the spirit of the time, which increasingly stressed the role of race and struggle in the natural order, Croat student progressivism struck off on its own, tending to acquire a harder nationalist edge. When it allied with Serb students in the Monarchy in 1910, the joint organ, Zora, was mid-way between progressive and nationalist positions, shifting the emphasis from older themes of educating a people to harder-nosed ones of building a nation through youth’s revolutionary sacrifice. Elsewhere, in Slovenia, Serbia and Bulgaria, similar trends could be seen. South Slav student congresses were held in Belgrade in 1904 and Sofia in 1906, in which students from Serbia, in no danger of denationalization by more developed neighbours, were more interested in political union than the cultural mutuality and economic regeneration stressed by Croats and Slovenes. In all cases the nature of the student experience meant that organizations and their journals changed with chameleon-like rapidity.

The first society of secondary school pupils in Bosnia dates from 1896, the Serbian Srpska svijest in Sarajevo Gymnasium. Though secret and admitting only ‘firm and reliable characters’, its activities were essentially literary. From the early twentieth century, other Serb societies emerged, in Banjaluka, Mostar and Doljna Tuzla, as well as a Croatian society in Sarajevo. The correspondence of members of Pokret, founded by Gradačac students at the Banjaluka Realka, shows how conscientiously the norms of associational life were followed and advice was sought from students in Prague and Vienna. Pretensions to a socio-political role were now apparent in the themes of lectures held and coordination of similar groupings was attempted, yet there was still an ingenuousness about these activities. One correspondent, sending a few pages of his lecture on ‘craft industry: a short history’—earnest encyclopedia-style information which took him to eighteenth-century English workshops—ended abruptly ‘to be
continued’, with a plea for his readers’ further attention. Another wondered how constructively youth could criticize the Serb notables’ economic policy ‘when we too don’t know even the most elementary things’. Meanwhile, the ever-active Archbishop Stadler, commenting that ‘the inner spirit of our youth’ was not always what it might be, set to promoting a Catholic-orientated youth movement, which had groups in Mostar, Banjaluka and later Sarajevo. Their energies were absorbed in struggles with the more secular ‘Young Croats’. Depicting the Vienna Serb student society Zora as a product of romanticism, the intellectually ablest Serb of his generation, Vladimir Ćorović, concluded in 1905 that in a more realist age youth could not have as significant a role as it had once played.

It was the annexation of 1908 which lent student activism a new bitterness. ‘In the flat of a Sarajevo backstreet, a few of us third and fourth yearers from the commercial school and the lower forms of the Gymnasium and the teachers’ training college, a few hostages of happiness and national freedom, fighters for human rights, as we ourselves then called them, met in that stormy time, made a pact of eternal friendship, … and committed ourselves to perish for the idea of Freedom—and to live and die for Serbdom’: thus a draft student lecture, probably from 1911. Despite the high-flown tone, the initial student response to Bogdan Žerajić’s failed attempt on the life of Bosnian Governor General Varešanin in June 1910 was apparently bewilderment that such a thing could happen among them, though it quickly changed to admiration. Žerajić had been one of the Bosnians who joined Serbian guerilla groups in expectation of an Austro-Serb conflict after the annexation. Mixing in literary-cum-political circles of academic youth after graduating from Mostar Gymnasium, he showed in correspondence the potential for some existential act: in his sense of loss of all beliefs, his people’s ‘wretched state’ and his residual faith that he was one of the kindred spirits of the ‘painter’ behind it all, and had the strength to ‘persist to the end’.

If Žerajić acted alone—and no clear evidence of others’ involvement has been found—he was not intellectually isolated. His correspondent above was his fellow Herzegovinian, Vladimir Gaćinović, who with Dimitrije Mitrinović may be seen as the chief ideologue of the Bosnian youth movement. Through Gaćinović spoke most loudly the anguish of the first generation of educated Serb youth at the passing of one kind of social solidarity, that of the patriarchal village community, without its replacement by another. It was a man’s task, he said, to prepare himself ‘to cast off what had made for the stupidity and primitivism of those before and, thus remade, like a cross-bearer to go forth … and with his great love and faith in the good and noble … lead a struggle … to clear the enervating atmosphere, explain, help, enlighten’. Gaćinović’s contribution, along with the shrewd analysis of socio-psychological crisis and anomie, was to offer a solution and concretize it. In his anonymous pamphlet, Death of A Hero,
published by the Serbian irredentist society ‘Piedmont’ in 1912, he expatiated on the new morality, the new religion and the new man, placed them in the tradition of French, Italian and Russian freedom fighters and embodied them in an epochal figure, ‘the type of the new era … the great revolutionary apostle …, Bogdan Žerajić’.78 His tribute skilfully interwove the depiction of an individual of unusual sensibility with a transcendent image of self-sacrificial purity for the ideal and a Serb tradition ‘rich in suffering, conspiracies and revolts’. Hindsight does no favours to rhetorical invocation of ‘a new homeland of freedom, beauty and sunlit perspectives’, together with the sweeping condemnations of the dark, sick and dead epoch of the present, not to speak of the ‘petty, dirty, muddying ties’ of which Žerajić in his exalted ‘fanaticism’ was deemed fortunately free.79 But Gaćinović largely succeeded in convincing his younger compatriots that Žerajić’s bungled assassination attempt and suicide were the ‘brilliant moments’ which the Narod editor Radulovic had said were missing from modern Bosnian Serb history, in an article known to have influenced Žerajić just before his ‘beautiful intellectual death’, in Gaćinović’s phrase.80

If Gaćinović pointed the theme of modernity’s travails more directly to the bruised instincts of radical Bosnian youth, Mitrinović put it in a wider context. His programmatic article ‘The National Sphere and Modernism’ sought to elevate Serbian and Bosnian Serb literary culture to the international level. To the organicism of the older Serbian society, which had nothing to say to the universal concerns treated by a Shakespeare, he opposed the organicism of the present, characterized by individualism and liberalism. Modernity and nationality were not in contradiction, as the international recognition of Russian and Scandinavian writers showed. In opening up to and borrowing from contemporary culture, Serb culture would be enriched, not eroded. The tool with which Mitrinović overcame the felt tension between the two terms of his title was the concept of differentiation. The organic principle, favoured by an older romanticism and conducive to nationalist ideology, remained but was refashioned in the sense of an evolutionary positivism. National development became a process of ‘individualization’, enabling ever more personal expression with the progress of modern society, while operating by ‘laws’ impossible to determine precisely because of the complexity to which ‘a certain freedom of the human spirit’ gave rise. Mitrinović continued:

In this way the literature of a nation means in fact the recorded development of its entire spiritual organism, from its least to its most differentiated condition … We, small and weak as we are, must struggle stubbornly on all fronts and by all means for our existence in the organism of the nations.81

More committed to literary and aesthetic theory than Gaćinović, Mitrinović was a frequent contributor to Bosanska vila and other Serb literary journals. His criticism amounted to a call to transcend the limits of Serb national culture hitherto and apply to Bosnia the principles of the Modern movement which had
burst upon the Czech and Croatian scenes in the later 1890s. In close touch with the innovative Serbian literary critic Jovan Skerlić, who played a role among Belgrade students not unlike that of Masaryk in Prague, Mitrinović advocated the same interpenetration of cultural modernization and national renewal in response to the rationalist, democratizing direction he deemed contemporary society to be taking. In his socially committed approach the moral content of a literary work was the overriding criteria of judgement.82 Mitrinović’s wide-ranging intellectual concerns, remarkable in one so young, thus operated within a context if not a school. Between them he and Gaćinović helped create a framework within which young Bosnians, in the first instance Serbs, could grapple with the predicament in which Bosnia’s stage of transitional development had placed them, and direct their frustrations to concrete goals. Here the substantial differences between them might be noted. Mitrinović’s ideas, while remaining within a Balkan nationalist canon,83 allowed scope for emphasis of the democratizing spirit of the age also in a western sense of liberal individualism. Gaćinović’s pamphlet *Death of A Hero* used the words ‘revolution’ or ‘revolutionary’ thirteen times, and ‘democracy’ or ‘democratic’ not once.

Of course, the chief role in the development of the Bosnian youth movement was played by events. Attempts to break the more independent spirit manifest in Croatia since the Croato–Serb coalition—Ban Slavko Cuvaj’s dissolution of the Croatian Diet, then his appointment as royal commissioner and suspension of the Constitution (January/April 1912)—produced a ferment punctuated by dramatic events: the great demonstrations of Zagreb students on 31 January, the emotional excursion of large numbers of them on a fraternal visit to Belgrade in April, the three assassination attempts on Cuvaj and his successor. The Zagreb students took with them to Belgrade a draft programme by Dimitrije Mitrinović for a youth organization under the name National Unity. Reworked in Belgrade and subsequently passed among activists in other centres, the programme affirmed ‘the unification of the Serbo-Croat nation, together with the Slovene nation’ on a basis of ‘intellectual agitation for the philosophy of Serbo-Croat nationalism and the political doctrine of radical democracy’, further, the propagation of the idea of ‘the sovereignty of the Serbo-Croat nation in a state founded on liberal principles’.84 The National Unity programme came to be the expression of the progressive movement among Serb and Croat youth and made much headway among Young Croats of the secular Starčević persuasion.

The groundswell in favour of such rapprochement rose to new heights with the victories of Serbian forces within the Balkan League’s war on Turkey in autumn 1912. The biggest clashes between Habsburg authorities and pro-Serbian opinion came actually in Dalmatia, where the town councils of Split and Šibenik were dissolved. Student journals became increasingly revolutionary in tone, led by the Zagreb *Val*, before it moved to Prague, following *Zora*, the organ of the National Unity programme. Split, Zadar, Trieste, Geneva and Ljubljana also had periodicals of the same leaning, as Slovene students—a new
feature—developed their network for Balkan agitational tours during vacations. A sympathetic survey of *Contemporary Croatia* by the Serbian writer Milan Marjanović, written from the standpoint of Serbo-Croat national unity, which was also Skerlić’s, deepened the mood of fraternity. As the political and intellectual forces favouring a heightened nationalism built up, so the emphasis turned from the original small deeds philosophy of the progressive movement towards ideas of revolutionary change, as if the awakening of consciousness that activists had earlier despaired of in their backward milieu could be achieved by an effort of will. The Serbo-Croat progressive youth movement was redubbed nationalist as it aspired to organizational unity. Abortive efforts to this end at Rijeka in September 1912 and Split in March 1913 led to the initiative to use centenary celebrations of the birth of the Montenegrin prince-poet Njegoš in Zagreb and Prague (March–May 1914) for this purpose. The Prague meeting called for a gathering in Vienna on 28 June 1914 to finalize the organization, but an important aspect of it, the creation of a common organ in Ljubljana, *Glas Juga*, went ahead in the spring. In *Glas Juga*’s words of 14 May: ‘We have three names … but these names we have only as one nation. Historical individualisms of whatever colour or medieval non-national carve-ups cannot divide us … a nation can have only one future and seek only the same ideals.’

Developments among student youth in Bosnia can hardly be discussed independently of this wider context. The progressive tendency led by late 1911 to the emergence of a ‘Serbo-Croat progressive organization’ in Sarajevo chaired by Ivo Andrić, the future Nobel Prize winner for literature. Most Bosnian Serbs still remained aloof from the February demonstrations of Croat and Croatophile Muslim students in Sarajevo in sympathy with their Zagreb counterparts. But Serb nationalists shared the progressive strategy of cultural enlightenment of the people through small deeds. The Tuzla fifth-former Mladen Stojanović enthused over his vacation work in the beauty of the mountains after the boring Posavina plains. ‘The village is the only hope. Lectures ready. Spread culture!’ The summer of 1912 saw some planned sharing out of areas for such work. The arrest of Miloš Pjanić in the autumn, leading to interrogation of large numbers of fellow participants, was a turning-point. The student progressive organization was broken up, but its leading idea, of Serbo-Croat unity, gained ground: the Sarajevo Serb nationalist monthly *Srpska omladina* (1912–13) ceased publication because of lack of interest, not persecution. Meanwhile, as the Balkan wars increased confidence, more radical approaches gained ground. ‘The practice of all history in general says that freedom came through revolution and revolution and nothing more’, wrote Branko Ćubrilović, brother of the executed conspirator Veljko, in January 1914. In the Zagreb journal *Vihor* Mitrinović ridiculed the idea that the ‘bastardized’ Czech doctrine of ‘small deeds—invisibly small and aimlessly done—satisfies the most essential demand of national being, national
honour … we believe in our purpose and our hope: let us go the way of our virile ancestors, with valour for justice’.90

By 1914 organization in Bosnia largely followed the impulse imparted by the unification movement elsewhere. Thus branches of ‘Serbo-Croat nationalist youth’ were established in the Sarajevo Technical Academy and the Teachers’ Training College as well as the Gymnasium and Realka. There was also a central coordinating committee, which sent representatives to the general Yugoslav youth meeting in Prague in May. Lazar Đukic, its head and a tireless mobilizer, succeeded in implanting a combined Serb–Muslim movement in Trebinje commercial school and in reactivating a student society in Banjaluka. The new Yugoslav structures did not penetrate everywhere. Serbs in Tuzla had been organized for some years; a Serb student society was refounded in Mostar in April. Croat clericals and nationalists kept their own identity, as Muslims in Banjaluka and the Serbophile group at Travnik Gymnasium tended to do.91

Remarkable in this activity was the youth of the participants. While Žerajić, Gaćinović and Mitrinović, born between 1886 and 1890, were all university students when they made their impact, hardly any ex-university students figured among the activists of 1914. Contemporaries suspected careerism. The Diet’s attack on the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Institute set up to house student scholarship holders in Vienna was motivated by some belief that the government had succeeded in its alleged aim of creating civil servant ‘mamelukes’.92 There is evidence that student leaders, themselves still at secondary school, thought the junior forms, because not yet moulded by their conservative surroundings, worth more attention, and certainly the fifth- and sixth-formers, among whom comments about the apathy of their elders can be found.93 The average ages of those put on trial after the Princip assassination in 1914 speak for themselves: 17 3/4 years old for the twenty-eight involved in Banjaluka, a month older for the sixty-five from Sarajevo and Trebinje, and 18 3/4 for the eleven from Mostar only because this group included two artisans in their twenties.94 It should be remembered that the secondary school matura was rarely sat till the age of nineteen.

Austrian sources speak constantly of Bosnians’ early maturity, but one must still ask what motivated such youngsters. That many told interrogators they had read Mitrinović’s 1912 programme without fully understanding it seems like a stock answer, as its thrust was clear enough for all the references to ‘ethnopsychic’ unity and other foreign terms. However, there were surely wide ranges in concerns and sophistication. Given for all were the confusion, rebelliousness and idealism of young people searching for identity, heightened by being a tiny elite in an overwhelmingly illiterate society under foreign rule. ‘We are modern Yugoslavs, free from all prejudices’, the rallying call of Yugoslav nationalist students in Prague concluded unconvincingly early in 1914.95 Since these were university students, most from more developed regions than Bosnia, the likely self-awareness of Bosnian secondary school pupils may be guessed at. The seventeen-year-old...
Vasa Ćubrilović breezily ended one message ‘Greetings to all bombers’; a few months later he was one of the six assassins. For another under-age conspirator with the forthrightness of youth, Cvetko Popović, it was simply ‘shameful’ that Franz Ferdinand should be allowed to leave Sarajevo alive. In Yeatsian elegiac terms in autumn 1914 Gaćinović gave as his generation’s greatest mistake that it was very young—‘they never considered that their daring stroke may be an act of suicide of the Serb people, naïve Serb children’.

No doubt the youth movement engaged the Young Bosnians at several levels. The sense of responsibility and service made for self-respect. ‘I know that they consider us unnecessary and uncalled for’, said Miloš Pjanić of the peasants, ‘but still we want to live—for them.’ It could also help satisfy the interest in reading and literary self-expression which played an important role in an age when modern sports had made little breakthrough. ‘Books for me mean life,’ Princip told a prison doctor in 1916. The tradition of the feuilleton and the prestige of literature explain why nine of Strindberg’s plays, for example, appeared in Srpska rič between 1911 and 1914. Of the political reading, where Russian and German radical works loomed large, confiscated texts speak to rebellious idealism rather than particular sophistication: anarchist appeals to a society without injustice, extracts from a socialist catechism or Chernishevsky’s novel What is to be Done. Heavier works read tended to be more philosophical than political, with an existential edge, like Schopenhauer or Nietzsche. As to writing, students’ own and other’s lectures or essays were regularly found in searches after the assassination; material was needed for the so numerous periodicals. Thus the sixty-page number produced by the small Trebinje group in 1914 was partly recycled from at least eleven other student papers. Hard up in Belgrade, Princip sold his books but drew the line at Milan Rakić’s poems. The Nobelist Ivo Andrić’s role as student politician has been mentioned. Symptomatic of the same trend, the leading student journal editors in Croatia, Vladimir Čerina and Tin Ujević, became leading Croatian writers, while Cuvaj’s failed assassin, Luka Jukić, like Princip, wrote a poem in detention. It is not surprising that the first article on ‘Young Bosnia’ as a phenomenon, in 1913, discussed it as a literary movement.

Two of Schopenhauer’s most widely bought books in Sarajevo were his The Metaphysics of Sexual Love and On Women. Youthful interest in such matters was all the more natural in a traditionally unpermissive society, where modernizing ideology put emphasis on health and eugenics. An early list of lectures given to Tuzla Gymnasium secret society included one on ‘The sexual drive, its consequences and further matters’, and thereafter lectures regularly included a large number on hygiene, including syphilis and pregnancy. A later episode in Tuzla shows the way in which political radicalism could be linked to a wider questioning of traditional norms. Three lectures in a literary discussion group, founded on headmaster Alaupović’s initiative in 1912–13,
figured prominently in Alaupović’s wartime trial for abuse of his official duties. Two on Darwinism were given by Petar Guteša, a sixth-former and president of a secret Serb society at the school that seems to have ceased functioning during the official society’s lifespan. He was expelled in 1914 for leaving the hall when the Austrian anthem was sung. The third, on feminism, and listing statistics on prostitution in Paris and Hamburg, was given by Mladen Stojanović, who received a sixteen-year jail term in 1915. His theme was that as Bosnian women lived as slaves to their husbands and western liberalism, from his statistics, had not worked, a third way was needed. The teachers’ response to Guteša is revealing of the intellectual cross currents of the time. Of those present, the liberal-minded but pious Alaupović mildly rebuked the boy for not pointing out that what he propounded were ‘mere hypotheses’ and one should remember the Latin tag ‘audiatur et altera pars’ (hear the other side). The geography master noted that Lyell’s theory of geological evolution, mentioned by Guteša, had been demolished already in 1830. A third joined in with the lecture’s failure to mention the psyche and reflect on the uniqueness of man’s development. The one Serb professor present (like the only pupil to speak) professed substantial agreement with Guteša, noting the parallel with Copernicus. A further piquant interplay between different spheres of rebelliousness comes from Sarajevo in 1914. Viktor Rubčić, whom the regime’s post-assassination investigation identified as the leader of the Sarajevo student movement, had already figured in their enquiries earlier in the year—as the man at the heart of the so-called ‘Free Love Association’ described in the previous section. Rubčić in fact claimed to have left the movement’s central committee after two sessions because of his Croatian convictions, a more convincing excuse than that of his universally attested fellow member Marko Perin, who disclaimed all knowledge of politics, having been interested only in girls.

It is hard to conceive of Princip essaying Perin’s alibi. Dedijer has commented on the asceticism and puritanism of those closest to Young Bosnia’s terrorism, certainly Žerajić and Princip. Perhaps a distinction should be made here. While Young Bosnia was part of a wider youth experience, at its core was a level of commitment best understood in the apocalyptic terms of Death of a Hero. Princip had set flowers on Žerajić’s grave. He would give a hundred lives, he said, to equal Žerajić’s deed. The idea that a Habsburg should be assassinated seems to have come to him after the February 1912 demonstrations. That the circles within which he moved lived with such thoughts is shown by the newspaper extract announcing Franz Ferdinand’s forthcoming visit, notoriously sent from Sarajevo to Čabrinović in Belgrade in spring 1914. Whether or not on the strength of a commission from the emigré Gačinović in France, Mustafa Mehmedbašić thought first of killing the archduke, and then Potiorek, at the installation of Reis Čaušević. The ideological and organizational escalation following the Balkan wars had led by June 1914 to a state of revolutionary exaltation in leading activists.
Youth must know that life was mission and they missionaries, watched by God, the nation, the homeland, humanity and the universe, the Tuzla leader Todor Ilić set down on the day of the assassination. As for his fellow leader the same day, Mladen Stojanović:

Sons of Yugoslavia! Are you not becoming Gods? ... Blood, blood, blood is what saves ... Death preceded Resurrection! The assassination is the Resurrection of the Nation! ... Sursum corda! ... The prophets are coming. Continue in their path ... O brilliant, o great prophet sons of Yugoslavia!

Both were to claim to interrogators that they were overcome by the occasion. Princip, however, remained cool and collected. Indeed, the mixture of activism and introversion, of humanist vision and aloofness, of self-sacrificial hubris and steely will, point in a well-travelled direction; but the self-control was achieved at some cost. As Princip wrote to a friend’s sister shortly before the assassination:

One needs a lot of strength in order to live, and action creates this ... My life also is full of bitterness and gall, my wreath has more thorns in it than others. I go from nothingness to nothingness, from day to day. Do read, you must read; this is the best way to forget the tragic side of reality.

During his last stay in Belgrade he underlined in a poem the words:

Even if we have not created anything ourselves
We will at least have put an end to the misery of our time
Our grave will yet be the foundation of new life without the flaws of today.

ASSESSMENT

Misguided as it was, there is a pathos in Princip’s short and troubled life as of the educated generation as a whole, caught between eras, ceaselessly challenged to take the moral leadership for perceived suffering people and wronged nation towards new life. In a famous book first published in 1966 the leading communist intellectual Vladimir Dedijer set the actions of Young Bosnia’s terrorist core in the context of a Balkan tradition of tyrannicide maintained by impoverished peasants through the heroic tales of the Kosovo cycle: ‘Princip’s shots confirmed that the influence of modern ideologies of mass resistance to tyrannical rule was not strong enough to withstand the tradition of backward Bosnian society.’ Quoting the work of the well-known Serbian geographer-ethnographer Jovan Cvijić (1866–1927) on the rebellious mentality of peasants in the west Balkan Dinaric mountains, Dedijer provides the most objective and sophisticated in a line of attempts by radical historians of Serb origin to relate the Young Bosnian experience both to the Serb revolutionary tradition and Marxist orthodoxy, which rejects terrorism. Rather like the famous French communist historian Soboul on the French Revolution, this historiographical trajectory has to see the
period of study as falling short of Marxist norms (a mass socialist movement) because of social undevelopment, yet pointing the way to the future. In an article of 1952, the writer Marko Marković crystallized a view implicit on the revolutionary left, when he spoke of Princip in 1914 passing the torch on to his nephew who in August 1941 led the destruction of a German motorized column east of Sarajevo: ‘Dear, eternally Young Bosnia’.\(^{117}\) For this school Young Bosnia foreshadowed the maturing of Serb radicalism, with the aid of Croat and Muslim allies, working through its violent heritage towards ‘brotherhood and unity’ in a socialist Yugoslavia.\(^{118}\) Unsurprisingly, the downfall of Tito’s Yugoslavia has produced a reaction against such interpretations. Young Bosnia has become again in some views a tool of the Serbian secret service, the line of much German-language research between the wars.\(^{119}\) It has always been possible to see it as a socially marginal phenomenon lent significance mainly by association with the Vidovdan assassination.\(^{120}\)

The key to Dedijer’s interpretation lay in the writings of Young Bosnia itself. For Gaćinović, Žerajić’s birthplace, Nevesinje, ‘preserved the atavistic feeling of freedom and revolt’ tragically crushed by the Austrian occupation. Passionate and stormy by nature, he bore in his soul some of the social psychology of his undeveloped milieu and was ‘deeply bound to his land by his virtues and his faults’.\(^{121}\) Gaćinović saw the radical writer Petar Kočić as the sculptor giving lasting expression to ‘a transitional social state, a struggle with darkness’, and his work’s most famous character, the peasant David Štrbac, as the embodiment of his race, at once hopelessly poor and ignored, yet proud, hard, deeply moral and unconquerable, subject to ‘strong impulses and reckless passions’.\(^{122}\) Mitrinović’s encomium to Ivan Meštrović, world famous for his sculptures of muscular heroes from the Kosovo cycle, likewise emphasized Meštrović’s hope through his work to summon up ‘Anger reborn’.\(^{123}\) Other personalities can be fitted into this picture, notably Princip himself. The son of a poor peasant who had to supplement his income with odd jobs, he certainly showed features corresponding to Cvijjić’s ‘Dinaric man’ in his capacity for irascibility, pride, cussedness, dreaminess, self-sacrifice and concentrated resolution. Allegedly, viewing Sarajevo all decorated with flags greeting the archduke, he commented that if he could put the town in a box of matches and light it, he would do it.\(^{124}\)

The notion of a movement fired by the inherited anger of aggrieved highlanders is vivid, perhaps too vivid. Apart from Žerajić, Gaćinović and Princip, the inner circle of Young Bosnia was less peasant-dominated than the population as a whole. Nedeljko Čabrinović, who fired first on Vidovdan, and the executed Danilo Ilić were of humble stock, but townsfolk. Veljko and Vasa Ćubrilović were from a family of some standing, related, true, to a leader in the rising of 1875–78. The father of the executed Miško Jovanović was actually a successful businessman and owner of a bioscope in Tuzla. True, Dedijer argues that activists could not escape from traditional values rather than that they embraced them,
but the strength of their repudiation must be appreciated. The peasantry for the Young Bosnians were people who lacked precisely what they valued in the new man they spoke of so readily, the sense of individuality. ‘Our peasant has no developed inner life, he has no ideas which would guide him and therefore he is a great materialist’, was one view, deploring the lack of the sense of discipline and cooperation that educated young Serbs yearned to acquire in the struggle for life.\textsuperscript{125} ‘I am dying of boredom, without books, without friends, without those who could understand and follow me’, wrote Miloš Pjanić about the peasants he was trying to enlighten, who looked him up and down suspiciously, and were surprised that he was not ashamed of having been in prison.\textsuperscript{126} Students in practice did not report encountering the combative spirit of a David Štrbac, rather fatalism and servility, suggesting a different kind of continuity from the past, for such traits were regularly noted in travellers’ accounts from the Turkish period. When Veljko Jovičić commented that all country towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina looked the same—‘and in all of them people worry about bread, and talk about the district commissioner and the gendarmes’, he was largely echoing Austrian officials’ reports.\textsuperscript{127} The Bosnian peasant’s chief concern was whether he could get his corn to market, noted the Bijeljina District Commissioner on the work of two young radicals in a Serb community as the first Balkan war got under way; ‘[he] is atavistically burdened by great suspicion, overall wants to hear nothing of newspapers, and the efforts of Serbo-enthusiasts founder on the passive resistance of the rural population’.\textsuperscript{128}

While Princip for one relished tales as a child of the 1875 rising, it is likely that other influences need to be set alongside the folk roots of 1914.\textsuperscript{129} Even the Kosovo saga was by this time as much consciously cultivated icon in Serbian national culture as spontaneous memory. Ideas of tyrannicide were available from Christian and classical tradition, the latter the main staple of the education most Young Bosnians received. Latin tags dot their writings: Veljko Ćubrilović ended his letter to his wife on the eve of execution \textit{Peractum est}. The authorities noted how students underlined Horace’s famous line \textit{Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori} (it is sweet and fitting to die for one’s country). Assassination, along with anarchism, was in the air before 1914: the King of Italy, Empress of Austria-Hungary, Polish governor of Galicia and Tsarist Minister of the Interior all fell victim to it. After Žerajić the next three attempts in the south Slav lands were in Croatia. The greatest exponent of the Kosovo myth was actually the Dalmatian Croat Meštrović, while Young Bosnia’s mix of bitterness and idealism is located also in the Croatian youth movement. Thus Čerina’s outburst in \textit{Vihor}, in 1914:

\begin{verbatim}
If in Zagreb there are 80,000 inhabitants, 50,000 of them should be taken to the slaughter house, 5,000 swept away by the river Sava, 5,000 more drowned by some inconceivably powerful cloudburst, and the greater part of the remaining 20,000 put in some kind of moral and national purgatory … In general all that can enthuse us is life which goes forward, forward, forward, life which climbs up, up, up. Down the years host upon host of young, fresh, buoyant and idealistic youth have come to Zagreb to study with a sea
\end{verbatim}
of the brightest dreams in their soul and ... have left almost always transformed, morally broken, racially drained, benumbed, enfeebled.\textsuperscript{130}

The attack on the corruption of urban bourgeois society was part of wider European trends as liberalism ebbed and anti-liberal ideologies bade for primacy.

Young Bosnians were certainly radical. They showed the interest in theories of revolutionary change found so understandably, in hindsight, in socially backward societies thrust into the competitive arena of modern life. The Sarajevo student activist Mirko Kus recalled in 1929 the impact on students of the 1906 strike and the importance they gave to attending workers’ socials and May Day celebrations. For Kus, socialist sympathies in youth were instinctive rather than clearly articulated, and strongest among the majority from village backgrounds, while he also noted a substantial bourgeois minority with clear-cut nationalist agendas.\textsuperscript{131} It is fair to see a more nuanced response to socialism than this in some individuals. Danilo Ilić argued the case against contemporary mainstream Marxism’s neglect of the national question as skillfully as any left-wing nationalist of the time.\textsuperscript{132} Nor are Princip’s comments trivial. His friends speculated that Kropotkin’s concept of a social revolution could come true, he told his prison doctor in Terezín, but only after national disputes in Europe had been settled, and they did not devote the matter great attention, seeing their duty as lying in this national dimension. This is compatible with the statement repeatedly attributed to him that if it were not for the unfinished national business, they would be socialists.\textsuperscript{133} Čabrinović also reflects the theme of the small man in revolt. Apprenticed as a locksmith and typesetter in turn, then first president of the Sarajevo Printers’ Apprentice Guild, he worked in a socialist and anarchist printing plant in Belgrade for a time, returned to Sarajevo with travel money from ‘Narodna Odbrana’, was expelled for his role in a strike and made a new base in Trieste, all in his teens. Yet, challenged to reconcile his international socialism with his statement that he had made his assassination bid ‘as a Serb’, Čabrinović smilingly said he had long realized his prior identity was national; indeed, he had earlier himself written that all these ‘socialists’ had Serb souls.\textsuperscript{134}

Does such an instinctive Serb identification make plausible interpretations of Young Bosnia as a mere tool of Serbian irredentism? This view stresses how the Belgrade-based assassins gained their guns from Serbian military sources and crossed the frontier into Austria with the aid of members of irredentist organizations, further that the Serbian government was aware of what was afoot.\textsuperscript{135} In its favour is that many members of Young Bosnia had military training in Serbia, in 1908–9 or during the Balkan wars. ‘Narodna Odbrana’, the nationalist society founded in Serbia after the annexation of Bosnia and named in the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum in July 1914, had an extensive network in Bosnia. The conventional counter that it was ‘Ujedinjenje ili Smrt’ (Union or Death, founded 1911) which organized the assassination, falls because the two bodies became effectively coordinated from spring 1913 and Union or
Death operated in Bosnia in the guise of the earlier society. Gaćinović was a member of Union or Death. That said, the argument first put clearly by one of the assassins, that whatever the parallel plans of Colonel Dimitrijević (Apis), the intelligence chief in the Serbian General Staff, the Young Bosnian conspirators came to their decision independently, seems valid. When Apis, who was at odds with the Serbian civilian government, nonetheless saw the wider political need to restrain the Bosnians he had had armed, they refused to abort their mission.

Counting most against the thesis of a Serbian official plot is the whole tenor of the youth movement’s rejection of tutelage. It was precisely their rejection of their elders, as Collas alone in the Sarajevo government surmised, which gave their movement its distinctiveness. Even Petar Kočić was old hat for them. In a letter of 1912, Petar Guteša opposed cooperation with ‘older people’ like Kočić; Bosnian youth were strong enough to maintain their own paper rather than stoically listening to their elders’ pronouncements. Božidar Tomić, the Tuzla leader sentenced to thirteen years in 1915, professed himself cold to the ‘meaningless campaign’ of the Bosnian Serb nationalist press, for youth had always been the creators and developers of political struggle, the leaders of evolution and revolt.

This is not to say that people so young can sustain the myth ascribed to them. Young Bosnia’s alleged Yugoslavism shows this. At his trial Čabrinović, like nearly all the accused, described himself as a Yugoslav, which cannot be denied a certain sincerity. The victory of the idea of Serbo-Croat (and Slovene) national unity is one of the defining features of the final stage of the youth movement in 1913–14, bursting through former reservations in an emotional torrent, whose sometimes contorted assertions betrayed a wish to make faith fact by power of will. ‘A Serb can be only a Croat by being a good Serb; a Croat can be only a Serb by being a good Croat … We are Croats because we are Serbs and because we are Slovenes’, wrote the Dalmatian leader Nikola Bartulica. But in fact, there had been and there remained reservations. The Serb nationalist Vukašin Babunović in 1912 thought the idea of Serbo-Croat unity too weakly founded: the Croats were greater Austrians than the Viennese themselves, they disliked Cyrillic, ‘that wholly panslav and perfect alphabet’ and indulged utopias like a ‘Greater Croatia’, including Bosnia. Theirs was ‘a servile spirit’. Gaćinović himself at that time thought the issue of unity was premature and advised a passive stance to the Croats. The Yugoslavism which many young Serbs finally adopted was often loaded. The new nationalism, threatened chiefly by Croat clericalism, was to come through Croats adopting the positive features of the Serbs and (implicitly) ceasing their divisive policies in Bosnia and against Croatian Serbs. Babunović declared his support for the Yugoslav idea in 1914 on ominous terms: ‘I am for this idea, but rather for political unification, for such a unification as I as a Serb understand it.’ The reservations were mutual.
In the most Yugoslav-minded Croat quarter, Dalmatia, Nikola Bartulica roundly told Srpska omladina that there could be no cooperation if men like Meštrović were called Catholic Serbs.\textsuperscript{145} The Yugoslavism of 1914 was conceived between youthful members of two ill-matched families on little acquaintance and brought to term prematurely by extraordinary events. It cannot bear the historic weight which was later put upon it.

By 1914 even Princip’s age-group was being outflanked by the radicalism of yet younger lieutenants. Too much by way of historic legacy cannot be read into a necessarily immature movement, just as it can only doubtfully be seen as the expression of age-old instincts. That does not mean it should be denied importance in its own present. The twentieth century was to demonstrate again and again that in modernizing societies like pre-1914 Bosnia’s, students play a bigger role than in more settled communities, being to an extent at the forefront of forces of change. In its most generalized form Young Bosnia reflected rejection of the slow pace and the nature of change in Austrian Bosnia, the 90 per cent illiteracy, continuance of kmetstvo, resentment of foreign rule and influences, clash with the methods and spirit of an alien, ‘non-national’ system. It germinated in the context of multiple overlapping crises, between empires and non-dominant nations, faith and scepticism, idealism and materialism, capitalism and socialism, globalism and colonialism, which accelerated in the immediate pre-war years from Ireland to Tsarist Russia, some to find partial resolution as a result of the war, many to fester on, but never to be linked together again in the prelapsarian earnestness of the dying liberal age. Of course, it reflected all these real tensions with the passion and impatience of youth. It brought to the Austro-Hungarian administration a magnifying glass rather than a distorting mirror. The final chapter must attempt to put that administration and its outcomes in a balanced perspective.
Since the collapse of communist Yugoslavia the last years of Austro-Hungarian occupation have taken on more positive associations, as a period in which Bosnia-Herzegovina had the potential to escape the travails of Balkanism and move towards the stable civil society of the European norm. This is a valid reflection of certain socio-cultural shifts which had undoubtedly taken place under the occupation. Looked at more closely, however, it would seem that the key word to describe the situation is ‘potential’ and that scenarios desirable to some sections of Bosnian society were highly undesirable to others. Bosnia was no longer static but the very multiplicity of possibilities and unevenness of the developments brought by Habsburg rule created uncertainties which bred tension, threatening the smooth integration which had always been the cultural mission’s policy goal.

THE MODERNIZATION OF BOSNIA: HOW DEEP AN IMPACT?

The most tangible sign of modernization was the transformation of the larger towns, particularly Sarajevo. With 52,000 people in 1910, three times more than any other, it had largely taken on, in its administrative and commercial core, the form it retains today. The post-annexation period till 1914 has been called its architectural ‘golden years’. Tax incentives encouraged construction and wealthy individuals and associations erected often monumental ‘palaces’ for family use, rented apartments or prestigious associational centres. Indeed, as of 1987, when the city was eight times more populous, a third of apartment buildings dated back to pre-1920. Mostar’s townscape was similarly embellished with monumental religious and educational structures, while Banjaluka acquired stylish parks and tree-lined allées. Progress in communications facilitated denser cultural networks: ‘At least the Švabo has arranged the post pretty well, so that we can exchange thoughts,’ wrote a Serb activist from Gacko to Mladen Stojanović in Tuzla in 1913. The volume of rail passenger transport went up by 20 per cent between 1907 and 1909 alone. The telephone service, opened up to civilian use in 1895, was a more elitist affair, but whereas only a third of the 443 subscribers were civilian in 1898, 64 per cent out of 1,358 were so by 1914. Sarajevo could
show thirteen bookshops and Mostar five. The great bulk of the more than 100 newspapers and periodicals published under the occupation also appeared after 1903.4

The emerging intelligentsia serviced by and serving these journals may be estimated through the numbers who completed secondary education, which has been calculated at 1779 for the whole occupation period.5 A high proportion of these went on to higher level education, aided by some 900 scholarships offered by the state, municipalities or confessional bodies in the post-Kāllay years. It seems likely that Bosnian secondary school graduate figures underestimate intelligentsia numbers, since many individuals who contributed to or consumed intellectual debate in print graduated outside Bosnia—Gaćinović, for example, or never completed it at all, like Princip. This educated class took the lead in a blossoming of associational life well beyond the confessional societies studied in chapter 8. Almost all district towns came to have their branches of Prosvjeta, Gajret and Napredak, together with at least one reading room, choir and tambura group, sokol club and temperance society, agricultural cooperative and perhaps savings bank. Many of these existed too in larger villages, the world where the primary school teacher and parish priest held sway.

The main form of public urban entertainment in nineteenth-century Europe, the theatre, was till 1878 confined in Bosnia to occasional visits by troupes of impresarios and private performances in homes of foreign consuls.6 By the second half of the occupation, German-speaking troupes servicing the swelling numbers of officialdom and commerce in Sarajevo and Mostar had influenced a change in local taste from the windy historical drama of the mother-tongue companies towards operettas and vaudeville, for which they had better technical resources. From the late 1890s audiences became more ethnically differentiated, with native Bosnians following more modern styles in amateur productions sponsored initially by the leading confessional singing societies. The Sarajevo-based Serb Dilettante Society (1912), which actually employed several professional actors, grew out of ‘Sloga’ by extension of this process. Guest appearances by professional companies from south Slav centres also increased, culminating in an official tour by the Novi Sad Serbian National Theatre in 1912, which reflected the new openness of the constitutional era. Theatre issues figured prominently in the daily and weekly press, by contrast to reportage on the burgeoning vogue for film, still tainted by foreign associations. But after the first appearance of travelling film shows (Sarajevo, 1897; Mostar, 1900) Sarajevo acquired five permanent cinemas by 1914, adapted or purpose-built, Mostar three, and nine other towns at least one as of 1915. Since one Sarajevo auditorium had 600 seats and the common pattern was for hourly performances repeated several times a day, the numbers attending must have been considerable.7

Academic painting was another art form which began to be domesticated in this period. Anything beyond icons and portraits was long the preserve of outsiders, like the brothers Arndt brought from Saxony to help Nada, who
became the core of a small and brief circle of expatriate painters in Bosnia, the ‘Sarajewoer Malereiclub’, or the Dalmatian Serb brothers Anastas and Špiro Bocarić who likewise settled in Sarajevo in the 1890s.\textsuperscript{8} The first exhibition by three native Bosnians took place in 1907, to limited attention. One of these, Branko Radulović, had been refused a scholarship by Prosvjeta, because art had no priority. However, the solo exhibition of Gabriel Jurkić in 1911 attracted 1,250 visitors, and three academically trained artists who exhibited in 1913 all made successful careers.\textsuperscript{9} In musical life, while choirs of leading singing societies like ‘Hrvoje’ and ‘Sloga’ lifted their standards, individual artists or teachers remained foreigners, like the famous Czech violinist Ondříček, or the founder of Bosnia’s first music school, in Banjaluka, his fellow-Czech Macejovski.\textsuperscript{10}

This pattern of incomer initiative, imitated by natives, was repeated in social life, where the Društveni dom (Social Centre) and Herrenklub opened by immigrants in the 1890s set the standard followed by Bosnians in their evening parties, known as sijela. The bilingual titles of societies for hunting, riding, cycling and shooting were the nod of non-Bosnians to the land they found themselves in. Gymnastics was the one sport for which Bosnians did not require an Austro-German example because of its antecedents in the Czech nationalist sokol. Starting in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1890s, the sokol movement took province-wide organizational form between 1909 and 1911 among Serbs and Croats, who participated in their hundreds in the sixth Panslav sokol meet in Prague of 1912.\textsuperscript{11} Football had altogether less currency, beginning in Herzegovina when an immigrant Mostar bank director brought a ball back from Budapest for his son in 1903, upon which a team was recruited from better-off officials’ children. Soon, however, street teams formed, then an organized club, and in 1909 Mostar played a match with counterparts from Sarajevo. Pre-war attendances of 200–400 spectators pointed obscurely to a brighter future.\textsuperscript{12} There were other pointers to that future. At the turn of the century a group of fifteen French people, travelling in four automobiles, were bemused to find themselves mobbed by thousands who had been awaiting their pre-announced arrival in mounting excitement on the streets of Banjaluka.\textsuperscript{13} The modern, interrelated world and its simultaneous distance, attraction and actuality for Bosnians, breathe through this episode.

With these processes came the changes of mentality Austria had sought. District towns competed as to who should get state secondary schools. \textit{Novi vakat}, shortly to become the first Muslim daily, launched itself in 1913 with a blast against the exclusively religious viewpoint which had prevented Muslims from accepting the new circumstances brought by the occupation. Now that Turkey had been defeated in the Balkan war by a stronger culture, it was high time to tackle Muslim educational reform, economic life and the schooling of women.\textsuperscript{14} As a result of Habsburg rule Bosnians’ access to the wider world now came almost entirely through an Austro-German prism. Piquantly, the Tuzla
schoolboy Petar Guteša could say he based a lecture on evolution from Darwin and other German books.\(^{15}\)

Yet this undoubted impact was effectively confined to the urban population, which barely advanced from 14.4 per cent to 14.6 per cent of the total population between 1879 and 1910. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of the sixty-six towns actually grew more slowly than the population as a whole.\(^{16}\) Moreover, 37 per cent of urban dwellers in 1910 still derived their living from agriculture, while just seven towns gained electrification and less than half had doctors.\(^{17}\) Only 0.5 per cent of the 46,593 enterprises and shops recorded in 1907 employed more than twenty workers.\(^{18}\) As to the countryside, it was something else. Literacy, 11 per cent in 1910, stood at 57 per cent in Sarajevo and 2 per cent in Cazin district. The retention of the Turkish landholding system had frustrated the kmets without satisfying the agas. Though the original 3:2 ratio of kmets to free peasants was inverted during the occupation—over 23,700 kmet plots were redeemed between 1878 and 1908—there were still some 100,000 kmet or mainly kmet households in 1913. Begs’ attempts to turn kmetstvo into a purely private landlord–tenant relationship resulted in 17,995 legal disputes on peasants’ rights in 1905, rising to 22,674 in 1911. Before the war only about one in eight kmet holdings were in process of redemption under the 1911 Diet law, leaving the question of the ultimate success of this process as tantalizing as in the case of Stolypin’s peasant reforms in late Tsarist Russia.\(^{19}\) As in the Kállay era the chief factor in this pawky progress was cost.

Srećko Džaja has rightly noted Austria-Hungary’s unwillingness to invest more on the occupation.\(^{20}\) The explanation goes beyond the limits on resources imposed by the Monarchy’s political system. The occupation took place in a laissez-faire climate and in the age of imperialism. The superiority of European civilization was judged so self-evident that mere contact with it and its representatives’ ‘know-how’ would provide newly acquired territories with the leaven for progress, without the need for unpopular outlay of public funds. That the colonial analogy is not superimposed in hindsight appears from the care Biliński took on taking office to deny that he saw Bosnia as a colony.\(^{21}\) What historians have dubbed ‘unspoken assumptions’, or those things an age hardly needs to articulate, meant in practice that the regime’s hoped-for acculturation of Bosnia relied as much on the contribution of the kuferaši (Bosnians’ disdainful term for immigrants from the Monarchy, meaning carpet-baggers) as on salaried gendarmes and school teachers.

Indeed, as has been seen, incomers to Bosnia played a great role in transmitting the values and interests of the metropole to new ranks of educated Bosnians. But their presence was resented, as rivals for positions native Bosnians coveted for themselves. By the new century the regime took on board the fact that the promotion of Bosnians was a matter of social and political importance. At the humble level of the primary school teacher, natives were already in a slight majority by 1905.\(^{22}\) At the secondary level progress was much slower.
In 1899–1900, the only native Bosnian among nineteen secondary school professors—seventeen of them Catholic—was a Muslim teacher of Arabic, while Bosnians made up fourteen of thirty-five other teachers. In 1913–14 there were forty-three out of 130 in all posts, including two of the eight directors. Most doctors and at least half of lawyers, booksellers and printers remained incomers in 1913, while the four Monarchy-based banks had double the capital of the fifty native ones. Among government employees the percentage rose from a mere 6 per cent in 1885 to 27.6 per cent in 1905 and 42.2 per cent in 1914, an advance helped in part by the inclusion of street cleaners and clerks in the ranks of Landesbeamten. However, native Bosnians were finally entering the upper reaches of the service, with the appointment in 1914 of the Croat Nikola Mandić as Deputy Chief of the Provincial Government (successor post to the pre-1912 Civil Adlatus) and the Serb Teodor Zurunić as head of its political department.

Yet was such advancement proof of the nativization of the administration, or the Austrianization of Bosnians? While the Sabor battled to remove German from internal administration and colonists’ schools, social life remained open to its influence, taking ever new forms. Thus the majority of cinema owners were non-natives and advertised their programmes exclusively in German, providing no translations of the German subtitles. With the immigrant urban population reaching 35 per cent in the case of Sarajevo and Tuzla, this sort of cultural pressure could only be expected to increase. More people in multi-ethnic Tuzla had acquired German as a second language than Serbo-Croat, an interesting indication of social power. In many ways this is just the sort of situation Habsburg politicians might have hoped to create. The problem was that it aroused hostility from almost all quarters of native opinion, extending to almost existential angst at the threat posed to the ‘narod’ and its destiny. Though Orthodox immigration to Bosnia was not insignificant, it was overwhelmingly peasant and Serbs most actively played the anti-immigrant card. The articles of the Narod editor, Risto Radulović, vividly express the fear that a Serb peasantry who had lost confidence in their old values would not be able to withstand the corrupting effects of Austrian rule. For him salvation could come only from an urban intelligentsia, but the materialistic one he saw emerging, receiving the values of the progressive West only through Austria’s impure mediation, and conscious of its inability to compete with incomers, was in danger of being co-opted in a cynical political system. Radulović would not have been cheered by the call to make Bosnia a major tourist destination in a new weekly transport supplement of the Bosnische Post.

Hence the contradiction at the heart of the Austrian enterprise in Bosnia. Disinclined to fund the full costs of cultural mission, the state tacitly shared the task with representatives of Austrian civil society in Bosnia. But instead of lubricating integration with the monarchy, increased multicultural contacts and the spread of the German language were seen as undermining the native
society. Critics contrasted the non-national nature of the administration to the healthier situation in Zagreb or Belgrade, particularly the latter, where it was linked to the image of Serbia as a democratic country which heeded its citizens’ wishes. ‘Thus work the friends of culture!’ opined a schoolmaster in comparing Austrian educational provision unfavourably with Serbian. Both cities possessed universities (Zagreb, 1874; Belgrade, 1905) and had had National Theatres since the 1860s. The scale was different. There were twenty-four Serbian-language dailies in Belgrade in 1914, and circulation could reach 30,000 (15,000 in Zagreb), compared to the 3,000–4,000 claimed by Srpska riječ. It was symptomatic that film subtitles in Belgrade cinemas were regularly presented in the mother tongue.

The situation of women may provide some gauge of differential development in the three societies. All were, of course, heavily paternalistic, so that women’s post-primary education level was advocated in terms of enhancing their traditional role as wives and mothers of the nation’s youth, rather than individual fulfilment. However, Gymnasium-level education became available to bourgeois girls in Zagreb and Belgrade from the 1890s and in the next decade the universities opened their doors; 10 per cent of students at Belgrade University were women in 1914. Though subscribing to its principles only as a long-term goal, the Serbian National Women’s Union was admitted to the International Alliance for Women Suffrage in 1910. The leading Serbian literary periodical reported the ideas of western pro-feminist writers, and radicals like Skerlić accepted them in principle, albeit preferring the patriotic Milica Janković to her more avant-garde fellow-novelist Isidora Sekulić, who could devote seventeen pages to her heroine’s headache. Such a discourse did not exist in Bosnia, nor was there a female Gymnasium until the new Yugoslavia. In the final pre-war years both Srpska riječ and Bosnische Post had women’s pages. But the ideas of suffragettes were introduced only to be dismissed as ‘illusions’ to be cured, or ‘defective caricatures’ of the Russian revolutionary women who saw their menfolk as comrades in the cause: the Serbian Women’s Charitable Associations, of which twenty-two existed in 1912, stressed their supportive role. The Russian example pointed to the ‘freedom’ perspective which could give a slightly more radical gloss to Serb statements, but there was essential agreement that women’s realm was that of love, feeling, self-sacrifice and motherhood.

Under Kállay there had been evidence of a desire to give Bosnia a distinctive cultural profile in the Balkans. Biliński showed some openness to the symbolism entailed and urged the case both for a university and a National Theatre in Sarajevo. But Bosnian Croat opinion looked to Zagreb as the capital of a future Trialist Croatian state; Potiorek feared the political consequences of unemployable graduates and believed the atmosphere in Bosnia unsuitable for the higher education of loyal officials. Biliński’s approach to the Emperor
to lend his name to a theatre initiative as a counterweight to Serb and Croat nationalism fell through when Franz Joseph did not play ball. In the end a Sabor-backed plan for a theatre company running a ‘National Theatre for Bosnia-Herzegovina’ with moderate subsidy was approved some months before the assassination. A project closer to the Kállay spirit did make some progress in these years but on a modest scale. This was the archaeologist Carl Patsch’s Balkan Research Institute, which grew out of the Provincial Museum with a brief to cover the wider area while the Museum proper concentrated on Bosnia. The varied sources of its few thousand crowns’ subsidy, including the Foreign Ministry and Hungarian Trade Ministry, showed the potential political implications, though the energetic Patsch’s motives were those of the entrepreneurial colonial scholar rather than strictly political.

The grounds of Potiorek’s opposition to a university were a damaging admission that Austrian influence was not working as originally intended. The educated were becoming more, not less, aligned to specifically national programmes, disrupting the sequencing implied by Burián’s view of a Sarajevo university as the coping stone of the cultural mission. On the other hand, the crystallizing national movements were not necessarily revolutionary. It was precisely the danger that nationalists would be suborned into the ‘Austrian spirit’ of a corrupt process of political horse-trading, as he saw it, that embittered Radulović. In these contested circumstamces, what were the trajectories of the three confessional groups and how far were they heading towards a manageable multicultural pluralism or something less reassuring? This theme requires an examination of the three in turn, but also of the direction of Austrian policy in the final years. In the discussion it seems advantageous to take the two Christian communities in turn and only then to address the distinctive problems of the Muslims. It is not therefore ordered according to the size of the respective groups. In each case, a representative figure of the emerging intelligentsia will be taken for illustration.

**THE BOSNIAN SERBS IN THE LAST PRE-WAR YEARS**

The Bosnian Serbs had always loomed largest in government calculations. There was something approaching an official consensus that they were the most culturally and economically active, ‘by far the strongest element’ in Horowitz’s phrase, ‘undoubtedly the most talented’ in Thallóczy’ oft-named report on education. All the impetus of the Serbian national idea would now be turned against Austria-Hungary, wrote one official after Turkey’s defeats in the Balkan war; ‘therein lies the danger’. For Potiorek the tight discipline of the Serb communal organization was ‘proven a hundred-fold’.

Potiorek’s comments about Serb nationalism after the assassination amount to a startling confession of perceived failure. The Serb autonomous organs were a
‘a state within a state’, he complained. After all the fuss the authorities had made about the state right of supervision, its merely negative powers were ‘an empty formula’, which allowed the state to incur the odium of banning things, but not the automatic right to be informed and approve on an ongoing basis.45 Thus Serb schools could continue to use maps with no border shown between Bosnia and Serbia until caught out by an inspector, who could not arrive unannounced, giving Serbs a sense of psychological advantage over a baffled administration. The Provincial Government’s campaign to get portraits of Franz Joseph into Serb schools had been met with passive resistance or outright insolence—‘buy them yourself’ was one line of response. Moreover, Serb communes’ obligation to present their final annual accounts did not allow meaningful financial control without the means to check the figures.46 Such sentiments were to become the grounds for the demonization of Serb cultural autonomy in German nationalist historiography as a ‘huge success’ for the Slav enemy at the expense of misguided leniency.47

A discouraging balance sheet could also be drawn for Austria’s ecclesiastical policy. Reljevo remained almost as unpopular as the Bosnian Institute in Vienna with oppositionists. As the authorities tried to raise standards by requiring first six, then seven years’ Gymnasium for entry, so numbers faltered, far below the nominal complement of forty-eight.48 There was recurrent dissent. In 1909, for example, apparently in connivance with opposition figures, seminarists were protesting against a non-Bosnian professor who was monitoring their church attendance—counting them like cattle, in the words of rebellious youth. So depressed was Metropolitan Letica at the sniping over his management of Reljevo from the native Bosnian bishops of Banjaluka and Mostar that he proposed to resign his responsibility for it.49 This was not his first such move. As Banjaluka Bishop, he and Bishop Zimonjić, both incomers, had tried to resign on the grounds that the anti-‘foreigner’ campaign deprived them of all moral credit with clergy and laity.50 Presumably lack of choice led the regime nonetheless to propose Letica to Franz Joseph for elevation to Sarajevo on dubious grounds of his general authority.51 His successor in Banjaluka, Vasilije Popović, did not hesitate to write to him that the appointment of a non-Bosnian as Reljevo Director would be viewed by all Bosnians and Herzegovinians as an insult and a provocation!52 The last pre-war years saw a definite pitch by the Serb autonomy to bring Reljevo, which by the 1905 statute remained under the Metropolitan of Sarajevo, hence in practice the Provincial Government, under its influence. Part of this was the long-running saga of the transfer of the institution to Sarajevo, agreed in principle, but which dragged on through successive financial modalities, in which the government wished to prevent the autonomous organs acquiring ownership of the proposed new building.53 In November 1912, when a declaration by Serb Diet members of their ‘sacred duty’ to congratulate the Serbian Crown Prince Alexander on Serbia’s Balkan victories caused consternation in regime circles, only Letica refused to sign it. The
three other metropolitans defended themselves with reference to the obloquy they would earn if they resisted the tide: a disappointing balance sheet for the hierarchy on which Austria had set its hopes.\(^5\)

There is no question in hindsight that the pre-1914 years were a high point in the prestige of the ‘Serb national idea’. Serbia emerged successful from the ‘trade war’ with Austria-Hungary of 1905–8 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Under the civic-minded King Petar Karadordević she came as near as in her history to a stable parliamentary state, whose cultural life was advancing rapidly with the foundation of Belgrade University in 1905 and the 140 per cent increase of secondary school numbers in the 1900s.\(^5\) Able intellectuals had the self-confidence to chart broader, self-consciously modernizing horizons for the nation, embracing a Yugoslav vision in which Croatian aspirations and society were sympathetically presented. As often happens, events conspired to put a rosy gloss for Serb patriots on long-standing factors which now appeared to come together in a compelling synthesis. While for Skerlić confidence led to positive attitude to Croats, for most others it strengthened Serb triumphalism. Serbs possessed Cyrillic, ‘that wholly panslav and so perfect a script’, designed expressly for the mother tongue, just as in Orthodoxy they had a religion which agreed with ‘the purity of spirit and heart characterizing the Slav peoples’. Catholic Croats lacked both their own religion and their own language, for they had adopted Serbian, abandoning the \textit{kajkavski} dialect native to Zagreb, whose substratum, however, accounted for the errors and infelicities which disfigured the work of even their best writers.\(^5\) In increasingly wider circles since Garašanin’s secret ‘plan’ of 1844, Serbs had had a programme of national restoration to aim at which they felt distinguished them from Muslims sunk in Oriental denial and Croats whose ‘servile spirit’ shackled them to Vienna. Bosnian Serbs could not deny that Croats had their own historical programme—Trialism—which the constant polemics between \textit{Hrvatski dnevnik} and \textit{Srpska riječ} showed they feared. But the standard charge was that while Croats were bold against Magyar oppression, they were as sheep towards equally tyrannous Austria.\(^5\)

As to Bosnia, no Serb doubted that it was a Serbian land and that demography was on their side. Serbs were 44 per cent of the population, while \textit{Srpska riječ} declared that the real figure was 48 per cent and they would soon be an absolute majority.\(^5\) Their intellectual base was not only the largest, with approximately 375 higher education scholarship holders during the occupation,\(^5\) but arguably the most attuned to wider social and intellectual trends. All in all, Serbs had the most varied press, including the ambitious periodical \textit{Pregled} (1910–12), though its self-consciously modernist themes, like eugenics, ultimately lacked appeal. The \textit{Narod} editor, Risto Radulović, could cite Sorel’s \textit{Sur la Violence} a year after its publication and offer wide-ranging sociological-cum-philosophical surveys, cast, to be sure, in the hard-nosed rationale of the time: ‘\textit{salus nationis suprema lex!’} (the salvation of the nation is the supreme law). England, wrote Radulović, offered the prospect of a grandiose struggle between the imperialist idea and
social justice, which would end in the compromise of modern democracy, a
democracy which could not evolve into the egalitarianism of Marxist utopia,
because even if property were to be abolished the conflict between elite and
masses, driving force of social evolution, would continue. 60 This was not bad
stuff for a smalltown Balkan editor. Radulović’s overall view has been concisely
summarized: the Serbs had the tradition to resist Austria but not the cultural
development; the Croats and Muslims had neither. 61 Of course, the attempt
to spur that culture into being was Radulović’s life’s work. Insofar as ideas
of Serbo-Croat unity came into the picture, Serbs were ‘the bearers of this
integration’. 62

The apparent cohesion of these perspectives certainly gained some support for
the Serb self-image as the Piedmont of the south Slavs among Croat and Muslim
youth, as the notorious episode of Zagreb students’ visit to Belgrade in 1912
reveals. Hrvatski dnevnik itself a fortnight before the assassination explained this
prestige by Serbs’ greater vigour in publicizing their cause. 63 Serbian assertiveness
was attractive. The Croats were feeble, the Russians did not consider them proper
Slavs and other big nations knew nothing about them, argued one Muslim Serb
schoolboy. 64 Radulović claimed Arnautović had told him, at the time of the
annexation, that the Muslims would not fight but ‘you Serbs are something
else’. 65 Here can be seen the picture of militant, united Serbdom which became
the view of Serbs among themselves and among opponents like Potiorek. Yet
may not the fact that both parties to the view had an interest in maintaining it
rouse some suspicions?

Indeed, the view from inside the Bosnian Serb camp was not so buoyant. Its one conspicuous victory, in the autonomy struggle—in which the Serbs
actually gave up their most far-reaching demands—had yielded little fruit in
practice. Risto Radulović’s fears for Serb society and the dissatisfaction among
Serb teachers have been noted. Kosta Božić, the oppositionist president of the
association of Serb priests founded in 1910, spoke of the inability of ‘our simple
and easily-led people’ to adapt to the ‘waves’ of western European ideas. 66 Sensing
that ordinary people were losing inner conviction in the performance of religious
rites and becoming ‘cold’ to the faith, thoughtful clerics wondered if they had
the training to rise to new challenges. 67 They were irritated to face not only
charges of Orthodox ‘sterility’ from the Catholic side, but of clericalism from lay
teachers on their own. 68 Evocations of the newly qualified priest transported to a
remote parish, too poor to buy papers, seeing his children go hungry and cursing
the day he was born, mirrored teachers’ laments. 69 A leading article summed
up the clergy’s position as caught between Church and state authorities, which
imposed higher educational qualifications, and their paymasters, the autonomous
authorities. 70 The finalization of a regular salary for the clergy dragged on, though
a pension settlement was reached in 1912. The association of Serb clergy was one
of those closed down by the exceptional measures of May 1913. Its re-legalization
offered a case of ministerial liberalism against which Potiorek was to fulminate
after the assassination, for Biliński turned down his proposal to link it with tighter supervisory regulations. Yet Potiorek was not the only angry man around. A report to a meeting of clergy printed in *Srpski sveštenik* raged against ‘all the social garbage of western Europe’ which was shaking the foundations of national life, removing people from ‘the idyllic peasant cottage’ to enterprise canteens where ‘our drunken peasant youth’, crudely imitating foreign songs, left his earnings, religion and morality in the company of bohemians and prostitutes, and ruined his health and life. Peasant morale mattered to patriots because in 1910 still only 7 per cent of Serbs were urban, as against a Muslim figure of 23 per cent, which hardly changed during the occupation. This was the Achilles heel of educated Serbdom, explaining the urgency behind the movement for artisanal societies to take more young Serbs into the towns, where communal organs were strong. Their weakness in this modernizing arena was a key limitation on Serb ambitions.

The idea that the autonomy was a weapon deployed by a united Serbdom to potent, treasonous effect is thus something of a myth devised after the event. In modern terminology, both sides were sending negative messages to each other. The government thought the autonomous organs were out to degut its supervisory powers; the organs that the government was out to degut the autonomy. Actually, both were right. The tensions inherent in the 1905 statute inevitably emerged in the prevailing climate of distrust. While the autonomous organs, following the government’s pattern of recurrent educational *enquêtes*, spent much time discussing realignment of their syllabuses with state programmes, in the last analysis their goal of a Serb spirit had to clash with Potiorek’s bid to push the dynastic idea in the schools, just as his concept of a staged process of coordination would have removed Serb autonomy even on matters like the number of hours a week devoted to freehand drawing. The ministry warned Sarajevo just before Vidovdan that, while prohibiting openly nationalist works, it could hardly order the Serb schools to change nearly all their other books within two years, when it had tacitly long accepted their use. Some Serbs were not inclined to fight a presumably doomed war of attrition on such issues and would have abandoned their schools. This was Professor Čuković’s view, and may explain why the government could have described him as politically reliable in appointing him a secondary school headmaster. However, such people were not renouncing the educational fight, but transposing it into the state and particularly the state secondary school sector. Čuković’s chief reason for advocating state schools was that they afforded Serbs more contact with Muslims to be won for the Serb national idea. The Provincial Government’s suspicion that the Serb media were targeting non-Serb headmasters in order to replace them with Serbs is wholly credible. But if Serbs were tacticizing, so was the government. Potiorek’s general hard line towards the Serbs on autonomy matters went with a willingness to turn a blind eye to individual nationalist ‘cultural workers’, in hope of securing
a pro-government majority in the Diet. Potiorek as a political soldier was rather clumsy in his would-be subtlety.

A conventional view might consider such matters inconsequential when cultural politics had yielded to the real thing. This book has argued that the scope for political gains was limited by Bosnia’s constitutional constraints and that issues of cultural development retained saliency. It can hardly be doubted that most Bosnian Serbs would have welcomed unification with Serbia, but this was not on the table. True, Jeftanović and Šola were in contact with Belgrade, directly and through Dr Gavrila, but Bosnian Serbs admitted during the annexation crisis that their influence on the masses was not strong enough to counter Austrian power. Insofar as they took Serbian guidance in the pre-war years, it was for moderation, and their wartime trial was discontinued partly because officials did not believe they had ever been revolutionaries, which indeed their social position made unlikely.\(^7\) The trajectory of a wider confrontation, with Russia on the Serb side, was more serious again, but the Bosnian Serb press devoted much less attention to international politics than papers like Zastava had done during Turkish rule, and vastly less than to articles on cultural/economic work. The comment of Srpska riječ, Jeftanović’s paper, on the opening of the Balkan War, that it could be the frightful prologue to the yet more frightful tragedy of world war, is eerily prophetic but conveys no arrière pensée, any more than its expression of ‘joy’ at the resolution of tension between the Monarchy and Serbia at a later point.\(^8\) The impression conveyed is that the Monarchy was seen as a going concern. In September 1913 twelve members of the Srpska riječ group resigned from the Diet because they could no longer balance their Serb nationalism and their prudence.

The Narod group represented the national programme in its quintessential intelligentsia-driven form, with its sharp sense of historic suffering and injustice, the obverse of the heroic Kosovo legend. The darkness of national fate, the distress of a tormented people and the sad, black days of its gloomy existence: these were standard expressions of the nationalist psyche and are reflected in Princip and throughout Serb journalism. Radulović put his finger on the mood in an article on the Kosovo anniversary in 1913. Despite the recent great victories in the Balkan wars:

Nonetheless, there is something unfinished, incomplete, empty … We feel all of us at every moment in collective and individual life, that for many centuries we have been cut off in obscurity from the entire world, because choked under the yoke of a nation incapable of culture, a state which had as its basis inequality—social injustice … centuries in which we could take no step forward, while other nations free and less encumbered, laboured intensively and advanced in progress … Entering the wealth of their cultures and creativity of their spirit, we feel like beggars in a palace.\(^8\)

In its picture educated Serbs were called on to complete a process of national renewal by bringing to the people the staff of life itself, the bread of national
culture, where an arrogant, alien bureaucracy could offer them only the stone of repression. Powerful though the call, in a clutch of Diet by-elections in late 1913 the *Narod* group, allied with *Srpska riječ* forces, failed to win a single seat. Most went to the new grouping of Dr Dimović, an advocate of Serb cooperation in a governing coalition. The franchise was not democratic but the limited reach of what men like Radulović called the principled nationalist position is clear. Of course, Dimović exacted a price from the government for cooperation. During the war he served as lawyer for the defence in all the major treason trials, and in the new Yugoslavia he fitted seamlessly into the new order, like the former Joint Finance Ministry’s cultural referent, Dr Božo Čerović. Do these facts bear out Potiorek’s claim for the traitorous solidarity of all Serbs, or imply that the Monarchy overreacted to the archduke’s assassination? Where does Young Bosnia fit in the picture?

Young Bosnia can be linked with the Serbian irredentist movement Narodna Odbrana, some of whose members in Bosnia helped smuggle the assassins into Bosnia. Radulović, whose newspaper Čabrinović was carrying on Vidovdan, had written that only ‘elemental events like elemental storms’ could regenerate society. After the war it came out that Vasilj Grđić, secretary of Prosvjeta, had had a conversation with Žerajić just before his assassination attempt and after Vidovdan had ripped out and recopied minutes Princip had written in temporary employ for the society. Princip canvassed for the *Narod* group candidate in the December 1913 by-elections and wrote an article on the disillusioning experience. In the small world of the urban intelligentsia people breathed the same air literally and metaphorically, though contiguity did not necessarily mean agreement. The Northern Ireland of the Troubles perhaps offers parallels. Yet agents of would-be Serbian irredentism had operated off and on in Bosnia since the mid-nineteenth century without much effective influence on the course of events. Even if they included leaders of Prosvjeta, it is clear from Bosnian activists’ statements and Narodna Odbrana’s reports that Serbs of independent Serbia had little grasp of Bosnian realities. While the reports ranged from rhetoric about an oppressed people about to erupt to more common disparagement of Bosnian passivity, Narodna Odbrana’s practical recommendations amounted to the advancing of national consciousness, in fact, ‘small deeds’. Insofar as there was a military dimension, a Serbian border agent who reported that a thousand men, armed, could take Bosnia from the Habsburgs, was plainly talking nonsense. In the same lines in which Radulović signalled the need for ‘elemental events’ he also wrote of a ‘process’ and of ‘social convulsions’ (author’s emphasis), more in line with his long-standing stress on the cultural-economic regeneration of Serbdom. This was the dominant preoccupation of Prosvjeta and kindred bodies. It is easy, however, to see how a young person might respond to such words. Moreover, this propaganda had a clear political purpose, for Serb journalism constantly
stressed how political power in the modern world had cultural and economic foundations.

One may venture the conclusion that there was a deep clash between the Habsburg and the Serb idea, which ruled out integration at any other than a pragmatic level. The injured innocence with which the Serb press rebutted aspersions on its dynastic loyalty is difficult to swallow whole. But it may be, to put the most positive construction, that what was meant by most was: please believe we have no intention of direct action against you. Hence Radulović’s ‘surprise’ may be credited at the counterproductive exceptional measures of May 1913, which loom so large in subsequent anti-Austrian historiography. For all the charge of radicals like Mitrinović that Austro-Hungarian rule was not real parliamentarism and could not be countered by parliamentary means, most Serbs do seem to have believed they were living in a state of law. In the denouement to war there appears to have been impatience on both sides with an undoubted impasse, which was, however, far from the point of ungovernability. The danger in 1914 was for political actors to be lured to try to short-circuit history in their favour. This was the error of Princip’s deed and Potiorek’s idée fixe of destroying Serbia. Such moves are made when people fear the historical process is about to take an irreversible turn, shutting out certain possibilities for ever. It is possible to see more widely in the Serb camp a fear that ongoing Germanization might end up sapping the nation’s power to achieve its goals and yield a Habsburg fate which many Serbs despised in the Croats, or which a Joint Finance Ministry official offered them, advocating the parallel of Galician Poles. There could be a self-conscious pride in ‘racial’ identity here which contributed to the superiority complex Bosnian Serbs felt vis-à-vis Muslims and Croats, and which has not stood the test of time. But a stiff-necked attitude to political compromise did not have to mean nationalist hubris. In Radulović’s case it also concerned principled opposition to what he took to be the corrupt wheeler-dealing of contemporary Austrian politics.

In fact, there was considerable dalliance between the regime and Serb leaders. By 1914 Šola had been Vice-President of the Diet Jeftanović decorated by the Emperor, and Radulović’s party trounced by Dimović’s members of the pro-government coalition. This turnabout, which was described in Tito’s Yugoslavia as the opportunism of an immature bourgeoisie, could also be seen as a relative success for Austrian policy and Bosnia’s fledgling constitutionalism. The two viewpoints are not necessarily contradictory. They indicate something of the complexity of the Bosnian Serb constituency. Pressures from hindsight and from politics crowd in to force a simple verdict, making the community fit a Serb triumphalist, anti-Serb or Marxist perspective. Such approaches miss what was stressed by the cleverest contemporaries, Mitrinović, Gaćinović and Radulović alike, that alongside the undoubted progress of a new secular elite was the confusion of a society in a state of flux. Young Bosnia was a representative
reflection of these trends, but insofar as the assassins sought to cut through the complexities to a single dramatic resolution, they betrayed them.

Vladimir Čorović, as a product of the Austrian occupation, exemplifies in a single individual perhaps the widest variety of Serb activities, experiences and perceptions in and of that period. Born in 1885 in Mostar, he was a Gymnasium student there in the 1890s when it enjoyed the most active Serb cultural life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which his elder brother, Svetozar, was a renowned littérature. Vladimir himself chose to follow the academic route, studying Slavistics and Byzantology under leading experts in Vienna, Munich, Paris and Bologna. Awarded the Franz Joseph gold ring as best student of his year in Vienna, he declined to receive it in protest at the annexation. He had already expressed his patriotic views in a study of the Vienna Serb literary society ‘Zora’ in 1905, belabouring society members for ‘our lack of persistence, … our classic lack of solidarity, our impetuosity in conceiving work and carrying it out’. Given he also wrote that 1878 was the year of the destruction of Serb hopes, it is interesting that Hörmann gave him a post in the Provincial Museum and that he accepted it; moreover, stayed there when a Docent’s place was his for the taking in Belgrade, a fact he exploited to gain secondment to Carl Patsch’s Balkan Institute. By this time Austria was eager to employ more native Bosnian officials, particularly Serbs. Hörmann had ironized to Thallóczy about the advantage of being able to point to a ‘brother Serb’ in the Museum—albeit a ‘temperamental’ one—when Jefto Dedijer, later Pregled editor and father of the partisan author Vladimir Dedijer, applied in 1907. Čorović became a voluminous and fearsomely scholarly contributor to Serb and German journals, his nationalist connections earning him an eight-year prison sentence at the Banjaluka trial in 1915, from which he was pardoned in 1917. A fierce quarrel then came with Patsch, to whom he had previously been tied by professional respect, when Patsch refused him permission to publish a manuscript, based on Institute assets, on which he had been working before his trial. The end of the war found him writing for a Yugoslav-orientated periodical in Zagreb, which he followed with a ‘Black Book’ on the mistreatment of Bosnian Serbs during the war, the closing down of Patsch’s Institute in Sarajevo and a professorship in Belgrade, where he stayed, a productive and prestigious scholar, till his death in an air crash fleeing the Nazis in 1941.

Čorović’s attitudes are emblematic of his generation, of which he wrote that with its mythic exertions equally with its passive martyrdom it had achieved greatness, so that the whole nation for the first time in history had participated in the making of ideas and deeds. Inevitably, his wartime experiences in prison and with Patsch will have given edge to his views, but not to the point, it seems likely, of distorting his pre-war impressions. Čorović saw that period as one of ‘glad creative strength’ in Serbia, when all young Bosnians’ eyes were fixed on Belgrade. The Balkan wars showed, in the phrase of positivist nationalism,
her ‘vital force’. Austria-Hungary had shut off Serbia from every prospect of escape from her cramped position, denying her the chance of true state life, in accordance with age-old Austrian selfishness. Factually thorough, Corović’s work is a classic statement from the age of nationalism. It also shows the way in which by the First World War Serb intellectuals had come to adopt Yugoslavism, the idea of a single nation of which Serbs were part, while retaining their view of Serbs’ distinctive destiny. Yugoslavism was particularly strongly emphasized in his Black Book. Yet he also shared the Serb concern with the ‘nationalizing’ of the Muslims, and edited a book of Muslim folk songs with one of the most committed of Muslim Serbs in 1913, arguing for change of heart in Serb attitudes to Muslims.

The slipperiness of interconfessional relations, however, is only too apparent in what he himself referred to as a ‘delicate question’ in his inaugural lecture on ‘Religion and Race in the Serb Past’ at Belgrade University in 1919. Why had Orthodoxy been best for the Serb psyche? Roman Catholicism was a centralist, universalist and dogmatic creed. The Serb attitude to religion by contrast was liberal and undogmatic; indeed Serb Orthodoxy was really a matter of tradition, patriarchal and primitive, with religion playing only a formal part. As such, those who fell away from the tradition by becoming Muslims were commonly designated deviants, traitors, cowardly weaklings, public scandals and the like. Religion had played an important role in maintaining Serb identity but from the second half of the nineteenth century it had become a purely private matter whose public significance was confined to the past. ‘It had served its time.’ This view of religion is again reflective of Corović’s intellectual contemporaries among Bosnian Serbs, but one would think only an understandable euphoria of the time could lead him to such incautious utterances. After all, Corović’s Catholic and Muslim partners in the single Yugoslav nation had shown no disposition to treat religion so lightly. Corović’s life and work show how Austrian Bosnia could produce a formidable intellectual who for a time worked in a key institution of the ‘cultural mission’, but also how that relationship broke down; how, too, Corović’s intellectual persona did not promise an easy relationship with the non-Serbs with whom he came to claim a common identity.

Croats divided

Croats had made the most relative progress under the occupation, in line with Austrian hopes expressed at its start. They had risen from 18 per cent of the poorest people in the two provinces to 22.4 per cent, increasing twenty-four fold in the capital, to press close on the Muslims’ heels. They had acquired a Gothic cathedral in the heart of Sarajevo, backed by an impressive complex for administration and seminary, an elegant bishop’s palace in Mostar, and the stately structures of the Archbishop’s Gymnasium in Travnik and the Franciscan
Gymnasiums in Visoko and Široki Brijeg. There were also the thirty-one primary schools and twelve Higher Girls’ Schools maintained by the three nuns’ congregations (the Sisters of the Merciful Heart, Sisters of the Precious Blood, and Daughters of Divine Love), a network of orphanages and welfare institutions and the successful centralization of Franciscans’ theological training in Sarajevo (1909) and Mostar (1895). As a result of all this educational activity, Catholics at 23 per cent were more than twice as literate as the rest of the population (Orthodox 10 per cent; Muslims 5 per cent).

The most signal community achievement was the Napredak House, built at the huge cost of 1,200,000 K and opened in September 1913. It represented the associational ideal of the union of different patriotic societies under one umbrella, for it housed Napredak’s central administration, various Croatian societies, a bookshop, the Napredak insurance and savings association, a cinema, a Napredak café and restaurant, and a shop, all of which through rent would make the House a lucrative concern. The complex financing benefited from advice of Catholic bankers and architects, immigrants like most of the new Sarajevo Croat intelligentsia. But Napredak was a success story also in muting the tensions between incomers and natives, and even between pro-Franciscans and Stadlerites. By 1913–14 it had financed 1,192 students in various ways, including its seventy higher education scholarship holders. Some stumbles showed the immaturity of Bosnian civil life. Organizing a projected visit of the Ljubljana Slovene Opera was still beyond its resources in 1907, even with piano accompaniment alone. But the income from Sarajevo’s annual ‘Napredak Day’ celebrations rose healthily to 14,925 K in 1912, over four times the 1909 figure. And the next year’s Day had the pilgrims’ chorus from Tannhäuser and arias from Eugene Onegin, Tosca and La Bohème—a bourgeois nationalist dream come true!

At a humbler level the picture was more mixed. A new organ of the Croatian National Association (HNZ) opened with the theme of a bleak inheritance: ‘The past of our homeland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, is a bitter and bloody picture of eternal commotions and battles, homes destroyed … and flight’ in which only the faith of the fathers had brought people through ‘the wilderness of black, dark days’. While the story of progress was affirmed against over-rosy views of the past, contrary themes also broke through: ‘Why our people are declining’; ‘the people are hungry’. The journal used the dialogue form in imparting its message, and showed nothing of the Yugophile ‘one people’ perspective by this time influencing more elite discourse. Serb ambitions for Albanian land were referred to with cool detachment. While there was no hint of disloyalty to ‘our wide-flung Monarchy’, there was a sense of catering for humble folk ‘who know well that all ill that beats them comes from above’. The readers were addressed as Croats, but in view of the low rate of literacy among native Catholics it is not surprising that the generalization of this name among Bosnian Catholic
peasants has been dated to the 1930s. Yet real progress had undoubtedly been made. Several native Bosnians rose to important positions in the pre-war years: Ivan Šarić as auxiliary bishop in Sarajevo, Nikola Mandić as deputy provincial governor, and Professors Tugomir Alauović and Ivo Dujmušić as secondary school inspector and editor of *Vrhbosna* respectively.

Nonetheless, the impact of the incomers was the dominant feature of the Catholic experience in the occupation. They made up half the elected Catholic representatives in the Sabor, as against a sixth of the Serbs. Strengthening the community in one way, they had also divided it. In 1914 the feud between Archbishop Stadler and the Franciscans raged stronger than ever. In these last years it took both Catholic institutional and wider political forms, provoking the Curia into appointing the Belgian Benedictine, Dom Pierre Bastien, Apostolic Delegate in Bosnia on a mission which lasted from December 1910 till October 1914. The institutional problem centred around Stadler’s understandable wish to provide adequately for his secular clergy through a regular salary (congrua), in place of the offerings of the faithful, which were low since Franciscans kept control of most of the richest parishes. The issue underlay Stadler’s attempt, in the wake of the Serb statute of 1905, to secure a parallel autonomy for the Catholic Church which would allow it to levy a surcharge on its flock. Yet Stadler’s pressing of the autonomy theme saw him at his most opportunistic. Ignoring the lay role which was at the heart of Serb and Muslim autonomy, his draft statute of 1907 would have given the Catholics a fourth diocese to match the new Orthodox see of Banjaluka, added a Greek Catholic diocese in Sarajevo and provided Trebinje diocese with its own bishop; that of 1910 would have exempted bishops from punishment save by the Emperor and the Pope (1910). The last point—a response to a fine levied on Stadler for violating the conversion ordinance—was rather typical of the archbishop’s self-defeating mode of procedure, since it would hardly appeal to interlocutors responsible for the fine in the first place. Franciscans opposed the autonomy idea for fear of being outmanoeuvred in the institutions thereby created and because they saw the existing system of paying clergy as a means to support their teaching institutions, in compensation for the extra state funding Stadler received for the Travnik Gymnasium. No progress was made on the autonomy and little on the congrua.

Having put his diocese 2.5 million K in debt by his buildings, Stadler seemed due for the *coup de grâce* when in 1913 Bastien joined the Habsburg authorities in seeking his removal. He was saved in a last meeting with the Pope, who pronounced: ‘Manet et manebit’ (He remains and will remain). However, his authority and even his energy was weakened. Stadler’s great contribution to the Catholic presence in Bosnia is undoubted and there is testimony to his personal saintliness, but what the Provincial Government called his ‘never resting manoeuvres’ won him many enemies. In his battles with the Franciscans
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he was to an extent a victim of government miscalculation, because having been installed as a new broom he was then left in the lurch by the authorities when they realized the strong position of the native clergy. The Franciscans were doughty scrappers themselves, who no doubt made opposing Stadler a matter of principle. The leading Herzegovinian candidate to succeed Bishop Buconjić in Mostar, the ‘impulsive and irascible’ fra Ambros Miletić, was one of several Franciscans the authorities described in such terms over the years. Nonetheless, was it accidental that all Austrian administrators who came in contact with him, and finally the Apostolic Delegate Bastien, blamed him for the quarrel with the friars? It has been argued that Bastien allowed himself to be over-influenced by the state authorities and that he was, both as monk and Hungarophile, not impartial. Yet a reading of Stadler’s stream of memoranda and requests leaves the impression of a zealousness both focused and unfocused, sweeping up indiscriminately every argument thought to serve the interest of the urgently demanded action. It is not the impression of a reasonable man, for doubtless Stadler would have deemed too much latitudinarianism no virtue in God’s cause. On the policy which did most damage to his reputation, on conversions, it is true that Serbs and Muslims attacked him from a standpoint of religious traditionalism, which took no account of the wishes of the individual. Yet the argument that the archbishop sought to defend the humane ideal of freedom of conscience in a multi-cultural society tends to play down the somewhat murky circumstances of many of the contested cases. He was punished for his inflexibility because it enabled his enemies to launch campaigns of a Catholic propaganda, unscrupulously exaggerated.

Stadler’s tunnel vision isolated him in the field of party politics also. He condemned the HNZ’s initial rapprochement with the Serbs in the Diet, centred on the peasant question, and was not reassured by its subsequent pact with the Muslims, since he put no trust in HNZ hopes for the Muslims’ ‘nationalization’. Only when Croat-Muslim relations cooled did he merge his own minority party with the HNZ. By 1914, however, this merger was coming unstuck: Potiorek and the Curia were putting ineffective pressure on the archbishop to curb Hrvatski dnevnik’s attacks on HNZ politicians, which Potiorek claimed were undermining Croatian unity in the face of the Serb threat. Stadler tried but failed to prevent Nikola Mandić’s appointment as Deputy Provincial Governor. Behind his continuing distrust of the HNZ was the belief that leaders like Mandić were inclining it towards the ‘progressive tendency’ of the Croato-Serb coalition, which made its way back to office in Croatia in 1913. Stadler’s preferred alternative was to build a Croatian Catholic block throughout Croatian lands, including Bosnia, with a programme for a Croatian Trialist state directed against the Coalition’s Yugoslavism. A meeting of the prospective Catholic parties to the merger foundered, however, bringing to a halt the strategy in which the archbishop had invested much energy. As an unwavering supporter of the Great Austrian circle around the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Stadler was an enemy of the Magyars,
who saw the Bosnian administration as being under Magyar influence and was antagonized by Mandić’s willingness to cooperate with Hungarian commercial interests. Three strands of politics had thus become intertwined, at the level of Vienna versus Budapest, the south Slav world and Bosnia itself.\textsuperscript{115}

The permutations are complicated, but at risk of simplification they can be given an emotive rationale. For a man trained in Rome under the arch-conservative Pius IX, the ‘progressive’ strand represented in Croatian politics by the Croato-Serb coalition was doubly obnoxious, for its secular-modernist and its Serbophile leanings. In the Franciscans, for all their anti-modernism, there was a vein of south Slav sentiment going back to Ivan Franjo Jukić and before which could make them more accessible to the incipient Yugoslav cause.\textsuperscript{116}

The ultimate failure of Yugoslavism makes it possible to paint the archbishop as a Cassandra figure, seeing through the lay intelligentsia’s illusions about a multiconfessional Croatdom, and its slippage towards the thralldom of a Great Serb state wrapped in mendacious Yugoslavism. Such a view requires much hindsight, however. It became very tempting even for Starčevičites by 1914 to see the overtures of partnership being made to Croatia by Yugoslav-minded Serbs as more promising than anything else on offer. Franz Ferdinand, for example, was not a Trialist but intended to use the Croats against Serbs and Magyars in the interests of a reinvigorated centralism.\textsuperscript{117} Stadler was in the difficult position of advocating a pro-Austrian policy which had no strategic endorsement from Austrians and at the tactical level was condemned by a Great Austrian figure like Potiorek. The overriding weakness of an anti-Yugoslav Croat politics was that it relied on Vienna’s support when Franz Joseph would always choose Hungary over Croatia.

Thus the pattern of high politics in the Dual monarchy cut across the occupiers’ original intention to build up the Bosnian Catholic community as a support for the regime. Internally, the Franciscans and the HNZ also opposed plans of Stadler and the Travnik-based German Jesuit Puntigam to strengthen it through Catholic immigration, replacing departing Muslims. Zoran Grijak has commented ironically from a pro-Stadler standpoint that the HNZ saw Catholic immigration from the monarchy as a greater threat than the endeavours of Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{118} But this judgement is somewhat anachronistic. Native Bosnian Catholics had not yet become standard Croats and shared much of the resentment of other Bosnians towards the kuferaši. Besides, in Croatia itself the view that saw Serbs as the main enemy was largely confined to a conservative, Catholic minority wing of educated opinion. Bosnian Croat students by 1914 were beginning to swing in the direction of the Serbo-Croat Nationalist Youth movement, which was pro-Yugoslav. Ivo Andrić is the paradigm case. The path is discernible which would lead Mandić as the community’s leading politician into alignment with the Croato-Serb coalition and its demand for a Yugoslav state in 1918.

Tomislav Išek in his study of Napredak has stressed how the often antagonistic tendencies described above remained united in its ranks. The man who deserves
perhaps most credit for this was its secretary and later president Tugomir Alaupović, whose life illustrates many of the attitudes in the majority pro-Franciscan wing of the Bosnian Catholic community. Born near Travnik in 1871, Alaupović was grounded in his Croatian identity in primary school, and after seven years in Travnik Gymnasium appears to have been inspired to deepen his interest in Croatian literature further by the Franciscan religious instruction teacher in his eighth year, in Sarajevo. Specializing at university in Slavistics at Zagreb and Vienna, he was the first native Bosnian Gymnasium professor, in Sarajevo, before becoming director of Tuzla Gymnasium in 1911, and secondary school inspector in 1913. The opening report in his official file described him as a mixture of poet, philosopher and scholar, and for his biographer his poetry gave Croats the first true picture of Bosnian life. Alaupović’s writing reflects the preoccupation with the dark sufferings of his people which has been noted above as part of the psyche of both Bosnian Serbs and Croats, though it should be said that he is known for his elegiac tone. It was infused further with a neo-Darwinian strain:

In eternal and painful turmoil,
In the vital struggle for existence,
Centuries contest with centuries.
Our mountains give birth to heroes
Who for the faith perish and die …

Alaupović was drawn to the figure of the pioneer of Bosnian enlightenment, the Illyrian fra Ivan Franjo Jukić, whose ‘short and so tragic’ life he wrote, as well as those of several other nineteenth-century Franciscan leaders. A typical anniversary poem to Jukić rises through ‘the hungry centuries and harsh distress’ and the ‘sweat and toil’ Jukić’s people sowed without harvest to a stoic affirmation: ‘What is to be eternal has the weft of eternity/The years bring a martyr’s glory!’

Significant in the work of this Habsburg official is the absence of any suggestion that in Austrian Bosnia the time of liberation has arrived. Jukić’s last resting place was ‘under the grey and leaden Vienna sky in a hard, foreign land’; the divisions of immature Bosnians have allowed a third party to extract his own interest. Alaupović followed his hero in his south Slav sympathies. Salvation lay only in overcoming divisions, he wrote emotionally from Vienna studies to the Muslim poet Bašagić, not with those whose slogan was ‘Divide et impera’. Few as we were, ‘sloga’ was necessary, but ‘Truth is on our side and sooner or later it will triumph’. ‘Sloga’ at this time Alaupović pictured as between Catholic and Muslim Croats, with Serbs indirectly figuring as ‘without a crumb of fraternal feeling’. Later his patriotism came to include them also. It is not surprising that Alaupović should have the familiar description as of ‘lively’, then ‘extremely lively’ temperament from his superiors, which became ‘bitterness’ at lack of advancement in a report of 1910. Throughout he played a leading role in Croatian associational life, in ‘Trebević’, the Croatian Club, the Croatian
sokol and Napredak. On becoming director in Tuzla, he sought to implement his belief that the teacher should be the friend of his pupils and know them as individuals. We have seen him in this guise as initiator of the Gymnasial literary club. The result was personally all but disastrous. In 1915 Alaupović was tried for abuse of his office on the basis of denunciations by Croatian and Croatophile Muslim masters, to the effect that he had favoured Serbs, failed to prevent them frequenting forbidden societies while preventing Croat students mixing with Muslims, allowed immoral and irreligious discussions and led an outing to the border town of Zvornik, where Serb students had kissed the Serbian soil. The court decided that whatever his disciplinary negligence, there was no evidence of the malicious intent required for a crime. The ordeal no doubt strengthened his credentials to become three times, if briefly, minister of education in interwar Yugoslavia.

Alaupović’s correspondence from that time, kept significantly in the Franciscan Gymnasium in Visoko, confirmed the difficult position of Bosnian Croats as members of the smallest of the main Bosnian communities and of the smaller of the two main Serbo-Croat speaking nations. One of his correspondents, a former colleague in Tuzla, in his disillusionment very quickly turned against his Yugoslav Serbophilism; another, Ivo Andrić, seems eventually to have deemed himself a Serb. Ivo Pilar, with whom Alaupović had protested against Stadler over the ‘Trebević’ affair, published a weighty pseudonymous volume attacking Great Serbian hegemonism in the First World War. The Croat-educated laity which had arisen under Austria was united against Stadler’s clerical pretensions, but much less so on the major strategic question facing Bosnia’s Croats: how should loyalties be divided between Austria, Croatia and Yugoslavism? According to one of their most sensitive historians the dilemma remains, though its terms are reduced to loyalty to a Croat identity within a civic Bosnia, or integral Croatian nationalism.

**MUSLIM QUANDARIES**

In many ways the Muslims provide the most intriguing story of the occupation. Habsburg–Serb and Habsburg–Croat relations followed a course in part predictable on the basis of the Monarchy’s previous dealings with those peoples elsewhere, which in the Muslim case had no parallel. While Christian elites attacked it for insufficient reform, the Muslim critique was both radical and conservative, from begs and hodžas still regretting the passing of Turkish rule and also new western-educated voices. This was the ‘double whammy’ imperial rule characteristically faced in colonial, non-Christian contexts. But alongside striking failures, there were also regime successes. By 1914 something can be seen of the evolution which has made modern Bosniaks look back with some nostalgia to the Austro-Hungarian period.
At one level, the problems which preoccupied Muslim reformers remained. ‘We have declined from day to day,’ wrote Novi vakat’s opening editorial of Muslim conservatism: ‘in a word, we have remained the same right up to today: the same upbringing, same customs, same view of life and same mentality’. Rich Muslims still saw fit to keep their children from the schools; the intelligentsia was alienated from the people; youth suffered from a veritable disease of laziness; alcoholism and illiteracy were the community’s ‘open wounds’, while other communities moved ahead, united in purpose. The jump in emigration after the annexation lends weight to these familiar plaints. Overall Muslim emigration from Bosnia under the occupation no doubt exceeded the official figure of 61,114 and contributed to a further fall in the Muslim proportion of the population to just under a third in the 1910 census. They remained a bare majority in the towns (50.3 per cent) and the largest group employed in industry and crafts (45 per cent); above all, they were still 91 per cent of landowners possessing kmets. This accounted for the unity of Muslim parties in opposing compulsory land reform as a ‘vital’ interest of the community. An interesting statistic underscores the continuing Muslim sense of insecurity, which inclined them to gravitate to areas of relative strength. Whereas the Muslim population in Sarajevo Kreis rose between the 1895 and 1910 censuses by 18.4 per cent, in Serb-dominated Banjaluka Kreis it fell by 3.4 per cent.

The anti-Austrian implications of this insecurity still resonated. There was a sense that in 1878 Bosnia had been cut off from a community ‘to which it belonged in soul and sentiment’. That year, stated an editorial of 1906, was the most fateful time in Bosnian Muslims’ history, when they had woken from a ‘horrible dream’ to find it was reality, the tearing away from the moorings which had held ‘all their hopes and confidence for four centuries’; as a result nowhere were Muslims heard of as a ‘national, corporative whole’. For Novi vakat, Källay and Kutschera had been duplicitous enemies, whose show of sympathy for Islam masked a determination to keep the community backward and dependent, economically and educationally. Historians have noted that the Muslim opposition did not recognize the annexation till February 1910, well after Jefstanović, and that the unpopularity of the Muslim Autonomist Party may have had more to do with its pro-government than its pro-Croat leanings. Such enduring distaste for the ‘Švabe’, who had made a pitch to win them over, must be accounted a failure in one of Austria’s fundamental goals.

Yet the picture was not so bleak, for the Muslims or Austria. A literary and reform-minded intelligentsia and autonomy movement had emerged, which despite the traditional social roots of the latter and western orientation of the former, reached a certain modus vivendi. Writing of the newly founded Muslim Central Bank in 1913, Novi vakat claimed that though Muslims remained far behind their Christian neighbours, they could derive consolation from their economic and cultural institutions, particularly in recent years. The turn of the
century was usually seen as the point of upturn, when negative attitudes to western education began to change. The foundation of Gajret in 1902 put Muslim society on the same trajectory as Christian in terms of financing a modern intelligentsia, aided by government scholarships which from 1911 approximated to the Muslim share in the population. Maximilian Braun interestingly observed that by 1914 for western-educated Muslims the Islamic world was becoming a cultural ideal to be held up against an increasingly Europeanized day-to-day reality. True, this western-educated stratum was thin—only a third of Muslim representatives in the Diet, alongside landowners—and the associational life which accompanied it had no presence outside the towns. Only a handful of Muslim secondary school graduates came from villages, as opposed to between a third and a quarter of Serbs. A telltale item in Vakat complaining about the telephone service, at a time when one in two thousand Bosnians subscribed to it, suggests the social isolation of its readers.

Even in the towns there was a long way to go towards Muslim bourgeois culture in a western sense. Theatre groups, pioneers of the public sphere in an east European context, found difficulties initially because Muslims refused to play non-Muslims or negative characters. The problems of putting on the existing Serb or Croat repertoire, however, led to Muslims writing plays themselves. Muhamed Kalajdžić’s Muslim publishing company founded on a joint stock basis in 1909, and its series ‘The Little Muslim Library’, marked another advance. The literary reviews Behar (1900–12) and Biser (1912–14, 1918) provided a forum largely outside party wranglings. The level of activity by would-be modernizers was sufficiently strong for the beg-dominated autonomy movement to seek to control it, as in its takeover of Gajret in 1907. In fact, something of a consensus developed in all Muslim publications about the need for a thoroughgoing reform of Bosnia’s Islamic schools, vigorously supported by the Muslim National Organization’s organ Musavat. Education, particularly of women, as the answer to the community’s perceived decline; the example of foreign Muslims, particularly Turkish and Russian; the need for mother-tongue Koranic instruction and for secondary school religion teachers who had heard of Darwin and the like; the reduction of the time spent in mektebs; fewer but better madrassas offering secular instruction: these were the chief threads running through the discussion.

There was also, to be sure, disagreement between those who wanted reformed religious schools to reveal ‘the essence of Islam’ and those chiefly concerned to curtail their role. At opposite poles of the westernization-tradition debate were men like the Diet MP and doctor Karamehmedović and the Gajret correspondent who noted, apropos the role of women, that western scholars themselves recoiled from the unnatural aspects of modern life. But the tendency was for less stress to be put on the reservations. After the Balkan Wars the MNO leader Šerif Arnautović spelt out that Bosnian Muslims must recognize the European way of
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life. Even the madrassa students who demonstrated against Musavat’s claim that half of them were syphilitic asserted the buzz words of progress, culture and reform and called for secular subjects. The germ of a radical Yugoslavism is reflected in a Gajret critique of the organ of Croatian nationalist students in 1913: why talk of King Tomislav when the progressive idea of democratization and progress was rapidly conquering European youth?

Yet the deliberations of the educational enquêtes of 1910–11 fell well short of reformers’ wishes and anyway were not implemented. The government’s view that an ultra-conservative Medžlis-el-ulema sought every means to frustrate them is lent plausibility by the private remark of a Medžlis member: what would we [the ulema] do if everything was translated into our language and everyone could read it? Omer effendi Zukanović hardly did his conservative cause much credit by stating that no child who went to a state primary school would want to enter a madrassa, while the government believed some mekteb teachers deliberately failed their pupils to deprive them of the necessary qualification for primary school entrance. This state of affairs contributed to the deposing of Reis-ul-ulema Šarac, ostensibly for insulting behaviour, in 1912. But it is plain that without support from the ulema the wishes of the intelligentsia had little impact on grass-roots conservatism.

Šarac’s successor showed, however, that the wind of change was blowing through sections of the ulema too. Džemaludin Čaušević (1869–1938) returned from a brilliant educational career in Turkey with a sense of regenerative mission for his motherland. With his deep sense that Bosnian Islam had fallen into formalism through ignorance of the wellsprings of the faith, and his focus on the Muslim peasantry, it is not surprising that Čaušević as Medžlis member responsible for education (1905–9) developed his publicistic activity in the mother tongue but in an adapted Arabic script (arebica). Besides a periodical, Tarih, and a calendar, Mekteb, he published some twenty-six books in three years, as well as founding an organization for muallims and the journals El Muallim and Misbah. Leaving his post as professor at the Sharia School because of lack of advancement, he was reclaimed from his odd intention to become a bookseller in Bursa by his appointment as Reis, after the government had rejected him the first time round. His enthusiastic reception by 150 fiakers on his return to Sarajevo from an imperial audience suggests an upsurge in Muslim self-confidence, echoed by the new Reis’s own determined words on Muslim backwardness: ‘This can no longer continue’. Even before his permanent return to Bosnia, Čaušević had set out a programme for educational reform, including the fusion of existing madrassas and an advanced institution in Sarajevo. Čaušević, as an admirer of Mohammed Abduh and his Cairo journal El Menar, was in the mainstream of Islamic reformism with its aspiration to return to what it saw as the rational core of Islam: his later writings were to offer a naturalistic explanation of the Israelites’ crossing of the Red Sea. Rhetorical as it may have been, the ‘happy
news’ he brought from Vienna of the love held by ‘our gracious sovereign’ for his Muslims bespoke a relationship which at long last promised to make the Muslim hierarchy the kind of institution Austria had intended it to be.  

Yet the very reconciliation of educated Muslims with European ‘modernity’ sharpened the unresolved question of Muslim identity. Current European attitudes required everyone to belong to a nation, but what nation did the Muslims belong to? Since contemporary Herderian assumptions defined national culture through language, the idea that a nation might spring from a religious base was preposterous for an age which assigned religion to the traditional sphere. ‘We Muslims here are no kind of separate nation, but part of a Slav nation recognized by language’, wrote Mulabdić, pioneer novelist of the literary revival. Even the de facto organ of the MNO, caustic in its criticisms of Serb and Croat policy, declared that all Muslims would eventually ‘nationalize’, that is, in the language of the time, align themselves as Serbs or Croats.  

The irony of such stances is that the components of now generally recognized Bosniak nationhood were already present in pre-1914 Bosnia. The expression ‘muslimanski narod’, less commonly ‘islamski narod’, was as pervasive as the Serb and Croat equivalents ‘srpski narod’ or ‘hrvatski narod’, alongside ‘national collectivity’, ‘corporative whole’, ‘national idea’ and ‘Islamic patriotism’. Historic-territorial awareness breathed through Čaušević’s chagrin at the abandonment for ever of wide swathes of land by Bosnian Muslim emigration. Safvet-beg Bašagić outlined the thesis of Muslim descent from converted Bogomils in his ‘History of Bosnia’, and Novi vakat evoked the shades of medieval rulers like Tvrtko and Hrvoje, even while adjuring Muslims not to live in the past. This historic backdrop was reflected in a sprinkling of terms like ‘chivalrous’ (viteški), ‘proud Bosnia’, ‘heroic ancestors’ and the like which bespeak a different view of the past from the dark evocations of Serb and Croat texts. Moreover, the sense of being ‘still now the richest element in the land’ occasionally made itself felt, while the free status of almost all Muslim peasants gave them potentially greater access to agricultural credit. The Islamic spiritual heritage, then as now, mingled with the territorial Bosnian and the linguistically Slav. The awakening in the Islamic world was an important part of Bosnian Muslims’ world view, and a pan-Islamist strand enters their journals on the eve of war, while these paid at least as much attention to Turkey as Serb ones did to Serbia. Indeed, the stress in modern Bosniak historiography on Bosniak detachment from Ottomanism is not altogether confirmed by the warmth of references to Turkey in pre-1914 texts. Sociologically speaking, claimed one writer, the Muslim masses might still be called Turks, if one judged by spirit and sentiment rather than externally by language and customs.  

Given the tension between theories of ‘nationalization’ and Muslim ethnic reality, conversion to Serbdom or Croatdom was bound to be a problematic affair. It was aided by the conviction of many of the western-educated that
religion and nationality were separate things and that such a powerful force as the ‘national idea’ should not be neglected in tackling the apathy and disorientation young Muslims saw in their co-religionists.\textsuperscript{162} A process that had begun with a Croatianizing trend among literati in the 1890s had its strongest adherents by 1914 among Serbophiles. In the former case personal friendship or the influence of a respected Croat secondary school teacher often appears to have played a role, helped by Croatian willingness to woo Muslims. Tugomir Alaupović’s correspondence with his Gymnasium schoolfriend Bašagić made an emotional appeal to ‘bind eternal friendship’ through old Croat fraternity in the interests of ‘our unhappy nation’.\textsuperscript{163} Bašagić was one of three representative young Croats chosen to report the opening of the Starčević House in Zagreb to the aged nationalist leader himself. The famous historian Hamdija Kreševljaković, youthful author of \textit{A Short History of the Croatian Book in Herceg-Bosna} (1912), recalled to Alaupović how he had been influenced as a schoolboy by Alaupović’s poems and the Croat historian of Bosnia, Vjekoslav Klaić.\textsuperscript{164} Čaušević’s own designation as a Croat probably goes back to his first literary contacts in his mother tongue on return from Turkey with the Croatophiles Bašagić, Hadžić and Mulabdić.\textsuperscript{165} Though this example shows how lightly the Croatian identity could lie, in some cases it had greater weight. The businessman and publisher Ademaga Mešić stressed Bašagić’s Croat nationality several times in his obituary tribute to him and served as Vice-President of the Bosnian administration in ustasha Croatia.\textsuperscript{166} Mešić was prominent in the minority Muslim Progressive Party, which stood for Croato-Bosnian Trialism and an Austro-German-Turkish alliance, as the best defence against Serbian hegemony.\textsuperscript{167} But even Mešić protested against the annexation, and the Progressives’ successors, the Muslim Autonomist Party (1910), dropped the Croatian affiliation. In the Croat–Muslim Diet pact of 1911, Muslims did not commit themselves to Trialism. To all intents and purposes, whether some Muslims called themselves Croats or not had no effect on the course of events.

The attraction of a Serbian orientation was to maximize grievance against a foreign administration and feared Catholic Church. The publication of \textit{Pobratimstvo}, Serb patriotic verse by three young, partly Serbian-educated Muslim poets in 1900, showed that for militant-minded youth the Balkan heroic tradition, exemplified by independent Serbia, could provide a framework spanning the religious divide. More mainstream Muslim response to \textit{Pobratimstvo} was scathing, however. Their work was ‘an insult … to the memory and traditions of us Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims’, wrote Behar.\textsuperscript{168} Did students who had signed a joint declaration with the Orthodox not realize that Bosnian divisions were no mere matter of prejudice but historical memories, the journal commented some years later.\textsuperscript{169} Gajret’s last pre-war years were stormy, with the annual general meetings of 1912 and 1913 suspended because of disorder. The divisions were not really about its adoption of a Serb orientation after the MNO
takeover, however, but between MNO-orientated elements seeking to maintain control against variegated Croatophiles, Muslim ‘democrats’ and opponents of the society’s politicization. After the Serbophile poet Đikić’s early death Serbs lent enthusiastic support to the Serbophile Muslim student hostel founded in his memory, but *Novi vakat*, a mainstream organ, denounced it trenchantly as Serbicization:

It is a matter of our skin and our future, and the duty of all parents of such youth lies in preserving their children from the greatest enemy of Muslims in Bosnia, Serbdom, in the struggle for existence we are fighting today with the Serbs.170

Most Serbophile Muslims wore their ostensible nationality as lightly as their ‘Croat’ counterparts. One of them wept like a baby at the fall of Turkish Edirne to the Balkan coalition of which Serbia was part; another, Dr Karamehmedović, volunteered to fight in Turkey’s cause.171

Some Muslims did take a position closer to the modern view of separate identity, whether as a third ‘tribe’ alongside Serbs and Croats, or indeed as Bosniaks, the modern national name.172 But more common among the educated appears to have been the disarming position of the poet-editor Musa Čazim Čatić: that people should be free to choose their national name (i.e. Serb or Croat), but these were only opinions and the main thing was to know there was one people and to work unitedly.173 Easing the problem was the growing Yugoslav sentiment, as in the student movement, which allowed ‘nationally determined’ Muslims to deflect criticism by merging their orientation in the common identity of all confessions.174 Yet still the social force of Muslim specificity led Muslim groups to operate apart, so that Serbophiles or Croatophiles formed their own student groups or sokols rather than joining Serb or Croat ones. Vienna University came to have three Muslim groupings.175 The Europeanization of Muslim life which Austria had sought had begun, but was too weakly rooted to take clear-cut ideological forms. The Bosnian Muslim experience was characterized by sociological cohesion and intellectual fragmentation. There was, though, an emotional identification which could break through the most firmly held espousals of Europeanization. Viewing the European world’s indifference to anti-Muslim excesses in the wake of the Balkan Wars, *Novi vakat* exploded:

So the Muslims of Egypt, India, Morocco and Tripolitania see in the French, the English and the Italians people who bring them culture and happiness! No, they come all the more to the conclusion that Europe will bring them no kind of happiness and peace, but lies, treachery, and moral and material ruin. God willing, the time is not far off when the whole Islamic community will chase from their midst these snakes which have for so many years deceived them and sucked them dry. Divine justice must surely triumph some time!176

Indeed, the inner lack of sympathy with Muslims as Muslims which marked Austrian administrators, Serbs and Croats and can be seen in the whole doomed
programme of ‘nationalization’, not formally abandoned till the 1960s, was
doubtless a factor in the maintenance of Bosnian Muslim solidarity.177

The poet and politician Safvet-beg Bašagić (1870–1934) is in many ways the
most attractive representative of the mixing of western and Islamic motifs to
which Austrian education gave rise. Born of a distinguished family in Nevesinje,
Herzegovina, he did not complete Sarajevo Gymnasium till he was twenty-five,
partly because of the time Muslims typically spent in religious education. Inspired
by his father’s tales of ancestors’ stirring deeds, he studied Islamic languages in
Vienna before teaching in this field in Sarajevo Gymnasium (1900–6) and taking
a leading role in Behar and Gajret. From 1910 he was president of the Diet till its
dissolution in 1919.178 Bašagić’s career, like Ćorović’s and Alaupović’s, showed
how the Austrian system could bring forward talented Bosnians into its civil
service, but could not win their hearts. The Provincial Government earmarked
him while still a student for the Provincial Museum, but his work on Bosnian
history, which Hörmann had followed, did not turn out quite to its taste and
it was published privately. His departure from Sarajevo Gymnasium followed a
request for leave for illness, which was met with dismissal. The proud Bašagić
preferred his independence to joining the Muslim Progressive and Autonomous
Parties, which he said had been cooked up by officials—Hörmann again!179
Bašagić’s handling of national allegiance also reflected wider trends. After literary
contributions to both Serb and Croat periodicals, he published some of his
most famous lines in the second number of Bošnjak: ‘From Trebinje to the
gates of Brod’ (i.e. from one end of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the other)/‘There
were neither Serbs nor Croats’. Challenged by Tugomir Alaupović with a switch
from Croatdom to Bosnianism, Bašagić answered almost playfully that this was
a ‘mere means’ to destroy the Great Serb idea among Muslims, whereupon he
could put it to rest with thanks for services rendered.180 The poem did not
appear in a collection subsequently published in Zagreb, which contained the
equally famous lines, ‘The hum of the Croatian language can unite/…/East and
West/Reason and mind’.181 As a Croat from largely Serb Nevesinje, he fits the
suggestion that ‘nationally determined’ Muslims commonly chose a different
identity from the Christians in their own locality, because to do otherwise would
have been a psychological step too far.182 All in all, national names lay lightly on
him.

But the East–West theme cited conveys the agenda which engaged him
passionately throughout his life. Bašagić’s aspirations for a modern Muslim
literary culture in Bosnia went with a deep love of Oriental literature and pride
in Muslim Bosnia’s heroic past, testified in his history of Bosnia from 1463 to
1850 and his survey of Bosnian contributions to Oriental literature. His history
of Bosnia does not start with the background of medieval Bosnia but that of
the Osmanlis, though all his work makes great play of the Bogumils’ decision to
convert to Islam—the ‘great idea’ which ensured their descendants ‘stormy and
glorious future’ in what became the ‘strongest state in the world’. Their act also helped gain Bosnia’s autonomy as a de facto state ‘within a state’, which ceased only with ‘that accursed enemy’. Omer-Pasha, in 1850. Christians appear in this account only as fomenters of unrest among ‘a peaceful population’. 

Bašagić’s work anticipates modern Bosniak emphases except in its less sanguine view of the 1832 revolt, reflecting perhaps familial piety: his forefathers had opposed Husein Gradašević. His leading play, Abdullah-paša, also combines Bosnian patriotism with Ottoman loyalty: Bosnia’s governor Abdullah, who has refused treacherous orders to yield Bosnian territory to the foe, drinks poison as commanded, but the Sultan, finding the Grand Vizier has misrepresented him, orders the latter’s execution, and the play ends with invocations for Turkey’s glory. Bašagić was known for his serene personality, but the contrast between his upbeat picture of a noble past and the anguished images of Christian writers is still worth noting. There was much of the pride of an old elite in his make-up and he plainly hoped a new Muslim intelligentsia could play a similar role in new circumstances. The prospectus for a short-lived newspaper with which he was associated defined intelligentsia as ‘a select caste of people whom some call a spiritual aristocracy’ and claimed that Muslims had a historic and natural right to Bosnia, for every bush of which the blood of Bogomils and Muslims had flowed. This was ‘the old inheritance’ (stara baština) which made the agrarian question the central concern of Bašagić’s political career. Another cutting in his papers no doubt speaks for his true priorities:

Today the politics of us Bosnian Muslims should not be dominated by the question of aristocracy or democracy, or liberalism or radicalism, or Serbdom or Croatdom, or Austrophilism or Magyarophilism: from today in our politics only one question should be always on the agenda, and that is defence against the enemies of our welfare and progress, whosoever they might be!

The greatest danger to Muslims proved in the article to be Muslim advocates of ‘democratism’, a heresy which had been condemned at the start of Islam. It was as incomprehensible as were opponents of Bosnian Muslim unity in defence of their faith and property. Thus the Bašagić case study suggests how, for all the progress made in rescuing the Muslim community from a state of denial about the implications of 1878, only a precarious adaptation, at an essentially elite level, had been achieved. Almost uniquely in the Balkans, a large Muslim community had survived the end of Ottoman rule with a clear psycho-sociological profile. But though basically secure from assimilation to Serb or Croat neighbours, the Muslims had not yet framed an identity in the national terms of the age and their political will was focused chiefly on the defence of an archaic land system. Understandable as this was as Muslims’ one remaining social trump, it only invited Serb and Croat social pressures as well as national ones and risked some youthful leakage from the Muslim camp towards more radical versions of modernity embodied in an increasingly Serb-tinged Yugoslavism.
Hence it is not surprising that despite his strident rejection of the annexation, a Muslim mainstream leader like Šerif Arnautović by 1917 should be seeking to strengthen Bosnia’s attachment to the Monarchy via unification with Hungary. Bosnian Muslim politicians were not represented in the Yugoslav declarations of Serbs and Croats in the final stages of the war and had to renew the struggle of adaptation under harder circumstances in a Yugoslavia of land reform and Serb preponderance. However, lessons learnt under Austria enabled Bosnian Muslims to survive this experience better than if they had become part of Serbia in 1878.

THE OUTCOME

Čorović, Bašagić and Alaupović are fairer signposts to the cultural impact of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia than a Žerajić or a Princip. All three were educated in its schools and universities, were offered employment in its administration and cooperated with it until 1914. Each represented a trajectory made possible only by the occupation. Yet none of them could truly be described as Austrophile. With the training of minds had not come a winning of hearts. All remained preoccupied with what seemed to them the uncertain futures of their communities after four decades of Habsburg rule. In 1918 uncertainties appeared to be resolved. The new Yugoslav state was founded on judgements which in modified form remained orthodox until 1991. Austria-Hungary had fallen because it was an outmoded, class-ridden, non-national state and had been replaced by a democratic union of south Slavs. How far does this study bear out this double verdict?

There are grounds for the more favourable view of the Austro-Hungarian period in Bosnia taken since the break-up of Yugoslavia. Alongside its infrastructural work in transport and industry, a well-organized administration established religious hierarchies and an interconfessional school system on modern lines. Whatever its earlier arbitrarinesses, it introduced a constitutional order and was moving towards the nativization of the administration in accordance with demands from an elected Diet. A generous scholarship policy enabled people of humble origin to play a bigger role in the emerging intelligentsia than elsewhere in the Monarchy. Yet the picture of Bosnia being raised into the realm of modern civism by a European Kulturstaat must take on board the limited nature of the investment made in Bosnia and, relatedly, the fragility of the Habsburg state itself.

The figure of 88 per cent illiteracy was the cultural reflex of the substantial neglect of the agrarian question. Between them these factors go far to explain the sense of unease discernible in pre-war Bosnia. The new educated class felt itself to be the tip of a morass of poverty and ignorance, people whose traditional ways had been disrupted but who had not been released from these burdens. A theme which emerges from all the main Bosnian communities on the eve of war is the challenge of change. The obvious traditional—modern polarity within Muslim
elites reproduced itself in different forms in the two Christian confessions, in Serb fears about peasant values and Habsburg incomers and Stadler’s conflict with the lay Croat intelligentsia. Moreover, the ‘modern’ towards which national ‘cultural workers’ claimed to be working itself shifted and evolved, as forms of social mobilization became more complex and old romanticism yielded ground to realism, scientism and social Darwinism. The range of external influences on Young Bosnia, from literary Modernism to anarcho-socialism, combining with inherited traditions and observable social malaise, was an extreme case of a wider tendency.

The fragility of the Habsburg state lay in its own vulnerability to change. Were not the occupying authorities, who had made control of the modernizing project grounds of their legitimacy, also fractured by modernity? There is a prima facie case for applying to Austria-Hungary the famous thesis of Fritz Fischer that Germany’s leaders embarked on war in 1914 as a means of resolving internal conflict. The Monarchy’s rulers were increasingly frustrated by the rash of national and social problems. The authoritarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand harboured far-reaching schemes for cutting the Gordian knot of Hungarian and Czech nationalism on his accession by dubiously constitutional manoeuvres. As a counterbalance to these movements the purportedly loyal Catholic Croats played a significant role in his circle’s plans. Part of this scenario was the reorganization of the Bosnian administration so as to give the military commander, General Potiorek, the real power in the Provincial Government.¹⁸⁹

Potiorek, a Carinthian German, was the product of a closed military set-up where advancement through cliques was common. Franz Ferdinand’s former military adviser Brosch came to see him as an ‘out-of-touch dreamer’, whose accumulation of powers gave him the illusion of control.¹⁹⁰ This helps explain how a man who highlighted the Serb threat and manoeuvred to detach control of education from the ministry in Vienna could have presided over the confusion described in the previous chapter. Moreover, the emergency measures of May 1913, whereby Serb and socialist were banned but not others, like the Schutzcorps Potiorek organized as a paramilitary adjunct to the gendarmerie, from which Serbs were excluded, were barely compatible with constitutional government and could only exacerbate the Serb disloyalty he emphasized. At a time when more south Slavs than ever before were contemplating the capacity of the Serbian Piedmont to deliver a modern project, Potiorek shot the Austrian version in the foot.

Of course, Potiorek was only one man in a polyglot administration. Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Slovenes, Ukrainians, Croats, Serbs and Muslims all served the cause of a multinational state with considerable efficiency and conscientiousness, despite the reservations about the system revealed in later memoirs. Yet the phenomenon of a Potiorek is testimony to the weakness of this system. Lacking a real esprit de corps, the late Habsburg monarchy’s course depended on small groups of men around the emperor, the heir to the
throne and in the Magyar ruling elite, who deeply distrusted each other. The burgeoning national idea seemed all the more to offer the accountability called for in a democratizing age. Yet democracy was incompatible with the mystique on which the cultural mission in Bosnia was founded, which derived ultimately from Habsburg traditions of enlightened despotism: the rule of impartial, dispassionate bureaucrats who appropriated to themselves the sphere of modern administration. But when modernity came to take on the guise of democratization, time was called on the Habsburg cultural mission. If this verdict seems over-influenced by Sarajevo, 1914, it has to be said that it was the verdict drawn by Potiorek’s own regime, when it responded to the assassination by abolishing Serb schools and societies and dismissing the cultural autonomy previously conceded as a vast conspiracy. Effectively, in the four years that remained to the occupation the cultural mission as previously conceived was no more.

In the face of the Monarchy’s difficulties, ideas of national unity and Yugoslavism made some strides in the pre-war years. Serbia acquired more credibility as an alternative model, particularly after the Balkan Wars, and for the first time Yugoslav sympathies in Habsburg lands were strongly reciprocated in portions of the Serbian progressive intelligentsia. Yet these impulses hardly reached the grass roots. In a letter to Alaupović, Ivo Andrić devastatingly described Bosnian society in 1919: complete apathy among the bureaucratic intelligentsia, brute greed in the commercial class, endless strikes of the workers and total stagnation on the land. These circumstances he ascribed mainly to ‘Austrian sins’, but he saw roots also in ‘the psyche of our people’, singling out the sick psyche of the intelligentsia and the influence of the Catholic hierarchy and the Serb Radicals on the masses. ‘Our democratic party’ would have a hard fight on its hands.191

Indeed so. The Bosnia of 1878 would have needed a much greater investment than the Monarchy could give it to become so soon fertile soil for a project of democratic civic pluralism. The original Austrian assumption had been that modernization would translate into Austrophilia, an assumption that the thoughtful Burián rightly appears to have shared less than the more regarded Kállay.192 A Yugoslav democracy seemed to patriots in 1918 to have the advantage of common nationality on its side, but it was a much more ambitious project than the Habsburg one. Bosnia was a society of three confessions, in which the modernizing impulses had acted within the framework of these well-established structures to strengthen their identity. The Austro-Hungarian occupation saw the crystallization of the triple nationhood of modern Bosnia. Of course, common ties traditionally subsisted alongside the confessional allegiances. Bosnians had a sense of their common Slav language and customs and of their Bosnian homeland; the common parlance of brotherhood could be and was invoked when the occasion suited. Moreover, the belief that mutual division only benefited their rulers, which found expression in the 1905 Croato-Serb coalition made a belated and much more limited impact in Bosnia on the eve of 1914. Yet, though these sentiments had greater emotive force than loyalty to the Habsburg state, their
base was shallow. To an extent, the very sense of kinship could work against full pluralism because it encouraged all sides to see mutuality in terms of their own identity. Thus Alaupović’s friendship for Bašagić was smelted by his sense of their common Croatdom; Ćorović’s work on Muslim folk song rested on a belief in the Serb identity of Muslims; the Croat-orientated Hamdija Kreševljaković was drawn to Alaupović by the latter’s sympathy for the old Bosnian past.¹⁹³

None of this is surprising. Commonalities and particularities had been part of the Bosnian experience for centuries. The Austro-Hungarian occupation did not dig deep enough to transform this situation but it gave it sharper definition. Thus the charge of the Bosnian Serb historian Milorad Ekmečić that Austria pursued a policy of divide and rule in Bosnia which foreclosed the possibility of a progressive future is overdrawn. It appears to rest on a view that the 1875–78 revolt, if allowed to succeed, could have led to a radical, instead of a conservative trajectory for Serbian state and society.¹⁹⁴ Non-Serbs have every reason to challenge the implication that, without Austrian underpinning, Bosnian Catholics and Muslims would have voluntarily accepted a Serb identity in this scenario. Bosnian Muslim history, the existence close at hand of a Croat national movement and, however tenuous, state tradition, and the power of Catholicism and Islam as world religions together ruled out a Serbicizing perspective. Its thwarting was not the work of Austria. By the same token, Bosnian tradition alone could not be a hegemonic force in this period. Significantly, the relations between Bosnians of different persuasions were eased when the Yugoslav idea gained credibility in the occupation’s last years. In the circumstances of the time, this Yugoslavism necessarily had a Serb flavour. The independent Serbian state, the relative strength of the Bosnian Serbs and the anti-clericalism of most contemporary nationalism lent Serb perspectives an attractive force. Ironically, in view of the intentions of the occupation, Austria-Hungary’s vendetta against the Serbs increased their prestige for the disaffected. In the battle for the moral high ground, the claim to embody modern western civilization over Balkan primitivism, she was beginning to lose by 1914. Her response to the assassination and the subsequent war completed this process.

This battle, however, was being fought on a very limited stage, corresponding to the limited scope of the Austrian mission. When ‘liberation’ and ‘unification’ came, the qualified nature of the Yugoslav victory soon became apparent. The reconciliation of the commonalities and particularities of Bosnian society awaits the flowering of the civic spirit, whose first seeds were planted under Habsburg rule.
Risto Radulović’s words from 1914 that there was ‘something unfinished, incomplete’ about his people’s experience strike an ever-repeated note in the period of the Austro-Hungarian occupation.1 ‘We are conservative in the extreme, we hold to old customs and beliefs blindly, without considering whether they meet the needs of our time’, wrote Novi vakat. ‘We are ignorant and lazy’, began an article in Napredak bluntly.2 The endeavours of educated Bosnians which have been traced in this book were aimed at overcoming this perceived heritage of backwardness and incompletion. Their journals alternately bemoaned the continuance of the traits they condemned and greeted more hopeful signs: new attitudes, ‘turning-points’, the new age anticipated in Novi vakat’s very name.

However, no specialist knowledge of Balkan history is needed to know that the turning point to a more secure future did not come. Modern Bosnian historians use similar language of ‘belatedness and underdevelopment’ to describe the sense of historical shortfall.3 Together, these testimonies suggest two conclusions. One is that the Habsburg monarchy’s claim at the Congress of Berlin that it would give Bosnia-Herzegovina modern government was potentially well-judged. Not only was cultural mission a well-understood legitimizing concept among the Great Powers, but the transformative processes it implied could strike a chord with the people concerned. The other is that the Habsburg period turned out to be another episode in Bosnian history which ultimately failed to deliver. Like the communist years, to which it is similar in duration and a measure of achievement, it ended abruptly in violence and intercommunal bitterness. The same could be said of the interwar period, though its promise of achievement faded much sooner, and also of Ottoman rule, which enjoyed a brief period before the end when modernization and communal harmony became the goals. However, the scale and impact of this late Ottoman work was vastly less than what Austria attempted. It is fair therefore to see the period covered in this book as the first sustained attempt to overhaul a backward and communally riven society.

The argument here has been that Austria-Hungary faced a unique set of problems in Bosnia. On the one hand were the difficulties of developing economic and cultural infrastructure in a region as undeveloped as some of the extra-European colonies of the time. On the other, it was operating in a territory adjacent to the Monarchy, whose interaction with other south Slav lands could directly impact on the Monarchy’s domestic politics. It may be
helpful to recall these problems in turn, as they raise themes of considerable contemporary interest: the relation of western and non-western cultures and the nature of nationalism.

The occupation of Bosnia showed European confidence, not to say hubris, at the high point of the imperial age. Its lofty goals were to be achieved at minimum cost. Bosnia was to pay its way, for the Monarchy’s financial sheet anchor, the middle classes, had opposed the occupation. Yet this constraint was made less daunting by the laissez-faire assumptions of this first age of globalization and the sheer belief of European civilization in its leavening power in contact with the backward ‘other’; not just Bosnian Muslims were deemed Oriental. The state role could be limited to a basic network of modern communications and primary schools, District Commissioners proclaiming civic and confessional equality and reconstruction of religious hierarchies, with some attention to the training of priests, and a handful of secondary schools in the largest towns. Gaps in state funding could be filled by the migrating enterprise of thousands of the Monarchy’s subjects, who would be living advertisement for the civilization to which Bosnians should be weaned.

In many ways this approach was successful. Western values were imbibed. Many articles in Bosnian periodicals under the occupation read like texts for Foucault-style studies of colonialism, the constant invocations to work and organization, and attacks on laziness and lack of focus a veritable instruction kit for Modern Man in all his self-internalizing discipline. Few Bosnians can have missed some aspects of this process: whether the monetarization of tithe and trećina payments; or the railway timetables, listing the exact number of kilometres, minutes and fare to each station; or the seven pieces of paper applicants for Visoko Gymnasium, for example, were to bring with them, certifying baptism and confirmation, primary school ‘good success’, good conduct, medical condition, and personal and parental statements of support for enrolment. That these were new times, requiring new attitudes, was the single most persistent message of public life. Perhaps the biggest success on this score was the eventual emergence of a small Austrian-educated Muslim stratum preaching a western orientation for its community, which was to become decisive in the evolution of the modern Bosniak nation. Here Austria was helped by the favourable climate of the time, because besides its policies and the European origin of the Bosnian Muslims, the reformist tendencies strengthening throughout the Muslim world played their part.

Yet there was a downside to cultural mission conducted as it were on the cheap. The very success, eventually, in stimulating desire for education led to Bosnian discontent with the modest scale of the schools network created and to charges that Austria was throttling native development, in breach of its promises. Muslim intellectuals’ accusations that Austria had abetted the anti-(western)-school conservatism of Muslim notables were almost wholly unfair, but demonstrated
the classic danger to which occupying regimes have been exposed among non-Christian populations: opposition both from traditionalists à la Džabić and from westernized elements impatient with the stately tempo favoured by a conservative imperial power. In a period of angst about the ‘clash of civilizations’ it is worth noting that western values have always been more acceptable than foreign rule. Though Kállay and Thallóczy held markedly ‘Orientalist’ views in Edward Said’s famous term, the key problem in mass intercultural conflict is no doubt ordinary psychology rather than intellectual ratiocination. The fact is that westerners underestimated the difficulties involved in economic improvement of an occupied country. From the famines of India, and the fellahin of Lord Cromer’s Egypt, to the peasants of Bosnia, the standard of living of the masses hardly seemed to rise, fuelling a reservoir of bitterness against the occupiers and their arrogant claims. Shouldering responsibility for the destiny of another country is an awesome task, demanding an outlay of resources which the occupying power, confident in the catalytic effect of its values, commonly has no inclination to provide. This lesson learnt from the colonial age is in danger of being forgotten. In Bosnia the high proportion of scholarship-holding secondary school students from poor homes added salience to this factor. Any alienation they may have felt because of a background of poverty was exacerbated by their temperamental and cultural clash with what seemed to them starchy teacher representatives of an alien regimen.

Yet what most sharpened disaffection was a factor specific to Bosnia. The slogans of European progress were being championed there not just by the Monarchy, but by Serb and Croat nationalists who challenged the occupation regime’s right to speak in Europe’s name. This was the second of Vienna’s difficulties. She could persuade international opinion that she was modernizing a recalcitrant, Oriental land; but in fact she was also engaged in a fight with gradually mobilizing nationalisms of classic central European type. For these, the nation organized in free association was the real source of social progress over against the dead hand of imperial bureaucracy. For would-be Serb or Croat activists, Kállay’s denial of Serbdom and Croatdom in Bosnia was like a red rag to a bull. His strategy was a logical extension of the colonializing approach: by deeming Bosnians to be only Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims, and not proto-nations, he assigned them to the sphere of tradition and arrogated the modernizing, legitimizing role to the Habsburg state. More than anything, the ‘Bosnian idea’ came to define perceptions of his regime.

This book has noted the ambiguities in this policy, which despite nationalist charges was not set in stone. Its argument has been that Kállay’s Bosnianizing policy had several strands. It was a pragmatic answer to the tricky problem of naming the mother tongue, a framework for maintaining Muslim loyalty as a vital weapon against Serb and Croat nationalism, and an evocation of the memory of the medieval Bosnian nobility whose Muslim descendants Kállay hoped to win as supporters of the occupation. Beyond pragmatism, however,
Kállay’s career shows his attraction to broad visions, as in his conceptualizations of East and West, and the ‘Bosnian scheme’ with which he launched his career in Belgrade. It is possible, therefore, that for a time he believed in the possibility of creating a Bosnian national identity common to all three confessions, probably in conjunction with a return of Muslims to Christianity. But the bottom line is that he advocated Bosnianism—a policy he latterly relaxed—as a means to smooth Bosnia’s accommodation to the Habsburg state, not as endorsement of the continuity of Bosnian statehood in a modern Bosniak sense.

It seems that Kállay overestimated his skill. Rightly seeing the weaknesses of Serb nationalist pretensions, he oddly underplayed the lightness with which educated Serbs took their religion, and the fact that what prestige the Church enjoyed was bound up with its nationalism. A somewhat contemptuous view of Orthodox and Muslim clerics as opposed to Catholic ones was a mark of his Orientalism. Ironically, the priest who most shared the regime’s view of clerical authority, Archbishop Stadler, caused it the greatest difficulties, through his feud with the Franciscans who actually held Catholics’ loyalty. In general, the minister did not seem to realize that the impact of a more modern regime would tend to strengthen the national feeling of the peasant masses, not their Austrophilia, because awakening consciousness would find Serbdom (or Croatdom) psychologically closer than Habsburg dynasticism. He was not alone. Tsarist officials similarly assumed emancipated Polish serfs would become their support against the Polish nobility.

To be fair, Kállay was grappling with problems which have continued to perplex historians of nationalism. They would endorse his sense of the weaknesses of the Serb and Croat ‘national ideas’ in Bosnia: the national identities to which educated urbanites sought to ‘reawaken’ rural majorities were essentially works in progress remote from windy historical claims. Yet a modern tendency to privilege positive ‘civic’ as opposed to negative ‘ethnic’ elements in nation building, as if only the latter contain dangers, should also find food for thought from Kállay’s attempt to build an overarching Bosnian identity. Nineteenth-century notions of civic nationhood were not necessarily democratic, but could justify the leading role of historical elites like the gentry in Kállay’s Hungarian ‘political nation’, paralleled by the similar role he adduced for a Bogumil/Muslim aristocracy in Bosnia. Actually, civic and ethnic features in nation building commonly both play a role and cannot so easily be disentangled. Both Serbs and Croats sought to include the Muslims (and each other) in their own civic national projects: thus Croats of Muslim faith, or Catholic Serbs. These formulations did not bear fruit because too much history contradicted them. While modern nations are modern constructions, the historical inheritance sets bounds to the process. In Bosnia religion played a key role. The secularizing intellectual climate of the nineteenth century allowed only statehood and language to be building blocks of nationhood, but religion was closer to the people and had forged political links. Franciscans could trace their presence back to the Middle Ages and Bosnia’s
last Catholic kings; Orthodox could link their faith with the Serbian Nemanja dynasty; Muslim identity was still too closely bound to the foreign Ottoman dynasty to have the prop to proclaim a nationhood which existed, however, in social reality. Thus Bosnia’s nations are modern creations, but their emergence from the chrysalis of the past was not as arbitrary as some views of ethno-genesis would suggest, or as Kállay chose to assume.

Austro-Hungarian educational policy deserves more credit. State-backed inter-confessional schooling established a lasting basis for integration of the Bosnian communities, the more noteworthy because it bore on the resources of a cash-strapped administration. However, this strategic decision was really inevitable, given the régime’s premises, as purely confessional schooling would have offered no framework for the Europeanization of Muslims or the hoped-for Bosnian and Austrophile spirit. Negative features of this policy were the intermittent harassment of Serb confessional schools (though these were no doubt equally held back by their own limited resources), and Kállay’s passivity on the question of Muslim schools. In the latter case, he feared that any official intervention would lead to other confessions’ calls for similar solicitude towards their institutions, undermining the centrality of the state-backed school system. Thus the madrassas remained essentially unreformed.

The policy of interconfessional education should be set against the charge of Serb historians in particular that Austria-Hungary pursued a strategy of divide and rule in Bosnia. It is clear that official strategy was aimed at isolating Serbs from Catholics and Muslims. However, the framework the administration operated in, like interconfessional schooling, seriously curtailed possibilities for large-scale discrimination. Serb annoyance at constant pinpricks in the Kállay era is very understandable, less so the more radical charge that communal divisions in Bosnia were actually created by regime policies. Acknowledging regretfully that identities in the Yugoslav territories are based on religion, not language, Milorad Ekmečić is unduly harsh in attributing the negative consequences of this to Austria-Hungary, as if she had fomented these divisions. Kállay may be given credit for recognizing the power of religious divides, which south Slav nationalists of all hues wished to play down. Yet one might surmise that he shared, implicitly, the same normative view of the situation as Ekmečić, namely that language should be the mark of national identity, this being the modern European perception. Since Oriental Bosnians grounded their identity in religion, he could not see them as nations. If this was indeed his line of assumption, he was not as perceptive as he thought. Slav nationalists for generations made hay with Kállay’s reputation, so that the revisionist historian is tempted to restore it. But though much is owing to a brilliant and resourceful man, that restoration can only be partial.

Burián has been the forgotten man of the occupation. Praised for moving on from the quagmire of cultural autonomy which bogged down Kállay, he has been dismissed in some quarters for a strategy seen as naively pro-Serb. These emphases may need some qualification. Burián was not pro-Serb, but thought
Serbs could be more effectively countered by an inclusive rather than an exclusive policy within the constitutional system towards which he was moving. On the other hand, his readiness to shift the focus away from cultural politics made him somewhat insensitive to Serb feelings on neuralgic issues like state supervision of Serb schools, where his methodical nature pointed him down a path likely to produce more heat than light. Burián may have lacked a certain imagination to see how the emotive power of cultural regeneration expressed in ‘Prosvjjeta’, ‘Napredak’ and ‘Gajret’ could create dispositions not so easily triangulated in the rational politics of the possible that he plainly had in mind. But, by this time, appointments policy in fields of cultural concern shows how little Serbs could complain of discrimination.

With Burián’s fall in 1912 any hope of a Bosnian strategy relatively detached from the Monarchy’s internal imbroglios faded. Rather than safeguarding the Monarchy from nationalist turmoil, the occupation had merely added another ingredient in the brew. The contrasts between Potiorek’s anti-Serb rhetoric and his pursuit of Serb support in the Diet, and between the clueless exhortations of educational administrators and the spinning of student webs between Prague, Vienna, Ljubljana, Zagreb, Split, Belgrade and Sarajevo, are testimony to an administration adrift, lacking human even more than material resources to achieve its purposes. Yet Potiorek need not have seen the solution only to be that of crushing Serbia. He could have taken comfort in the fact that a modernizer like Čaušević had finally become Reis-ul-ulema, joining loyal Metropolitan Letica, that loyal Franciscans offered a barrier to the ageing Stadler, that Srpska rič had become the voice of Serb bourgeois caution, that mainstream Muslim politicians were embracing Europeanism and the Monarchy, that native products of Austrian education like Ćorović and Alaupović were state officials and Bašagić president of the Diet. Ironically, had his administration disposed of Kállay’s contacts he would surely have had some inkling that there was no seamless web connecting notables and professors to secondary school hotheads. Despite poor living standards, no underlying structural crisis or mass nationalist fervour threatened the Bosnian regime with collapse. In hindsight, Habsburg Bosnia in 1914 looks no less stable than the Monarchy as a whole.

Perhaps structure and stability are less solid historical concepts than they seem, however. In the rule of one society over another there is more than usual room for psychological factors, operating at various levels. At the most abstract and ideological, Austro-Hungarian mission and Slav nationalism faced each other as rival views of progress: the order and prosperity of a multi-ethnic community united in equality under the sceptre of its benign sovereign opposed the awakened national community, energized in pursuit of enlightenment and its historic destiny. Beneath this level one can see Kállay scheming and south Slavs bemoaning their dark fate and listless apathy. But this too is in part pose, and at a lower level again Young Bosnians write to each other as much in
light-hearted raillery as world-historical angst, people who are simply people, as the student informer Lazar Brkić said Serbs wanted the authorities to see them. The interaction of all these levels is what determines the consciousness of a community. The overall tendency was moving in Serbdom’s favour by 1914, and a Yugoslavism led by the Serbian Piedmont had more attraction and coherence for many non-Serbs than the blusterings of a Potiorek. Yet this was tendency, not inevitability, and the Austro-Hungarian response to Vidovdan was a matter of morale and judgement rather than necessity. The vituperation directed at the fallen Monarchy by victorious nationalists was undeserved, but recent swinging criticism of the nation-state idea also seems unbalanced. The difficulty the multinational Habsburg monarchy had in adapting to democratizing norms, which one such critic, Charles Ingrao, concedes, was not just a problem but a fundamental one, as the last chapter concluded. By 1914 the role of Hungary meant, too, that it was increasingly hard to speak of the Monarchy’s ‘essentially supranational institutions’.8 The belief in a national basis for political community was widely shared by educated Bosnians and seemed to be the lesson of the breakdown of the non-national state system set up in Vienna in 1815. Nationalism’s potential for divisiveness was obscured by a traditional sense that Bosnians were after all the same people and by the fact that the Balkan versions available offered themselves not just as ‘ethnic’ but as civic, modernizing movements. On the basis of this study one is tempted to agree with Gale Stokes’s ‘unpalatable paradox’ that in ethnically fraught situations the way ahead is the further satisfaction of ethnic aspirations to self-rule, rather than the attempt to transcend them.9

That a shallow-rooted Yugoslavism Serbian-style fell short in this respect soon became apparent. Letters to Alaupović from a one-time Croat colleague in Tuzla Gymnasium tell the tale. Beginning in January 1919 with a letter written wholly in Cyrillic, followed by one where only the signature was in latinica, they morph within six months into an apoplectic tirade against Serbian ignorance, incompetence and anti-Croat prejudice.10 Later on, a Young Bosnian Serb writes to Alaupović lamenting the fact that he has found no Croat to contribute to a volume in tribute to the movement, though the creditable role played by some Croats alongside their Serb brothers in the fight for liberty and unification deserves recognition, and will Alaupović oblige?11 The Croat bid for hegemony was to come in 1941–45, in conjunction with a much more sinister Germanic patron than Vienna. After the collapse of the communist attempt at synthesis, which in early decades amounted to Kočić and Young Bosnia, minus bourgeois Jeftanović, the Bosniaks find themselves numerically in a similar position to the Bosnian Serbs in 1918, and enjoy similar sympathy in the international community. Whether they will be able to use this position to bring a resolution of the Bosnian ethno-confessional conundrum closer remains to be seen. Here the danger noted at the end of the previous chapter should be avoided, namely,
of interpreting the patent commonalities among Bosnians in terms of one’s own tradition, with the hegemonizing implications entailed.

Such considerations are outside the scope of this book. Perhaps, however, it may be permitted to stray beyond its time span to record the fate of various of its actors. Prinicip died of TB in Terezín prison, Bohemia, in April 1918, a disease which carried off the writer Svetozar Čorović in 1919. Veljko Čubrilović was hanged for assisting the assassins in 1915, while his brother Vasa, an actual assassin but too young to be executed, lived on through a distinguished career as a Belgrade history professor for another seventy-five years. Aged seventy-four, Gligorije Jeftanović presided over the post-war provisional national council in Sarajevo. The Austrophile Metropolitan Letica resigned after the war and retired to his native Slavonia, while under his Bosnian successor the Bosnian Orthodox Church passed under the newly created Serbian Patriarchate at Belgrade.

Among Muslims, Džemaludin Čaušević resigned as Reis in 1930 when he refused to accept a revision of the Austrian autonomy statute, increasing the state’s powers; in his retirement he translated the Koran. Osman Nuri Hadžić, a Croatophile under Austria, now a Serb, wrote a warm account of the autonomy movement he had opposed. The novelist Edhem Mulabdić died in obscurity in 1954, aged ninety-two. Bašagić had preceded him in 1934, having been pensioned off by the Yugoslav as by the Austrian government. The conservative ex-Mufti Džabić never returned to Bosnia, but acquired a reputation for theological works in Arabic. Of Croats, Stadler’s death in November 1918 has been described. Tugomir Alaupović, who had gone to school under Turkish rule, spent the last thirty years of his life in Zagreb, dying in 1958. Nikola Mandić, the highest-ranking native official under Austria, who held the same post in Sarajevo under the ustashas, was executed in 1945. Among non-native Habsburg officials, Thallóczy deployed his skills as civil commissioner in occupied Serbia before dying in a train crash on the way back from Franz Joseph’s funeral; Burián wrote his wartime memoirs before his death in 1921. Kosta Hörmann, the occupation regime’s cultural panjandrum, beat a retreat to Vienna in 1918. After generations of obloquy in the history books, he now has a Sarajevo street named after him, as indeed has Archbishop Stadler. What could better indicate the flux of history and historical fortunes? There is no street named after Kállay.
Notes

PREFACE

1 Hereafter, Bosnia will often be used for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Austria for Austria-Hungary, except where the usage would be ambiguous or inappropriate in context.
4 N. Šehić, Autonomni pokret Muslimana za vrijeme austrougarske uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo, 1980); B. Madžar, Pokret Srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vjersko-prosvjetnu samoupravu (Sarajevo, 1982); P. Vrankić, Religion und Politik in Bosnien und der Herzegovina (1878–1918) (Paderborn, 1998); Z. Grijak, Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa Josipa Stadlera (Zagreb, 2001).

CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND TO A MISSION: PRE-AUSTRIAN BOSNIA AND THE POWERS

1 Memorandum printed in fra B. Gavranović, Uspostava redovite katoličke hijerarhije u Bosni i Hercegovini 1881. godine (Belgrade, 1935), 280–7 (283).
2 For examples, see chapter 2 below, p. 26.
5 T. Kontje, German Orientalisms (Ann Arbor, 2004), 118–32 (122).
7 G. Muir Mackenzie and A. P. Irby, Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey-in-Europe, 2 vols, 5th edn (London, 1877), i. 1. The chapter concerned was written
after Mackenzie’s death; A. A. Paton, *Servia, the youngest member of the European Family* (London, 1845), 96.


9 S. Čerić, *Muslimani srpsko-hrvatskog jezika* (Sarajevo, 1968), 150. Of the 2,718 mixed villages, 653 were inhabited by members of all three confessions.


15 For a swelling literature, see, for example, H. Šabanović, *Književnost Muslimana na orijentalnim jezicima* (Sarajevo, 1973), and the symposium in *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju* 39 (1989).


18 E. Pelidija, *Banjalukački boj iz 1737* (Sarajevo, 2003), partic. 351.


20 M. Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka* (Sarajevo, 1998), 338. Ahmed Aličić in his *Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832. godine* (Sarajevo, 1996), 51–60, attacks the distinction between free and dependent peasants as alien to Ottoman legislation, but it is generally accepted that in the later Ottoman empire patterns of dominance and dependency had come to overlap substantially with religious divides: N. Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (London, 1994), 48.


23. Figures vary: see H. Čurić, Muslimensko Školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini 1800–1918 (Sarajevo, 1983), 45, for mektebs; the madrassa figure is reckoned from specific references in I. Kasumović, Školstvo i obrazovanje u Bosanskom ejaletu za vrijeme osmanske uprave (Mostar, 1999), 157–249.

24. J. Džambo, Buchwesen in Bosnien und der Herzegovina (1800–1878). Zum Problem der LesersozioLOGie (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), 43. Significantly, boys outnumbered girls by three to one among Muslims and Catholics and five to one among Serbs.


26. Ibid., 90, and Čurić, Školske prilike muslimana.


30. PRO, FO 78/2296: Holmes to Granville, 5 September 1873; 78/2402, Holmes to Derby, 3 December 1875; 78/2296, Holmes to Granville, 23 October 1873.

31. French text of the rescript in PRO, FO 78/2340: Holmes to Derby, 3 April 1874.

32. Examples in Zastava o Bosni i Hercegovini, ed. H. Kapidižić, 4 vols (Sarajevo, 1954), i, articles of 1/13 and 5/17 May 1866; V. Bogičević, Istorija razvitka osnovnih škola u Bosni i Hercegovini od početka do 1918 (Sarajevo, 1965), 56, 58.

33. Izveštaji italijanskog konzulata u Sarajevu (1863–1870 godine), ed. P. Mitrović and H. Kreševljaković (Sarajevo, 1958), 126: Duranda al Ministero, 8 March 1867; PRO, FO 78/2035: Holmes to Stanley, 1 June 1868.

34. PRO, FO 78/2402: Holmes to Derby, 30 December 1875.

35. For bosančica, see Hrvatska enciklopedija (Zagreb, 2000), i. 246–7. Serbs have traditionally identified bosančica wholly with Cyrillic, denying it separate status as a territorial script, cf. Ćirković, Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske države, 235.


38. Malcolm, Bosnia, 95.

39. Izveštaji italijanskog konzulata, 124; Duranda al ministero; PRO, FO 78/2137, Holmes to Granville, 17 February 1870; 11 March 1870.

40. M. Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni 1875–1878 (Sarajevo, 1960), 11. Ekmečić plausibly suspects these census figures exaggerate the number of free peasants.

41. For this figure: I. Hadžibegović, Postanak radničke klase u Bosni i Hercegovini i njen razvoj do 1914. godine (Sarajevo, 1980), 40. These were the begis and agas, terms which by this time roughly denoted great landlords and gentry respectively. For the title ‘beg’: H. Kamberović, Begovski zemljišni posjed u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1878 do 1918 (2nd edn, Sarajevo, 2005), 39–108.

42. fra B. Gavranović (ed.), Bosna i Hercegovina od 1853 do 1870 godine (Sarajevo, 1956), 132.

44 Bosnian Orthodox bishops took the title ‘metropolitan’, the distinction between bishops and metropolitans having been largely erased in the Eastern Church: I Silbernagl, *Verfassung und gegenwärtiger Bestand sämtlicher Kirchen des Orients* (Regensburg, 1865), 23.

45 *Zastava o Bosni*, iii. 3, 37, 9.

46 ABiH, ZMF, BH 7439/1882, Provincial Government (PG) to Joint Finance Ministry (JMF), 23 August 1882.

47 Jukić, Ivan Franjo, *Putopisi i istorisko-etnografski radovi* (Sarajevo, 1953), 345.


50 For large acquisitions by Serbs, see *Zastava o Bosni*, ii. 135, iii. 34 (Jovo Babić, Gradiška); iv. 260 (Petro Petrović, Sarajevo, later a prominent supporter of the Austrian regime).


52 V. Skarić, *Srpski pravoslavni narod i crkva u Sarajevu u XVII i XVIII vijeku* (Sarajevo, 1928), 107.

53 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4906/1879: PG to JMF, 31 August 1879.

54 *Zastava o Bosni*, ii. 198: 25 April/7 May 1873.

55 Minutes of the Sarajevo communal committee, meeting of 23 December 1884/4 January 1885. I was permitted to see only a summary of the minutes, covering the period 1884 to 1893.


57 PRO, FO 78/1872, Holmes to Russell, 2 March 1865.

58 PRO, FO 78/2296, Holmes to Granville, 4 April 1873; *Zastava o Bosni*, ii. 191–5.


63 V. Skarić, *Sarajevo i njegova okolina od najstarijih vremena do austrougarske okupacije* (Sarajevo, 1931), 223.
64 V. Bogičević, *Razvitiak osnovnih škola*, 19–66, is a convenient factual survey. For the realka, see T. Kruševac, ‘Srpska realka-gimnazija u Sarajevu’, *Glasnik ADA*, 3 (1963): 91–124. On Serb schools I also used the twenty-nine notebooks on Bosnian Serb schools compiled from press and periodical references and private correspondence by the Serb schoolteacher Risto Šušljić between 1930 and 1945. Formerly in the Bosnian National Library (NUB), these no longer exist there.
65 Calculated from NUB, Šušljić Mss, R-390/17.
66 ABiH, ZMF, BH 139/1881: PG to JMF, 20 December 1880.
68 Ibid., 18.
70 PRO, FO 78/2402: Holmes to Derby, 30 December 1875.
71 The rights and wrongs remain disputed. See Džaja, *Konfession und Nationalität*, 208–12 (Catholic), and B. Nilević, *Srpska pravoslavna crkva u Bosni i Hercegovini do obnove Pečke patrijaršije* (Sarajevo, 1990), 208 (Orthodox).
73 Hilferding, *Reise-Skizzen*, 56.
74 *Izvještaji italijanskog konzulata*, 121: Duranda’s report of 24 January 1867; PRO, FO 78/1291: Zohrab to C. Alison, Chargé d’Affaires, 1 September 1858.
75 Vrankić, *Religion und Politik*, 364. Vrankić reflects the Bosnian secular clergy’s critical stance to the Franciscans.
76 For Martić, see the introduction to I. Kecmanović, *Fra Grego Martić, Izabrani spisi* (Sarajevo, 1954).
80 Ibid. See the subtitle.
82 This paragraph is largely based on M. Papić, *Hrvatsko školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918. godine* (Sarajevo, 1982), and Vrankić, *Religion und Politik*, 377–89.
83 S. Marković, *Hrvatska katolička škola i učitelji u Livnu za turske uprave* (Mostar, 1923).


91 PRO, FO 78/1978: Holmes to Stanley, 15 February 1867.


99 See Petrinjensis (Fran Milošar), *Bosnien und das kroatische Staatsrecht: eine historisch-juridische Studie* (Zagreb, 1898), partic. 254–61.


Notes


111 HStA, PA, XXXVIII 187: Kállay to Andrássy, 6 July 1870.

112 Zastava o Bosni, i. 56–8 (1866).


114 Ekmečić, *Ustanak*, 323.


118 Iz memoara protopop Nedeljka (n. pl; n. d.), 10. For Nedeljko’s memoirs, believed to have been by the radical nationalist Bosnian Serb priest Stevo Trifković and published c.1900 in Novi Sad, see Vrankić, *Religion und Politik*, 100.


120 Stojančević, ‘Vasa Pelagić’, 141.


123 For these points, see Đambo, *Buchwesen*, 90–9.


125 Đambo, *Buchwesen*, 56. Staka’s was one of only 194 books produced by Bosnian Christians in the years 1800 to 1878, more than a third of them in 1870–78: ibid., 71.


CHAPTER 2 STUTTERING INTO GEAR

1 Baron von Helfert, *Bosnisches* (Vienna, 1879), 158, 21.


3 *Stenographische Sitzungs-Protokolle der Delegation des Reichsrates*, Session 13: Klaić’s speech of 6 November 1880.

4 Dr J. Neupauer, *Wie könnte die europäische Cultur nach Bosnien verpflanzt werden?* (Vienna, 1884), 13.
5 PRO, FO 7/975: Consul Freeman to Salisbury, 29 August 1879.
7 Ibid., 376.
9 B. Nikašinović, Bosnien und die Herzegowina unter der Verwaltung der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie und die österreichisch-ungarischen Balkanpolitik (Berlin, 1901), 18–19, citing the proclamation of 28 July 1878.
10 Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti (SANU), Belgrade, Ristić papers 17/1/284: J. R. Đžinić—poštovani prijatelju, 24 October 1878.
11 Iz memoara protopop Nedeljka, 30. See ch. 1, fn. 118.
12 PRO, FO 7/1005: Freeman to Granville, 20 September 1880.
13 PRO, FO 7/975: Consul Freeman to Salisbury, 29 August 1879.
15 Stenographische Sitzungs-Protokolle, Session 35 (1899–1900), 104.
17 HHStA, PA XL Interna 208: G. Thoemmel, Memorandum über die im Falle einer Occupation der bosnischen Ländergebiete in Bezug auf die ersten administrativen und judicären, dann polizeilichen Einrichtungen dringlichsten Vorkehrungen, 21 April 1878. The other memorandum, dated 1 May, was purely descriptive.
18 See A. Malbaša, Hrvatski i srpski nacionalni problem u Bosni za vrijeme režima Benjamina Kallaya. I Dio (1882–1896) (Osijek, 1940), 23, who mentions a geography, a history, a political study and a biography of General Phillipovich.
19 HHStA, PA XL 290, Gemeinsame Ministerratsprotokolle (GMP): meeting of 12 September 1878.
23 HHStA, PA XL 290: GMP: meetings of 17 January and 16 November 1879.
24 HHStA, PA XII 258: Verhandlung mit der Pforte betreffs Besetzung Bosnien und der Herzegowina.
27 Ibid., 119: Wassitch memorandum of March 1880.
28 Ibid., 132, in a common ministerial council of 23 June 1880.
29 Bosansko-hercegovačke novine, 22 September 1878.
30 PRO, FO 78/2839: Freeman to Salisbury, 20 November 1878.
31 Bosansko-hercegovačke novine, 22 September; Iz memoara protopop Nedeljka, 45.
32 Instruktionen für den Feldzeugmeister Josef Freiherrn von Philippović, quoted in M. Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni (Sarajevo, 1960), 363.
33 M. Marković, ‘Tragom kvarenja našeg jezika u nedavnoj prošlosti u Bosni’, in ibid., Članci i ogledi, 2 vols (Sarajevo, 1951), i. 5–42.

34 Bosansko-hercegovačke novine, 10 October 1878.

35 ABiH, ZMF, Pr. BH 1498/1879: PG to JMF, 12 April.

36 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1999/1879: PG to JMF, 11 May.

37 ABiH, ZMF, BH 5031/1879: PG to JMF, 6 October 1879 (women); 4606/1879: PG to JMF (education).

38 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4606/1879: PG to JMF.

39 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2919/1879: PG Erlass 8865 Pol., 6 June; ‘as many children as possible’, particularly including Muslims, were to be taught in district and other centres.

40 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4606/1879: PG to JMF.

41 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1498/1879: PG to JMF, 12 April.

42 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4906/1879: PG to JMF, 31 August 1879.

43 ABiH, ZMF, BH 6402/1879: PG to JMF, 9 December.

44 ABiH, ZMF, BH 222/1880: Kukuljević’s draft of 1 January.

45 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1780/1879: Jovanović to JMF, 30 April.

46 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4606/1879, PG to JMF, 20 August.

47 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4478. 4480/1879: PG to JMF, 26 August.

48 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2919/1879: PG Erlass, 6 June.

49 ABiH, ZMF, BH 5031/1879: Kukuljević’s draft, 26 September. Kreis school inspectors were eventually appointed in 1893.

50 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2919/1879: PG to JMF, 12 April; BH 4479/1879, JMF to PG, 12 September; BH 1285/1880, enclosing PG Verordnung no. 2649, 9 February.

51 ABiH, ZMF, BH 6088/1879: PG to JMF, 22 November.

52 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1498/1879, JMF to PG, 3 May.

53 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1689/1879: Hofmann to Franz Joseph, 9 June.

54 See the article of the ultra-loyalist Administrator of Karlowitz, German Andelić, in Srpski narod (ABiH, ZMF, BH 848/1879) and the Karlowitz theology professor E. E. Radić’s Ein Kampf ums Recht. Beitrag zur Lösung der Orthodoxen Kirchenfrage in Bosnien und der Herzegowina (Prague, 1879), 24, 27. The Patriarchate of Peć was abolished by the Turks in 1766.


56 Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 100, is surely right to see Nedeljko, Iz Memoara, 46–7, as gilding Serb opposition in this early period. See also B. Madžar, Pokret Srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vjersko-prosvjetnu samoupravu (Sarajevo, 1982), 20, and T. Kruševac, Sarajevo pod austro-ugarskom upravom (Sarajevo, 1960), 238, 246–7.

57 Zastava o Bosni, iv. 260 (Petro T. Petrović), 145 (Dimitrije Jeftanović).

58 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1689/1879: Kosanović to Franz Joseph, 28 April.


Notes

61 Ibid., Kállay to Herbert, 3 November 1879.
62 HHStA, Administrative Registratur (AR), 28/16: Kállay to Tisza, 6 November 1879.
63 For example, triple nomination by the Emperor for the Patriarch’s decision and presence of Bosnian bishops in the Holy Synod: HHStA, AR, 28/16: reports from Constantinople of 17 December 1879.
64 HHStA, AR, 28/16: Kállay to Kosjek, 11 December 1879.
65 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2566/1880: Kállay to JMF, with the text of the Convention.
66 See the Austrian Minister of Culture Stremayr’s rejection of a Concordat with ‘Orientals’, subject to a Sultan’s whim: HHStA, AR 26/18: Stremayr to Taaffe, 9 January 1880.
67 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 74/1880: Szlávy to Württemberg, 14 December.
68 ABiH, ZMF, BH 6226/1880, Szlávy to Franz Joseph, 4 September; See Vrankić, Politik und Religion, 141–3, for the depiction.
69 J. Koetschet, Osman Pascha, Der letzte grosse Wesier und seine Nachfolger (Sarajevo, 1909), 70.
70 SANU, Ristić Papers, 17.1.337: Izjava Kosanovića za prijedorskog sveštenika, 15 September 1878, O.S.
71 Bosansko-hercegovačke novine, 6 July 1879: Kosanović’s ‘Open Letter’; ABiH, ZMF, BH 5296/1879, PG to JMF, 19 October.
72 HHStA, Kabinettkanzlei, Geheimakten, 19: Andrian’s report, 27 November 1879.
73 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1498/1879: PG to JMF, 12 April.
74 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1689/1879: Hofmann to Franz Joseph, 9 June.
75 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3430/1880: Foreign Ministry (Kállay) to JMF, 12 June.
76 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4667/1880: Württemberg to JMF, 4 July; police report of 6 July.
77 Ibid.: Szlávy to Württemberg, 14 July 1880; BH 5069/1880: Württemberg Tel. to Szlávy, 26 July (the belated reply suggests Württemberg’s discomfort).
78 HHStA, AR 28/16: Calice to Haymerle, 1 October 1880. For Austria’s counter to the Patriarch’s characterization of Kosanović, reported from Istanbul on 31 October 1879, see ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 47/1880, Kállay to Calice, 10 November. No doubt Joachim turned against Kosanović when the archimandrite reported his approach to Austria.
79 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 74, 92 and 113/1880: Kállay to JMF, 26 November and 4 December, enclosing Calice’s despatches of 2 and 23 November.
80 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 2/1880: Franz Joseph’s comment on Szlávy’s report to Haymerle of 27 October.
81 Madžar, Pokret Srba, and Vrankić, Religion und Politik, pass over this matter, the latter saying merely: ‘The formalities in Istanbul were soon settled’ (143). Actually, Kosanović’s appointment was approved by Franz Joseph on 4 October, but not announced till 20 December.
82 V. Ćorović, Mostar i njegova Srpska pravoslavna opština (Belgrade, 1933), 85.
83 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1829/1881: PG to JMF, 6 March.
84 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 410/1881: Dahlen to Franz Joseph, 17 April. The speech of the metropolitan of Prizren in Turkey was judged worth his handsome 1,000 florins’ travelling expenses.
85 Ibid., JMF to PG, 28 May 1881.
86 ABiH, ZMF, BH 222/1880: Kukuljević’s draft of 1 January, little modified in the PG draft sent to the ministry on 4 February: BH 940/1880.
87 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4904 and 5541/1880, Tisza to JMF, 17 July; Austrian culture minister Eybesfeld to JMF, 3 August.
88 ABiH, ZMF, BH 8026/1880: PG to JMF, 27 October 1881; JMF comments, 8 May 1882.
89 ABiH, ZMF, BH 7439/1882: PG to JMF, 23 August.
90 Šematizam Pravoslavne Mitropolije i Arcidijeceze Dabro-bosanske za godinu 1882 (Sarajevo, 1882).
94 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 150/1882: PG to JMF, 19 January. The government told Kosanović that the procession, with its Austrian military presence, must go ahead regardless of whether any Serbs attended.
95 Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 148–9; PRO, FO 7/1023: Freeman to Granville, 15 July 1881.
97 E. Winter, Russland und die slawischen Völker in der Diplomatie des Vatikans 1878–1903 (Berlin, 1950); B. O’Reilly, Life of Leo XIII (New York, 1887), 380–97.
99 Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 394 (memorandum).
100 HHStA, PA XI 258: Andrásy to Paar, 8 August 1878, cf. Franz Joseph’s pencil note on Hungarian culture minister Trefort’s report of 3 August.
101 Ballhausplatz instructions to Seiler, 16 October 1878, printed in fra B. Gavranović, Uspostava redovite katoličke hijerarhije u Bosni i Hercegovini 1881 godine (Belgrade, 1935), 291; HHStA, PA XI 258: Seiler to Andrásy, 1 November 1879; Paar to Andrásy, 29 November 1879.
102 Z. Grijak, Politička djelatnost vrbosanskog nadbiskupa Josipa Stadlera (Zagreb, 2001), 52–3; Gavranović, Uspostava, 295–7 (Strossmayer’s memorandum).
103 Gavranović, Uspostava, 61–70, 88–9, 92–4. More recent treatments of the setting up of the Catholic hierarchy are in Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 390–474, and Grijak, Politička djelatnost Stadlera, 45–79.
104 Gavranović, Uspostava, 335. Gavranović (324–50) prints the Propaganda documents, which Austrian diplomacy succeeded in purloining and copying overnight. The eventual setting up of the Bosnian Catholic hierarchy did indeed impede Vatican negotiations with Russia: Winter, Russland, 42.
105 Gavranović, Uspostava, 295; ABiH, ZMF, BH 2145/1879: Hofmann to PG, 9 June 1879: ‘The Catholic clergy of the occupied provinces at the very time when danger was involved, clearly showed proofs of its sympathies for the Imperial and
Royal Government...I must therefore place particular value on maintenance of this relationship in the future.'

106 Vrankić, Politik und Religion, 426.

107 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1765/1880, for a Franciscan petition to Franz Joseph on tithe of 16 March 1880.

108 See PG reports of 30 August and 30 December 1880 in ABiH, ZMF, BH 6262/1880 and 140/1881.

109 ABiH, ZMF, BH 7944/1880: PG to JMF, 31 October; BH 735/1881, with Vuičić’s letter of 22 December 1880 threatening ‘further measures’.

110 ABiH, ZMF, BH 8405/1880: Hungarian Minister of Culture to JMF, 28 November; BH 8685/1880: PG to JMF, 6 December.

111 HHStA, PA XII 258: Undated Foreign Ministry memorandum, filed with a despatch of Szlávy to Haymerle of 2 July 1880.


113 Ibid., 371.

114 Paar Tel. to Haymerle, 31 March 1881, printed in Gavranović, Uspostava, 374–5.

115 Gavranović, Uspostava, 147–74. Text of final agreement of 8 June 1881, printed in ibid., 199–201; 200 for quote.

116 Paar to Haymerle, 1 April 1881, printed in ibid., 376.

117 Paar to Haymerle, 16 May 1881, printed in ibid., 382.

118 HHStA, AR 27: Szlávy to Haymerle, 6 February 1881.

119 Szlávy to Haymerle, 2 July 1881, quoted in Gavranović, Uspostava, 357–60.

120 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 91/1881: Archbishop Haynald of Kalocsa to JMF, 29 November 1880 and 14 January 1881, enclosing two undated memoranda by Vestenek.

121 See, for example, Dahmen’s letters of 10 and 16 March 1880 in ABiH, ZMF, BH 2873.3559/1880

122 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 558/1881: Ban Pejačević to Szlávy, 8 March. See also Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 476–9; Z. Grijak, Politička djelatnost Stadlera, 81–90.

123 Grijak, Politička djelatnost Stadlera, 102–12. Stadler was not himself a Jesuit but had unsuccessfully sought membership of the Order.

124 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2712/1882: Stadler to Szlávy, 1 April.

125 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2712. 3205/1882: PG to JMF, 15 April.

126 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2121/1882: JMF to Stadler, 30 March. One of the nuns’ Vienna schools had rejected the state right of inspection.


130 Osman-Äziz, *Bez nada. Pripovijest iz mostarskog života* (Zagreb, 1895); E. Mulabdić, *Zeleno busenje* (1898). Osman-Äziz was a pseudonym for Osman Nuri Hadžić and the journalist Ivan Miličević, who wrote collaboratively.

131 HHStA, PA, XII 137: Dubsky (Istanbul) to Haymerle, 13 April 1880.

132 For an immense retrospective list of these, see *Memorandum nj. preuzvišenom ministru Kallayu predan 19.12.1900 u Sarajevu od predstavnika i zastupnika muslimanskog naroda okupiranih zemalja* (Novi Sad, 1900).

133 AbiH, ZMF, BH 4803/1880: PG to JMF, 10 July (Sarajevo); BH 5368/1880: PG to JMF, 30 July (Derventa).

134 AbiH, ZMF, BH 5368/1880: PG to JMF, 30 July; BH 5453: PG to JMF, 4 August.

135 Vrankić, *Religion und Politik*, 648–50. Vrankić says the official concern was left in post by the Provincial Government. He was, however, dismissed by the JMF: AbiH, ZMF, BH 2245/1880: JMF to Taaffe, 14 April.


137 PRO, FO 7/1023: Freeman to Granville, 26 November 1881.

138 AbiH, ZMF, BH 6596/1881: War Ministry to JMF, 3 September.

139 For negotiations with Muslims, see H. Kapidžić, *Hercegovački ustanak 1882 godine* (Sarajevo, 1958), 75–82; N. Šehić, *Autonomni pokret Muslimana za vrijeme austrougarske uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Sarajevo, 1980), ch. 1.

140 AbiH, ZMF, BH 7306: JMF official Sax, 7 October, on discussion with Fadilpašić.


142 AbiH, ZMF, BH 4884/1880: PG to JMF, 26 June; BH 1711/1885, PG to JMF, 3 March.

143 AbiH, ZMF, BH 7687/1881: PG to JMF, 6 October. The ministry’s formal reply on 11 June 1883 merely referred to the statute as ‘not approved’.

144 HHStA, PA XL 210: Szlávy to Haymerle, 21 June 1880.

145 AbiH, ZMF, BH 8184/1881, PG to JMF, 5 November: Szlávy to Franz Joseph, 26 November. The PG insisted that the final examination should test pupils’ knowledge of the ‘Slavonic language in Latin letters’.

146 AbiH, ZMF, BH 5755/1882: PG to JMF, 15 July. The salaries were raised after just one poorly qualified person applied in the first year.

147 Anonimus [Osman Nuri Hadžić], *Muslimansko pitanje u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Zagreb, 1902), 56.

148 D. Franković (ed.), *Povijest školstva i pedagogije u Hrvatskoj* (Zagreb, 1958), 161.

149 Ibid., 163.

150 AbiH, ZMF, BH 6503/1879: Tisza to JMF, 27 November, with Trefort’s comments; BH 273/1880: Taaffe to JMF, with Stremayr’s report of 28 October 1879.


in these exchanges, but not the implications for policy towards Serb confessional schools.

153 ABiH, ZMF, BH 6783/1880: Taaffe to JMF, 28 September. Tisza complained that interconfessional schools were still envisaged and the Hungarians were being kept in the dark, BH 7029/1880: Tisza to JMF, 3 October.

154 ABiH, ZMF, BH 315/1880: Zore to JMF, 7 January; JMF to PG, 18 January.

155 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2800/1881: Szlávy to Franz Joseph, 17 April.

156 ABiH, ZMF, BH 6870/1882: Kállay to Franz Joseph, 8 September.

157 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2045/1879: Stremayr to JMF, 14 May; BH 6503/1879: Trefort’s comments.

158 ABiH, ZMF, BH 5813/1880: PG to JMF, 17 August; BH 7524/1881: PG to JMF, 26 September. The PG took on the cost of the sixteen most successful officer-teachers.

159 See PG reports in ABiH, ZMF, BH 139/1881, 7844/1882, and 1625/1884.

160 These and other figures in this paragraph are calculated from the references given in the preceding footnote.

161 ABiH, ZMF, BH 5602/1880: PG to JMF, 7 August.

162 ABiH, ZMF, KB (Kabinettbriefe) 102/1892 : Kállay to Kutschera, 23 July.

163 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3868/1882: PG to JMF, 16 May, for the intention.

164 See Plentaj’s obituary in Školski vjesnik, 8 (1901): 934–7.

165 ABiH, ZMF, BH 701.1407/1880: PG to JMF, 29 January and 23 February.

166 V. Krestić, History of the Serbs in Croatia and Slavonia 1848–1914 (Belgrade, 1997), 225–56.

167 ABiH, JMF, Pr BH 104/1880: PG to JMF, 5 December 1879, enclosing nos 40–45 of Srpski list: 1/13 October to 5/17 November.

168 ABiH, ZMF, BH 7353/1880: PG to JMF, enclosing the Mostar petition of 4/16 September 1880. For events in Mostat, see the memoirs of Đ. St. Bekić, Borba srpsko-pravoslavnog Opsteštva u Mostaru protiv austro-bosanske uprave 1880–82 godine (Sarajevo, 1936), 1–152.


170 Figures in this paragraph calculated from ABiH, ZMF, BH 139/1881: PG to JMF, 20 December 1880; ABiH, ZMF, BH 6783/1880: Taaffe to JMF, 28 September 1880, with Eybesfeld’s comments.

171 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1625/1884 (Bijeljina). In 1881–2 there had been 116 Serbs in the Bijeljina state school and 148 in the confessional: BH 7844/1882, PG report of 22 October.

172 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1703/1881: PG to JMF, 24 February; JMF to PG, 15 September: ‘Serbian national history is certainly not exactly a suitable subject, but to let it alone seems to me a lesser evil than the agitation which would seize the Bosnian Serbs in consequence of its abolition as a subject of study.’

173 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3358/1882: PG to JMF, 30 April.

174 Kruševac, Sarajevo, 402–3; Šušljić, Mss, R-390/6, 37, quoting Školski list, 18 (1882), no. 18 (Director Popović).

CHAPTER 3 THE NATURE OF THE KÁLLAY REGIME

1 OSzKK, XI/540, Khuen-Héderváry to Thallóczy, 6 May 1909.
2 For interwar verdicts, see A. Malbaša, Hrvatski i srpski nacionalni problem u Bosni (Osijek, 1940), 80–4; V. Čorović, Političke prilike u Bosni i Hercegovini (Belgrade, 1939), 32–4.
5 Kállay to Andrássy, 31 May 1868: see Radenić, Dnevnik Kalaja, 661.
6 Ibid., 44: diary entry of 26 June 1868 for the quotation; Okey, ‘Hungarian Balkanists’, 240–3, for the unscrupulousness.
7 Gustav Steinbach refers to such a commission in Erinnerungen an B. von Kállay, reprinted from the Neue Freie Presse obituary of July 1903.
8 OSzKK, Fol. Hung. 1689, 493, in a section headed ‘Aphorisms’.
10 OSzKK, Fol. Hung 2902/8: Thallóczy’s materials for his Kállay memorial lecture.
12 Steinbach, Erinnerungen, 9.
13 OSzKK, Fol. Hung. 1689, p. 497, no date.
15 Steinographische Sitzungs-Protokolle der Delegation des Reichrates, Session 28 (1892), 175.
16 HHStA, PA XL 293, Gemeinsame Ministerratsprotokolle (GMP): meeting of 3 June 1883, with Kállay’s memorandum, n.d.
Notes

17 OLME, 240/1893: Wekerle’s comment on Csáky’s despatch of 17 January 1893.
19 HHStA, PA XL 293, GMP, 3 June 1883: Kállay’s memorandum.
20 Hugo Freiherr von Kutschera (1847–1909), born in Vienna of Slovak background and educated in the Oriental Academy there, came to the Bosnian service from a diplomatic career in the Balkans, being first head of the political department of the Provincial Government and from 1886 to 1903 Civil Adlatus: Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950, iv. 375.
21 Baron Appel was military commander and head of the Provincial Government from 1882 to 1903. His request, as a military man, to be dispensed from making a speech on opening a railway, or else told what line to take, shows he fitted Kállay’s civilianization project perfectly: OL, P. 344, Kállay Papers: Appel to Kállay, 1 July 1901.
22 F. Schmid, Bosni en die Herzegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns (Leipzig, 1914), 86–8; PRO, FO 7/1070: Freeman to Granville, 1 April 1884.
24 Đ. Juzbašić, Izgradnja željeznica u Bosni i Hercegovini u svijetu austrougarske politike od okupacije do kraja Kállayeve ere (Sarajevo, 1974), 106–17.
25 This was Muslim landowners’ fate in Serbia: D. S. Stojićić, Agrarvo pitanje u novoslobodenim krajevima Srbije posle srpsko-turskih ratova 1878–1907 (Leskovac, 1987), 18–19, 35–7.
26 See the chapters by the Orthodox V. Skarić and Muslim O. N. Hadžić, in V. Skarić et al. (eds), Bosna i Hercegovina pod austro-ugarskom upravom (Belgrade, 1938), 33–55 and 56–101 respectively, and for the Croats, Malbaša, Nacionalni problem.
27 OLME, 1844/1883: Kállay to Tisza, 9 June 1883.
28 Stenographische Sitzungs-Protokolle, Session 28 (1892), 168.
29 Die Lage der Mohammedaner in Bosnien, von einem Ungarn, 2nd edn (Vienna, 1900), 4. There is preparatory material in Lajos Thallóczy’s papers in OSzKK, Fol. Hung. 1635. Lajos Thallóczy (1854–1916) was Kállay’s closest intellectual collaborator and shared his views on Islam in modern society.
30 ABiH, ZMF, KB 72/1890: Kállay to Kutschera, 28 November.
32 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1945/1882: Kállay to Franz Joseph, 7 October.
34 ABiH, ZMF, KB 94/1893: Benko to Kállay, 5 April.
36 OLME, 1844/1883: Kállay to Tisza, 9 June 1883 (sharia); HHStA, PA XL 293, GMP, 3 June 1883: Kállay’s memorandum (land reform and vakuf).
37 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1945/1882: Kállay to Franz Joseph, 7 October.
38 Radenić (ed.), *Dnevnik Kalaja*, 116 (diary entry of 19 November 1868).
39 For example, Čorović, *Političke prilike*, 34.
42 HHStA, PA XXXVIII 183: Kállay to Beust, 26 July 1869.
43 For example, M. Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka* (Sarajevo, 1997), 375.
46 Ibid., 82.
50 Kraljačić, *Kalajevo režim*, 83. Kraljačić first says the ‘quite different’ nationality circumstances in the two countries exclude an identification, but then he appears to make it.
51 *Stenographische Sitzungs-Protokolle*, Session 29 (Vienna, 1893), 200.
52 This appears strongly from Thallóczy’s rationale for a ‘Bosnian line’ in history textbooks. See Kraljačić, *Kalajevo režim*, 253–4, though Kraljačić does not draw this conclusion.
53 OSzKK, IV/442: Kállay to Falk, 20 December 1892.
54 *Stenographische Sitzungs-Protokolle*, Session 28 (Vienna, 1892), 173.
55 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4791/1883: PG to JMF, 4 September.
57 Dlustuš, ‘Školske prilike’, 156.
58 PRO, FO 7/1125: Freeman to Salisbury, 27 December 1887.
59 Đ. Pejanović, *Srednje i stručne škole u Bosni i Hercegovini od početka do 1941* (Sarajevo, 1953), 137.
60 ABiH, ZMF, BH 8114/1891: PG to JMF, 23 August; JMF to PG, 2 November.
61 PRO, FO, 7/1153: Freeman to Salisbury, 11 February 1889 (£21,641 out of £29,225; £2,083 of this went on the teachers’ training college).
62 Calculated from Dlustuš, ‘Školske prilike’, 156, and *Spomenica Prve gimnazije u Sarajevu* (Sarajevo, 1929), 7.
63 T. Kruševac, *Sarajevo pod austro-ugarskom upravom* (Sarajevo, 1960), 51–2 (Sharia School); PRO, FO 7/1153: Freeman to Salisbury, 11 February 1889.
64 See, for instance, the opening of the Trebinje commercial school: ABiH, ZMF, BH 1519/1893: PG to JMF, 3 February.

67 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 345/1893: PG to JMF, 6 April; also Pr BH 19/1893, 2 January (Cetinje school); O. Klesić-Peleš, ‘Više djevojačke škole ili o odgajanju djevojaka’, Školski vjesnik, 1 (1894): 346–50.

68 Reduced to about thirty by a reform of 1896: ABiH, ZMF, BH 1093/1896: PG to JMF, 20 January; JMF to PG, 6 July.

69 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1282/1904: Thallóczy’s report on Bosnian education.

70 Ibid.

71 Dlustuš, ‘Školske prilike’, 538 (for 1890); ABiH, ZMF, BH 6893/1899: PG to JMF, 27 June (for 1900).

72 ABiH, ZMF, BH 11512/1895: PG to JMF, 4 October.

73 ABiH, ZMF, BH 1009/1883: JMF to PG, 22 February.

74 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2513/1883: PG to JMF, 7 May; JMF to PG, 28 May.

75 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3720/1895, n.d.

76 ABiH, ZMF, BH 2513/1883: PG to JMF, 7 May.

77 ABiH, ZMF, BH 968/1884: PG to JMF, 11 January.

78 ABiH, ZMF, BH 5999/1886: PG to JMF, 2 August. For an example of the PG’s sensitivity to charges of using a Croatianized language, see its note that while the Croatian category of ‘leading teacher’ was to be introduced in Bosnian schools, this figure could not be called ‘ravnajući učitelj’, a term ‘odious’ to Serbs: BH 8114/1891: PG to JMF, 29 August.


80 ABiH, ZMF, BH 8676/1896, PG to JMF, 20 July. These orders came in 1887–9. At first the PG had experimented with textbooks in both scripts for all. The Serbs objected that traditionally the Christian script best known to Muslims had been Cyrillic.

81 Stenographische Sitzungs-Protokolle, Session 28 (1892), 173; Session 29 (1893), 200. For the view of the renowned linguist Professor Vatroslav Jagić that Bosnia was a legitimate regional term for the common language in Bosnia, see ibid., Session 32 (1896), 157.

82 ABiH, ZMF, BH 12736/1893: PG to JMF, 28 October.

83 ABiH, ZMF, BH 598/1891: ministry notes on a report by Dlustuš of 25 December 1890. Dlustuš urged a history textbook for the teachers’ training college, believing that ‘superficial’ history teaching bore much responsibility for teachers’ susceptibility ‘in many lands’ to political and socialist agitation.

84 Kraljić, Kalajev režim, 253–6, for Thalliczy’s view; quote from p. 256.

85 ABiH, ZMF, BH 11885/1893: JMF to PG, 29 October.

86 ABiH, ZMF, BH 14158/1892: PG to JMF, Lilek’s plan, 23 April; Thallóczy’s comments, n.d. October; JMF to PG, 22 June 1898.

87 ABiH, ZMF, BH 7003/1900: Thallóczy review of Lilek’s revision, n.d.; BH 12914/1901: JMF tells to PG, 16 and 27 November.

88 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 153/1893: PG to JMF, 9 February; JMF to PG, 21 March.
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91 ABiH, ZMF, BH 7601/1894, PG to JMF, 18 May, for four costed building plans.
94 Kraljačić, kalajev režim, 210–14.
95 K. Hörmann (ed.) Narodne pjesme Muhamedanaca u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo, 1888); M. Kapetanović (ed.), Narodno blago (Sarajevo, 1887).
96 Kraljačić, Kalajev režim, 271–2.
98 ABiH, ZMF, KB 101/1894; Hörmann to Kállay, 2 June, printed in R. Besarović (ed.), Kultura i umjetnost u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austrougarskom upravom (Sarajevo, 1968), 94–116.
100 Lj. Mladenović, Građansko slikarstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini u XIX veku (Sarajevo, 1982), 96, 101.
102 Reynolds, ‘Kavaljeri, kostimi’.
104 Ibid., 335.
105 Steinbach, Erinnerungen, 16.
106 For example, Kállay’s letters to Falk of 20 December 1889: ‘Confidentially, I tell you that I dictated this article myself’, and 21 April 1893: ‘Enclosed I send another article in the form of a report from Belgrade’: OSzKK, IV/442.
107 OSzKK, Fol. Hung. 1689: Article from the Liverpool Courier, From a Correspondent, Sarajevo, September 1890.
109 Ibid., 148. Laveleye had been given Strauss’s Bosnien: Land und Lente by the authorities. The Orthodox were ‘sullen and subdued’, he implied, because the regime insisted on absolute equality, not Christian dominance (155).
111 For example, Laveleye, Balkan Peninsula, 112–24.
112 ABiH, ZMF, KB 51/1890: Kállay to Kutschera, 10 July 1890. The gusle was the instrument to which Serbian heroic folk poetry was recited.

Chapter 4 Kállay and the Serbs

1 For Serbian politics, see G. Stokes, Politics or Development. The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia (Durham, NC and London, 1990), and the classic works of Slobodan Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenović, 3 vols, 2nd edn (Belgrade, 1934), Vlada Aleksandra Obrenović, 2 vols (Belgrade, 1929–31).

3 S. Novaković, _Srpska knjiga. Njeni prodavci i čitaoci u XIX veku_ (Belgrade, 1900), 3–4, 3, 5, 6.

4 See also W. D. Behschnitt, _Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten 1830–1914_ (Munich, 1980).

5 S. Novaković, _Balkanska pitanja_ , ed. M. Vojvodić (Belgrade, 2000), 299–359; B. Madžar, _Pokret Srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vjersko-prosvjetnu samoupravu pod austrougarskom upravom_ (Sarajevo, 1982), 80, for Progressive attacks.

6 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1759/1882: PG to JMF, 21 July 1882; JMF to PG, 12 June 1883. Information was sought at district level on the functioning of the communes and their schools.

7 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 506/1885: Kállay to Franz Joseph, 27 July.

8 T. Krusuševac, _Sarajevo pod austro-ugarskom upravom_ (Sarajevo, 1960), 266–8.

9 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 272/1883: JMF to PG, 11 May.


12 ABiH, ZMF, ZVPr BH 1050/1884: Mostar Kreis Commissioner to PG, 7 August.

13 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 934/1884: PG to JMF, 31 October; JMF to PG, 27 December.

14 See, for example, W. W. Weir, _Education in Cyprus. Some Theories and Practices in Education in the Island of Cyprus since 1878_ (Cyprus, 1952), 24–8, 71, 113–15.

15 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4791/1884: PG to JMF, 4 September.


17 For example, ABiH, ZMF, BH 1625/1884; BH 6740/1884, PG to JMF, 12 October.

18 ABiH, ZMF, BH 6962/1885: PG to JMF, 13 September.


20 ‘Srpske škole u Bosni i Hercegovini’, _Srlobran_ , 14/26 February 1887, excerpted in Šušlić, Mss, R-390/20.

21 See, for example, numerous grievances in papers of the Vojvodina radical and adviser to the Bosnian Serbs, Emil Gavrila, excerpted in Šušlić, Mss, R-390/29, and the Zagreb Serb paper _Srlobran_ ’s articles for 1887, nos. 20, 32, 38, 50, 53, 54: Šušlić, Mss, R-390/20.

22 For instance: Gradačac, where the Serb school declined with people’s impoverishment until in 1896 the poorer parents sent their children to the government school, founded in 1880–81. Metropolitan Mandić and the generosity of the commune president re-established the school fund, and the errant children returned: Šušlić, Mss, R-390/8, 78–9, quoting _Srpski vjesnik_ , 2 (1898), no. 9.
23 For example, Školski list (1885), no. 7 (Bugojno—praise); Srpsko kolo (1884), no. 55 (Bijeljina—rebuke), cited in Šušlič, Mss, R-390/20, 131.
25 Descriptions in Bosanska vila, 4 (1889), no. 8, 124 (Gradiška); no. 12 (Prijedor).
26 For instance, in Čajnica, Sanski Most, Doljni Vakuf, Bosanski Brod and Glamoč. See footnote 16.
27 ‘Pisma Mitropolita Dabro-bosanskog Save Kosanovića Đordu Nikolajeviću’, Crkva i život, 2 (1923), Kosanović to Nikolajević, 26 February/10 March 1886.
28 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 569/1885: Ambassador Calice to Kálnoky, 18 August 1885.
29 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 54/1883: Kállay to Franz Joseph, 23 January; Pr BH 69/1883: JMF to PG, 31 January.
30 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 641/1884: Nikolics to JMF, 20 July.
31 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 456/1883: Hungarian Interior Ministry to Kállay, 3 August. Kállay took it upon himself to describe Radičević as a poet of ‘fairly minor significance’.
32 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 667/1884: Hungarian Culture Minister to JMF, 6 August.
33 T. Kraljačić, Kalajev režim u Bosni (Sarajevo, 1987), 336.
34 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 506/1885: Kállay to Kálnoky, 4 August.
35 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 689/1883: JMF to PG, 30 November.
36 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 203/1884. JMF to PG, 7 March.
37 Ibid., PG to JMF, 25 February 1884; Pr BH 118/1884: Kállay to Kálnoky, 9 February. Stadler opposed the calendar’s bland invocation to religious tolerance as indifference to the interests of the true faith.
38 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 89/1883, Appel to JMF, 29 January 1883.
40 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 203/1883: reports of the Bijeljina Military Commander and District Commissioner respectively, 20 January and 6 February.
41 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 567/1884: Appel to Kállay, 29 September.
42 On Kosanović’s efforts to save the school, see M. Maksimović, ‘Srpska realka i srpska gimnazija u Sarajevu’, Bratstvo, 4 (1928): 67–70. For the graveyard issue: D. Ruvarac, Životopis Đorda Nikolajevića, Mitropolita Dabro-bosanskog (Zemun, 1898), 84–5.
43 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 277/1884: PG to JMF, 16 March (circular against singing nationalist songs).
44 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 203/1883: JMF to PG, 7 March.
45 The pastoral letter and Stadler and Buconjić’s countering Open Letter of August are in ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 551/1883.
46 The now speeded-up enquiry yielded a Church justification of a supposed request for the Catholic items by an Orthodox pupil, somewhat uncritically reproduced in T. Vukšić, Medusobni odnosi katolika i pravoslavaca u Bosni i Hercegovini, 1878–1903 (Mostar, 1994), 101–2. The teacher concerned was transferred and subsequently dismissed for appearing half-naked on the street at night in women’s clothes: ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 689/1883: PG to JMF 24 November.
47 Neither Vrankić nor Grijak mention this aspect of the ‘Open Letter’. Their depiction of Kosanović is harsher than mine. Kosanović’s complaints were in his
answer of 10 September to the Catholic bishops’ Open Letter, contained in ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 629/1883.


49 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 497/1884: JMF to PG, 7 June.

50 Ruvarac, Životopis, 83–91. Ruvarac quotes a letter of March 1884 from Nikolajević, then consistorial member in Sarajevo, saying that Catholic propaganda had almost driven Kosanović to despair (90–91).

51 The Open Letter was published in Vienna and Zagreb in 1883. According to ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH, 589/1883: JMF to PG, 18 October, all copies of Kosanović’s reply, set up in the press in Novi Sad, were sent to the Provincial Government, but Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 152, says some were distributed.

52 ABiH, ZMF, BH 6267/1880: Kállay to JMF, 20 August; Pr BH 1265/1881: Foreign Ministry to JMF, 31 December.

53 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 81/1885: JMF to Austrian Culture Ministry and to PG, 14 March.

54 Šušlijić, Mss, 390–R/29.

55 ABH, ZMF, Pr BH 506/1885: Kállay to Kálnoky, 4 August; Pr BH 597/1885: Kálnoky to Kállay, enclosing Calice’s telegrams of 1–5 September.

56 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 660/1885: Kállay to Franz Joseph, 25 September.

57 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 521/1885: PG Chiffre Tel. to JMF, 7 August.

58 ‘Pisma Kosanovića Nikolajeviću’, 22 July/3 August 1887; 11/23 June 1888; 26 February/10 March 1886 and 21 July/2 August 1888.

59 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 905/1888: Šebanović to JMF official Horowitz, n.d.

60 ‘Pisma Kosanovića Nikolajeviću’, Nikolajević to Kosanović, 18/30 August 1888.


62 Text of statute in ABiH, ZMF, BH 1852/1888.

63 In a quarrel with the Patriarch, Ignatios threatened resignation, which Kállay saw was smartly accepted: ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 669/1887: PG to JMF, 3 December; Pr BH 15/1888: Kállay to Mostar Kreis Commissioner, 7 January 1888.

64 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 724/1885: PG to JMF, 21 October; ministerial internal memorandum, 24 November; Pr BH 107/1885: PG to JMG, 1 March; JMF to PG, 15 March.

65 Šušlijić, Mss, R-390/2, for minutes of Sarajevo commune committee meeting of 17/29 September 1885.

66 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 737/1885: JMF to PG, 8 November.

67 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 235/1890: PG to JMF, 25 November: Naše doba (Novi Sad) and Novo vreme (Zemun), subsidized by the purchase of fifty and twenty-five copies respectively.

68 Kraljačić, Kalajev režim, 128.

69 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 542/1891: Kállay to Kálnoky, 23 November.

70 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 655/1889: Belgrade legation report of 4 September, transmitted to the JMF (Mihailo); Pr BH 106/1889: PG to JMF, 18 February (St Sava Society).

71 Arhiv Srbije, Društvo Svetog Save (AS, DSS), no. 96, n.d.

72 AS, DSS, no. 403: Društvo Svetog Save to R. Kondić, 20 March 1889 (OS).
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73 Ibid.
75 *Bosanska vila*, 1 (1886): 15.
77 Ibid., 4 (1889): 95.
78 For details of Tuzla and Mostar, see R. Besarović (ed.), *Kultura i umjetnost u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austrougarskom upravom* (Sarajevo, 1968), 573–5, 577–89.
79 *Sloga o svojoj pedesetogišnjici 1888–1938* (Sarajevo, 1938), 4–5. The minutes of the Sarajevo commune committee for meetings of 24 November and 15 December 1888, 30 March and 4 May 1889 (all O.S.) show the commune’s reluctance to provide facilities for Sloga, whose membership was described by the Provincial Government as being ‘chiefly from the most radical young Sarajevo Orthodox, the so-called Omladina’: ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 285/1892: PG to JMF, 21 April.
82 Ibid., 32.
84 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 71/1891: PG to JMF, 18 February. Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim* (338), says that securing the departure of Ignatios and Dionysios cost the government 23,927 florins.
86 This summary of clerical grievance is based on petitions contained in Pr BH 26/1891 above, particularly that of the Sarajevo protopresbyteriat of 30 November 1890, and on articles in the Bosnian Orthodox Church journal, *Dabro-bosanski Istočnik*. Examples are: ‘O stanju Srpskopravoslavnog sveštenstva u Bosni’, *Dabro-bosanski Istočnik*, 2 (1889): 372–4; ‘Zašto popina propovijeda nema značnijeg utiska na narod?’, ibid., 3 (1890); ‘Nekim koji su protivni da se svešteničko stanje u Bosni i Hercegovini poboljša i u red dovede’, ibid., 4 (1891): 16–18.
87 ABiH, ZMF Pr BH 26/1891. According to a note in the document of 4 August, this undated draft of Kállay’s was seen and approved by Kutschera while visiting Vienna. But Kutschera recommended that the section cited should be omitted as too confidential for official submission. In the end the draft was not sent, though it anticipated later government policy.
88 Measures were reported as having been decided in ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 605/1891: JMF to PG, 13 June, after a grumpy letter from Nikolajević of October 1891.
89 ABiH, ZMFBH 12565/1891: PG to JMF, 24 December 1891; BH 5243/1893: JMF to PG, 5 1893; Pr BH 81/1897: PG to JMF, 15 January 1897. Kállay’s notes in Pr BH 26/1891 seem to have envisaged subventions for all parishes, making a total annual outlay of some 75,000 florins. In the event less than half the clergy gained subventions.
90 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4750/1892: PG to JMF, 28 April. Entrant figures taken from the annual lists in *Dabro-bosanski Istočnik*. 
Notes

91 ABiH, ZMF, KB 142/1893: Kutschera to Kállay, 7 June.
92 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 977/1894: PG to JMF, 28 August.
93 ABiH, ZMF, KB 161/1898: Kutschera to Kállay, 4 May.
94 ABiH, ZMF Pr BH 1144/1898: PG with letter of Svetislav Davidović.
95 Listed in Ruvarac, Životopis Đorđa Nikolajevića, 115.
96 Ibid., 90–1.
97 Iz memoara protopop Nedeljka, 95.
98 For instance, ABiH, ZMF, KB 142/1893: Kutschera to Kállay, 7 June; Pr BH 1430/1894: JMF to PG, 12 January 1895.
99 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 81/1897: PG to JMF, 15 January.
100 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3657/1892: PG to JMF, 2 April.
101 Šušlijić, Mss R-390/29: complaint of Ljubuški commune to the Serb leaders. For Glamoč, see Šušlijić, Mss R-390/13. Index 2.
102 ABiH, ZMF, BH 14672/1896: PG to JMF, 19 December.
103 This figure is calculated from names of transferred teachers listed by Šušlijić, Mss, R-390/9, 150, with additional references provided in the complaints of the forty-nine communes to Serb leaders in 1899, Šušlijić, Mss, R-390/29, and in S. Kaluderčić, ‘Srbi i Srpskinje iz Vojvodine učitelji i učiteljice u Bosni’, Glasnik istorijskog društva u Novom Sadu (1939), 193–209.
104 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 496/1895: PG to JMF, 18 April.
105 Šušlijić, Mss, R-390/29: Ljubinje complaints to Serb leaders, 1899; Ključ, Brčko, and Bugojno communes complained about similar pressures on peasants: ABiH, ZMF, BH 3806/1897: PG to JMF, 29 March.
106 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 584/1895: PG to JMF, 11 May; Šušlijić, Mss, R-390/29: čajnica complaints.
107 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 614/1895: PG to JMF, 11 May.
108 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1037/1894: PG to JMF, 12 September, with the characterization; JMF to PG, 12 October.
110 ABiH, ZMF, BH 13517/1892: PG to JMF, 6 December 1892: JMF to PG, 25 January 1893.
111 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 619/1895: Benko’s reports to PG of 2 March and 22 April.
112 Ibid., PG to JMF, 19 May 1895.
113 This was Kállay’s addition to the Normalstatut draft, despite the first tentative canonical doubts expressed by the convenient Zhishman: ABiH, ZMF, BH 5943/1893.
114 ABiH, ZMF, BH 12650/1895: JMF to PG, n.d.
115 Perović’s views on Žitomislić can be found in ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 85/1896, enclosing his memoranda of 28 April 1894 and 20 October 1895 (both O.S.). For his yearnings for peace, see Pr BH 1504/1895: Mostar District Commissioner Klimburg to PG, 27 November.
117 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1330/1895: Kállay to Franz Joseph. 31 October.
118 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1545/1895: Benko to Appel, 15 December.
CHAPTER 5 KÁLLAY AND THE MUSLIMS


3 I. Hadžibegović, Bosansko-hercegovački gradovi na razmeđu 19. i 20. stoljeća (Sarajevo, 2004), 39.


5 H. Kamberović, Begovski zemljišni posjed u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1878 do 1918, 2nd edn (Sarajevo, 2005), 328, 352.


7 For the legal process, see F. Schmid, Bosnien und die Herzegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarn (Leipzig, 1914), 150–9.


10 E. Mulabdić, Zeleno busenje (Sarajevo, 1998), 64–7, 169. First published 1898.

11 PRO, FO 7/1178: Freeman to Salisbury, 22 September 1891.


13 H. Kreševljaković, Banje u Bosni i Hercegovini (1462–1916), 2nd extended edn (Sarajevo, 1952), 73–90.

14 S. Babić, Das unbekannte Bosnien (Cologne, 1992), 195.


16 By the 1910 census, 2,181 claimed knowledge of Turkish and 448 of Arabic: M. Hadžjahić, Od tradicije do identiteta (Sarajevo, 1974), 128.

17 S. S. Hadžihuseini Muvcek, Povijest Bosne, 2 vols (Sarajevo, 1997), p. XI.
22. Ibid., 147–9.
23. ABiH, ZMF, BH 2135/1884: PG to JMF, 4 April 1884. Bosnia had been one of the first Ottoman provinces where ruždijas were set up, in the early 1850s: S. Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire 1839–1908* (Leiden, 2001), 65.
24. ABiH, ZMF, BH 13791/1893: PG to JMF, 21 November.
28. See, for example, T. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley, 1991). Mitchell’s claim that Islamic tradition had no call for ideas of schooling and regimentation (83–6) accords ill with a system which elaborately graded madrassas and muderises from the rural provinces up to Constantinople and the Sheikh-ul-Islam.
29. ABiH, ZMF, BH 13791/1893: PG to JMF, 21 November.
30. ABiH, ZMF, KB 72/1890: Kállay to Kutschera, 28 November.
31. Ibid., ‘but always only together with the upper classes, since alone these will offer us the moral and material guarantee we will seek in vain in the inconstant and unreliable great masses’.
32. ABiH, ZMF, KB 102/1892: Benko to Kállay, 12 July.
33. ABiH, ZMF, BH 7188/1891: PG to JMF, 20 July. This proposed a Dar-ul-mualimin in Sarajevo. A second Dar-ul-mualimin in Banjaluka was urged by the PG in the despatches of BH 716 and 3086/1893, 14 January and 11 March.
34. ABiH, ZMF, BH 511 and 3086/1893: PG to JMF, 5 February and 10 May.
35. ABiH, ZMF, BH 7188/1891: JMF to PG, 12 September.
36. ABiH, ZMF: BH 3086/1893: JMF to PG, 10 May.
37. ABiH, ZMF, KB 102/1892: Benko to Kállay, 12 July 1892; for Džabić, BH 511/1893, ministerial marginal side comments on PG report of 7 January.
38. ABiH, ZMF, BH 511/1893: JMF to PG, 5 February.
39. ABiH, ZMF, KB 102/1892: Kállay to Kutschera, 23 July 1892; BH 3086/1893: JMF to PG, 10 May 1893.
40. ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1058/1893: minutes of conference of Kállay with PG officials, 29 August.
41. ABiH, ZMF, BH 14122/1896: JMF to PG, 10 July.
42. ABiH, ZMF, BH 4422/1900: PG to JMF, 16 April. For the financing, ABiH, ZMF, BH 5052/1897, with ministerial decree of 3 June.
44 ABiH, ZMF, 7381/1898: PG to JMF, 14 July; JMF to PG, 23 July.
45 ABiH, ZMF, BH 537/1899: PG to JMF, 11 January.
46 ABiH, ZMF, 13381/1893: PG to JMF, 13 November; Kállay Tel. to PG; BH 5701/1899: PG to JMF, 24 May.
47 ABiH, ZMF, BH 5319/1898: PG to JMF, 20 May.
48 ABiH, ZMF, KB 69/1893: Kállay to Kutschera, 23 March; BH 510/1893: PG to JMF, 9 January.
49 Zapisnici sjednica islamske prosvjetne ankete (Sarajevo, 1911), 8–9.
50 ABiH, ZMF, BH10537/1896: PG to JMF, 3 September.
51 Reis Azabagić drew up a list of thirty-six efficient madrassas out of forty-eight: ABiH, ZMF, BH 14122/1896: JMF to JMF, 10 July 1897. The ‘comprehensive report’ on madrassas envisaged in these documents did not materialize but the same ‘efficiency’ criteria were used, with some official cynicism, to exempt softa students from communal labour service in 1901 (BH 15115/1901: PG to JMF, 3 December).
52 H. Ćurić, Muslimansko školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918. godine (Sarajevo, 1983), 227. Kasumović, Školstvo, 178, however, speaks of ‘secular learning’ being introduced, without details. See also D. Pejanović, Srednje i stručne škole u Bosni i Hercegovini od početka do 1841 (Sarajevo, 1953), 159.
54 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 65/1897: PG to JMF, 11 January; BH 6384/1897: JMF note on Azabagić’s daughter.
55 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1257/1899: PG to JMF, 7 October (Mostar); BH 1560/1899: JMF to PG, 11 February (Doljna Tuzla).
56 ABiH, ZMF, BH 925/1893: JMF to PG, 24 February. ‘Ruždija’ was to be used instead of the official term ‘Second Elementary School’ only with Muslims. This tactic worked so well that in the Diet education debates of 1910 the Serb deputy Svetozar Čorović disclaimed knowledge of the ruždijas’ existence.
57 ABiH, ZMF, BH 13791/1893: PG to JMF, 21 November; BH 13166/1899: PG to JMF, 1 December.
58 ABiH, ZMF, BH 511/1893: JMF to PG, 5 February.
59 ‘Uzroci i posljedice našeg zastoja’, Novi vakat, 1 (1913), nos. 4, 6.
60 For example, the measures taken on Muslim fall-off in the state schools at Vinac and Gornji Vakuf: ABiH, ZMF, BH 9977/1890: PG to JMF, 17 November 1890, and BH 10672/1892: PG to JMF, 28 September 1892, respectively.
61 Rizvić, Bosansko-muslimanska književnost, 444–5.
62 ABiH, JMF, Pr BH 1058/1893, for a memorandum of notables of 8 October on the vakuf, alluded to in the ministry’s final draft of the reform: BH 15050/1893, 3 May 1894.
63 N. Šehić, Autonomni pokret Muslimana za vrijeme austrougarske uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo, 1980), 19–30.
64 V. Čorović, Mehmed-beg Kapetanović. Književna slika (Sarajevo, 1911).
65 Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak, Što misle muhamedanci u Bosni (Sarajevo, 1885); M. Hulussi Effendi, Eine Entgegennung vom Standpunk des Islam auf die in Leipzig erschienene Broschüre ‘Bosniens Gegenwart und nächste Zukunft’ (Sarajevo,
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1886). The reference to the ‘doughty Yugoslav nation’ comes from Kapetanović’s similar pamphlet, *Budućnost ili napredak Muhamedanaca u Bosni* (Sarajevo, 1893), 24.

66 T. Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim u Bosni* (Sarajevo, 1987), 215–30, sees the appearance of *Bošnjak* as a kind of ‘proclamation’ of the ‘Bosnian nation’, its unifying course prepared by licensed nationalist polemics between the Croatian paper *Glas Hercegovca* and the Serb *Napredak*, both secretly subsidized. Though such sleight of hand would certainly not be out of character for Kállay, in this case the speculation seems to me to put too much weight on *Bošnjak*.


69 A. Nametak, *Edhem Mulabdić* (Znameniti Hrvati islamske vjere, Kolo 1, Knj. 4) (Zagreb, 1995); Rizvić, *Bosansko-muslimanska književnost*, 440.


72 Ibid., 74.


74 Ibid. 159–60 (Dikić); 167 (Avdo Karabegović).


76 The petition is in F. Hauptmann (ed.), *Borba Muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine za vjersku i vakufo-skom autonomiju* (Sarajevo, 1968), 63–8.

77 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 65/1897, printed in ibid., 69–78.

78 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 493/1897: PG to JMF, 5 April (reading room); Pr BH 602/1898: PG to JMF, 26 May (Džabić).

79 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 125/1894: Van Zel to Ambassador Calice on spy Ali ef. Termin, 18 January.

80 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 256/1893: JMF to PG, 22 March. Pro-Serbian writers Kállay mentioned were Dervisbeg Ljubović and Mehmed Spahić.

81 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 179/1897: PG to JMF, 22 January; Pr BH 602/1898: PG to JMF, 26 May.

82 Draft statute printed in *Spisi Muhamedanske narodne deputacije iz Hercegovine* (Novi Sad, 1899).


84 ABiH, ZMG, KB 72/1890: Kállay to Kutschera, 28 November.

85 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 65/1897: draft of PG letter to Reis Azabagić, printed in Hauptmann (ed.), *Borba Muslimana*, 69–78.

CHAPTER 6 KÁLLAY AND THE CROATS

1 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH, 696/1888, enclosing the undated document.

2 R. Drlijč lists the grievances in *Fra Anton Kněžević, Dobri pastir*, 6 (1955), 230–41 (238), but mistakenly assumes Kállay received them at their only meeting in 1884.

3 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 406/1884: Appel to JMF, 18 June.

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5 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1945/1882: Kállay to Franz Joseph, 7 October; KB 42/1888: Kállay to Kutschera, 19 July.


7 Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 687–708.

8 Ibid., 695.

9 ABiH, ZMF, KB 42/1888: extract from a Franciscan letter to the head of their Order, 22 June.

10 For Buconjić’s protests: Z. Grijak, Politička djelatnost Vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa Josipa Stadlera (Zagreb, 2001), 154–55 (prohibition of Croatian name); ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 330/1890, PG to JMF, 7 June (ban on religious procession entering Muslim quarter).

11 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 300/1887: PG to JMF, 25 April.

12 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 275/1888: Austrian Ministry of Culture to JMF, 21 March; Pr BH 672/1890: Ministry official Jankowitsch to Kállay, 15 September.

13 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 401/1889: PG to JMF, 6 June. The ban was withdrawn when Narodni list moderated its line (846 Pr BH/1889).

14 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 267/1883: Provincial Čavarović’s letter of thanks to Kállay, 16 April; KB 42/1888, Kállay to Kutschera, 19 July, on his talks with the Vienna Nuncio; Pr BH 221/1898: Kállay to Goluhowski on the Franciscans’ behalf, 5 March. Grijak, Politička djelatnost Stadlera, 130, oddly ascribes Kállay’s decision to a government goal of ‘creating conditions for the continued weakening of the Catholic community in Bosnia-Hercegovina, in order to implement confessional balance’. This resurrection of traditional nationalist interpretations overlooks the fact that in 1882–3 the issue for the regime was not weakening Catholics, but making good the divisive consequences of its own policies, which threatened to destabilize a community whose existing weakness the regime wished to alleviate.

15 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 60/1886, PG to JMF (Hieronym); Pr BH 527/1889: quotations from PG to JMF, 11 July (Redemptorists).

16 This material is based on Karamatić, Franjevci Bosne Srebrne, 209–27.


18 Calculated from the sources listed on p. 278, note 16. See also M. Papić, Hrvatsko školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918 godine (Sarajevo, 1982), 113–14.


20 The chief advantage of ‘public right’ (Öffentlichkeitsrecht; javno pravo) was the acceptance of pupils’ school certificates for passage to other educational institutions.

21 For Franciscan post-primary education, see Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 638–43; Papić, Hrvatsko školstvo, 127–32.

22 P. Slijepčević (ed.), Napor Bosne i Hercegovine za oslobođenje i ujedinjenje (Sarajevo, 1929), 100.

23 Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 643.
27 Ibid., 669, for the Catholic figure (1,320,833 florins); ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 81/1897, PG to JMF, 15 January, for the Orthodox (1,854,163 florins).
28 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 124/1887: Dahmen to JMF, 7 February. Dahmen put the charities’ expenditure in Bosnia since 1883 at 350,000 French francs.
29 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 152/1889: Stadler to Kállay, 12 March; Kállay to Kutschera, 20 April; KB 9/1890: Stadler to Appel, 20 January; Kállay to Appel, 16 February; KB 164/1890: Dahmen to Kállay, 5 December.
30 Grijak, *Politička djelatnost Stadlera*, 228.
31 ABiH, ZMF, KB 134/1900: Kutschera to Kállay, 29 June.
32 ABiH, ZMF, KB 9/1890: Appel to Kállay, 22 January.
33 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 152/1889: Kállay to Kutschera, 20 April.
34 AHAZU, Strossmayer Papers, XI-A: Stadler to Strossmayer, 31 December 1884.
35 For example, *Vrhbosna*, 1 (1887), 322–25 (unbelievers); ibid., 11 (1897), 367–72 (science); ibid., 5 (1891), 85–92 (true knowledge).
36 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 300/1887: PG to JMF, 25 April.
37 F. Šišić (ed.), *Korespondencija Rački-Strossmayer*, 4 vols (1928–31), ii. 251: Rački to Strossmayer, 6 June 1881; ii. 394: Strossmayer to Rački, 18 August 1881.
38 Ibid., iv. 90: Strossmayer to Rački, 28 September 1889.
40 Grijak, *Politička djelatnost Stadlera*, 263.
46 For early examples, see the complaints of Stadler and Fojnica Franciscans in ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 118/1884, 14 and 11 January.
48 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1008/1897: PG to JMF, 26 July.
49 ABiH, ZMF, KB 67/1890: Kállay to Kutschera, 3 November. The drafting of the edict and its rejection by the Vatican have been discussed in Vrankić, *Politik und Religion*, 657–68.
50 Text in ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 66/1895: PG to JMF, 16 December 1894.
52 ABiH, ZMF, KB 141/1893: Kutschera to Kállay, 18 April.
53 Ibid., Kállay to Kutschera, 9 July 1893; KB 143/1893: Kállay to Kutschera, 25 October (Rome and the Serbs).
54 This account is based on cases listed in ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 998/1899: Treščec’s ‘Zusammenstellung’, n.d. and Pr BH 520/1901, n.d.
55 Ibid.
56 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 998/1899: Treščec’s ‘Zusammenstellung’.
57 Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 686.
58 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 998/1899: Catholic bishops to PG, 31 July.
59 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 878/1900, PG listing of seventy-nine conversions from and fifty-seven to Catholicism.
60 Grijak, Politička djelatnost Stadlera, 162–3.
61 Ibid., 410–13.
63 Ibid., 163.
64 ABiH, ZMF, BH 8215.7811/1899: PG to JMF, 1 August; JMF to PG, 8 August 1899.

CHAPTER 7 THE CRISIS OF THE KÁLLAY REGIME

1 OL, P. 344: Milan to Kállay, 27 March 1897, with details of the secret Serbo-Bulgarian agreement on spheres of influence in the Balkans.
4 D. Kirilović, Srpski narodni sabori. Spisi bečkih državnih arhiva, 2 vols (Novi Sad, 1938), ii. 63.
6 For agrarian conditions, F. Hauptmann, Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Herrschaft in Bosnien und der Herzegowina 1878–1918 (Graz, 1983), 90–192.
8 T. Kruševac, Sarajevo pod austro-ugarskom upravom (Sarajevo, 1960), 50, 202, 219.
10 ‘Nekoliko riječi na članku “Zašto popina propovijed nema značnjeg utiska na narod?”, Dabro-bosanski Istočnik, 3 (1890): 433.
12 ABiH, ZMF, KB 220/1897, Hörmann to Kutschera, 24 November. ‘Gazda’ connotes social power, with the colloquial force of ‘boss’.

13 ABiH, ZMF, KB 69/1897: Kállay to Kutschera, 6 May.

14 ABiH, ZMF, KB 59/1897: Kállay to Benko, 26 April; for press law, KB 159/1897: Benko to Lieber Freund [Horowitz], 29 May; KB 93/1897: Kállay to Horowitz, 28 June.

15 ABiH, ZMF, KB 210/1897; Kállay to Kutschera, 13 December.

16 ABiH, ZMF, KB 5/1898: Kutschera to Kállay, 4 January; Kállay to Kutschera, 8 January; KB 16/1898: Kállay to Kutschera, 22 January.

17 ABiH, ZMF, KB 210/1897; Kállay to Kutschera, 13 December.

18 ABiH, ZMF, KB 48/1898: Kutschera to Kállay, 2 February; KB 62/1898: Foglár to Kállay, 31 January.

19 ABiH, ZMF, KB 91/1897: Kállay to Kutschera, 27 June; KB 127/1897: Benko to Kállay, 12 September; KB 143/1897: Kutschera to Kállay, 20 September.

20 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1200/1897: PG Tel. to JMF, 8 September; Pr BH 1488/1897: JMF Tel. to PG, 20 November; and Kreis Commissioner Vojvodić’s reports of 16 November, 1 December and 2 December 1897: (Pr BH 1470, 1566 and 1547/1897).

21 ABiH, ZMF Pr BH 345/1893: Mostar District Commissioner to Kreis Commissioner, 7 February; KB 109/1898: Kállay to Kutschera, 29 April.

22 This response had been urged by Benko to show the Serbs that it was no ‘academic game’ to play with the administration of a Great Power: ABiH, ZMF, KB 50/1897: Benko to Lieber Freund, 7 January.

23 ABiH, ZMF, KB 52/1897: Hörmann to Kutschera, 29 September.

24 ABiH, ZMF, KB 220/1897: Kutschera to Kállay, 1 November; KB 221/1897: Kállay to Kutschera, 28 December.

25 ABiH, ZMF, KB 210/1897: Kállay to Kutschera, 13 December.

26 ABiH, ZMF, KB 166/1897: Hörmann to Kutschera, forwarded to Kállay, 7 October (Srbobran); KB 123/1897: Kállay to Benko, 7 September (Srpski vjesnik).

27 Thus Kállay commented on the long-standing Vojvodina Serb editor of the semi-official Sarajeviski list, Ivan Popović, whose loyalty the Provincial Government vouched for: ‘Every Hungarian Serb, like every Serb in general, even if unconsciously, takes a standpoint in such political matters which contradicts our standpoint or does not overlap with it’: KB 7/1897: Kállay to Benko, 18 January.

28 Nikašinović’s programme is outlined in an undated commentary in ABiH, ZMF, KB 22/1899. For Kállay’s views, see KB 73/1898: Kállay to Kutschera, 18 March.

29 ABiH, ZMF, KB16/1898: Kutschera to Kállay, 19 January; Kállay to Kutschera, 22 January. For a bizarre example of Nikašinović proposing to deceive the opposition and Kutschera proposing to deceive him by pretending to accept his scheme: KB 25/1898: Černy notes, 24 January; Kutschera to Kállay, 27 January.

30 ABiH, ZMF, KB 73/1898: Kutschera to Kállay, 10 March.

31 ABiH, ZMF, KB 109/1898: Kállay to Kutschera, 29 April.

32 HHStA, PA XII 310: Calice to Gotuchowski, 25 May 1899 (bribery); Calice’s reports of 7 and 15 September 1898 on Russian and Serbian assurances.

33 V. Đorđević, Srbija i Turska 1896–1897 (Belgrade, 1928), 267, 298.
34 For the problems met in trying to influence the text, see Calice’s report of 21 September: HHStA, PA XII 310.
35 ABiH, ZMF, KB 251 and KB 261/1898: Kállay to Kutschera, 4 and 6 October. The claim of Madžar, *Pokret Srba*, 237, that the government ‘received the encyclical with great satisfaction’ is brought in question by these letters.
37 Between 1901 and 1903 Jeftanović received 92,000 francs for the autonomy struggle from Belgrade: D. Đorđević, *Carinski rat Austro-Ugarske i Srbije 1906–1911* (Belgrade, 1962), 569.
39 Calculated from *Prvi šematizam srpsko-pravoslavne eparchije banjalučko-bihačke* (Banjaluka, 1901). Nearly a third had had only primary education.
40 *Odjek Srpskog pravoslavnog sveštenstva iz Bosne i Hercegovine* (Novi Sad, 1899), 16.
41 ABiH, ZMF, KB 65/1898: Černy to Kutschera, 6 February.
42 *Odjek Srpskog pravoslavnog sveštenstva*, 18–30; ABiH, ZMF, KB 16 and 48/1898: Černy notes; KB 65/1898: Travnik District Commissioner to PG, 4 February.
43 ABiH, ZMF, KB 16/1898: Kállay Tel. to Kutschera, 2 February; KB 75/1898: Kállay to Kutschera, 20 March.
44 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1106/1898: PG to JMF, 30 August 1898.
45 HHStA, PA XII: Calice to Gołuchowski, 22 March 1898.
46 HHStA, PA, XII 308: Calice to Gołuchowski, 5 May 1899. The Patriarch appeared embarrassed by Austria’s linking of this rise, for which an objective case could be made, with the reforms (Calice report, 11 May). Differently from Kállay, Calice had referred on March 30 to the ‘moral character, steeled in hard struggle, of the authoritative characters in the Patriarchate’.
47 Mandić’s draft statute is in ABiH, ZMF, KB 78/1898.
48 *Prepiska između narodnih vođa i srpsko-pravoslavnih mitropolita* (Bosansko-hercegovački zbornik, III) (Novi Sad, 1901), 42; ABiH, ZMF, KB 84/1900: Kállay to Kutschera, Tels. of 7 and 11 May 1900.
49 Printed in *Tri carska memoranduma* (Bosansko-Hercegovački zbornik, I) (Novi Sad 1901).
50 OL, Thallóczy Papers, IX, no. 30, cutting from *Pester Lloyd* for 12 October 1901.
51 *Die Lage der Mohammedaner in Bosnien, von einem Ungarn*, 2nd edn (Vienna, 1900), 105.
52 Ibid., 114.
53 Kállay to Kutschera, 1 February 1900, in F. Hauptmann (ed.), *Borba Muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine za vjersko-prosvjetnu samoupravu* (Sarajevo, 1968), 101–3.
54 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH, 73/1900: Kutschera to Kállay 16 January; KB 17/1900: Kutschera to Kállay, 8 February; Kállay to Kutschera, 15 February.
55 ABiH, ZMF, KB 247/1898, enclosing *Hrvatsko pravo* for 26 September 1898.
56 ABiH, ZMF, KB 193/1898: Kutschera to Kállay, 25 July; Černy to Kutschera, n.d.; KB 123/1900: Kutschera to Kállay, 2 May; ‘Izjava Šerifa Effendi Arnautovića’, *Spisi Islamskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini u stvari vjersko-prosvjetnog uređenja i samouprave* (Novi Sad, 1903), 187–207. See also Đž Juzbašić, ‘Pokušaj stvaranja političkog saveza između vodstva srpskog i muslimanskog autonomnog pokreta
Notes

u Bosni i Hercegovini', in ibid., *Politika i privreda Bosne i Hercegovine pod austrougarskom upravom* (Sarajevo, 2002), 177–245 (196).


58 ABiH, ZMF, KB 176/1900: Kutschera to Kállay, 6 September. In December Hadžić, ‘this by no means unimportant young man’, was granted 500 K for his services: KB 230/1900: Kutschera to Kállay, 5 December.


60 ABiH, ZMF, KB 143/1900: Kállay to Kutschera, 13 July.

61 ABiH, ZMF, KB 143/1900: Kutschera to Kállay, 11 July.

62 Hauptmann (ed.), *Borba Muslimana*, 122, 125.


64 Šehić, *Autonomni pokret Muslimana*, 75–108, summaries the negotiations.

65 For example, V. Ćorović, *Bosanske političke prilike* (Belgrade, 1939), 39.


68 See voluminous documentation of articles filed in OL, Thallóczy Papers, V, VIII, IX, and OSzKK, Fol. Hung. 2902/8. The reference to a Bosnian empire is in *Pesti napló*, 14 June 1900.

69 For Visontai, see J. Szinnyei (ed.), *Magyar írók élete és munkái*, 14 vols (Budapest, 1891–1914), xiv. 1268.


71 Hauptmann (ed.), *Borba Muslimana*, 288.


74 For example, ministerial comments in ABiH, ZMF, BH 8656/1899, 26 August; KB 154/1899: Zurunič memorandum, n.d. A. Barre’s Serb-influenced *La Bosnie-Herzégovine. Administration autrichienne de 1878–1902* (Paris, 1906), 99, gave the proportion of official and immigrant children among those taking the *matura* in Sarajevo Gymnasium from 1887 to 1897 as 47 per cent.

75 ABiH, ZMF, BH 8656/1899, JMF to PG, 26 August 1899.

76 ABiH, ZMF, KB 20/1896: 24 February 1896.


78 ABiH, ZMF, KB 13/1903: Zurunič to Kállay, 22 February.

79 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 53 and 385/1894: ZMF to PG, 26 January and 28 April respectively.

80 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 936/1888: JMF to PG, 28 December.

81 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 383 and 1295/1894: PG reports of 4 April and 17 November.

82 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 383/1894: PG to JMF, 4 April.

83 ABiH, ZMF, KB 118/1902: Kutscher to Kállay, 31 March.

84 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1282/1904: Thallóczy’s report, 2 December.

85 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 406/1902: students’ statement of 3 April.

86 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1518/1902: Confidentenbericht, n.d.
87 ABiH, ZMF, KB 112/1899: Kállay to Benko, 25 April.
88 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1170/1901: Confidentenmeldungen, 20 August.
89 For the misleading advice: ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1002/1901: Confidentenbericht, 2 July 1901.
90 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1608/1901: Izvještaj iz Beograda, 22 November.
91 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 752/1902: Confidentenmeldung. By comparison, in 1894 the Sarajevo authorities had known of seventeen Bosnians studying in Belgrade, only one with a Serbian state scholarship: Pr BH 706/1894: PG to JMF, 15 June.
92 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 270/1902: Brkić letter, 5 March.
93 ABiH, ZMF, KB 13/1903: Zurunić to Kállay, 22 February.
94 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 270/1902: Brkić letter, 5 March.
95 ABiH, ZMF, KB 3/1902: Rukavina to Kutschera and Kállay, 6 January; Kállay to Kutschera, 20 January.
96 Kállay to Kutschera, 10 April, in Hautpmann (ed.), Borba Muslimana, 292.
97 ABiH, ZMF, KB 47/1902: Horowitz to Kállay, 5 March.
98 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 902/1901: Confident-Notiz (Branik and Dubrovnik); Pr BH 1696/1901: Confident-Notiz of 12 December (Srbobran); Pr BH 26/1901: PG to JFM, 2 January (Srpski vjesnik).
99 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1759/1901: Pittner to PG, 24 December. The ministry made a special copy of this report.
100 Spisi Islamskog naroda, 167, 170, reprinting Kállay’s speech in the Hungarian Delegation of 31 May 1902.
102 ABiH, ZMF, KB 17/1900: Filipović petition of 27 January. Kállay (15 February) agreed to an additional 600 K, but the next year Filipović was back for more: KB 134/1901.
103 ABiH, ZMF KB 3 and 35/1903: Kutschera to Kállay, n.d. and 14 February.
104 ABiH, ZMF, BH 9854/1902: PG to JMF, 22 July, and JMF notes.
105 ABiH, ZMF, BH 717/1903: PG to JMF, 12 January.
106 For one of several references in Thallóczy’s diaries to this Kállay fear, see OSzKK, Fol. Hung. 1677/1, 17 March 1903.
107 OL, P. 344 (Kállay Papers), Széll to Kállay, 10 and 16 June 1900; Hauptmann (ed.), Borba Muslimana, 252: Kállay to Kutschera, 9 February.
108 Stenographische Sitzungs-Protokolle der Delegation, Session 38, 175.
109 OSzKK, Fol. Hung. 1649: Thallóczy papers, folder ‘Rücktritt’ (resignation). The rumour was planted in the Belgrade paper Dnevni list.
110 For various combinations which came to naught in 1902–3, see Šehić, Autonomni pokret Muslimana, 159–73.
111 Thus Kutschera was stung by the opposition’s contrast between the government’s abrupt dismissal of Mufti Džabić and its seeming impotence before Stadler: Pr BH 865/1900: PG to JFM, 19 July.
112 ABiH, ZMF, KB 60/1903: Kutschera to Kállay, 20 March.
114 Kállay to Kutschera, 3 September 1902, in Hautpmann (ed.), Borba Muslimana, 342–44.
CHAPTER 8 TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1903–10: DIVERGENT VISIONS

2 Publications calculated from ibid., 93–102; I. Hadžibegović, Bosansko-hercegovački gradovi na razmeđu 19. i 20. stoljeća (Sarajevo, 2004), 75 (private presses).
3 This paragraph is based on I. Hadžibegović, Postanak radničke klase u Bosni i Hercegovini i njen razvoj do 1914. godine (Novi Sad, 1980), 250–300.
4 RZsL, Burián Papers, XXI/81, Burián’s diary, clipping from Neue Freie Presse of 23 February 1912.
6 OSzKK, XI/166, Burián to Thallóczy, 22 January 1885.
7 Ibid., 16 January 1899.
8 Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Burián’s diary for 1903–6, 18 July 1903.
10 Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Burián’s diary, 5 April and 10 October 1905; 3 March (with the quotation) and 14 March 1906.
11 OSzKK, XI/166, Burián to Thallóczy, 16 January 1899.
13 OSzKK, XI/166, Burián to Thallóczy, 25 February 1903.
14 Ibid., 3 March 1886.
16 OL, I 67, Thallóczy Papers, II. 57, private letter on Thallóczy’s behalf to editor of Neues Budapester Abendblatt.
17 A közösségek tárgyalása a magyar országgyűlés által kiküldött és Ő Felsége által 1906 június 9 éve Bécsben összehívott bizottság naplója (Budapest, 1906), 176–7.
Characteristically, while condemning preventive censorship as incompatible with ‘a cultured, progressive state form’, Burián retained the prohibition on street sale of newspapers and the requirement for an editorial deposit from political journals, in view of Bosnian backwardness and the ‘in part inferior quality of those circles from whom the representatives of the native press are recruited’: ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 53/1907: Burián to Franz Joseph, 29 November 1906.

18 Hadžibegović, Postanak radničke klase, 323, 293.
20 Ibid., XI/42: Aufzeichnung über eine Besprechung des gemeinsamen Ministeriums bei Aehrenthal über die gegenwärtige Situation in Bosnien und der Herzegowina, 1 Dezember 1907. ‘False political direction’ was Aehrenthal’s summary of Burián’s presentation, which Burián himself tactfully suggested should be rephrased ‘no longer operable’.
21 RZsL, Burián Papers, X/43: Burián to Aehrenthal, 24 February 1907.
23 RZsL, Burián Papers, XI/42: Aufzeichnung; 3/3, Burián’s diary, 4 January 1908; XI/44, Burián to Bosnian Landeschef Winzor, 8 May 1908, to be read to the Kreis Commissioners.
24 Ibid., XI/44, Burián to Tivadar Batthany, 10 January 1908.
25 ABiH, ZMF, PR 830/1907, Horowitz to Burián, 19 July.
27 Ibid.
28 OSzKK, XI/166, Burián to Thallóczy, 24 June, 1884; 21 September 1912.
30 For example, P. Slijepčević (ed.), Napor Bosne i Hercegovine za oslobodenje i ujedinjenje (Sarajevo, 1929); V. Skarić, O.N. Hadžić and N. Stojanović (eds), Bosna i Hercegovina pod austro-ugarskom upravom (Belgrade, 1938); V. Masleša, Mlada Bosna (Sarajevo, 1945).
31 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 63/1904, Albori to JMF, 18 January, enclosing five reports of the statute deal’s reception.
35 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 63/1904: PG with confidential report of Mirko, 12 January.
36 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 71/1904, PG with confidential report of Mirko, 18 January.
37 HHStA, PA XII/311, Liasse XXXI, Burián to Gołuchowski, 21 April 1904.
38 Ibid., Burián to Gołuchowski, 1 September 1904: Calice should ask the Patriarch point-blank about a possible ‘capture’ of a Synod majority; Calice to Gołuchowski, 31 August (decorations), 1 September (opposes ‘discreet means’), 19 September (Patriarch via intermediary recommends ‘discreet means’).
39 Ibid., Calice to Gołuchowski, 21 June, 1905.
40 Ibid., Calice to Gołuchowski, 25 July 1905 (Patriarch); Burián to Gołuchowski, 1 November 1905 (secretary Tantalides); Calice to Gołuchowski, 28 September 1904 (Russian ambassador); Freiherr von Flotau (minister in Belgrade) to Gołuchowski, 15 January 1905 (Serbia).
41 ABH, ZMF, PR 248/1905, Konfident-Meldung of 18 February.
46 Ibid., 280–356.
47 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 830/1907: Horowitz to Burián, 19 July.
48 JFM note of 10 March 1904 recorded in R. Besarović (ed.), *Kultura i umjetnost u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austrougarskom upravom* (Sarajevo, 1968), 169.
49 ABiH, ZMF, BH 13961/1903: Burián to Franz Joseph, 20 May 1904, replacing the first, negative draft to the PG. The document contains a lengthy ministerial Votum.
50 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 694/1904, JFM to PG, 24 July.
51 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 277/1905, Albori to Burián, 23 February; actually, the ministry took the harsher line, 6 March.
52 ABiH, ZMF, BH 13961/1903: the unsigned Votum mirrors Thallóczy’s signed views elsewhere.
53 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1282/1904, Thallóczy report, 2 December.
54 Ibid., 27–8: ‘Even with a more disciplined [Muslim] leadership and a uniformity of outlook the problem of a modernized Mohammedanism, still never settled anywhere and actually quite against nature, could not be solved.’
55 Ibid., letters of Dlustuš and Treščec respectively to Thallóczy of 17 May and 26 April 1905.
56 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 497/1906, Thallóczy to Burián, 7 May; Burián to JMF, 25 May.
57 ABiH, ZMF, BH 12494/1906, Benko to JMF, 28 October; BH 1713/1906.
59 ABiH, ZMF. 7925/1903, Kutschera to JMF, 20 June.
60 ABiH, ZMF, 11048/1904, PG to JFM, 20 November; JMF to PG, 5 November.
61 *Spomenica Prve gimnazije u Sarajevu* (Sarajevo, 1929), 13.
62 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3186/1904, Benko to JMF, 10 March.
63 *Izvještaj o upravi Bosne i Hercegovine 1910 godine* (Sarajevo, 1910), 46–51.
64 ABiH, ZMF, 8717/1904, Paul to JMF, 14 August (reduction); 8256/1905, Molner to JMF, 14 August (quality).
65 See Hauptmann (ed.), *Borba Muslimana*, 506–10, for a PG summary of the Muslim educational problem (Pr BH 1090/1907).
66 ABiH, BH 7092/1907, ZMF to PG, 31 August.
67 See M. Ekmečić’s chapter, ‘Narodni pokret u Bosni’, in *Istorija srpskog naroda*, vol. 6, pt. 1 (Belgrade, 1983), 604–48. Ekmečić sees the line pushed by Dr Gavrila, the autonomous leaders’ long-standing intermediary with Belgrade, as abandoning the peasant question in favour of conventional nationalism (628–9).
69 For an example of youthful scorn from 1911, see B. Čerović, *Bosanski omladinci i sarajevski atentat* (Sarajevo, 1930), 175–86.
70 *Izvještaj o radu eparhijskog upravnog i prosvjetnog savjeta eparhije banjalučke i bihačke za godinu 1907* (Sarajevo, 1908), 15.
72 See the long debate in *Srpska riječ* for 1905, finally closed in no. 173, e.g. nos. 39, 45, 46, 150, 159; also *Izvještaj o radu … eparhije zabunsko-hercegovačke*, 5–6.
73 *Izvještaj o radu … eparhije zabunsko-hercegovačke* recorded six ongoing disputes between priests and their commune, 16.
74 *Srpska škola, pedagoško-književni list*, 1 (1907–8), no. 11–12.
75 Ibid., 362–3: ‘Učitelj i pojanje’.
77 *Izvještaj o radu … eparhije banjalučke*, 25.
78 *Srpska škola*, 1 (1907–8), no. 5.
79 Ibid., 395: ‘Naše tekovine’.
80 ABiH, ZMF, BH 7092/1907, PG to ZMF, 31 May, enclosing Serb views.
81 Ibid., Burián to PG, 31 August 1907.
82 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1326/1907, PG Tel. to JMF, 14 November; BH 14524/1907, Burián to PG, 2 December.
83 *Srpska škola*, 1 (1907–8): 391.
84 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1448/1907: Konfident-Meldung of 1 December.
85 ABiH, ZMF, 8792/1906, Benko to JFM, 1 August. 5427/1907, Albori to JFM, 19 April 1907.
86 ABiH, ZMF, BH 6065/1907, Burián to PG.
87 ABiH, ZMF, BH 13526/1906, Thallóczy draft reply to PG, n.d.
88 For such an intervention by Burián, ABiH, ZMF, BH 15598/1907, Burián to PG, 20 January 1908.
89 ABiH, ZMF, BH 7092/1907, Burián to PG, 31 August (*Aufsichtsrecht*); BH 8792/1906, Burián to PG, 24 August (funding).
90 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3066/1908, JFM’s answer to the autonomous General Council’s protest, 25 March. A conspectus of the issue can be found in 1092 Pr BH/1910.
91 When these names are italicized in the text, they refer to the journals the societies published. For the foundations, R. Besarović (ed.), *Kultura i umjetnost u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austrougarskom upravom* (Sarajevo, 1968), 339–60; T. Išek, *Mjesto i Uloga HKD Napredak u kulturnom životu Hrvata Bosne i Hercegovine* (1902–1918) (Sarajevo, 2002), 30–50; I. Kemura, *Uloga Gajreta u društvenom životu Muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine, 1903–1941* (Sarajevo, 1986), 27–40.
95 *Prosvjeta*, 1 (1907): 1.
96 *Napredak*, 7 (1913): 139.


103 *Prosvjeta*, 3 (1909): 53: ‘Gdje je naša budućnost?’


105 Thus *Prosvjeta* noted: 5 (1911): 118, that nearly two thirds of the previous year’s new recruits had already dropped out.

106 Ibid., 1 (1907): 37.


110 *Prosvjeta*, 6 (1912), no. 5–7; *Dvadeset i pet godina rada Prosvjete*, 20.

111 *Prosvjeta*, 2 (1908): 179 (agents); 3 (1909), 69–70 (journalism).


113 For example, *Napredak*, 5 (1911): 237–40. According to this report to the annual assembly, of the ninety-nine youths initially put forward, sixty-six actually came to be trained, of whom twenty-one ‘fled’.

114 *Dvadeset i pet godina rada Prosvjete*, 65–6.


118 *Prosvjeta*, 7 (1913): 89. Printing these lists cost *Prosvjeta* 400K in 1907; ibid., 1 (1907): 31.


120 See D. Mitronovič’s 1908 critique, ‘Nacionalno tlo i modernost’, in P. Pre-radovič (ed.), *Književnost Mlade Bosne*, 2 vols (Sarajevo, 1965), ii. 41–9, esp. 41–2.


124 *Napredak*, 7 (1913): 353.

125 *Napredak*, 3 (1909): 139–44, for this 1908 AGM debate.

126 Đžaja, *Bosnien-Herzegowina*, 130, 171–2


132 Dr Ivo Dujmušić, ‘Katolicizam i znanost’, *Vrhbosna*, 17 (1903): article series, nos 1–7, 12–14, 16–17 (p. 2).


136 Serafinski perivoj. *List za katoličku zabavu i kulturu za godinu 1912*, 39 (‘Borba za moral’).

137 Ibid., 72.


142 Ibid., particularly 286, 321–3.

143 *Napredak*, 3 (1909): 32.

144 For letters of Trstenjak to Dvorniković, commenting on the machinations of ‘reaction’, see IAS, Dvorniković Papers, DLJ 34–6.


146 Ibid., ‘Herbert Spencer’, *Školski vjesnik*, 11 (1904). Spencer was a progressive icon in east-central Europe in this period.

147 *Behar*, 1 (1900–1): 1: ‘Našim čitaoćima i saradnicima’.


151 *Gajret*, 3 (1910): 38; *Behar*, 1 (1900–1901), nos. 6–9, presentation of I. T. Eckardt’s article in the *Deutsche Rundschau* of July 1900.


154 The new MNO leadership pushed for one politically loaded change in Gajret’s statutes, allowing state-funded theology students to study outside the Monarchy.


156 *Gajret*, 3 (1910): 2–3, leading article, ‘Naši mektebi i medrese’. 
160 Prosvjeta, 3 (1909): 18 (Zdravlje). The government thought unlimited liability for agricultural cooperatives was economically dangerous, which only made the Serbs demand it more vehemently—a characteristic exchange.
161 Prosvjeta, 1 (1907): 22.
162 R. Besarović (ed.), Kultura i umjetnost u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austrougarskom upravom (Sarajevo, 1968), 494–6 (November 1905).
164 Ibid.: 61.
166 Prosvjeta, 2 (1908): 30 (Absatz-Gebiet), 189 (foreign capital).
167 Hadžibegović, Postanak radničke klase, 191, 153. By contrast, the founding of some fifty-four rural settlements up to 1905 by immigrant German, Polish and Ukrainian peasants aroused less antagonism: Đ. Mikić, ‘O kolonizaciji stranih seljaka u Bosni i Hercegovini u vrijeme austrougarske uprave’, in N. Šehić (gen. ed.), Migracije i Bosna i Hercegovina (Sarajevo, 1990), 181–93.
168 ABiH, ZMF, BH 8256/1905, Institute Prefect Dr Molner’s annual report, 14 August.
169 Bosnische Bote pro 1904. Universal-Hand-und-Adressebuch (Sarajevo, 1904), 117–19, 305. Repeating its title in small letters was this publication’s only gesture to the native language.
172 Srpska riječ, 16 February 1905: ‘Germanizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini’.
173 Calculated from Džaja, Bosnien-Herzegowina, 140, 146, 173.
174 For example, Đ. Nastić, Jesuite u Bosni (Begrade, 1906).
175 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 531/1906, containing Kutscher’s decisive adjudication and prior comments by Thallóczy and Paul. See also Vrankić, Religion und Politik in Bosnien und der Herzegowina (1878–1918) (Paderborn, 1998), 679–82.
178 Ibid., 25–8, 61.
179 Ibid., 27.
180 Ibid.
182 For the launching of Otadžbina and the press prosecutions, see Petar Kočić, Dokumentarna građa, 173–251.
183 Ibid., 238–9.
Chapter 9: A Public Reckoning: Cultural Policy in the Bosnian Diet

1 Református Zsinati Levéltár (RZsL), Burián Papers, IV/4: Burián’s diary, 30 August 1908.
2 Ibid., III/3: Burián’s diary, 17 February 1910.
3 Ibid., XXI/81: Burián’s diary, 31 December 1910.
5 Ibid., VIII/18: Pittner to Burián, 29 April 1910.
7 Ibid., with General Auffenberg’s memorandum, 294–309 (294).
9 Ibid., III/3, Burián’s diary, 1 May 1910; XI/44: Emlékirat-tervezet a bosznia-hercegoviniai kérdés megoldását illetöleg, June 1911.
12 ABiH, ZMF, BH 12127/1906, PG to ZMF, 27 October.
13 RZsL, Burián Papers, X/43: Aehrenthal to Burián on Bienerth’s position, 6 V 1909.
14 Ibid., Burián to Aehrenthal, 24 February 1907.
16 RZsL, Burián Papers, III/3: Burián’s diary, 30 March 1908.
19 RZsL, Burián Papers, III/3: Burián’s diary, 16 February 1910.
20 Ibid., VIII/19, Director of the Cabinet of his Imp.Ryl. Apostolic Majesty to Burián, 19 July 1910.
21 For Diet politics, see particularly Dž. Juzbašić, Jeziočko pitanje i austrougarski parlamentarizam u Bosni i Hercegovini pred Prvi svjetski rat (Sarajevo, 1973).
22 ABiH, ZMF, BH 16046/1908; BH 2907/1909, with JMF comment to PG report of 22 February.

23 ABiH, ZMF, BH 386 and 16475/1909.

24 For Čorović’s speech, Stenografski izvještaji o sjednicama bosansko-hercegovačkog Dieta godine 1910/1911, ii. 625–41 (quote, 629). On the hypocritical use of health regulations Čorović no doubt had in mind the pressures brought against the Serb schools of his home town Mostar, which had applied for a government loan to rebuild schools menaced with closure on this score: see ABiH, ZMF, BH 13020/1909.

25 Arguments of Karamehmedović, Mustajbeg Mutevelić and Hafiz Ahmed ef. Mehmedbašić: Stenografski izvještaji, ii. 670–1; iii. 872–8. Volume 3 recorded the debate on limited compulsory attendance held in February 1911.

26 Ibid., ii. 649–67: speeches of Dr Sunarić, Bosnian Provincial Mišić and Dr Džamonija.

27 Ibid., iii. 871.


29 Stenografski izvještaji, ii. 625; Pr BH 289, 476, 1032/1911 (German school).

30 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1268/1910; Burián to Franz Joseph, 2 September.

31 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1352/1910: Burián to Bienerth, 19 October.

32 Stenografski izvještaji, ii. 670 (Mutevelić: Muslim schools); 641 (Grđić: Divide and Rule).

33 ABiH, ZMF, 12494/1906, PG report, 28 October.,

34 Stenografski izvještaji, iii. 878 (Dr Karamehmedović).

35 ABiH, ZMF, BH 6479/1894: JMF to PG, 26 June; Pr BH 497/1906: Thallóczy inspection report of 7 May.

36 ABiH, ZMF, BH 16046/1908; 7891/1910; 10855/1911; 5469/1912.

37 ABiH, ZMF, BH 16046/1908: PG to JMF, 11 December.

38 ABiH, ZMF, BH 5649/1912: JMF to PG, 12 April.


40 ABiH, ZMF, BH 7278/1912: Motivenbericht.

41 ABiH, ZMF, BH 9048/1914: Biliński to Franz Joseph, 2 July.


43 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1419/1906: PG to JMF, 26 December.

44 Stenografski izvještaji, iii. 871: 1 February 1911.

45 Karamehmedović campaigned on this issue in leading articles in the Muslim daily Vakat in 1914, for example, nos 44 and 66.

46 B. Čerović, Bosanski omladinci i sarajevski atentat (Sarajevo, 1930), 57.

47 Treščec was sixty-five but it appears his retirement was speeded up some months by the criticism: ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1694/1910: JMF to Franz Joseph, 15 October.

48 For example, Boško Petrović, ‘Osnovni problemi filozofije’ (Fundamental Principles of Philosophy), the last of whose eleven parts was entitled ‘Psychophysical monist directions’; Školski vjesnik, 11 (1904).

The dominance of the German Protestant J. F. Herbart (1776–1841) in Austrian pedagogy was increasingly challenged from the 1890s: see H. Engelbrecht, *Geschichte des österreichischen Bildungswesens*, 5 vols (Vienna, 1982–8), iv. 43–7.


Ibid., 39–40, 100–101.

Országos Levéltár (OL), XI/455: Hörmann to Thallóczy, 11 December 1910.

Bericht über die Verwaltung Bosniens und der Hercegovina für die Jahre 1914 bis 1916 (Vienna, 1917), 100.


ABiH, ZMF, BH 7278/1912: Motivenbericht.

ABiH, ZMF, BH 2073/1907: PG report, 29 January 1907.

*Učiteljska zora*, 4 (1908): 81.

Ibid., 113–14.

60 Ibid.


Zapisnici sjednica islamske prosvjetne ankete držanih krajen decembra 1910 i u januaru 1911 godine, ed. dr. Hamdija Karamihmedović, (Sarajevo, 1911), 8, 14–15.

Ibid., 163.

ABiH, ZMF, BH 932/1912: PG to JMF, 15 January.

See *Srpska škola*, 3 (1909–10), and *Prosvjeta*, 4 (1910), for these debates.

Ibid. and S. Kaluderčić, ‘O nacionalnom karakteru srpske škole’, in *Pitanje o uredenju srpskih škola u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Sarajevo, 1910), 87–90.


See footnote 21.

RZsL, Burián Papers, XXI/81: Burián’s diary. This comment, typed on the back of another document, appears to date from 17 February 1912.

Ibid., *Neue Freie Presse*, 19 February 1912, affixed to the diary.

See Biliński’s memoirs, *Wspomnienia*, 2 vols (Warsaw, 1924), i. 227–96, which reveal more about Viennese than Bosnian politics under his ministry.


RZsL, Burián Papers, IX/42: Šola to Burián, n.d.

CHAPTER 10 AN UNOFFICIAL RECKONING: THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

1 PRO, FO 371/399: Freeman to Grey, 15 August 1908.
2 There was some parallel in similarly backward, authoritarian Tsarist Russia, where controlled education was likewise intended to substitute for social processes: P. L Alston, Education and the State in Tsarist Russia (Stanford, 1969), 244, 246.
3 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4234/1909: PG to JMF, 24 March.
5 Calculated from Đ. Pejanović, Srednje i stručne škole u Bosni i Hercegovini od početka do 1941 (Sarajevo, 1953), 65.
7 Travnička Spomenica 1882–1932. Prigodom pedesetogodišnjice Nadbiskupskog sjeništa i Nadbiskupske Velike gimnazije u Travniku 1882–1932 (Sarajevo, 1932), 146.
8 ABiH, ZMF, BH 6007/1908.
9 A. Nametak, Musa Čazim Čatić. Studija (Tuzla, 1965).
11 Gajret, 2 (1909): 82. The play was Svak na posao.
12 Travnička Spomenica 1882–1932, 158.
13 B. Čerović, Bosanski omladinci i sarajevski atentat (Sarajevo, 1930), 114: Đulaga Vulović to Borivoje Jevtić, 23 January 1914.
14 Todić, ‘Iz burnih dana’, 281. ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1836/1914, PG to JMF, 14 November for the Milisić background not mentioned by Todić. Lazarević was executed as a hostage in 1915.
15 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1508/1907: remonstration of Vaso Crnogorčević et al., 7 December.
16 ABiH, ZMF, BH 7848/1908: PG to JMF, 16 June 1908.
17 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3599/1906. Bedjanić’s report, 11 February; PG to Gymnasium authorities, 21 March; JFM to PG, 10 June. Bedjanić was one of the Croats praised by Serb teachers for his wise approach.
18 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 705/1914: PG to JMF, 15 June.
19 See Kudlich’s reports to the PG of 12 and 20 December 1908 in ABiH, ZV (Zemaljska vlada), 7716 Res/1908 and 1019 Res/1909 respectively.
20 See fn. 15.
21 ABiH, ZMF, BH 5272/1912: Ćorović to PG, n.d.
22 For these characteristic polemics, see Srpska riječ (10/23 March 1913): ‘Muštra od gimnazije’; Narod (8/21 June 1913): ‘Anacionalnost školskog obrazovanja u Bosni i Hercegovini’.
24 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 323/1909: PG to JMF, 4 February.
25 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4121/1912: PG Tel. to JMF, 18 March. Significantly, Zečević was not transferred. He was in fact a member of the Belgrade-based nationalist


28 Pejanović, *Srednje i stručne škole*, 74, names the stages.

29 I. Kranjčević, *Uspomene* (Sarajevo, 1965), 5–44.

30 ABiH, ZMF, BH 11065/1912: PG to JMF, 20 July 1912.

31 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 2215/1908 (Nedeljković); BH 12571/1912 (Čuković).

32 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1133/1908: Čuković to Grđić, 25 June.

33 See above, p. 186.

34 OSzKK, 2549/7: Thallóczy’s diary, 19 September 1907.

35 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1246/1910: Pittner to Thallóczy, 29 July.

36 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 705/1914: Alaupović report. n.d., but probably June 1914. Priv Reg 416/1914 gives an example of Dimović intervening on behalf of a Serb teacher disciplined by the PG.

37 ABiH, ZV, 1491 Res/1912, PG to JMF, 28 February.

38 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3256/1912, containing Verordnung of 28 April 1910.

39 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 968/1914, with copy of the 13 September 1912 circular.


41 ABiH, ZMF, BH 4532/1908: JFM Votum. The ministerial decision took six months and was implemented in 1909.

42 ABiH, ZMF, BH 14590/1912: PG to JMF, 11 October; JMF to PG, 10 December.


44 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 968/1914, with circular of 19 June 1911. Societies should be non-denominational and confined to a single school.


46 ABiH, ZMF, BH 14126/1912: PG to JMF, 22 September.

47 Ibid.

48 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 564/1914: PG to JMF, 28 April.

49 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 705/1914: Potiorek to JMF, 15 June.

50 Ibid.

51 *Bosnische Post*, 6 June 1914. Leading article: ‘Wohin?’

52 *Hrvatski dnevnik*, 12 June 1914. Leading article, ‘Školska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini’.

53 *Srpska riječ*, 9/22 March 1912. Untitled leading article.


56 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1600/1914: state prosecutor Holländer’s report of June 1912.

57 *Vakat*, 16 January 1914: ‘Klub slobodne ljubavi’.
Notes

58 ABiH, ZMF, BH 917/1914: PG to JMF, 17 January.
59 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 705/1914: JMF to PG, 27 June (despite the date, internal evidence suggests this despatch was finished after the assassination); 968/1914: PG to JMF, 16 July; 1836/1914: PG to JMF, 16 November.
61 Ibid. In 1909, Školski vjesnik was replaced by Školski glasnik, which was more a journal of record of official school policy than a pedagogical periodical.
62 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1272/1914, with Government Commissioner Collas’s report of 2 August 1912.
67 Spomenica Prve gimnazije u Sarajevu (Sarajevo, 1929), 51–2.
70 Ibid., 31: R. Đurić to Veljko Vujasinović, 6 June 1906.
71 V. Ćorović, Istorija ‘Zore’ (Prilog istoriji omladinskog pokreta) (Ruma, 1905), 50.
72 Čerović, Bosanski omladinci, 180.
73 Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, 406.
75 Dedijer, Sarajevo, 398–406.
76 Bogićević (ed.), Mlada Bosna, 55: Gaćinović to Mirko Damjanović, 2 July 1911.
77 Ibid., 57: same to same, 31 October 1913, on a ‘race’ of Serb youth, dispersed over the world but ‘equally … unfocused, disorganized and incoherent’.
79 Ibid., 127, 120, 127.
80 Ibid., 120, Dedijer, Sarajevo, 398.
81 D. Mitrinović, ‘Nacionalno tlo i Modernost’, in P. Palavestra (ed.), Književnost Mlade Bosne, 2 vols (Sarajevo, 1965), ii. 41–9 (46, 45). The sentence order has been inverted in the quotation.
82 Palavestra, Književnost Mlade Bosne, i. 132, 165–71.
83 Džaja, Bosnien-Herzegowina, 232–3, plausibly stresses the extent to which Mitri-nović remained influenced by nationalist tropes.
84 Programme printed in Ljubibratić, Gavrilo Princip (Belgrade, 1959), 102–05.
85 M. Marjanović, Savremena Hrvatska (Belgrade, 1913).
87 Bogićević (ed.), *Mlada Bosna*, 87–8: Mladen Stojanović to Todor Ilić, 26 June and 15 July 1911.


89 Bogićević (ed.), *Mlada Bosna*, 108: Branko Ćubrilović to Vukašin Babunović, 2 January 1914.


91 For Muslim secondary school groups, see M. Hadžijahić, *Od tradicije do identiteta. Geneza nacionalnog pitanja bosanskih Muslimana* (Sarajevo, 1974), 183.

92 See Šćepan Grdić’s comments: ‘But with these students only our administration has gained … it has gained faithful servants. But our nation has not gained the people it needs’, *Stenografski izvještaji o sjednicama bosansko-hercegovačkog Dieta godine 1910/1911*, ii. 657.


95 Bogićević (ed.), *Mlada Bosna*, 382.

96 Ibid., 111: Vasa Ćubrilović to Rado Starović, 23 February 1914.


99 Dedijer, *Sarajevo*, 308.

100 Palavestra, *Kniževnost Mlade Bosne*, i. 200–03, for this and details of books sold in Sarajevo.


102 N. Trišić, *Sarajevski atentat u svijetu bibliografskih podataka* (Sarajevo, 1964), 385–6. Trišić’s helpful work summarizes 1,644 books and articles published on the Sarajevo assassination.


104 Palavestra, *Kniževnost Mlade Bosne*, i. 201.


106 Ibid., 408. For Guteša’s expulsion in 1914, see Trišić, *Sarajevski atentat*, 360.

107 ABiH, Arhiva civilnih i vojnih sudova (sudski procesi): Okružni sud Sarajevo: IV-9-2, Zapisnik literarnog kluba: minutes of Guteša’s lectures of 17 February and 4 December 1912. Lyell’s geological classic of 1830 has of course not been demolished. Stojanović’s lecture from 1913 is not in the Minutes but is summarized in ibid., IV-9-2/136.

108 Hence the Banjaluka trial of sixty-five Sarajevo and Trebinje secondary school students in 1915 was officially conducted against ‘Viktor Rupčić and others’.


110 Dedijer, *Sarajevo 1914*, 338.


113 Ibid., 392–4: note by Stojanović, 28 June 1914.
Notes

114 Dedijer, *Sarajevo*, 342.
115 Ibid., 470.
116 Ibid., 390. For the general theme, see 389–424.
118 Works in this tradition include V. Masleša, *Mlada Bosna* (Sarajevo, 1945); B. Ćubrilović, *Petar Kočić* (Sarajevo, 1953), and D. Ljubibratić’s biographies: *Gavril Princip* (Belgrade, 1959) and *Vladimir Gačinović* (Belgrade, 1961).
121 V. Gačinović, ‘Smrt jednog heroja’, in ibid., *Ogledi*, 119, 121.
123 Palavestra (ed.), *Književnost Mlade Bosne*, ii. 197.
124 Trišić, *Sarajevski atentat*, 373. Princip’s personality appears in the trial records after the assassination. Declaring himself a ‘revolutionary Yugoslav’ who sought to achieve a united state with the use of ‘terror’, he added that another main motive was ‘revenge’ for all the ills the people suffered under Austria: *Sarajevski atentat: izvorne stenografske bilješke sa glavne rasprave protiv Gavrila Principa i drugova, održane u Sarajevu 1914 godine*, ed. V. Bogičević (Sarajevo, 1954), 62.
127 Bogičević (ed.), *Mlada Bosna*, 102: Veljko Jovičić to Mladen Stojanović, 19 September 1913. Stojanović had written that he was ashamed to belong to this nation.
128 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1861/1912, Bijeljina Bezirksvorsteher to PG, 30 November.
131 Ibid., 275–6.
135 For a restatement, F. Würthle, *Die Spur führt nach Belgrad* (Vienna and Munich 1978), e.g., the reference to ‘Mlada Bosna, guided from Belgrade’ (48).
137 Dedijer, *Sarajevo*, 662–4. Dedijer’s treatment of the Serbian theme (605–86) is more convincing than Würthle’s, which allows distaste for Serb nationalism to strain the factual argument.
139 Ibid., 100: Tomić to Vojislav Vasiljević, 26 August 1913.
CHAPTER 11 ON THE EVE OF WAR: A BALANCE SHEET

1 For this theme, R. J Donia, ‘Fin-de-Siècle Sarajevo; the Habsburg Transformation of an Ottoman Town’, *Austrian History Yearbook*, 33 (2002): 43–75.
2 B. Spasojević, *Arhitektura stambenih palata austrougarskog perioda u Sarajevu*, 2nd edn (Sarajevo, 1999), quote from p. 57.
4 *Bosna i Hercegovina u brojkama* (Mostar, 1911), 20 (passengers); I. Hadžibegović, *Bosansko-hercegovački gradovi na razmeđu 19. i 20 stoljeća* (Sarajevo, 2004), 25 (telephones), 75 (bookshops).
6 For this theme: J. Lešić, *Istorija pozorišta Bosne i Herzegovine* (Sarajevo, 1985).
14 *Novi vakat*, 2 July 1913, untitled leading article. ‘Vakat’ means time in the sense of ‘time which has come’ in Turkish.
17 Ibid., 37, 75.
18 Ibid., 42.
19 For agriculture, F. Hauptmann, *Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Herrschaft in Bosnien und der Herzegowina 1878–1918* (Graz, 1983), 90–208, partic. 117, 177, 204.
21 *Srpska riječ*, 1/14 March 1912.
22 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1282/1904: Thallóczy’s report on Bosnian education, 2 December, put it at 53 per cent.
24 Hauptmann, Österreichisch-ungarische Herrschaft, 89.
25 Ibid., 235–40; Dr. Juzbašić, Jezičko pitanje i austrougarski parlamentarizam u Bosni i Hercegovini pred Prvi svjetski rat (Sarajevo, 1973), 18.
26 Slijepčević, Kinematografija, 291.
27 Hadžibegović, Bosansko-hercegovacki gradovi, 65, 204.
28 Hauptmann, Österreichisch-ungarische Herrschaft, 28.
29 R. Radulović, Rasprave i članci, ed. P. Slijepčević (Belgrade, 1940); see especially 3–11, 84–6, 110–12. See also D. Gajević, ‘Risto Radulović—Ideolog i kritičar’, in ibid., Bosanske teme (Sarajevo, 1989), 214–72.
31 Srpska riječ, 8/21 February 1912.
32 Slijepčević, Kinematografija, 64–5.
35 For example, Bosnische Post, 10 November 1913 (illusion); 26 July 1913 (motherhood women’s best profession); Srpska riječ, 9/22 July 1913 (caricature); 30 June/13 July 1913 (sacrificial love).
36 Srpska riječ, 9/22 July 1912.
37 Bosnische Post, 1 July 1913: ‘Die Frage einer Universität in Sarajevo’, quoting Hrvatski dnevnik: ‘Zagreb is our state-political, national and cultural capital and will so remain’.
41 Radulović, Rasprave i članci, 99.
42 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 830/1907: Horowitz to Burián, 19 July; Pr BH 1282/1904: Thallóczy’s report, 2 December, p. 16.
43 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1861/1912: Bijeljina District Commissioner to PG, 30 November.
44 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 831/1915: Potiorek to JMF, 15 July.
45 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1682/1914: Potiorek to JMF, 14 November.
46 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 831/1915: Potiorek to JMF, 17 July.
47 F. von Reinöhl, Grosserbische Umtriebe vor und nach dem Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges. I. Der Fall Jefianović-Sola (Vienna, 1944), xiii.

49 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 21/1910: PG to JMF, 4 January; Regierungskonzipist Rajacsich to PG, 25 December 1909.

50 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1157/1907: Benko Chiffre Tel. to JMF, 19 October.

51 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1383/1907: Burián to Franz Joseph, 14 November.


53 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3714/1914: Ministerial Amtsvortrag summarizing the history, 24 February.


55 V. Grujić, *Gimnazijaško obrazovanje u Srbiji do prvog svetskog rata* (Belgrade, 1997), 162.

56 Bogićević (ed.), *Mlada Bosna*, 89: Vukašin Babunović to Petar Božić, 13/26 March 1912 (Cyrillic); O. Milosavljević, *U tradiciji nacionalizma ili stereotipi srpskih intelektualaca XX veka s ‘nama’ i ‘drugima’* (Belgrade, 2002), 50 (religion); P. Palavestra (ed.), *Književnost Mlade Bosne*, 2 vols (Sarajevo, 1965), ii. 270, 274–6, for Dimitrije Mitrinović’s critique of Croatian writers.

57 For example, Radulović, *Rasprave i članci*, 104–5.

58 *Srpska riječ*, 22 February/6 March 1912, leading article, ‘Narodno jedinstvo’.


61 Gajević, *Bosanske teme*, 244.

62 Radulović, *Rasprave i članci*, 69: ‘Srbi i Hrvati’. In his thought-provoking *Bosanska politička misao. Austrougarsko doba* (Sarajevo, 2003), Esad Zgodić illustrates the hegemonistic hubris of Bosnian Serb writers before 1914 and argues that they took from western ideas what fitted their nationalism. It seems fair to comment, though, that Bosnian Serb intellectuals did have wider horizons than their Bosnian Muslim or Croat contemporaries.

63 *Hrvatski dnevnik*, 12 June 1914, leading article, ‘Školska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini’.

64 Bogićević (ed.), *Mlada Bosna*, 169.


70 Ibid.: 103.


74 Hadžibegović, *Bosansko-hercegovački gradovi*, 44.

75 ABiH, ZMF, BH 878/1914: Potiorek to JMF, 13 January; BH 1201/1914: ibid. to ibid., 21 January. Note too Potiorek’s rotund complaint about pupils‘ ‘complete
disorientation concerning the person of our august monarch and the all highest dynasty': Pr BH 831/1915: Potiorek to JMF, 17 July.

76 ABiH, ZMF, BH 3767/1914: JMF to PG, 15 March. The ministerial referent on cultural matters was the Bosnian Serb Čerović, but he does not seem to have been a Trojan horse.

77 ABiH, ZMF, BH 12571/1912: PG to JMF, 23 August.

78 Thus Tugomir Alaupović was condemned as anti-Serb by the Serb press when headmaster of Tuzla Gymnasium, 1911–13: ABiH, Arhiva civilnih i vojnih sudova (sudski procesi): Okružni sud Sarajevo: IV-9–1-66, enclosing seven articles attacking Alaupović from Srpska riječ and Narod; but he figured in subsequent Serb accounts as a pioneer of brotherhood.

79 Reinöhl, Grossserbische Umtriebe, 7, 12–13, 20, 197.

80 Srpska riječ, 26 September/9 October 1912; 11/24 December 1912.


82 Ibid., 125–6: ‘U čemu leži spas?’ (13–26 April 1913); Dedijer, Sarajevo, 551.

83 Spomenica Vasilja Gr ¯di´ca (Sarajevo, 1935), 147–9; N. Trišić, Sarajevski atentat u svijetu bibliografskih podataka (Sarajevo, 1964), 224.


86 For example, Srpska riječ, 23 December 1912; Narod, 24 June 1914 (reprinted in Radulović, Rasprave i ˇclanci, 170), both dates New Style.

87 Radulović, Rasprave i ˇclanci, 129.

88 Reinöhl, Grossserbische Umtriebe, 36, printing Shek’s report of conversations with Serb opposition leaders in late April and early May 1909 (1219 Pr BH).

89 Radulović, Rasprave i ˇclanci, 126–31, ‘Dva tipa i jedan režim’.


91 V. Čorović, Istorija ‘Zore’ (Prilog istoriji omladinskog pokreta) (Ruma, 1905), 4–5, 25.

92 OŠzKK, XI/455/20: Hörmann to Thallóczy, 25 April 1907. For Čorović’s relationship with the Museum, see H. Kapidžić (ed.), Naučne ustanove u Bosni i Hercegovini za vrijeme austrougarske uprave (Sarajevo, 1973), 482–4, 528–35.


95 See Čorović’s article in Gajret, 5 (1912–13), reproduced from Bosanska vila.

96 V. Čorović, ‘Vera i rasa u srpskoj prołosti’, in ibid., Pokreti i dela (Belgrade, 1921), 7–49 (49).

97 For Catholic education, see M. Papić, Hrvatsko školstvo u Bosni do 1918. godine (Sarajevo, 1982); P. Vrankić, Religion und Politik in Bosnien und der Herzegowina (1878–1918) (Paderborn, 1997), 609–43.

98 T. Išek, Mjesto i uloga HKD Napredak u kulturnom životu Hrvata Bosne i Hercegovine (1902–1918) (Sarajevo, 2002), 142.
99 Ibid., 85; Džaja, Bosnien-Herzegowina, 183.
100 Išek, Mjesto i uloga, 157, 159, 165, 169.
101 Hrvatska zajednica, 1 (1913): 1, editorial, ‘Naša riječ’.
102 Ibid.: 4–7, 30–1 (Kako su ljudi napredovali); 167 (Za što nam narod propada); 368.
103 Ibid.: 123, 203, 316.
104 Ibid.: 190.
105 I. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati. Esej o organizaciji jedne evropsko-orientalne mikrokulture (Sarajevo, 1998), 16.
106 Džaja, Bosnien-Herzegowina, 190–1.
107 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 160/1907, Stadler to PG, 20 January; Pr BH 95/1910, Stadler’s draft and JMF comments sent to him, 7 February.
108 M. Karamatić, Franjevci Bosne Srebrne u vrijeme austrougarske uprave 1878–1914 (Sarajevo, 1992), 166–74; Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 687–708. Stadler’s proposals entailed maintaining the bir, or traditional annual offering, in addition to the new surcharge; they were also unpopular in his secular priests’ urban parishes, where no bir had existed, so parishioners had been lightly burdened.
109 See the chapters by I. Olujević and M. Niić in T. Knžević (ed.), Josip Stadler, Život i djelo (Sarajevo, 1999). Two needy Young Bosnians, refused aid by a prominent Serb nationalist, out of pique approached Letica and Stadler, both of whom, to their great surprise, helped them out: Trivić, Sarajevski atentat, 88.
110 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 95/1910: PG to JMF, 23 February.
111 Z. Grijak, Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa Josipa Stadlera (Zagreb, 2001), 488.
112 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH/1911: 30 November 1911: PG to JMF. The appointment eventually went to the Bosnian Provincial, fra Alojzije Mišić.
113 Grijak, Politička djelatnost, 495.
114 Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 686.
116 For a sensitive discussion, see Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati, 162–218.
118 Grijak, Politička djelatnost, 509.
119 Adil Zulfi karpašić, in his The Bosniak (London, 1997), claims that Alaupović’s mother responded to her son’s self-identification as a Croat by urging him: ‘We’re not Croats, we’re Catholics’ (p. 87).
120 AHiB, ZMF, Dosije Alaupovića: Director Nemanić, 12 April 1895; J. Milaković, Tugomir Alaupović. Književna slika (Sarajevo, 1919), 61.
121 Milaković, Alaupović, 29. From Naše rane (Our Wounds), first published in 1898.
123 T. Alaupović, Ivan Franjo Jukić (1818–57 (Sarajevo, 1907), 51; Milaković, Alaupović, 22.
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125 AHiB, ZMF, Dosije Alaupovića: reports of 12 April 1895 and 30 November 1898 (Nemanić); 24 April 1910 (Bedjanić).


128 L. von Südland (pseud.), *Die südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg* (Vienna, 1918).


130 *Novi vakat*, 2 July 1913.


132 M. Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka* (Sarajevo, 1997), 431.

133 Ibid., 371–2. Imamović says some estimates reach 150,000, without giving details.


136 Abdullah, ‘Stagnacija u našem javnom životu’, *Behar*, 7 (1906–7): 38: leading article. Behar’s editor at this time was Džemaludin Čaušević.

137 *Novi vakat*, 1 (1913), nos. 2–4, 6–8: ‘Uzroci i posljedice našeg zastoja’.


139 *Novi vakat*, 2 July 1913: ‘Muslimanka centralna banka’.


141 M. Braun, *Die Anfänge der Europäisierung in der Literatur der Moslimischen Slaven in Bosnien und Herzegowina* (Leipzig, 1934), 42.


143 *Vakat*, 12 March 1914: ‘Naši telefoni’.

144 M. Rizvić, *Bosansko-muslimanska književnost u doba preporoda 1887–1918*, 2nd edn (Sarajevo, 1990), 212.


148 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 332/1911, enclosing softas’ declaration, which also stressed reform in the Islamic world. *Musavat*’s attack on them (6 (1911), no. 3) was a response to the journal *Muallim*’s call for Muslim youth not to attend secondary schools because of their deleterious effect on faith and morals.


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151 Musavat, 6 (1911), no. 16; ABiH, ZMF, BH 16663/1911: 21 October.
152 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1308/1912: Allerhöchster Vortrag to the Emperor, 24 August.
154 ABiH, ZMF, Pr BH 1692/1911: Shek to Sehr geehrter Freund, 13 January 1912; BH 8812/1912: PG to JMF, 10 June.
155 Hrvatski dnevnik, 11 March 1914.
156 Karić and Demirović (eds), Čaušević, 235–62, originally published in Bošnjak in 1900.
157 Hrvatski dnevnik, 11 March 1914.
158 Rizvić, Bosansko-muslimanska književnost, 223.
159 Karić and Demirović (eds), Čaušević, 22–3; Novi vakat, 1 (1913), no. 8.
160 Gajret, 4 (1911): leading article of 1 March 1911; ibid., 6 (1913): 70 (‘Zemljoradničke zadruge’).
161 Gajret, 4 (1911): 54.
162 Zgođić, Bosanska politička misao, particularly 183–200 on Smail-aga Čemalović. Thus the best-known of Serbophile pamphlets devoted much more attention to the dire isolation which could befall Muslims if they did not ‘nationalize’ than to the positive attractions of Serbdom: Šukrija Kurtović, O nacionaliziranju Muslimana (Sarajevo, 1914).
163 IAS, BP, BS/77: Tugomir (Marko) Alaupović to Safvet-beg Bašagić, 23 December 1892.
164 Archives of Visoko Gymnasium, Alaupović Papers: Kreševljaković to Alaupović, 4 April 1938.
165 IAS, BP, BS/67: Čaušević’s typed tribute on Bašagić’s death, 12 April 1934.
166 Ibid., A. Mešić, ‘Sjećanja na Safvetbega’; B. Ercegovac, Ademaga Mešić (Znameniti Hrvati islamske vjere, Kolo 1, knj. 5) (Zagreb, 1995).
167 Šehić, Autonomni pokret Muslimana, ch. 9.
168 Behar, 1 (1900): 271–3. Rizvić, Bosansko-muslimanska književnost, 171, implies that the pseudonymous reviewer was Hadžić.
169 Behar, 7 (1906–7): 73, leading article: ‘Izjava muslimanske i pravoslavne omladine’.
170 Novi vakat, 1 (1913), 22 October 1913: leading article.
171 M. Hadžijahić, Od tradicije do identiteta. Geneza nacionalnog pitanja bosanskih Muslimana (Sarajevo, 1974), 152.
172 Ibid., 175; Rizvić, Bosansko-muslimanska književnost, 254; Karčić, Bosniaks, 143.
173 Rizvić, Bosansko-muslimanska književnost, 198.
174 For examples, ibid., 164 (S. Avdo Karabegović); 159 (Dikić).
175 Hadžijahić, Od tradicije do identiteta, 180 (Vienna University).
176 Novi vakat, 23 July 1913: leading article, ‘Evropska kultura’.
177 For Muslim charges, which she rebuts, that even Ivo Andrić, often seen as the chronicler of Bosnian symbiosis, was anti-Muslim: Celia Hawkesworth, ‘Ivo Andrić as Red Flag and Political Football’, SEER, 70 (2002): 201–16.
179 IAS, BP, BS-82, Bašagić to Mujo (unknown), 7 February 1910.
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180 Archives of Visoko Gymnasium, Alaupović Papers: Bašagić to Alaupović, 1 January 1893.
181 Rizvić, Bosansko-Muslimanska književnost, 133–4.
182 S. Ćerić, Muslimani srpsko-hrvatskog jezika (Sarajevo, 1968), 203. The leading Serbophile Šukrija Kurtović, however, came from the Serb stronghold Gacko.
183 Bošnjaci i Hercegovci u islamskoj književnosti in S. Bašagić, Sabrana djela, vol. 3 (Sarajevo, 1996), first published in 1912, 15–16; S. Bašagić, Kratka uputa u prošlost Bosne i Hercegovine (Od godine 1463–1850) (Sarajevo, 1900), 18, 166, 122, 137–43.
184 Printed in Bebar, 1 (1900).
185 Šarić, ‘Književnik Safvet beg Bašagić’, 84, with Director Bedjanić’s assessment.
186 IAS, BP, BS-33: Prospectus for Ogledalo, 25 March 1907.
187 IAS, BP, BS-68: Zeman, 9 September 1911.
189 See Dž. Juzbašić, ‘Aneksija i stavovi austrougarskih vojnih krugova prema upravljanju Bosnom i Hercegovinom nakon aneksije (Državno-pravni aspekt)’, in ibid., Politika i privreda u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austrougarskom upravom (Sarajevo, 2002), 265–318.
190 R. Ježábek, Potiorek. General im Schatten von Sarajevo (Graz, 1991), 79.
191 Archives of Visoko Gymnasium, Alaupović Papers: Ivo Andrić to Tugomir Alaupović, 2 May 1919.
192 While both men thought historically, Burián more completely rejected a role for coercion and manipulation in countering the rise of national consciousness. See his memorandum cited on p. 303, n. 79.
193 Archives of Visoko Gymnasium, Alaupović papers: Alaupović to Kreševljaković in 1938, commenting on the ‘great and for us significant [Ottoman] past’ conjured up by Kreševljaković’s history of Sarajevo.
194 M. Ėkmečić, Radovi iz istorije Bosne i Hercegovine u XIX veku (Belgrade, 1997), 252: ‘In the history of Europe in these forty years [1878–1918] there is no region where the insertion of national and religious division was so carefully and energetically pursued and systematically introduced into the fundament of the state idea.’ Ėkmečić’s view of Bosnian history reflects a dose of revolutionary utopianism. It is no mistake that he much prefers the rebellious Kočić to the positivist Radulović: Istorija srpskog naroda, vol. 6, pt 1 (Belgrade, 1983), 634–5, 641.

REVIEW AND EPILOGUE

1 See above, ch. 11, p. 228.
2 Novi vukat editorial, 1 (1913), 2 July; Napredak, 5 (1911): 197.
5 Noting Bosniak intellectuals’ relatively positive response to the West, Šačir Filandra says time has proved them right: Š. Filandra, Bošnjaci i Moderno. Humanistička misao Bošnjaka od polovine XIX do polovine XX stoljeća (Sarajevo, 1996), 10–12.


10 Archive of Visoko Franciscan Gymnasium: Alaupović papers: Branko Truhelka to Alaupović, 8 and 17 January; 17 August 1919.

11 Ibid., Vojislav Bogičević to Alaupović, 20 November 1930; 6 February 1931. Under communism Bogičević became the long-serving Director of the Bosnian State Archives.
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